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ABSTRACT 
 
My research inquires into the role of law and lawyers in global governance, trade 
regionalism and economic development. The central question is why contemporary regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) between developed and developing countries (South-North) are 
typically described in international law literature as the expression of a relatively uniform 
model of legal arrangements – when significant political and economic factors suggest 
otherwise. Indeed, these RTAs are homogeneously characterised as inter-state agreements 
devised to promote trade liberalisation. This common-sense understanding assumes lightly 
that free trade is the primary policy of RTA-partners. It also ignores the relevance of their 
economic differences and the effects of these imbalances over policy preferences and 
bargaining power.  
My doctoral thesis explains how South-North regional trade regimes came to be 
conceived as the expression of a single, dominant model. It focuses primarily on the work 
of lawyers in making and governing these RTAs. It is, accordingly, an important premise 
that legal thinking and practices play a pivotal role in envisaging, constructing, and 
managing RTA, and that this role is not well understood. It is through modes of legal 
governance – mainly legal doctrines and dispute settlement mechanisms – that trade 
policies and disputes are framed as legal issues, to which legal norms and ideas are applied, 
and solutions are devised. Specifically, legal doctrines on trade regionalism attempt to 
affect the disciplinary understanding by providing an ideal model for RTAs. Thus, legal 
doctrines are strategically employed to shape, at some fundamental level, the way RTAs are 
thought, constructed and governed under the World Trade Organisation.  
My thesis accounts for the rise and fall of one of the legal doctrines on the 
international law of South-North RTAs. It postulates that three distinct legal doctrines were 
produced to structure decision-making over these RTAs between 1947 and 1985. It suggests 
that their influence achieved its zenith in the 1970s, but was followed by a sharp decline 
shortly afterwards. By the late-1980s they were marginalised by the emergence of a legal 
doctrine, which has dominate legal expertise ever since. This thesis argues, therefore, that 
this new legal doctrine has empowered lawyers to shape the existing South-North trade 
relations. Conversely, it has also operated as a disciplinary grip, arguably preventing 
lawyers from engaging in devising innovative solutions for present-day problems.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis engages with a conversation that has been largely forgotten, and yet very present 
even in the newspapers since the turn of the millennium or even further back to the rise of 
‘neoliberalism’ in the 1980s. We often read about international actors, national 
governments, political parties, businesses, and social movements discussing the virtues and 
vices of regional trade agreements (RTAs). The context, actors and opinions may differ – 
developed or developing countries, producers or consumers, exporters or importers, 
conservatives or liberals, experts or activists – but the description is similar: all regional 
trade agreements, regardless of the partners, are international instruments for promoting 
trade liberalisation. Some RTA defenders argue that the liberalisation of trade fosters 
economic development by increasing economic efficiency and market access. Yet, others 
claim that RTAs contribute to consolidating a (neoliberal) rule of law for world trade. By 
contrast, the opponents contend that RTAs prevent economic development by destroying 
domestic business while shipping jobs overseas. Others assert that RTAs restrict the 
domestic space for social and environmental regulation and development policies. But, 
what if, these viewpoints share, as a starting point, a particular understanding of what RTAs 
are for, and how they work? This thesis is about that shared understanding – what it is, how 
it is constructed and maintained, and how it frames our debates about the shape the trade 
agreements ought, and ought not, to have in the 21st century. 
From its inception to 2016, the world trading system has never been free from 
controversies. Neither the World Trade Organisation (WTO) nor the constellation of RTAs 
(including the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement between the EU and Canada, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 
and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Agreement) has ever gathered strong support 
among the general public. However, the opposition has tended to be dispersed, enabling 
politicians, policymakers, experts, and domestic and transnational business sectors, to 
conclude a series of trade agreements since the end of World War II. Looking back, 
countries have been in a continuous state of multilateral and regional negotiations. 
The difference today is that the political-technocratic consensus around the 
advantages of international trade has been weakened by politicians and populist 
movements. They have seized the opportunity for gaining political support by blaming 
economic globalisation and immigration for the losses impinged on the majority of citizens 
by the Great Recession triggered by the 2008 global financial crisis. This opposition to 
15 
 
trade agreements only became a reality for the political and expert establishment in 2016 
with the shocking outcomes of the Brexit referendum, Wallonia’s threat to reject the CETA 
referenda and the US presidential election. Since then, North America and Europe have 
been in turmoil. The three symbolic pillars of the world trade regime’s success are under 
siege: the European Union (EU), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and 
WTO. 
Are we – international lawyers1 – responsible for Brexit or Donald Trump’s 
victory? Lawyers might only wish they have the kind of power necessary to determine the 
outcome of referenda or elections. Yet, even if lawyers have not been the cause of those 
stunning results, we would bear part of the responsibility for having legitimised and 
validated the shared understanding of international trade by grounding on its stories and 
ideas legal arguments about the WTO and RTAs. 
The origins of our current challenges seem to begin back in the 1970s-1980s. In this 
period of global economic stagnation and political turbulence, an ideational programme for 
world trade emerged. It was founded on a persuasive set of political and economic theories 
about the relationship between the state and economy, which promised to promote growth 
in a faltering world economy. This rising blueprint rejected various ideas and policies 
associated with ‘liberal-welfarism’, the programme that dominated the political and expert 
communities since the postwar period.2 The core ideas of the new programme were first 
introduced in Chile in the mid-1970s. They were, then, adopted over the 1980s in the 
Ronald Reagan’s United States and the Margaret Thatcher’s United Kingdom, and in the 
rest of Latin America through the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Bank. From the early-1990s leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, this body of 
norms, theories, and practices, became a dominant programme that was applied (unevenly 
and partially) around the world. 
The programme proposed – at the most fundamental level – to reimagine society as 
a marketplace. It proclaimed that markets, not governments, held the key to prosperity and 
freedom. 3 It turned away from a concept of politics as a shared language for formulating, 
mobilising, and realising the collective goals of a political society, towards a concept of 
                                                   
1 For the sake of clarity, the terms “lawyers” or “legal experts” are used interchangeably. They both mean 
intellectuals and practitioners who work in the field of international law. These professionals are legal 
experts who tend to think of themselves as practitioners (e.g. attorneys, policy makers, diplomats, judges, 
prosecutors, activists) or intellectuals (e.g. academics, thinkers, scholars, jurists). Each of them has her/his 
political and moral orientation that disappears inside of legal expertise and reappears vested into a 
specialised vocabulary and style in the intense debates about international law and governance.  
2 Jouannet, 2012: 249-253; Ruggie, 1982: 393. 
3 Plant, 2010: 6. 
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politics as a shared idiom for enabling individuals’ pursuit of self-interests.4 This process of 
redefining the meanings of ‘society’, ‘politics’, ‘governments’ and ‘markets’, has drawn 
inspiration primarily from neoclassical economics, which nurtured a strong normative 
preference for ‘free’ and ‘fair’ markets. The ascendance of a ‘market faith’ led the 
programme to embrace free trade and competitive markets, combined with strong private 
rights, as the ultimate form of wealth creation. The role of the state was to be limited to 
sustain the institutional and normative conditions necessary for enabling the development of 
well-functioning markets. Over time, this way of thinking penetrated deeply in minds and 
hearts around the world. As a result, without realising or deciding, societies “drifted from 
having a market economy to being a market society.”5 This programme has been named 
‘Washington Consensus’, ‘market fundamentalism’, or ‘neoliberalism’, depending on the 
perspective. 
The ideational, political and economic transformations driven by neoliberalism had 
profound impacts on international trade law. The contemporary world trading system was 
originally centred on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 (GATT), a 
postwar offspring of the liberal-welfarist programme. At present-day it is presided over by 
the WTO, a product of the radical reconceptualisation of the GATT regime by 
neoliberalism in the 1980s-1990s. 
Yet, the first laboratory for neoliberal thought in international trade agreements was 
not the GATT but regional trade agreements. The Canada-US Free Trade Agreement of 
1988 (CUSFTA) and the NAFTA of 1992 were the earlier experiments to take the 
institutional form of the neoliberal programme at the international level. They came to be 
imaginatively associated with a neoliberal model of concrete RTAs. The combination of 
these programmatic developments with the collapse of the socialist bloc, the debt crisis in 
the Third World, and the push towards economic globalisation opened an opportunity for a 
‘neoliberal regionalism’. For instance, the waves of ‘new regionalism’ in the late-1980s and 
of ‘bilateral’ and ‘mega-regionals’ in the late-2000s produced roughly 250 RTAs modelled 
on the neoliberal archetype. 
In this context, neoliberalism was progressively entrenched in the field of 
international economic law. Initially, lawyers came to be engaged by the demands, reforms, 
questions, challenges, and struggles associated with the rise of the neoliberal programme, 
                                                   
4 Lang, 2011: 1-2. 
5 “The difference is this: A market economy is a tool—a valuable and effective tool—for organizing 
productive activity. A market society is a way of life in which market values seep into every aspect of 
human endeavor. It’s a place where social relations are made over in the image of the market” (Sandel, 
2012: 23).  
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and sought to bring their expertise to bear on them. Later, they began to gradually embrace 
neoliberal thought and weave it into legal ideas and practices. My thesis advances one 
general and two specific arguments about the profound impact that global political and 
intellectual struggles around neoliberalism have had on the international trade law and 
governance of regional trade regimes between developed and developing countries (South-
North) (and vice versa). 
The first general argument is about lawyers’ sizeable share of responsibility for the 
normalisation of a particular ideal of South-North regionalism within the IEL field while 
accepting (consciously or otherwise) the disappearance of alternative concepts and models 
from the contemporary legal debates. The second argument is about legal histories lawyers 
tell to make sense of and engage with these RTAs. The third argument is about legal 
doctrines that lawyers produce, which combine history lessons with norms, ideas, and 
practices, to produce and enact (relatively) stable and coherent frameworks for decision-
making in and about those RTAs. These arguments, briefly summarised in the following 
paragraphs, are partial responses to the question of the share of lawyers’ responsibility in 
the current state of international trade affairs. 
 
International Trade Law of South-North Regionalism as Legal History 
 
The initial argument I make is about the three widespread and influential lessons about the 
relationship between multilateralism and regionalism learned from history. Chapter 1 
describes these teachings by retelling the widely accepted accounts of the evolutions of the 
world trading system and RTAs from the early-20th century onwards. The conventional 
narratives reveal that the interaction between multilateralism and regionalism has been 
sometimes tense, sometimes harmonious, due to the normative preference for the latter 
formed in the postwar period. 
The first lesson is that the ideational mission of the GATT was to promote 
multilateral trade liberalisation while preventing the destructive effects of protectionism and 
ensuring RTAs were devised to foster rather than hamper free trade and economic 
integration. The second is that the GATT’s institutional defects were partially responsible 
for exposing the multilateral regime to recurring waves of regionalism. The third is that the 
unsatisfactory jurisprudential solutions to normative ambiguities and policy contradictions 
weakening the authority of GATT law were partially responsible for disempowering the 
control of the world trade regime over regionalism. 
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According to the traditional history, those problems have been greatly mitigated 
through the profound reforms carried out in and over international trade law throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. Institutionally, the reconstitution of the GATT as the WTO, combined 
with the piecemeal improvement of its disciplines on regionalism, has, if not contained the 
proliferation of RTAs, at least directed them to contribute to multilateral liberalisation or, 
perhaps, economic globalisation. Jurisprudentially, new approaches have assisted lawyers in 
increasing the influence of WTO law over decision-making in and over RTAs through 
legalisation and judicialisation of trade disputes. Ideationally, RTAs have been re-
conceptualised as second-best servants for constructing a global free and fair market, as a 
response to the long deadlock in multilateral negotiations preventing the world trade regime 
from realising its mission. 
In Chapter 3, I make the broader claim that the importance of these stories has been 
to contribute to validating and legitimising a narrow view of South-North RTAs, on which 
lawyers have built their projects and ideas, and reworked their expertise. These 
conventional narratives have been articulated to frame needs, preoccupations, and 
challenges associated with regionalism in a particular way that has substantially constrained 
the range of potential options and solutions imaginable within the domain of international 
trade law. This suggests that history-telling bears a great deal of responsibility for shaping 
lawyers’ understanding of and response to the recent events that rapidly drifted away from 
the rise of ‘mega-regionals’ and towards Brexit and Trumpism. 
My response to the traditional history is to rethink ‘what’ histories international 
lawyers tell, and ‘how’ they historicise international trade law. Chapter 3 examines the 
techniques undertaken by lawyers to portray institutional and jurisprudential stories. It 
describes and identifies the shortcomings of (what I call) the ‘traditional approach to legal 
history’. To avoid some of these weaknesses, I propose an alternative devised to assist us to 
re-engage with lawyers’ past and present expertise and choices. I resituate the international 
trade law of South-North regionalism within a wider temporal trajectory and spatial context, 
with the purpose of remembering the ‘rest’ of international trade law that was forgotten by 
inside disciplinary struggles, and outside political-economic conflicts underscoring the 
‘invention’, ‘maturation’, and ‘defence’ of legal doctrines. 
Chapters 5 and 6 apply my ‘alternative approach’ to retelling partially the history of 
the interaction between multilateralism and regionalism. Although historicising the 
trajectory of South-North regionalism all the way back to the late-19th century may well be 
best, the task cannot be undertaken within the limits of this work. Instead, I offer two very 
brief, and not exhaustive, overlapping historical accounts of international law and lawyers 
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in the making and management of South-North RTAs under the GATT. My purpose is to 
reveal what kind of institutional and jurisprudential stories can be told when historical 
narratives are not instrumentalised in support of a legal doctrine. These accounts also intend 
to show that the traditional history is neither a mere objective and neutral description of the 
past, nor an incontestable set of lessons that can only entail a single legal doctrine with 
universal application. Rather, they reveal that stories are built on facts and ideas that are 
less clear and determinate than the conventional narratives suggest. Finally, they aim to 
assist us in rethinking the received wisdom of the three history lessons set out above, which 
underlie contemporary lawyers’ thinking and practices of South-North regionalism. 
 
International Trade Law of South-North Regionalism as Legal Doctrine 
 
The second argument is about the contemporary dominance of a particular legal doctrine6 
on the international trade law of South-North regionalism. Chapter 2 describes and analyses 
in detail what I call ‘the WTO law of regional trade agreements’ as found in academic and 
policy literature and official documents. This comprehensive account provides evidence to 
support my claim that there exists a specific legal doctrine that holds a dominant position 
within the IEL field and exerts a significant authority in legal and policy debates about 
South-North RTAs, and how WTO law should address them.  
This legal doctrine – I argue – is (like the traditional history) structured on three 
domains of legal thinking and practices. Ideationally, it embraces a programme of market-
led growth and integration. Institutionally, it focuses on the WTO as a governance model 
for institutions and rules. Jurisprudentially, it centralises WTO law, while also privileging 
functionalist ideas about the role of the law, and the range of legal techniques which are 
available. The combination of these constitutive features underlies the doctrinal framework 
for South-North regionalism.  
The origins of this legal doctrine go back to the formation of neoliberal thinking. 
Since the late-1980s, this doctrine has not only marginalised its competitors within the IEL 
field but also gained great currency in global trade governance. Once it became dominant, 
legal expertise has narrowed its focus on making the doctrine more coherent, technical, and 
accurate. It also has empowered lawyers’ influence in and over the world trading system. 
                                                   
6 In this thesis, the term ‘legal doctrine’ refers not only to legal norms or their interpretation. As I shall 
discuss in Chapter 4, legal doctrine is conceived as a coherent and stable framework of positive and non-
positive norms and legal knowledge and techniques, which serves as a legitimate and authoritative mode 
of legal governance.  
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However, the narrow specialisation has constrained the range of lessons and norms, ideas 
and methods regarded as valid and legitimate. A concrete effect has been to consolidate a 
view of South-North RTAs as the expression of a relatively uniform model of legal 
arrangements devised to promote trade liberalisation. This common-sense understanding 
not only assumes that free trade is the primary policy of RTA-partners but also considers 
irrelevant both their economic differences and the impact of these imbalances on policy 
preferences and bargaining power. As a consequence, I contend that this legal doctrine has 
played a pivotal role in constraining lawyers’ ability to think ingeniously about solutions to 
the present-day problems concerning the relationship between international law and 
governance, trade regionalism, and economic development. 
To be clear, the problem to which I seek to draw attention is not the increasing 
complexity of recent RTAs’ scope, scale, norms, and relationship with the WTO. This is 
well known within the IEL field. Rather, the broader claim I seek to make through these 
observations is that we do not yet have a satisfactory analysis of the precise ways in which 
legal doctrines affect the participation of law and lawyers in the making and interpretation 
of South-North RTAs (and vice versa). Thus, I offer, in Chapter 4, a ‘socio-legal approach’ 
to account for what I believe is the critical function of legal doctrines in international trade 
law and governance. Applied to South-North regionalism, this alternative approach focuses 
specifically on the constitutive features of legal doctrines and how they shape, at some 
fundamental level, the way RTAs are thought, constructed and governed. 
Since this doctrinal dimension is currently under-appreciated, I undertake an 
exploratory inquiry of the past and present of legal doctrines on the international trade law 
of South-North RTAs. Grounded in my findings, Chapter 7 hypothesises that three distinct 
legal doctrines were produced to structure decision-making in and over South-North RTAs 
between 1947 and 1985. It speculates that their influence achieved its zenith in the 1970s, 
but was followed by a sharp decline shortly afterwards. By the late-1980s, they were 
marginalised by the rise of today’s dominant legal doctrine. 
To partially demonstrate my hypothesis, I examine the rise and fall of one of those 
three legal doctrines. My account shows how lawyers engaged international law in the 
creation and operation of regional trade agreements between the European Union and the 
newly independent African states from 1947 to 1985. I claim, therefore, that the Yaoundé 
and Lomé Conventions were negotiated, designed, and interpreted based partially on a 
doctrinal framework, which was distinct from legal doctrines underlying other South-North 
RTAs. 
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Re-Imagining the International Trade Law of South-North Regionalism 
 
In conclusion, I bring the discussion back to the contemporary world of neoliberal 
regionalism in order to revisit the question with which this thesis began. Until 2016, we – 
international lawyers – were all living in a different moment. It was a time in which our 
mindset was framed around the quest for finding ways out of the Great Recession. The 
strategy appeared to be almost consensual. To make national economies grow again, it was 
necessary to promote trade liberalisation even further. Given the deadlock of the Doha 
Round of multilateral negotiations, the WTO became perceived as too ineffective and 
dysfunctional by developed countries, which were interested in pushing towards a free trade 
agenda. As in the late-1980s, the solution was to turn to regionalism. The consequence was 
the rise of bilateral and mega-regional negotiations. Acronyms, such as ‘TTP’, ‘TTIP’, and 
‘CETA’, and sophisticated terms-of-art, such as ‘21st-regionalism’ and ‘shallow and deep 
integration’, became part of the prevailing legal imagination. However, this global 
marketplace of regional and multilateral trade deals had its foundational assumptions deeply 
destabilised by Brexit and President Trump’s trade policies. 
So, are we, lawyers, somehow responsible for the outcomes leading up to Brexit 
and ‘Trumpism’? Considering our active role in sustaining a homogeneous understanding 
of the world trading system and also in managing its core multilateral and regional regimes, 
my general argument is that lawyers must take a sizeable share of the blame for the 
(re)production of economic imbalances and political grievances that paved the way for the 
2016 attacks to the (neoliberal) international economic order. Part of this responsibility is 
associated with lawyers’ largely uncritical acceptance of the gradual dedifferentiation – 
undertaken by the current doctrine – of South-North and North-North RTAs. The 
consequence has been that lawyers have largely stopped debating South-North regionalism 
as its own particular governance challenge and legal form, and, as a result, we have allowed 
one model of RTA to dominate almost unchallenged. 
The purpose of this thesis is to help to change this state of things, and to do so by 
reinvigorating the debate about the international trade law and governance of South-North 
regionalism that used to be – and, I argue, should still be – at the core of the IEL field. My 
analysis offers reflections on the specific role that legal histories and doctrines of 
international trade law plays in global trade governance (generally), and in the conduct and 
regulation of South-North regionalism (particularly). It calls attention to the importance of 
understanding the connection between the construction and application of history lessons 
and doctrinal frameworks and the range of norms, ideas, and practices that may empower or 
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constrain lawyers’ imaginative interaction with the world trading system and RTAs. More 
concretely, I argue that lawyers should reflect on the potential relationship between the 
dominant doctrine examined in Chapter 2 and our apparent failure in contributing to 
adequate solutions or alternatives to deal with the contemporary challenges. 
For international lawyers interested in re-imagining South-North regionalism, or 
more broadly for those interested in the project of re-imagining the world trading system as 
a response to its current crisis of legitimacy, my central argument is that we should re-
engage in (re)writing our histories and (re)working our doctrines as a way to (re)open space 
for contesting and rethinking the ideational, institutional, and jurisprudential dimensions of 
South-North RTAs. Indeed, the IEL field should expand its disciplinary boundaries and 
rethink its prevailing common-sense so as to reconsider the consensus on the way the WTO 
law and governance of regionalism are currently thought and practised. My call is, 
therefore, to open ourselves up to the possibility (or perhaps the necessity) of developing an 
enhanced awareness of the diversity – diversity of programmes and facts, diversity of ideas 
and practices, and the diversity of norms and regimes – produced around the world. It is 
through this diversity of (past and present) ways of thinking and practising international 
trade law that the relationship between global governance, South-North regionalism, and 
economic development can actually be re-imagined.   
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PART I - FROM HISTORY TO DOCTRINE: THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF SOUTH-
NORTH REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES 
 
Debates about world trade within international economics, international political economy, 
international relations and international economic law (IEL) are frequently animated by the 
idea of a multilateral tradition that might be in conflict with a regional tradition. The history 
of postwar multilateralism is often remembered as a battle against regionalism and militant 
economic discrimination and protectionism, in which non-discrimination and free trade are 
equated with liberal governments, market economies, cosmopolitanism and a more peaceful 
world through commercial sociability. This dominant view of multilateralism looks to 
history in order to root a contemporary set of rules, institutions and doctrines in the past, to 
provide an authoritative and legitimate lineage that gives them meaning as part of an 
unfolding story of institutional and jurisprudential progress, and to narrate the triumph of 
this way of understanding the world trading system.  
The traditional history often begins with ambitious attempts to rebuild a liberal 
international economic order after World War II. Despite the failure to bring the 
International Trade Organisation into force, world trade has been, according to this story, 
continuously and linearly moving towards the institutionalisation and universalisation of a 
multilateral regime centred on the principles of free trade, non-discrimination, and 
reciprocity. This gradual advance has been hampered in certain moments by resurgences of 
regionalism. Nonetheless, the establishment of the World Trade Organisation symbolises 
the almost unanimous commitment to free trade multilateralism and the legitimate authority 
of this new institution to oversee and govern regionalism. In this context, international law 
has been deeply implicated in managing the world trading system and constructing the (still 
incomplete) global free market. 
The aim of Part I is to account for shared understandings that exist within the IEL 
field about the role of international law and lawyers in making and interpreting regional 
trade agreements (RTA) between developed and developing countries (South-North). It is a 
central assumption that legal thinking and practices play a pivotal part in applying 
international law to RTA. The IEL field has over decades developed a particular kind of 
legal expertise which empowers lawyers’ influence in and over the world trading system. 
Two legal techniques – the telling of histories and the development of doctrines – are 
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central to understanding the ways lawyers seek to shape the international law of regional 
trade agreements. Consequently, two specific goals orient my investigation. The first aim is 
to retell the traditional history of regionalism as an entry-point to explore the legal rules, 
ideas, and practices underlying and governing their conceptualisation, formation, and 
development. I intend to show that the consensual understanding of the past provides the 
grounds for legal doctrines. The second purpose is to describe the contemporary legal 
doctrine on the international trade law of regionalism so as to unveil its often-neglected 
function in negotiating, managing, and solving disputes over RTAs. It seeks to demonstrate 
that this legal doctrine is dominant within the IEL field, without there being a significant 
alternative.  
The history and doctrine of the international law and governance of trade 
regionalism offered in Part I intend to replicate the same style of history-telling and 
doctrinal analysis found in mainstream literature, and reflect on it. The first step that is 
routinely carried out by the majority of lawyers is to place a legal norm or regime into a 
historical frame. Hence, Chapter 1 tells the traditional history of regional trade agreements 
in the context of the world trading system. It provides an instance of conventional narratives 
of the formation and application of the WTO law of RTAs. It draws attention to the 
challenges underlying the origins and interpretation of the rules on South-North RTAs 
enshrined in Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The 
central purpose is to highlight how the prevailing understanding of the present-day WTO 
law of South-North regionalism has been constructed, sustained, and reproduced due in part 
to history-telling.  
The second step is to undertake a doctrinal analysis of a legal norm or regime in 
light of the present-day context. Chapter 2 provides, then, the contours of the contemporary 
legal doctrine on the international trade law and governance of regionalism. It describes 
how history lessons are employed to identify and select out of a constellation of norms, 
ideas, and facts, the elements that are regarded as valid and legitimate for applying and 
developing such doctrinal framework. Furthermore, it shows the existence of a present-day 
consensus over that unique doctrine. Finally, it foregrounds the current problems underlying 
the interpretations and application of the WTO disciplines on South-North regional trade 
regimes, which challenge, in turn, the dominant doctrine. 
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CHAPTER 1.  THE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND GOVERNANCE OF SOUTH-NORTH REGIONAL TRADE 
REGIMES 
 
Introduction 
 
At the present-day, it is not difficult to demonstrate the existence of a disciplinary 
consensus over the history of the international trade law and governance of South-North 
regional trade regimes. This Chapter retells (what I shall call) the ‘traditional history’ of 
regionalism as conventionally found in mainstream literature. My specific purpose is to 
examine the facts regarded as historical events or landmarks, and also reflect on the ways 
the history is told and understood by contemporary lawyers. 
Part of the work involves showing that jurisprudential and institutional stories are 
interwoven in a ‘grand’ narrative about the inevitability and desirability of a global free and 
fair market underpinned by the world trading system. It, also, consists of showing that this 
traditional style of history-telling makes it harder rather than easier to understand how 
history lessons that are relevant to the contemporary relationships between the multilateral 
system and regional regimes, free trade and economic development, and WTO law and 
RTAs are produced and taken away by lawyers. Finally, it describes the particular way 
those stories have been told that accounts for the historical evolution, and justify the 
legitimate position, of the dominant doctrine on the international trade law of RTAs. This 
Chapter paves, therefore, the way to explore the effects of the interaction between history 
and doctrine on the international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism. 
Before delving into the past, the traditional literature often provides the basic legal 
vocabulary for making sense of world trade affairs and their relation to international trade 
law. Two contested concepts – international trade law and regional trade agreements – 
require an ex ante clarification due to their central significance for conventional narratives.  
The concept of international trade law is habitually defined in two different ways. 
There is a more general meaning that derives from the abstract notion of international 
economic law. For instance, John Jackson conceptualises it as the subject, or branch, of IEL 
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that establishes rules for international trade.7 This definition has been rarely employed and 
so has very weak traction in the field. Rather, the disciplinary consensus identifies 
international trade law essentially with WTO law. Although Jackson acknowledges that 
international trade law is centrally served by the GATT/WTO legal system, most lawyers 
tend to equate both terms straightforwardly.8 
Similarly, the definitions of regional trade agreements are frequently constructed as 
specialised variations of the concept of international treaty. For Bartels, RTAs are “treaties 
providing for the liberalization of trade in goods and services.”9 A narrower definition, by 
contrast, equates RTAs with (non-multilateral) trading arrangements as defined in GATT 
Article XXIV. In this sense, Bartels explains that “[t]he term [RTAs] is used by the 
[GATT/WTO] to refer to free trade areas, customs unions, ‘economic integration 
agreements’ liberalizing trade in services, and ‘preferential trade agreements’ between 
developing countries.” Since the late 1990s, RTAs have received other more specific 
definitions, such as ‘regional trading blocs’, ‘free trade agreements’ (FTAs), ‘customs 
unions’ (CUs) and ‘preferential trade agreements’ (PTA), or even divided in between 
‘bilateral’, ‘regional’, and ‘plurilateral’ trading arrangements. Surprisingly, the continuous 
dispute over naming RTAs seems not to impact substantively how the history of South-
North RTAs is told. The choice of any of those terms, instead, seems to indicate the 
intellectual and political affiliations of the author. 
My choice to employ the term ‘RTA’ rests on the following reasons. As discussed in 
Chapter 2.A, ‘FTA’ and ‘CU’ are long-established terms in the IEL field. Since they were 
formalised by GATT/WTO law to refer to two specific legal institutions, they have 
significantly lost explanatory power. Conversely, ‘PTA’ is a recent term that describes 
‘trade agreements’ concluded to exchange trade preferences among partners, entailing, in 
turn, discriminatory effects over third countries. It was coined primarily to suggest the 
departure from the ‘normalcy’ in trade relations, which is assumed to be the interactions 
carried out by WTO members according to the principle of non-discrimination enshrined in 
WTO law. 
Finally, ‘RTA’ is a term with a long history in mainstream literature. Although it was 
used to describe postwar arrangements devised for ‘regional’ economic integration, the term 
has been employed by lawyers to indicate ‘trade arrangements’ that are either ‘non-global’ 
                                                   
7 Jackson, 1997: 25; 2009: 31-32. See also Loibl (2003: 689) and Herdegen (2016: 8-9). 
8 Compare Jackson (1997: 25) with Loibl (2003: 700), Bethlehem (2009: 1-2), Sebastian (2010: 330), 
Trebilcock et al (2012: 24-25), Fabri (2012: 365-367), Trebilcock (2015: 10-11) and Herdegen (2016: 8-
9). 
9 Bartels, 2013. See also Herdegen (2016: 319). 
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or ‘non-multilateral’. Despite potential misunderstandings, the term RTA is also chosen 
because trade agreements do not need to (and have not historically) serve primarily as 
instruments to exchange discriminatory trade preferences. Thus, it leaves the ‘whats’ and 
‘hows’ of a trade agreement open to being negotiated by its partners rather than assumed ex 
ante as the term PTA suggests. 
This subtle controversy over naming (non-universal/international/multilateral) trade 
regimes seems to be experienced by lawyers as either historically and empirically irrelevant 
or doctrinally and theoretically marginal. Most of them often use the above terms 
interchangeably to refer to what appears to be the same legal phenomenon. If this 
controversy is not a controversy, why has mainstream literature been unable to reach a 
consensus on the terminology? Why does it repeatedly justify using one of the terms 
discussed above?  
I argue that there is something about the act of naming10 that appears to entail a kind of 
expert effect that brings a ‘concept’ (or a noun) into ‘being’, with a sense of materiality, 
authority and legitimacy that risk putting in the shade disputes over projects and issues, 
norms and actors, ideas and techniques, process and agency. This means to say that the 
terms ‘RTA’, ‘PTA’, ‘FTA’, and ‘CU’ are not ahistorical, apolitical or value-neutral. 
Instead, their normative and descriptive dimensions reflect value-laden projects 
underpinned by political decisions and intellectual attitudes that are historically and 
contextually situated. Thus, behind the apparent neutrality in the usage of terms are choices 
on the relevance of sets of values, theories, methods, questions, and preoccupations, that 
frame legal thinking and practice in decisive ways. 
 
A.  The Making of the World Trading System: From Crises to the 
‘Permanent Interim’ Agreement to the Institutionalisation of the 
GATT Regime 
 
According to the conventional narratives,11 from World War I to the 2016 Brexit vote, the 
formation and evolution of the world trading system tend to be chronicled in four phases. 
The first phase retells the collapse of the liberal international economic order due to the 
                                                   
10 This argument is inspired by Marks (2005). 
11 This brief summary is mainly built on the following narratives that are generally accepted as accurate 
accounts of the history of the world trading system: Hudec (1990), Jackson (1997, 2009), Irwin et al 
(2008), Lowenfeld (2008), Winham (2009), Fabri (2012), Trebilcock et al (2012), Matsushita et al 
(2015), Trebilcock (2015), Herdegen (2016), Van den Bossche and Zdouc (2017). 
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destructive effects entailed by the political and economic crises leading up to World War II. 
The second period narrates the reconstruction of the world trading system, accounting from 
the defective birth to the continuous institutionalisation of the GATT. The third moment 
describes the establishment of the WTO. The fourth phase accounts for both the 
institutionalisation of the WTO and the developments from the Doha Declaration until the 
current challenges involving regionalism.12 
The common starting-point of traditional literature is with the traumatic events of 
the interwar period. Until World War I, international trade was led by Great Britain and 
governed by the so-called liberal international economic order. This regime was centred on 
classical international law, generally, and on its principle of freedom of commerce, 
specifically.13 However, the outbreak of World War I massively disrupted the international 
trading system of liberalising bilateral arrangements tied by most-favoured-nation clauses 
(MFN). The peace was not enough to repair the fractions in such liberal order, which 
recovered slowly during the 1920s. Most countries only gradually dismantled their war-time 
economic controls, while tariff levels continued higher than before 1914. Moreover, the 
1919 Versailles Treaty contributed to produce long-term, deleterious impacts on Germany’s 
economy, pushing it to adopt a predatory economic strategy. 
The liberal trading system was already severely cracked when the Great Depression 
began in the late-1920s.14 The trade policies of the 1930s would become eventually known 
as beggar-thy-neighbour for aiming to insulate national economies from the global 
downturn by raising barriers and adopting extreme forms of discriminatory and 
protectionist measures. This included exchange rate devaluations and all sorts of trade 
controls. This infamous strategy sought to subsidise domestic producers at the expense of, 
while externalising internal costs to, export suppliers. Consequently, the MFN clause fell 
into disuse forcing countries to conclude bilateral arrangements.  
When the United States, which emerged from the First World War as the largest 
trading nation, enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930 (the most notorious beggar-
thy-neighbour policy), it quickly provoked comparable retaliatory reactions by its major 
trading partners.15 All these predatory policies not only exacerbated the effects of the Great 
Depression but also led the international trading system to an institutional paralysis. By the 
mid-1930s, President Roosevelt managed to pass the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, 
                                                   
12 See section 2.B. 
13 Irwin et al, 2008: 5-12; Lowenfeld, 2008: 21-23; Winham, 2009: 9-13; Jackson, 2009: 31-33; 
Sebastian, 2010: 333-336; WTO, 2011: 50, 94; Trebilcock et al, 2012: 23-24; Herdegen, 2016: 14-15. 
14 See supra note 13. 
15 Trebilcock et al, 2012: 23. 
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authorising the US administration to negotiate new trade agreements. This swing back to 
free trade came too late, however. The outbreak of World War II is regarded as having 
cemented the end of the liberal trading system. 
The combination of the Franco-German revanchism, generalised trade wars, and the 
Great Depression, with an ineffective liberal order and marginal international law, served as 
traumatic lessons for what was supposed to become a new regime for governing the 
international economy.16 Since World War II, these teachings became common-sense 
within the community of trade experts. They were widely used for choosing economic 
policies and designing legal norms and regimes to lay the foundations for a new 
international economic order.  
When it had become reasonably clear that war would be shortly over, the idea of 
‘order’ was already present in the minds of Anglo-American officials and diplomats in 
charge of negotiating an original blueprint for postwar monetary, financial and trade 
policies and institutions.17 The US-UK diplomacy paved the way for concluding the Bretton 
Woods Agreement in 1944, which devised a plan to establish specialised international 
organisations under the future United Nations for reconstructing and governing the world 
economy.18 Following the war, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (later the “World Bank”) were duly established. 
However, the International Trade Organisation (ITO) failed in coming into existence, 
largely because of the United States’ refusal in 1947 to ratify its Charter. The US claimed 
that the ITO would excessively constrain its economic sovereignty. 
Alternatively, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, an interim agreement, 
negotiated in 1947 among 23 major trading countries, as a prelude to the ITO, became, 
“through the magic of practice,” the permanent institutional architecture for the multilateral 
trading system until the establishment of the World Trade Organisation in 1995.19 The 
history of the GATT is thus intertwined with that of the ITO Charter. While the ITO would 
be the specialised trade organisation, the GATT would be a provisional multilateral 
agreement to reduce tariffs of manufactured goods, through a process of negotiated trade 
concessions based on the principles of reciprocity and non-discrimination.20 
                                                   
16 Jackson, 2007: 3-4; 2009: 31-34; Lowenfeld, 2008: 21-26; Winham, 2009: 14; Trebilcock et al, 2012: 
24-25; Herdegen, 2016: 195-197. 
17 See supra note 16. 
18 Trebilcock et al, 2012: 24-25. 
19 Fabri, 2012: 365-366.  
20 Jackson, 2007: 4; 2009: 34-37; Lowenfeld, 2008: 46-60; Winham, 2009: 14-18; Trebilcock et al, 2012: 
24-25; Herdegen, 2016: 195-197. 
30 
 
When the ITO Charter failed to come into force, the GATT was used to fill the 
vacuum without explicit legal authority. Since negotiators believed it was to be 
incorporated by the ITO, the GATT agreement “never came fully into force, but was 
implemented in part by the ‘Protocol of Provisional Application’”21 The consequence was a 
permanent state of uncertainty about its legal character. This led lawyers to embrace a 
pragmatic attitude towards the implementation and operation of GATT ‘law’. Until the 
1980s, the GATT rules were perceived more as diplomatic guidelines rather than legal 
obligations.22 The settlement of trade disputes relied mainly on diplomatic techniques, 
instead of formal procedures. 
Nevertheless, between 1947 and 1994, the GATT not only evolved institutionally 
but also had its mandate and membership expanded.23 Eight multilateral rounds of trade 
negotiations were concluded under the GATT. The first six rounds (from the 1947 Geneva 
Conference to the 1963-1967 Kennedy Round) focused predominantly on tariff reductions. 
The 1973-1979 Tokyo Round sought, in addition to tariffs, to negotiate policy and 
institutional reforms to non-tariff areas. 
The 1986-1994 Uruguay Round was a turning point in the history of international 
trade law. It was the last and most complex multilateral negotiation under the GATT.24 It 
reached a set of trade agreements entailing a profound transformation in the world trading 
system. The establishment of the WTO was one of its central achievements followed 
closely by the unprecedented expansion of regulatory competence. Moreover, the creation 
of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) symbolised the passage from a power-oriented to a 
rule-oriented system, through the adoption of ‘juridical’ procedures for dispute settlement. 
Ever since the WTO came into force, the world trading system has been subject to a 
multitude of factors, including the dramatic enlargement of its membership, the 
implementation of the new regulatory domains, and the diplomatic push toward the 
extension of its substantive competence over uncovered areas of trade and non-trade 
affairs.25 Particularly, this new phase of operationalisation and expansion of the WTO 
governance has entailed a greater focus on domestic policy and regulatory divergences as 
potential distortions of international trade. The consequence has been to determine the 
degree to which the WTO may excessively constrain domestic sovereignty.  
                                                   
21 Jackson, 2009: 31.  
22 Jackson, 2009: 31, 45-46.  
23 Jackson, 2007: 4; 2009: 34-37; Lowenfeld, 2008: 46-60; Winham, 2009: 14-18; Trebilcock et al, 2012: 
24-25; Herdegen, 2016: 195-197. 
24 Jackson, 2009: 37-39; Lowenfeld, 2008: 60-67; Winham, 2009: 19-24; Trebilcock et al, 2012: 25-26; 
Herdegen, 2016: 197-199. 
25 Jackson, 2009: 39-41; Winham, 2009: 24-28; Trebilcock et al, 2012: 802-808; Herdegen, 2016: 199-
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The Doha Ministerial Declaration of 2001 launched a new round of negotiations for 
furthering the development of the WTO system. This first WTO round (or the ninth 
WTO/GATT) has proved to be extraordinarily laboured. As of this writing, the Doha Round 
is commonly acknowledged as having failed to live up to its comprehensive agenda. To fill 
the gap partially, the WTO Ministerial Conferences (MC) have only sought to approve 
packages of measures in support of developing countries.26 
 
B.  The Proliferations  of Regional Trade Agreements: From Article 
XXIV to the GATT Governance of South-North Regionalism 
 
The conventional history27 of regionalism can be summarised as ‘a chronicle of 
proliferations’.28 This narrative about ‘surges in’ RTA activity has been repeated at different 
moments in history. Before World War II, the ‘spread’ of RTAs was recounted as a remnant 
beggar-thy-neighbour strategy employed in the 1930s trade wars. In the GATT era, the 
‘increasing number’ of RTAs was habitually described as a continuous threat to free trade 
multilateralism. From the WTO until the mega-blocs negotiations, the ‘explosion’ of RTAs 
has been historicised as the “termites” in the world trading system.29 Only in the last 
decade, part of literature has shifted towards a more accommodative narrative, which 
neither condemns regionalism entirely nor portrays it as the WTO’s nemesis. The focus of 
this section is on the part of literature concerning particularly with South-North RTAs. 
Just like the multilateral trading system, the history of regionalism finds its roots in 
the post-World War I period when the liberal order was quickly deteriorating.30 The world 
trading system of MFN-linked bilateral arrangements was being replaced by preferential 
agreements devised to create advantageous relations between trading partners while 
discriminating third countries. The British Commonwealth was the most notorious system 
                                                   
26 In the 2005 Hong Kong MC, a package of measures was approved to support the least developed 
countries. The 2013 Bali MC succeeded in agreeing on the Agreement on Trade Facilitation, while the 
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sector (Herdegen, 2016: 199-200). 
27 This brief summary is mainly built on the following narratives that are generally accepted as accurate 
accounts of the history of the North-South regional trade regimes under the GATT/WTO system: Hudec 
(1990), Bhagwati (1991, 1993, 2005, 2008) Jackson (1997, 2009), Bartels and Ortino (2006), Irwin et al 
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of imperial preferences. It was established in 1932 between the United Kingdom and its 
dominions (principally Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa) with the aim of 
exchanging preferential tariffs to the detriment of third countries’ producers. This beggar-
thy-neighbour strategy spread out during the 1930s trade wars contributing decisively to 
fuel the economic crisis that was already underway.31 These circumstances combined with 
the political turmoil led up to the Second World War and the collapse of the liberal trading 
system. 
By the end of the war, Anglo-American policymakers turned their minds to 
alternatives to replace the liberal trade regime.32 However, it became soon clear that the role 
of RTAs in the future world trading system gave rise to a fundamental controversy between 
the US multilateralist attitude and the UK imperialist position. The establishment of 
Articles I (MFN) and XXIV (RTA) in the GATT is traditionally accounted as expressing 
the Anglo-American compromise on how to reconcile regionalism with multilateralism. 
This institutional arrangement envisaged assigning to the GATT legal authority to govern 
the formation and operation of RTAs. 
Recent research shows that the history of Article XXIV cannot be simply narrowed to 
the British interest in preserving its imperial system of preferences. Instead, its negotiation 
and design must be considered as intertwined with today’s overlooked Articles I:2 (Imperial 
Systems of Preferences) and XXV:5 (General Waiver).33 These three provisions were 
devised to strike a balance between a utopian aspiration for a non-discriminatory 
multilateralism and a concrete reality of preferential regionalism. It was consensual that 
non-discrimination was to be achieved by multilateralising the MFN through the GATT. To 
deal with existing and future preferential arrangements, three exceptions to Article I:1 were 
included: a provision ensuring the continuation of existing ‘imperial systems of 
preferences’ (Article I:2); a provision disciplining a waiver procedure for new ‘preferential 
arrangements’ (Article XXV:5); and a provision regulating the new ‘regional trade 
agreements’ (Article XXIV). 
 
  
                                                   
31 Alongside the British Commonwealth, other imperial systems of preferences were established by major 
trading nations, including France, the Nazi Germany, and Japan (Irwin et al, 2008: 6-7). 
32 Irwin et al, 2008: 5-12; Trebilcock et al, 2012: 24-25, 83-86; Matsushita et al, 2015: 508-509. See also 
supra notes 16-18, and accompanying text. 
33 See supra note 32. 
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1. The Article-I:2 Grandfather Discipline on South-North Imperial Trade 
 
Before the GATT, a number of preferential trade agreements were in operation, most 
prominently the imperial systems between European powers and their colonies, dominions 
and protectorates.34 These imperial regimes, especially the British Commonwealth, the 
French Union, and the Benelux35 Customs Unions, set forth protectionist and discriminatory 
measures to prevent colonies from trading with third countries. Although their 
dismantlement was one of the US priorities for the postwar trading system, developed 
countries settled their disagreements by grandfathering the most significant imperial 
systems from the core rules of the GATT, with the assumption that in due time they would 
either disappear or lose their function. Article I:2 carved out an exception for a list of pre-
GATT preferential trade arrangements, which would be subject to the Article-I:4 
prohibition on any increase of preferential margins. Hence, Article I:2 accorded a ‘special 
and differential treatment’ to imperial powers that were parties to GATT and desired to 
safeguard their South-North imperial trade preferences.  
 
2. The Article-XXV:5 Waiver Discipline on South-North Preferential Trade 
 
Another relevant discipline is established under Article XXV:5. This provision sets forth a 
waiver power ensuring that new preferential schemes could be created if a two-thirds 
majority of (then) ‘contracting-parties’ (and now ‘WTO members’) agreed on them. It 
enables contracting-parties acting jointly to suspend GATT obligations. Its institutional 
story goes back to the Suggested Charter36, which provided a limited version of the waiver 
clause.37 During the ITO and GATT negotiations, the power for waiving was extended to 
cover all obligations. If conditions were met, Article XXV:5 could exempt any preferential 
agreement. 
Since 1947, the waiver power has been invoked on some important occasions to 
authorise ‘special and differential treatment’ between developed and developing countries, 
or between empires and colonies.38 The practice of granting waivers for preferential 
                                                   
34 Yusuf, 1982: 7; Trebilcock et al, 2012: 56, 80. 
35 Benelux stands for Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. 
36 Feichtner, 2011: 58-59. 
37 The “Suggested Charter” was the US proposal that served as the basis for the negotiation of an 
international trade organisation (Irwin et al, 2008: 104). 
38 Yusuf, 1982: 47-50. 
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arrangements can be distinguished in three phases: the early years of the GATT; and the 
periods before and after the adoption of the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP).  
The first application of Article XXV:5 took place in 1948 to authorise the United 
States to offer preferential treatment to Pacific islands formerly under Japanese trusteeship. 
Afterwards, Italy and Australia requested a waiver to its former colony, Libya, and its 
trustee territory of Papua-New Guinea (respectively). All these waivers were justified on 
the basis that trade preferences support the economic development of recipients.39 This led 
the UK to propose in 1951 a GATT amendment creating a general waiver for imperial 
countries to establish preferential arrangements for promoting the economic development of 
their colonies. Although the reform proposal was rejected in 1955, European countries were 
continuously waived to accord preferences in support of their remaining or former 
colonies.40 
With decolonisation, developing countries increasingly demanded non-reciprocal 
preferences as a matter of international solidarity, historical justice, or development 
policy.41 Unable to secure their interests under the GATT, developing countries gathered 
around the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to pressure 
developed countries for changes. The GSP was created under the UNCTAD in 1968 and 
accorded a waiver by the GATT to operate in 1971. Even after the introduction of the GSP, 
contracting-parties (and later WTO members) have continued to request individual waivers 
for preferential arrangements that do not comply with the rules of such GSP waiver since 
they benefit only selected developing countries.42 Thus, Article XXV:5 is used to authorise 
the formation of South-North trade arrangements under GATT/WTO law insulated from the 
discipline of Article XXIV. 
 
3. The Article XXIV Discipline on South-North Regional Trade 
 
The ‘fierce’ US opposition to RTAs was not only tamed by the grandfather clause and the 
general waiver but mainly by the acceptance of the exception enshrined in Article XXIV. 
Given the powerful US position during the negotiations, the inclusion of Article XXIV to 
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41 See infra note 64, and accompanying text. 
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the GATT has repeatedly caused perplexity in the IEL field.43 The reason for this confusion 
lies in the apparent inconsistency between the accounts of Article XXIV’s origin and 
justification and the analyses of GATT’s preparatory work. Mainstream literature tends to 
explain Article XXIV as the consensual compromise by which the United States 
accommodated the British interests in imperial systems, developing countries’ demands for 
flexibility, and the European integration project. However, this understanding seems not to 
find support in the archival record. The British imperialism was already secured under 
Article I:2, while the exception for customs unions was already accepted by all countries 
negotiating the ITO Charter. Besides, the plans for European integration were only revealed 
after the Havana Conference. 
Looking back, recent scholarship suggests that Article XXIV was a compromise 
constructed in two steps, each of them accommodating interests of distinct groupings: the 
early drafts of the GATT made reference to an exclusive exception for customs unions, 
while only after the Havana Conference free trade agreements were added to Article XXIV. 
The central arguments for accepting the inclusion of CUs were practical and theoretical.44 
Pragmatically, the CU-exception was intended to accommodate the factual existence of two 
groups of countries that were already CU-partners: the Syrian–Lebanese CU and the 
Benelux. Theoretically, CUs were understood not as preferential arrangements, but rather as 
mechanisms for achieving economic or political integration. Conceived as a matter of 
border and sovereignty rather than trade preference, the CU-exception was proposed in the 
first drafts of the ITO Charter and the GATT, and was never opposed by the negotiating 
countries, including the United States. 
Conversely, the addition of FTAs to Article XXIV has been regarded as the 
outcome of a more obscure bargain.45 The FTAs-exception only appeared after the 1947 
Havana Conference. The justifications for such amendment remain contentious. It seems 
that a formal proposal was presented by Syria and Lebanon and several other Latin 
American countries, with the support of France and other developing countries, grounded in 
the view that FTAs were a better-suited instrument to promote economic integration among 
the latter. A different narrative suggests that the US accepted the FTAs-exception not to 
strike a compromise with European or developing countries. Rather, the US needed to carve 
out a loophole for an FTA it had secretly negotiated with Canada. It was, hence, in the form 
of Article XXIV that the GATT was invested with the legal authority to govern 
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44 See supra note 43. 
45 See supra note 43. 
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regionalism. Specifically, Article XXIV sets forth the legal rules for constituting and 
operating RTAs.46 
 
4. Two Waves of Regionalism under the GATT  
 
The establishment of Article XXIV did not prevent the ‘proliferation’ of regional trade 
regimes. Whereas very few RTAs were formed in the 1950s, two major ‘surges’ took place 
in the 1960s-1970s and from the mid-1980s onwards.47 The European Union48 was at the 
centre of both episodes, while Latin America joined the race in the 1960s, and North 
America and Asia only in the 1980s. At the creation of the WTO in 1995, 124 RTAs had 
been notified to the GATT, of which roughly 70 came into force, and about 50 were active. 
 
(a) The First Wave of Regionalism (1950-1985) 
 
The ‘first wave’ of regionalism (r)evolved around Europe. In the context of rising East-
West tension, Article XXIV was initially used by the United States to design the Marshall 
Plan and the Canada-US FTA.49 The European Recovery Program (the so-called “Marshall 
Plan”) was devised for assisting the European economic reconstruction from the devastation 
of World War II. It played an important role in sponsoring the European integration 
projects. Consequently, Western European countries led to the formation of RTAs, first, 
among themselves and, later, with their former and existing colonies. Hence, the first wave 
was driven by the Marshall Plan and governed by Article XXIV. 
European regionalism started with the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) in 195150, which was followed by the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
195751.52 This encouraged the formation of the competing European Free Trade Association 
                                                   
46 See section 2.D. 
47 Mansfield and Milner, 1999: 600; Damro, 2006: 26-27; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009: 476-478; 
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52 Carpenter, 2009: 18-19; Trebilcock et al, 2012: 26-27, 86; WTO, 2011: 51-54. 
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(EFTA) in 196053. Under Article XXIV, European countries concluded RTAs with other 
European countries not partners to EEC or EFTA and with their former or existing colonies. 
Outside Europe, groups of developing countries in Africa, Caribbean, Central and South 
America rushed to create their own RTAs inspired by the European integration projects. 
The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) of 196054 and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) of 196755 were important examples of non-European 
regionalism. 
Throughout this period, the GATT’s multilateral negotiations, membership 
enlargement, and policy and legal disputes moved in tandem with the expansion and 
deepening of (predominantly European) regionalism.56 The proliferation of RTAs led other 
GATT contracting-parties to pressure (mainly) European countries for lowering MFN 
tariffs across the board so as to mitigate the effects of trade preferences. The 1960-1961 
Dillon Round was launched in part because of the establishment of the EEC, whereas the 
Kennedy Round was triggered by the intensification of European integration, and the Tokyo 
Round by the EEC’s first enlargement. 
Running in parallel to these multilateral rounds, intense disputes concerning the 
consistency of RTAs with GATT law arose.57 The debates focused mainly on the 
compatibility of the EEC, EFTA, LAFTA, and the EEC’s association agreements with 
Article XXIV. These RTAs were accused of having several inconsistencies that ranged 
from tariff issues to the lack of a clear commitment to full trade liberalisation as well as 
infant industry exceptions.58 However, the GATT did not have at the time a permanent 
mechanism for reviewing RTAs notified under Article XXIV. Instead, RTAs were assessed 
by working parties that did not hold the authority to adopt definitive (binding) reports. 
Concretely, these controversies were mostly settled, waived, hidden, or disregarded as part 
of multilateral and bilateral negotiations and consultations, which led the GATT and its 
contracting-parties to develop a policy of a high tolerance for a wide diversity of RTAs.59 
The legal debates about Article XXIV seemed to have enabled contracting-parties to 
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exercise some degree of influence over the development of RTAs in a way that mitigated 
their adverse effect on non-RTA-partners.60 
Against this historical background, the GATT law and governance of South-North 
regionalism experienced significant developments. The most important transformation was 
driven by the developing countries’ reaction to the GATT regime. Initially, only 11 of 23 
signatories to the GATT were developing countries. Nonetheless, from the negotiations for 
the Suggested Charter to the ITO Charter to the GATT agreement, they raised concerns 
regarding the fact that rules assumed formal equality despite the evident material inequality 
between developing and developed parties.61 Their main criticism was that the GATT’s 
‘one-size-fits-all’ disciplines required contracting-parties to negotiate and accord non-
discriminatory and reciprocal trade concessions, irrespective of their development level. 
They understood developing economies could not compete for export markets on an MFN-
equal basis with developed economies, and so they demanded special treatment. 
The acceptance of development as an issue in the GATT took place only in the late-
1950s when the Haberler Report was circulated62. The Report found unequivocal evidence 
that the problem of developing countries’ exports was chiefly associated with protectionist 
measures for agricultural and manufactured goods in many developed markets. The 
conclusion was that the protectionism of developed economies was the major factor 
adversely impairing the growth of developing economies. Consequently, the bulk of its 
recommendations consisted of demanding developed states to dismantle or reduce their 
protectionist policies combined with some sort of foreign aid and liquidity mechanism. 
Although its policy proposals were not adopted, the Haberler Report became the reference 
for debating development issues in the upcoming multilateral rounds. 
The non-implementation of the Haberler Report reinforced the idea of the GATT as 
a rich men’s club.63 This encouraged developing countries to reorganise themselves around 
the United Nations, first, and then the UNCTAD, with the aim of addressing what they 
understood to be their distinctive economic needs. During the Kennedy Round, contracting-
parties agreed to negotiate a new chapter on trade and development. In 1965, Part IV was 
added to the GATT establishing three provisions, which were regarded as non-binding legal 
obligations. These new rules introduced the special and differential treatment (SDT) into 
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GATT law, which in practice exempted developing countries from any obligation of 
reciprocity concerning trade concessions while urging developed countries to offer them 
unilateral market access. 
However, both Part IV and the trade concessions of Kennedy Round produced 
disappointing results for developing countries.64 The frustration led them to return to the 
UNCTAD to pursue their interests. In 1968, the UNCTAD established the Generalised 
System of Preference, a framework for developed countries to offer preferential trade 
arrangements on a non-reciprocal basis to developing countries. Since the GSP would 
violate Articles I:1 and XXIV, contracting-parties agreed in 1971 to grant a 10-year 
collective waiver. This was succeeded in 1979 by the Decision on Differential and More 
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries (the 
so-called “Enabling Clause”), a permanent waiver authorising the constitution of two new 
special arrangements. One possibility is the creation by developed countries of their own 
GSP schemes, through which tariff preferences are unilaterally granted to developing 
counties. Another possibility is the formation of South-South arrangements, which authorise 
the exchange of preferences between developing countries. 
The consequence of the first wave of European-centric regionalism was that roughly 
85% of the South-North RTAs had at least one European state as a partner.65 Moreover, 
most of the RTAs concluded among developing countries (South-South) and inspired by the 
European model collapsed or drifted into dormancy by the end of the 1970s. By 1980, 
roughly 60% of RTAs in force was South-North, 20% between developed countries (North-
North) and 20% South-South.66 
 
(b) The Second Wave of Regionalism (1980-1995) 
 
The ‘second wave’ of regionalism began in the 1980s and extended until the mid-1990s.67 It 
started taking off with the EU’s Single European Act of 1986 setting forth a plan to create 
its single market and its reluctance to join the Uruguay Round. These decisions triggered a 
response of the United States in the form the Canada-US FTA (CUSFTA) of 1988, which 
was expanded in 1992 to include Mexico, resulting in the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). These watershed RTAs symbolised the US departure from its strong 
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commitment to multilateralism.68 The EU responded back with the 1993 Treaty of 
Maastricht establishing the European Union, and with a series of RTAs with the former 
socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and with developing countries in North 
Africa and the Middle East. 
The EU and the US were not alone in pushing towards trade regionalism, since 
other regional trading blocs (re-)emerged among developing countries.69 In South America, 
the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) was created in 1991, inspirited by the European 
integration, for constituting – but never achieved – a customs union among Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.70 In Africa, different initiatives sought to revive existing 
RTAs or create new ones in the early 1990s, such as the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Finally, the African 
Economic Community (AEC) 71 was created in 1991 to establish an economic and monetary 
union among African countries. In Asia, the ASEAN established an FTA in 1992. 
Even before the beginning of the Uruguay Round, regionalism had already become 
a topic of greater concern.72 In 1985, the Leutwiler Report was published concluding that 
the rules of Article XXIV had been seriously “distorted and abused” making them irrelevant 
to resolve disputes.73 To prevent further erosion of the multilateral trading system, it 
recommended that “GATT rules on customs unions and free trade-areas should be 
examined, redefined so as to avoid ambiguity, and more strictly applied, so that this legal 
cover is available only to countries that genuinely use it to establish full free trade among 
themselves.”74 During the Uruguay Round, a group of countries that included Australia, 
India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea presented proposals to strengthen Article 
XXIV. However, they encountered strong opposition, mainly from the European Union. 
Despite their ultimate rejection, the proposals succeeded in pushing contracting-parties 
towards the adoption of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1994 (Article XXIV Understanding). 
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The second wave lost its energy due to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.75 The 
establishment of the WTO is commonly understood as a multilateral reaction against 
regionalism. By the mid-1990s, out of roughly 70 RTAs in force, 35% were South-North, 
15% North-North, and 50% South-South. 
 
C.  Lessons from the History of the GATT Law and Governance of 
South-North Regionalism 
 
Within the field of international economic law, past and present are connected by the 
continuous teaching of and learning from legal history. As explained in Chapter 3, these 
lessons are used to organise and shape legal knowledge and techniques, which ultimately 
affect lawmaking and interpretation. Present-day lawyers draw lessons from the traditional 
history of the GATT law and governance of South-North regionalism in order to make 
sense of contemporary behaviour, preferences and policies of WTO members, frame them 
as legal issues or disputes, and offer arguments and solutions through law. However, these 
teachings are neither homogenously nor clearly articulated in mainstream literature. For my 
analysis only, I consolidate those around three takeaways. 
The first and foremost lesson from the traditional history is about the (aspirational) 
virtue of GATT law in dealing with the tension between multilateralism and regionalism. It 
teaches that the extensive use of preferences as a beggar-thy-neighbour strategy contributed 
significantly to fuel trade wars in the 1930s. In the post-World War II, the US sought to 
prevent those mistakes from repeating by banning all forms of discriminatory and 
protectionist arrangements through the establishment of an international trade organisation. 
The ITO regime was envisioned as a superior and fairer alternative for organising world 
trade around non-discriminatory and reciprocal principles rather than the previous 
international system of preferential and imperial trading. Throughout negotiations, Article 
XXIV was included in the ‘interim’ GATT agreement, with the narrow scope of 
accommodating specific interests in some form of regionalism. This provision was intended 
to set forth an exception for contracting-parties to depart from those general principles in 
order to conclude RTAs. The (ideal) purpose of the rules of Article XXIV was to limit 
contracting-parties’ discretion by requiring that only RTAs devised to complement the 
multilateral trading system would be valid and legitimate under GATT law. 
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By contrast, the second lesson emphasises the effects on Article XXIV of 
contracting-parties’ institutional practice. The thrust of the story is that Article XXIV was 
softened rather than strengthened over time due to the political and economic influence of 
contracting-parties with market power.76 The controversy over the legal character of the 
GATT is remembered as having prevented its rules from being regarded as fully binding. 
This conventional narrative reinforces the idea of the GATT as a diplomatic rather than a 
juridical regime, and so unable to prevent Article XXIV from bending towards stronger 
economies. On the other hand, it corroborates with the view of Article XXIV as a defective 
legal norm. These institutional and normative shortcomings are told as resulting from 
GATT’s ‘original sin’, a diplomatic attempt to strike a balance between the general 
principle of non-discrimination and the narrow exception to regionalism. Therefore, the 
multilateral trading system is historicised as having been constantly challenged by ‘waves’ 
of regionalism that were authorised through the progressive relaxation of Article XXIV 
caused by external forces and internal ambiguity. 
The third important takeaway concerns the secondary or marginal role played by 
international law and lawyers in the GATT governance of regionalism. To mitigate the 
relevance of the ‘legal defects’ of Article XXIV, the traditional history tells that during the 
negotiations on the ITO and GATT there were two competing views of what should be the 
function of law and legal expertise.77 On the one hand, there were advocates of an 
international economic order build upon a ‘deeper’ and ‘harder’ institutional architecture 
than that existing until World War II. They argued that the Havana Charter should set forth 
international law rules establishing legally binding rights and obligations, which would be 
enforceable through a formal procedure, and justiciable in the International Court of Justice. 
This view was openly championed by the United States.  
On the other hand, there were defenders of an institutional architecture less centred 
on law and more on diplomacy and policymaking.78 They reasoned that the ITO should be 
legally ambiguous to accommodate not only the divergent preferences and policies of 
contracting-parties, but also the political discretion and technical complexity involved in 
economic decision-making. Consequently, a dispute settlement should be governed by 
economic experts and pragmatic diplomats committed to achieving compromises rather 
than complying with legalistic procedures and formal requirements. In this sense, the 
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United Kingdom promoted a conception of international law as an instrument for attaining 
policy goals rather than a body of positive norms on state conduct. 
These opposing views of the appropriate role of international law have been in play 
in the GATT/WTO regime since its origins.79 Although their individual influence varied 
over time, the diplomatic view prevailed in the drafting of the GATT and over the initial 
rounds of multilateral negotiations. The conventional narratives account that the softness of 
the GATT and the ambiguous language of Article XXIV were not only a pragmatic 
compromise reached by the contracting-parties, but also reflected a dominant understanding 
at the time of international law as a purposive instrument for policymaking. More 
specifically, the GATT regime is historically portrayed as a power-oriented system that was 
operated mostly by non-legal experts, who were either second-tier diplomats, governmental 
officials and politicians, or other non-legal trade specialists.80 In contrast to ‘high’ political 
issues arising out of the Cold War, economic affairs were regarded as of ‘low’ political 
priority and dominated by more ‘technical’, and few ‘juridical’, matters. The combination 
of doubts about the GATT’s ‘legal nature’ and the epistemic dominance of policy-oriented 
disciplines over trade matters led the interpretative practice of Article XXIV to be governed 
by economics and political science thinking and techniques. 
With the professional and intellectual dominance of policy-oriented expertise, only 
a few lawyers feature in the conventional narratives as having actually participated in 
decision-making in or over the GATT or RTAs.81 Conversely, most of them are 
remembered for their academic commitment to IEL theory and (excessively) formalist 
approach to GATT law. Gradually, this jurisprudential view lost authority inside and 
outside the IEL field until being almost forgotten in the 1970s. 
According to traditional history, it was only in the 1980s legal expertise began to be 
reconstructed as a discipline for solving trade conflicts through policy-oriented 
interpretation and instrumentalist application of GATT law, thanks to the efforts of a more 
pragmatically-driven, rather than academically-oriented, lawyers.82 Specifically, their 
strategy was to stress the need for interdisciplinary collaboration with policy-oriented 
expertise, with the aim of reconceiving GATT law as a formal instrument for choosing 
regulatory policy to achieve economic and technical objectives. This turn-to-functionalism 
is described as an empowering undertaking, through which international lawyers 
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(re)claimed their protagonist position in global trade governance. They participated 
intensively in the institutionalisation process culminating in the establishment of the WTO 
and the adoption of the Article XXIV Understanding, and later in the attempts to strengthen 
Article XXIV through the DSB’s case law.83 
Nowadays, the majority of lawyers is committed to some strand of functionalism.84 
They understand international trade law as an instrument to produce predictability and 
certainty by ensuring the compliance of members’ preferences and measures with WTO law 
through the DSB.85 In practice, they balance conflicting policies, frame legal issues and 
craft (functionalist) arguments about the role of Article XXIV taking into consideration the 
nature of the relationship between multilateralism and regionalism. Grounded in 
functionalism, Article XXIV has been reconceived as a legal mechanism for governing, 
more or less effectively, RTAs rather than eliminate them. Thus, the traditional history 
teaches that the valid and legitimate ways of interpreting Article XXIV range in-between 
two stylised poles: regionalism and multilateralism. 
Supporters of multilateralism argue that Article XXIV establishes too vague or 
weak rules to discipline RTAs. These shortcomings are understood to be inherent to Article 
XXIV. In other words, the fundamental inconsistency between discriminatory and non-
discriminatory approaches to trade was entrenched into the GATT rather than solved. This 
is the historical reason for Article XXIV has been unable to prevent the constant 
resurgences of regionalism in the 1960s, 1970s, and mid-1980s. Particularly, the ‘chronicle 
of proliferations’ is told as a legal tragedy in which the efforts to fix Article XXIV have 
been resisted by powerful contracting-parties despite the progressive institutionalisation of 
the GATT. In this sense, the multilateralism-versus-regionalism debate fuels the fears of a 
return to discriminatory and protectionist measures, bearing the potential of eventually 
leading to trade wars and the collapse of the WTO. Regional trade regimes are, therefore, 
imagined as either ontologically or functionally incompatible with the WTO. This 
understanding frames the preoccupation with and critique of the current ‘third wave’ of 
regionalism.86 Although some pro-multilateralism lawyers remain inflexible in condemning 
regionalism, others with a more pragmatic attitude have advocated for reforms to strengthen 
the WTO’s control over RTAs. 
By contrast, supporters of regionalism reason that Article XXIV-consistent RTAs 
are validly created under WTO law. More importantly, they claim that these RTAs have 
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never represented a threat to the GATT/WTO for two reasons. First, the GATT provides not 
only the exception under Article XXIV but also a variety of other exceptions that authorise 
members to adopt policies and measures that would be inconsistent with WTO law 
otherwise. Second, RTAs have become neither like imperial systems of preferences nor like 
discriminatory bilateral arrangements. Rather, they are constituted as legitimate 
mechanisms for economic integration and trade liberalisation. Some pro-regionalism 
lawyers assert that the growing prominence of RTAs reflects the gradual demise of 
multilateralism. Others argue that history is clear in showing that regionalism and 
multilateralism are in essence complementary and need to be governed accordingly. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I want to conclude by reflecting on the traditional history and its central lessons. This 
Chapter shows that for over sixty years the championing of multilateralism and the defence 
of regionalism have been closely related to projects for the institutionalisation, 
juridification, and management of world trade through international law. It specifically 
demonstrates the existence within the IEL field of a strong consensus on the history of the 
international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism. 
Boiled down to its essence, the traditional history of GATT Article XXIV is simply 
chronicled as a series of progressive moments that tie political and economic crises to 
institutional responses and legal justifications. It can be synthesised as follows: from the 
extensive use of preferential and imperial arrangements as a beggar-thy-neighbour strategy 
employed in the 1930s trade wars; to the diplomatic attempt of the US to ban all forms of 
preferential and imperial systems; to the US-led effort to construct a multilateral trading 
system by accepting to include Article XXIV, a narrow and rigid exception to general 
principles; and, to the threat to the multilateral trade liberalisation by the progressive 
relaxation of Article XXIV interpretation and the increase of (temporary and permanent) 
exceptions to accommodate contracting-parties’ interests and needs. From 1947 to 1995, 
these ‘threats’ took the form of two waves of regionalism. These two surges were formally 
authorised by Articles XXV:5 and (mainly) XXIV and the Enabling Clause, despite the 
understanding of RTAs as incompatible with the non-discriminatory and reciprocal spirit of 
the GATT. This history is, therefore, a chronicle of the tragedy of Article XXIV for failing 
over and over again in preventing the proliferations of RTAs due to its policy contradiction, 
institutional defects, and normative ambiguity. 
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This summary draws attention to the critical effects of conventional narratives: it 
highlights certain events and understandings that are at the heart of the traditional history, 
while ‘hiding’ or ‘marginalising’ the others. It also obfuscates the effects of this traditional 
style of telling history on the IEL field. To shed light on the operation of conventional 
narratives, I propose to differentiate their descriptive and prescriptive dimensions and 
highlight their normative preference for particular ideational, institutional, and 
jurisprudential ideas and practices. 
Conventional narratives like the above function not only as a description of the past 
but also as prescriptive teachings for framing present-day thinking and practice of 
international trade law. Drawing from the traditional history, lessons describe what seem to 
be sometimes tense, sometimes harmonious interactions between two interwoven patterns 
of norms, institutions, ideas and practices that can be roughly associated with either 
multilateralism or regionalism. This juxtaposition is expressed in opposing terms: 
 
Multilateralism Regionalism 
multilateral trading system ‘regional-preferential-bilateral’ trade 
regimes 
non-discrimination discrimination 
reciprocity non-reciprocity 
free trade protectionism (or economic development) 
GATT/WTO RTAs 
global governance institutions sovereign states’ discretion 
formalist jurisprudence functionalist jurisprudence 
 
The above binaries have significant importance for framing our understanding of, 
and assigning meaning to, the present-day WTO law of South-North regionalism. More 
concretely, three lessons (discussed in this Chapter) attribute a normative value not only to 
the past but also to a pole of each binary. The consequence is to prescribe ideational, 
institutional, and jurisprudential views of and practices for governing present-day decision-
making over the interaction between multilateralism and regionalism. 
The first teaching asserts the ideational mission of the GATT/WTO in promoting 
multilateral trade liberalisation while constraining and directing regionalism to complement 
47 
 
multilateralism. It reminds that Article XXIV authorises members to depart from general 
principles only to conclude RTAs that are formally and purposefully consistent with 
GATT/WTO law. The second takeaway contends that the institutional defects of Article 
XXIV are partially responsible for exposing the GATT/WTO to periodic waves of 
regionalism. It retells that the shortcomings and improvements of Article XXIV result from 
a continuous process of deepening institutionalisation through the multilateral rounds of 
negotiations. 
The third lesson holds that the unsatisfactory jurisprudential solutions to normative 
ambiguities and policy contradictions weakening the authority of Article XXIV are partially 
responsible for disempowering the GATT/WTO’s control over regionalism. It accounts that 
the marginal part played by law and lawyers in the GATT/WTO governance of RTAs 
caused by the dominance of Article XXIV’s interpretative practice by policy-oriented 
experts due to the formalist jurisprudence’s disappointing solutions. This began to change 
in the 1980s with the turn-to-functionalism in the IEL field and followed up with the Article 
XXIV’s increasing legalisation and juridification as part of lawyers’ efforts to take over the 
domain of international trade law and governance. 
This Chapter provides, therefore, an account of ‘the traditional history’ and calls 
attention to its often-disregarded effects on international trade law and governance of 
multilateralism and regionalism. As suggested above, history lessons play a pivotal role as 
vehicles for transmitting a conversation that international lawyers have been involved in 
among themselves and with diplomats, policymakers, trade experts about the past, present 
and future place of regional trade regimes in relation to the world trading system. They not 
only encapsulate the descriptive and prescriptive dimensions of conventional narratives but 
also shape the understandings and meanings of WTO law and RTAs. The function of this 
traditional approach to history-telling is, therefore, to strengthen the connection between the 
past to present so as to reinforce the authority and legitimacy of the contemporary legal 
doctrine on the WTO law and governance of South-North regionalism.   
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CHAPTER 2.  THE DOCTRINE ON THE WTO LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE OF SOUTH-NORTH REGIONAL TRADE 
REGIMES  
 
Introduction 
 
This Chapter provides a comprehensive account of the legal doctrine on the WTO law and 
governance of regional trade regimes between developed and developing countries. It 
demonstrates the existence of a legal doctrine that is currently dominant within the field of 
international economic law and influential in and over the world trading system. It 
examines mainstream academic and policy literature and official documents to show that 
the contemporary legal doctrine is grounded in the traditional history of how GATT/WTO 
law is interpreted and applied to conclude and operate South-North RTAs. The 
conventional narratives (described in Chapter 1) carry with them, sometimes explicitly, 
sometimes implicitly, competing views of the relationship between multilateralism and 
regionalism, which arise from continuous debates about the history, practices and theories 
of RTAs. Specifically, the history lessons have transmitted a series of disciplinary 
understandings, meanings, concerns and preoccupations about the proper role of South-
North RTAs within the world trading system. 
The majority of international lawyers have traditionally positioned themselves 
either as supporters of free trade multilateralism or supporters of preferential trade 
regionalism; although recently some of them have sought to work out a certain compromise. 
The defence of each position – I argue – is undertaken through the competent use of a 
dominant legal doctrine, and this doctrine equally shapes the range of available positions on 
regionalism within the IEL field. As discussed in Chapter 4, my thesis adopts a narrow and 
specific understanding of the term ‘legal doctrine’. It is conceived as a coherent and stable 
framework of positive and non-positive norms and legal knowledge and techniques, which 
is devised to serve as a legitimate and authoritative mode of legal governance. Doctrinal 
analysis is regarded as an expert technique that is routinely carried out to make sense of 
states’ preferences, actions and policies, to interpret and apply international trade law, and 
to craft and interpret RTAs. It enables lawyers to argue persuasively with one another about 
the credibility or correctness of legal arguments and the consistency of RTAs with WTO 
law. It also empowers them to interact with non-legal trade specialists and policy-makers to 
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negotiate and manage RTAs. Thus, the dominant legal doctrine vests lawyers with 
legitimate authority to participate in a continuous conversation about the nature and 
functions of South-North regional trade regimes and their relations to international trade law 
and governance. 
Within the IEL field, legal doctrines are expressed in different discursive forms. 
They are traditionally embodied in scholarly (e.g. treatise, books, and articles), policy (e.g. 
expert reports, reform proposals, and preparatory work) or official (e.g. interpretative 
understandings and case law) texts. As discussed below, the legal doctrine on WTO law and 
governance of South-North regionalism has been articulated in academic works (majority) 
and policy reports (minority), which have been applied, rejected or transformed by official 
decisions reached by the WTO’s members and Dispute Settlement Body. 
The purpose of this Chapter is, therefore, to describe the dominant legal doctrine as it 
is found in mainstream literature. The doctrinal text generally begins by discussing the 
distinct concepts of trade agreements (section A). The second step is to account for the 
historical evolution and recent developments of regionalism under the multilateral trading 
system (section B). This is followed by a non-legal assessment of RTAs (section C). It then 
examines RTAs according to WTO law (section D). Section E explores the contemporary 
forms of interaction between multilateralism and regionalism. Lastly, it analyses the 
particularities of the WTO law and governance of South-North regionalism (section F). In 
conclusion, I argue that present-day South-North regional trade regimes have come to be 
negotiated, constructed and managed as variations of a single archetypical model that is 
conceptualised and practised according to, and within the limits of, this prevailing legal 
doctrine. 
 
A.  The Concept of Regional Trade Agreements 
 
The initial question that international lawyers seek to address concerns the nature, and 
appropriate naming, of the different ‘trade agreements’ between countries.87 In the WTO 
vernacular, ‘trade agreements’ are roughly understood as international treaties concluded 
between (at least) one WTO member and one or more countries, through which advantages 
and concessions are reciprocally exchanged on a non-MFN basis, aiming at advancing trade 
liberalisation and economic integration among themselves. Of the range of proposed terms, 
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four have been more commonly used to ‘name’ them: free trade agreements, customs 
unions, regional trade agreements and preferential trade agreements. 
The advantage of employing the terms ‘free trade agreements’ and ‘customs unions’ 
are twofold.88 Over the last two centuries, FTA and CU have been widely used to describe 
trade agreements and also to name them. Due to their historical acceptance and formal 
usage, these terms were enshrined (first) in the GATT and (later) in the WTO agreements. 
The formalisation of FTA and CU as legal institutions under WTO law has empowered 
them with normative authority. Conversely, it has also narrowed their descriptive power to 
the definitions established in GATT Article XXIV. The effect of formalising FTA and CU 
is to grant them prescriptive power at the cost of reducing their capacity to describe 
institutional arrangements that do not meet their formal requirements. For instance, the term 
FTA excludes necessarily CUs and other trade arrangements. Thus, the concepts FTA and 
CU are currently employed to refer solely to two specific phenomena: the ‘legal 
agreements’ that are notified to the WTO and are ideally crafted according to, and aspire to 
comply with, Article XXIV. Recent developments, concerning the shift of review authority 
from the Multilateral Review Mechanism towards the DSB89, seem to entail the assumption 
that trade agreements under the rubric of FTA and CU are prima facie consistent with WTO 
law. Consequently, to refer to the whole universe of WTO-consistent trade agreements, 
which might fall or not under Article XXIV, lawyers had to coin other terms. 
Regional trade agreements and preferential trade agreements were coined as 
general categories to encompass (almost) ‘any’ trade arrangement. Although some lawyers 
may use these terms interchangeably, each of them has a particular normative valence. 
Despite their differences, the terms PTAs and RTAs encompass FTAs and CUs, unless a 
carve-out is clearly stated. Some lawyers, who habitually employ the term ‘PTA’, conceive 
(consciously or not) ‘trade agreements’ as bilateral and plurilateral treaties devised to 
promote discriminatory trade under WTO law.90 Since these agreements create preferences 
among their partners, they impinge in turn discriminatory effects over the other WTO 
members. Hence, the term PTA is perceived by its users as providing a more accurate 
description of the trade relations undertaken under these exceptional regimes, as well as 
between PTA-partners and non-partners. 
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Other lawyers, who often use the term ‘RTA’, understand (consciously or not) 
‘trade arrangements’ as ‘non-global’, or ‘non-multilateral’, treaties consistent with WTO 
law.91 Trade agreements may be concluded among WTO members that neither need to be 
close to each other, nor need to include all countries from that geographical area. Thus, the 
adjective “regional” is almost a misnomer inherited from the postwar ideas on economic 
integration, which was employed to describe arrangements between trading partners that 
shared physical proximity. Despite potential misunderstandings, the term RTA is regarded 
as displaying two advantages. Historically, it has been widely used in mainstream literature. 
Also, it is arguably more accurate because trade arrangements do not necessarily serve to 
exchange discriminatory trade preferences. 
 
B.  The Past and Present of Regional Trade Agreements 
 
History is central for the formation, application and legitimation of the contemporary legal 
doctrine on the international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism. It builds 
a bridge between the past and present of the GATT/WTO law of RTAs, with the purpose of 
making sense of facts and assigning meaning to official texts. Historical narratives are told 
by international lawyers to identify and solve problems arising from, interpret the 
provisions of, and entrench normative missions into, WTO rules and institutions. As 
explored in Chapter 1, the history of GATT law of regionalism is mainly and foremost a 
chronicle of the sometimes tense, and sometimes complementary, interaction between 
multilateralism and regionalism. The disciplinary consensus tends to end the ‘past’ of the 
international trade law of regionalism in 1994 with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
Thus, the events following the establishment of the World Trade Organisation are 
commonly perceived as part of the present developments and so regarded as potential issues 
of global trade governance. 
In 1995, most lawyers, policymakers, and trade specialists believed that once the 
WTO came into force, RTAs would be gradually marginalised or would, at least, lose their 
relevance. This prediction never eventuated, however. The RTA activity accelerated 
dramatically following the failure of negotiations at the 1999 Seattle Ministerial 
                                                   
91 Bartels and Ortino, 2006: 1-2; Gantz, 2009: 238; Lester and Mercurio, 2009: 4-5; Bartels, 2013: para 1-
5; 4-5; Gathii, 2011a: 1, 86-87; Van den Bossche and Zdouc, 2017: 671-672.  
52 
 
Conference.92 In the immediate aftermath, the major economies launched multiple regional 
negotiations. The number of RTAs in force grew from roughly 70 in 1994 to 455 by 2017. 
All WTO members are currently partners to at least one RTA. 
Moreover, FTAs are by far the dominant type of RTA. Their scope and membership 
have expanded unprecedentedly.93 Not only has geography lost its centrality for concluding 
RTAs, but also the main focus of their policy mandate has shifted away from preferential 
reductions in manufactured goods tariffs and towards non-tariff regulation in non-goods 
subject-matters, such as trade in service, intellectual property, investment flows and others. 
The result is a new ‘wave’ of trade regionalism, which is perceived as holding unique 
features. 
First, RTAs are increasingly concluded between developing countries.94 60% of 
RTAs in force are South-South, while roughly 30% are South-North, and just 10% are 
North-North. Nonetheless, European countries were still leading in the absolute numbers of 
RTAs in 2010. The EU participated in the largest number of RTAs (30), while the EFTA 
members concluded between 20 and 22. Asian countries, which were latecomers in this 
process, showed increasing RTA activity. Singapore participated in 19 RTAs, India (12) 
and China (10). Latin America also contributed to trade regionalism: Chile concluded 26 
RTAs, Mexico (21), and Brazil (13). Other developing countries, such as Egypt (18) and 
Turkey (17), were not too far. Even the United States became more active, entering into 9 
RTAs since 2000. 
The second distinct feature is the rise in the number of cross-regional RTAs.95 As of 
2010, not only roughly 50% of RTAs in force were cross-regional, but the majority of 
RTAs that were in negotiation or signed were also cross-regional. This evidences that 
geographical location is not a fundamental determinant for concluding ‘regional’ trade 
agreements. 
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Bilateralism rather than plurilateralism has become dominant.96 By 2010, bilateral 
RTAs accounted for roughly 60% of RTA activity. There was also a pattern linking 
bilateralism and cross-regionalism. Whereas cross-regional trade regimes tended to be 
constituted by bilateral agreements, plurilateral arrangements were much more used within 
a particular region. Consequently, the doubling of cross-regional RTAs over the 2010s 
coincided with strong growth in the number of bilateral arrangements. Nonetheless, since 
2010 there have been negotiations on cross-regional RTAs involving a larger number of 
countries. The CETA, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP), TTIP, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement 
(RCEP) and the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) have been called ‘mega-regionals’ for 
envisaging plurilateral partnerships to further deep integration between countries or regions 
with a major share of world trade. 
Fourth, RTAs covering trade in goods are still the majority, but the tendency is 
moving towards to including trade in service.97 Although about 60% of RTAs in force 
concern only trade in manufactured goods and only 30% address goods and services, the 
number of RTAs covering both has more than doubled in the 2010s. 
The increasing move from ‘shallow integration’ towards ‘deep integration’ is the 
fifth trend.98 It involves shifting the focus from tariff reductions to the adoption of rules on 
‘behind-the-border’ domestic policy, such as intellectual property rights, capital investment, 
competition, public procurement, trade facilitation, and environment and labour standards. 
This tendency has not aimed at eliminating discriminatory treatment, but rather embedding 
these subject-matters into the preferential regulatory regimes established by the RTAs. The 
consequence has been an increase in the complexity of regionalism. 
The above features of contemporary RTA practice are widely accepted in 
mainstream literature. They are justified by combining empirical facts and historical causes. 
Although there are many different arguments for states to enter into RTAs, only three of 
them are widely perceived as explaining the third wave of trade regionalism.99 None of 
them, however, has succeeded in forming a widespread consensus. 
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The most common rationale asserts that the surge in RTA activity lies in the interest 
of WTO members in seeking improved market access through the exchange of tariff 
concessions.100 However, this broadly accepted justification has been contested on the 
ground that almost 71% of the world merchandise imports are subject to either zero or very 
low MFN tariffs.101 Only 4% of world trade in goods seem to be eligible for a margin of 
preference exceeding 10%, while 15% are regarded as “sensitive”, and so they will not be 
reduced through RTAs. In addition, tariff preferences have been eroded over time as the 
partners conclude other RTAs. 
Another common argument suggests that the increase in RTA numbers is a 
functional response to the challenges faced by countries in pursuing their preferences at the 
multilateral or even domestic level.102 This rationale reflects the frustration of WTO 
members in their attempts at furthering trade liberalisation through the multilateral 
negotiations. The deadlock of the Doha Round results from four structural issues: the large 
number of members, the increasing difficulties of monitoring new and subtle forms of 
protectionism, the decline of the US as the economic hegemon willing and capable of 
safeguarding the world trading system, and institutional and policy differences between the 
major trading nations. Hence, RTAs create the opportunity to agree on specific rules and 
policies not (yet or adequately) covered by the WTO, notably nontrade or behind-the-border 
areas, or to go beyond what is politically feasible at the multilateral level. 
A similar logic rests on the strategy undertaken by countries of shifting lawmaking 
initiatives from either domestic or the multilateral systems to regional venues. This tactic 
allows them to pursue their interests and lock in policies that are politically too costly to 
adopt or maintain at the domestic level.103 They aim to minimise the price for reducing the 
market-distorting policies enjoyed by politically organised domestic groups, which do not 
enjoy comparative advantage and survive from protectionism. 
In both cases, RTAs are intended to serve as sites for policy development, where 
countries can organise themselves into clusters aiming to maximise their respective 
preferences.104 Hence, RTAs offer the opportunity to move negotiations on trade 
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liberalisation to a distinct level where transaction costs and information asymmetries might 
be either reduced or more easily dealt with, and bargaining power might be aggregated to 
negotiate with more powerful partners. They also function as mechanisms for signalling the 
partners’ credible and long-term commitment to the specific set of policies and rules 
enshrined in the RTAs. 
A third, and more recent, argument reasons that WTO members may negotiate RTAs 
aiming to meet the institutional, regulatory, and governance demands posed by international 
production networks.105 The success of production networks rests on reducing the costs 
associated with the lack of sufficient infrastructure, harmonious regulatory standards, and 
sophisticated institutional apparatus. There is evidence suggesting that the formation of 
RTAs is likely to operate as a catalyst of international production networks and that these 
networks, once constituted and operational, will increase the demand for deeper integration 
through RTAs. Thus, countries aspiring to join global production networks have incentives 
to conclude RTAs. 
 
C.  The Non-Legal Assessment of RTAs 
 
From early days of the GATT until today, the legal doctrine continues to frame the general 
debate in terms of a tension between multilateralism and regionalism.106 To assess the 
benefits and costs of RTAs, lawyers tend not to resort to approaches and methods that are 
regarded as traditional within the IEL field. Rather, they import concepts, ideas, and 
techniques from other disciplines, notably economics and other policy-oriented sciences. 
This section examines the non-legal arguments and methods that have gained greater and 
greater influence in legal expertise. 
Since the previous section has discussed the current rationales that may induce 
WTO members to negotiate RTAs, the following analysis broadly addresses two critical 
questions. It begins by asking how those non-legal disciplines respond to the general 
question as to whether RTAs have a detrimental impact on trade and welfare of their 
partners and non-partners, and how these (non-)partners react. An equally relevant issue is 
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whether RTAs are beneficial or not in terms of systemic effect for the international 
economy, sovereign countries, and peoples’ lives. Thus, I will explore how legal expertise 
describes the ways non-legal disciplines address the general debate on multilateralism-
versus-regionalism. 
Before delving into the details, it is important to highlight that the general attitude 
within the IEL field is to present itself as neutral and apolitical. Few lawyers commit 
explicitly to a specific view. The majority argues that the theories, methods, and findings 
provided by non-legal literature are still inconclusive. Therefore, to avoid criticism, their 
preferred strategy is to offer a list of potential arguments in favour and against regionalism. 
It is possible, however, to foreground three key features entrenched into this tactic. 
On the one hand, non-legal arguments are understood as expressions of states’ 
preferences. The premise is that RTAs are institutional instruments for furthering partners’ 
trade policy and preference. On the other hand, non-legal arguments are often critical of the 
waves of regionalism. The assumption is that postwar international trade law was devised to 
prevent the proliferation of RTAs. However, the normative conflict between multilateralism 
and regionalism was embedded into GATT Article XXIV, rendering WTO law 
indeterminate and so ineffective.  
These non-legal understandings of how international trade law relates to states, the 
WTO and RTAs seem to contradict each other. The former position seems to embrace a 
functionalist approach, denying the WTO and RTAs any independent normative authority. 
By contrast, the latter attitude appears to adopt a formalist understanding of the WTO and 
RTAs as (quasi-)autonomous bodies of positive norms. In this sense, Article XXIV is 
ineffective not because it lacks binding force, but because its flawed disciplines bear an 
inherent normative ambiguity. As I shall discuss below, the legal doctrine creates strategies 
for hiding or suspending this contradiction. Either it overemphasises one side 
(functionalism or formalism) or creates some distance from the controversy by assuming a 
sceptical position. 
The last strategy undertaken by lawyers is to present the non-legal arguments as if 
they were options listed in a menu. This lack of historical contextualisation hides not only 
the intellectual developments in non-legal thinking and practice but also overlooks how 
these changes have shaped or not the legal doctrine. Baldwin suggests that the history of 
economic thinking on regionalism can be divided into two phases. 107 The first economic 
debate on “trade creation versus trade diversion” was developed in the 1940s-1950s as a 
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response to the first wave of regionalism.108 From 1960 to the late-1980s, this theoretical 
framework concentrated the attention of economists on a single matter as to whether 
countries should join or not RTAs.  
The second wave of regionalism not only increased the complexity of world trade 
but also called the attention to the potential systemic effects of RTAs over the brand new 
World Trade Organisation.109 The consequence was that from the late-1980s the economic 
paradigm changed to answer questions as to whether RTAs strengthen or weaken the 
multilateral trading system. The third wave of regionalism is still underway, but it seems to 
have pushed the economic thinking further into questions related to shallow and deep 
integration.110 Economists have worked particularly to incorporate the insights from 
international production networks into the reflections on regionalism. Finally, it is 
important to highlight that the debates on the non-economic goals of RTAs had historically 
preceded the economic ones, and have remained relevant up-to-date. However, for reasons I 
shall discuss later, they have been less influential in the IEL expertise. 
 
1. The Traditional Debate on the Static Effects of RTAs: Trade Creation versus 
Trade Diversion 
 
This and the next two debates share an underlying preoccupation.111 In the ideal world, the 
WTO would be successful in bringing about full free trade, ‘unleashing’ the law of 
comparative advantage that allows consumers and producers exchange goods and services 
as easily across national boundaries as within countries. However, although trade barriers 
have substantially declined since 1947, the WTO has not managed to achieve a perfect 
global free and fair market, given the different interests and preferences of its members. 
Against this backdrop, economists have asked themselves, if complete free trade were the 
ideal, any movement in that direction would be presumably beneficial. More specifically, if 
RTAs are largely free trade instruments and if free trade is beneficial, are RTAs therefore 
not beneficial almost by definition? This theory of the second best is at the core of the 
following issues. 
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The best-known controversy is whether the ‘static’ effects of the formation of RTAs 
lead primarily to ‘trade creation’ or ‘trade diversion’.112 This classic debate hinges on 
whether the reduction or removal of trade barriers through RTAs shifts the production to a 
lower-cost country (trade creation) or higher-cost country (trade diversion), based solely on 
the production costs. Since the seminal work of Jacob Viner in 1950, economic models 
have been developed and reviewed, yet conclusions on the impact of RTAs on non-partners 
are still ambiguous, demonstrating the possibility for both welfare-enhancing and welfare-
reducing RTAs.113 Similarly, empirical studies have produced conflicting results, depending 
on the methods used and the available data. Therefore, the legal doctrine often points out 
that it is not possible to determine whether the predominant effect of RTAs is one of trade 
creation or trade diversion.114 
 
2. More Recent Debates on the Static Effects of RTAs: the Spaghetti Bowl 
Phenomenon 
 
The second question concerns whether the ‘static’ effects of the RTAs proliferation cause 
the formation of distinct rules and tariff schedules in global trade governance, which in turn 
impose substantial transaction costs on importers and exporters that, ultimately, inhibit 
trade.115 First identified by Jagdish Bhagwati, this phenomenon was named the “spaghetti 
bowl” for arguably increasing complexity and divergence in international regulation, which 
culminate in reducing producers’ potential gains from free trade. Conversely, some 
economists have argued that the transaction costs imposed by RTAs might not deter trade, 
since identifying the applicable tariff rates is not burdensome, while producers always have 
the choice to export under WTO rules. Hence, the spaghetti bowl cannot diminish welfare 
beyond the overall regulation established by the WTO. Nonetheless, the grossly incomplete 
and inaccurate information has limited empirical studies on this matter leaving the issue 
unsolved. 
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3. The Systemic Debate on the Dynamic Effects of RTAs: Building Blocs 
versus Stumbling Blocs 
 
The third problem focuses on how the ‘dynamic’ effects of the formation of RTAs impact 
the future course of multilateral trade liberalisation.116 As ‘building blocs’, RTAs are 
regarded as instruments for furthering trade liberalisation by establishing incentives that 
lead countries to oppose protectionism and attain the WTO goals. As ‘stumbling blocs’, 
RTAs are conceived as instruments that divert trade and clash with the WTO goals. The 
“dynamic time-path question” suggests that RTA proliferation could affect the trajectory of 
multilateral liberalisation in two ways, by expanding RTA memberships and by accelerating 
or decelerating the pace of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN). 
Regarding the first process, economics provides two opposing claims.117 Grounded 
in domino theory and excluding MTN, the pro-RTA argument speculates that the formation 
of an RTA creates incentives for non-partners to seek membership. Over time, the 
incentives to join grow as the membership expands. This domino effect causes an RTA to 
move from a regional towards a global regime. Conversely, the competing argument 
suggests that, in some circumstances, existing RTA-partners have few incentives to allow 
new countries to join. Based on Cournot-oligopoly models, RTA-partners are expected to 
attain a welfare peak before reaching the universal membership, at which point they will 
have incentives to block further expansions. 
Conventional economics has not found solutions for the second process concerning 
the interaction between RTA formation and MTN.118 Instead, alternative theories and 
approaches have offered compelling responses suggesting that RTA surges are likely to 
hamper multilateral liberalisation. From a negotiation theory viewpoint, the possibility of 
concluding an RTA if MTN fail is likely to increase a country’s negotiating position in the 
WTO round. However, the ‘regional option’ is also likely to narrow the bargaining zone to 
the potential RTA partners, impacting negatively the prospect for multilateral liberalisation. 
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The political economy literature offers two views. From an international 
perspective, RTAs are likely to hinder multilateral liberalisation for two reasons.119 Where 
WTO members enjoy existing or potential regional market access, they are likely to face 
weaker incentives to pursue liberalisation through MTN. Likewise, where WTO members 
are highly dependent on regional market access, they are likely to have stronger incentives 
to resist to MTN to maintain their preferential margin. Nonetheless, the contrary argument 
suggests that a process of competitive liberalisation could result from a widespread trade 
regionalism. 
From a domestic political economy standpoint, the main argument is that frequent 
engagement in regional negotiations reduces the prospect for multilateral liberalisation 
since RTA-making causes internal trade anxiety and fatigue.120 Grounded in the bicycle 
theory, the opposing argument asserts that it is imperative to sustain momentum towards 
trade liberalisation by either multilateral or regional routes. The aim is to make producers 
understand that any preferential margin will be short-lived due to continuous avenues of 
liberalisation. Thus, RTAs might assist politicians temporarily to satisfy domestic producers 
when faced with resistance to pursuing an agenda of multilateral liberalisation. 
Furthermore, RTAs could contribute to governments by ‘locking-in’ free trade policies at 
the domestic level. They may operate as stronger mechanisms making future protectionist 
measures politically undesirable and economically costly. 
Taking into consideration the above political economy approaches to the dynamic 
path question, some empirical studies support the claim that RTAs operate as ‘stumbling 
blocs’, while others as ‘building blocs’.121 Notwithstanding, the legal doctrine once again 
asserts that the question is still unsolved and so in need for further theoretical and empirical 
research. 
 
4. The Systemic Debate on the Relationship between Economic Integration 
and RTAs: Shallow Integration and Deep Integration 
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The fourth and the most recent issue is concerned with the implications of ‘deep-
integration’ RTAs for the world trading system.122 Over the last three decades, regional 
trade agreements have gradually shifted their focus from the reduction of tariffs and border 
measures toward the adoption of regulations on ‘behind-the-border’ domestic policy. RTAs 
that mostly deal with border measures are conceived as promoters of ‘shallow’ integration, 
while the ones dealing with rules on domestic policies are regarded as vehicles of ‘deep’ 
integration. Different from the above debates on the effects of ‘shallow-integration’ RTAs 
on trade flows, the issues arising from the expansion of ‘deep-integration’ regionalism have 
two distinct, but interrelated, dimensions: the policy coverage and the institutional depth of 
RTAs. 
Furthermore, the deep-integration RTAs have been examined from two different 
angles.123 The first approach has found out that deep integration increases the difficulty of 
determining whether RTAs promote trade-creation or trade-diversion. Combining welfare 
economics with international production networks, the pro-regionalism argument asserts 
that deep-integration RTAs serve to maintain trade and improve welfare once countries gain 
the possibility of exporting and importing not only final goods but also components along 
the supply chain. An RTA might be welfare-reducing for a partner that was unable to 
compete with other partners’ final products; however, if the latter partner managed to trade 
in parts and components along a production network, then the effects of RTAs could 
become welfare-improving. However, the reverse reasoning could also be true. Since the 
possibility of trading components used in the production of final products affects the 
calculation of trade creation and trade diversion, the welfare implication is still deemed to 
be unsettled. 
The second approach focuses on the potential implications of the constitution of 
supranational public goods under deep-integration RTAs.124 These agreements may serve as 
supranational platforms for policy and regulatory harmonisation and institution creation. 
Such measures may be welfare increasing for (some stronger) RTA-partners, but they may 
also entail adverse effects over (weaker) partners and third countries. From an intra-RTA 
perspective, developing-country partners may be under pressure to adopt trade or non-trade 
rules and policies that are detrimental to their interests. From an extra-RTA viewpoint, 
deep-integration RTAs may be beneficial to the world trading system since they may adopt 
rules and policies that go beyond and deeper than WTO law. Also, they can serve as 
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laboratories for future WTO disciplines. However, this new regulation may also result in 
both discrimination, which would hinder trade liberalisation, and path dependencies, 
creating advantage for those states whose interests are crystalised in deep-integration RTAs. 
Since the debate over shallow and deep integration addresses new frontiers in economic 
integration via RTAs, the issues underlying it are still unsettled. 
 
5. The Debate on the Non-Economic Goals of RTAs: Narrow Mandate versus 
Broad Mandate 
 
It is not only economic objectives that are pursued through RTAs.125 Rather, RTAs can also 
pursue goals that do not fall strictly under foreign economic policy. Historically, a broad 
range of objectives, policies, rules and institutions have been qualified as non-economic. 
They are as diverse as peace and security, labour and environment, and development aid.126 
The fifth problem focuses, therefore, on the use of RTAs for non-economic objectives.  
The pro-argument asserts that RTAs might serve as a medium to pursue peace, 
security and stability in a region, by increasing political, economic or cultural ties and 
confidence among partners. The most successful example has been the European Union, 
while other non-European initiatives (e.g. ASEAN in Asia, SADC in Africa and Mercosur 
in Latin America) have also set forth non-economic objectives in their constitutive 
agreements. Recently, developed countries have demanded in their negotiations with 
developing countries that non-economic goals be included in RTAs. For instance, the 
NAFTA has established environmental and labour standards.  
Nevertheless, the use of RTAs to govern non-economic objectives have proved 
historically to be dangerous.127 The interwar period teaches that such political regionalism 
might lead up to destructive antagonism, trade wars and armed conflicts. Thus, the contrary 
argument claims that a strong commitment to multilateralism is the best solution to avoid 
RTAs to generate non-economic conflicts.  
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6. The Contradiction Underlying Non-Legal Arguments 
 
The five non-legal topics summarise how legal doctrine foregrounds certain issues in the 
debates over RTAs, and how it positions different views of these issues in relation to one 
another. Of course, they are not intended to be an exhaustive list of questions and answers 
discussed in mainstream literature, but they aim to represent the sort of problems, theories, 
and methods that have attracted the attention of the majority of lawyers. The above 
summary reveals that recent scholarly works do not reach definitive responses to the posed 
issues. 
My analysis of this rich, but inconclusive, set of non-legal arguments seems to 
highlight the contradiction of their assumptions. This interdisciplinary scholarship purports 
to reconcile its ‘scientific’ commitment to describing and explaining the formation and 
operation of RTAs on the grounds of state preference with its ‘normative’ pledge to sustain 
the world trading system devised to facilitate the development of a global market to 
function as a critical driver for prosperity and welfare. 
Mainstream literature aspires to find in non-legal arguments a firmer and less 
subjective basis for lawmaking and interpretation. The strategy is to integrate policy-
oriented sciences into legal expertise with the purpose of offering a scientific framework of 
analysis to determine why and how states conclude RTAs, or when RTAs are more likely to 
be advantageous or harmful to their partners. These questions are put forward not as an 
intellectual puzzle but from the perspective of WTO members, with stakes to improve or 
reduce domestic and/or international welfare as a result of decisions on whether to conclude 
RTAs. This turn to policy-oriented reasoning comes with a firm commitment to formalist 
assumptions, including to rational analysis and methodological individualism that are 
expected to provide useful ways for understanding the actual or potential consequences of 
the WTO law and governance and the proliferation of RTAs. 
However, re-imagining the WTO and RTAs as institutional instruments for 
pursuing individual economic interests entails a number of problems that were raised above. 
The most important for the legal debates that I shall examine below derives from the 
attempts of combining positive (i.e. scientific-neutral-apolitical) descriptions with 
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normative individualism and intentionalism128 of WTO members. This trend in non-legal 
reasoning correlates the issues of “effectiveness”, “efficiency” and “compliance” of WTO 
law and governance with the third wave of regionalism, which is regarded as reflecting a 
new economic pattern of (actual or presumed) preferences and behaviours of welfare-
maximiser WTO members. This understanding directs the argumentation for or against the 
creation and design of RTA or reforms to, or interpretation of, the WTO disciplines. 
Moreover, mainstream literature is committed to the world trading system. Policy-
oriented sciences are deployed to ensure that the proliferation of RTAs does not jeopardise 
the normative project for a global market. The scientific framework is used to determine 
whether, when and how RTAs are detrimental or complementary to the development of a 
global free and fair marketplace under the WTO. As the legal order devised to regulate the 
creation and operation of RTAs, WTO law is entrusted with the authority to prevent the 
third wave of regionalism from reducing general welfare or constraining the formation of a 
global market. This conception of the WTO and RTAs also raise a number of issues that 
were discussed above. The central aspect for the legal debates is the efforts to associate 
scientific descriptions with normative functionalism of the WTO. Likewise, problems of 
“effectiveness,” “efficiency” and “compliance” of WTO law and governance are linked to 
the third wave of regionalism.  
However, the recent surge in RTA-activity is not understood as a manifestation of 
state preference. Instead, it is interpreted as a behavioural deviation threatening the world 
trading system, since its systemic effects are not only welfare-reducing but also erosive of 
the fundamental purpose of developing a global market. This trend in non-legal reasoning 
tends to argue for or against RTA grounded in the normative ideal of constituting a global 
marketplace through WTO law. 
As shall be more evident below, these contradictory claims, unsettled debates and 
provisional conclusions in non-legal assessments of RTA play a central role in framing 
lawyers’ understanding and interaction with regionalism through legal expertise. Their gaps 
and shortcomings open the possibility for lawyers to strategically rework them as legal 
arguments to be used against or in favour of RTAs. In this sense, non-legal topics are 
translated into legal issues, to which WTO law is applied, with the purpose of providing 
solutions in the form of legal arguments or decisions. Thus, the continuous interplay 
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between legal and non-legal disciplines through the production of knowledge and practical 
applications has shaped the WTO law doctrine on South-North regionalism. 
 
D.  The Legal Assessment of RTAs 
 
The above non-legal analyses are mostly interested in understanding the political-economy 
and welfare implications of RTAs. They tend to remove, or abstract as much as possible the 
impact of, international trade law from their consideration. Conversely, the IEL field shifts 
the legal assessment to the other extreme by focusing primarily (and almost exclusively) on 
GATT Article XXIV for RTAs concerning trade in goods, and secondarily on GATS 
Article V for RTAs involving trade in service, and on the Enabling Clause for South-South 
RTAs.129 
The consensual understanding is that Article XXIV expresses the attempt of the 
drafters to strike a balance between two contradictory projects for governing world trade: 
free trade multilateralism and preferential regionalism.130 The compromise was embedded 
into Article XXIV:4 providing that “the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the 
development, through [RTAs], of closer integration between the economies of the countries 
parties to such agreements,” on the one hand; and “the purpose of a [RTA] should be to 
facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of 
other contracting parties with such territories,” on the other hand.  
As examined in detail below, this normative ambiguity has been governed by the 
rules of Article XXIV. From 1947 up to date, the continuous practice has progressively 
institutionalised Article XXIV as a legal regime for balancing formal and substantive 
considerations concerning the relationship between the WTO and RTAs. Nonetheless, 
Article XXIV has been widely regarded as weak and ineffective.131 The consequence is that 
most of the legal questions related to it have remained unresolved. The remaining of this 
section describes and analyses the dominant understandings of and around the teleological, 
substantive and procedural aspects of the WTO law of regionalism. 
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1. The Legal Purpose of RTAs 
 
One of the most long-standing debates concerns whether Article XXIV imposes an overall 
legal purpose to RTAs, and their place within the world trading system. The controversy 
lies in whether Article XXIV:4 disciplines ex ante the legal purpose of RTAs. Indeed, 
paragraph 4 could be understood as either prescribing a test for the legality of RTAs, or 
providing guidance for interpreting Article XXIV, or even setting forth a supplementary 
provision intended to fill gaps in Article XXIV.132 
Although the Article XXIV Understanding had failed in resolving the ambiguity, 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body settled the controversy in Turkey – Restrictions on 
Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey–Textiles). The Appellate Body (AB) 
found that Article XXIV:4 does not set forth an operative test for assessing the purpose of 
RTAs.133 Nonetheless, its decision held that the entire text of Article XXIV must be 
interpreted in light of the purposive language of paragraph 4. Therefore, the substantive and 
procedural requirements enshrined in Article XXIV:5-9 should be regarded as rules devised 
to facilitate trade between the constituent partners and not to raise barriers to the trade 
between third countries and such partners. 
Furthermore, it is commonly accepted that Article XXIV was devised to authorise 
the establishment of RTAs under the GATT regime.134 The wording of Article XXIV:4 
seems to leave no doubt that it creates an exception to the MFN obligation enshrined in 
GATT Article I:1. With the establishment of the WTO, the question of whether Article 
XXIV sets forth an exception to other provisions as well was raised. In Turkey–Textiles, the 
AB responded in the affirmative holding that “Article XXIV may justify a measure which is 
inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions.”135 The consequence is that Article XXIV 
assumes that RTAs are inherently compatible with free trade multilateralism and that they 
perform a legitimate function within the world trading system. 
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2. The Partners to RTAs 
 
Article XXIV disciplines RTAs concluded among WTO members. Two assumptions 
underlie this rule. First, Article XXIV is not applicable to RTAs between a WTO member 
and a non-member. To conclude an RTA with a non-member, a WTO member must obtain 
an Article-XXIV:10 waiver. However, the practice changed GATT/WTO law requiring 
WTO members also to notify RTAs with non-members according to the Article XXIV 
procedures.136 
The second premise rests on the principles of formal sovereign equality and 
reciprocity enshrined in Article XXIV:5. Article XXIV does not distinguish RTA partners 
according to economic development.137 Unless the partners declare to be all developing 
countries and invoke the Enabling Clause, Article XXIV should apply to their RTA. The 
joint effect of these regimes is to establish an institutional division of authority based on 
legal identity ascribed to members under WTO law. Article XXIV governs North-North and 
South-North RTAs, while the Enabling Clause regulates South-South RTAs. Article 7 of 
the Enabling Clause establishes a continuous process of ‘reclassification’ by which a WTO 
member may ‘graduate’ from the ‘special and differentiated’ condition once it reaches a 
certain level of development. The consequence of the graduation is to subject the now 
‘developed’ member to the disciplines of Article XXIV. The disputes about the relationship 
between Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause have never been directly raised by or before 
the DSB, nor extensively discussed in mainstream literature. 
 
3. Substantive Conditions 
 
(a) Internal Conditions 
 
The core rules disciplining the internal conditions for the formation and operation of WTO-
consistent RTAs are enshrined in Article XXIV:8.138 They determine the nature and degree 
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of trade liberalisation required of FTAs and CUs. Unsurprisingly, the text of paragraph 8 is 
very ambiguous raising controversies over a number of relevant terms and definitions. 
Under Article XXIV:8, an FTA is “a group of two or more customs territories in 
which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce […] are eliminated on 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such 
territories.” A CU adopts similar definition and goes a step further requiring its partners to 
establish a common external tariff, which shall apply “substantially the same duties and 
other regulations of commerce” to non-partners. 
 
“Duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce” 
One unsettled aspect of Article XXIV:8 concerns the expression “duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce.” The question is whether the term “duty” refers to 
bound or applied rates of duty. The WTO agreement and case law are silent. Yet, the 
Article XXIV Understanding, reaffirmed by the AB’s decision in Turkey—Textiles, 
determines that the term “duty” in Article XXIV:5 must be interpreted as applied rather 
than bounded rates of duty.139 Although neither of them addresses Article XXIV:8, it is 
likely that similar interpretation applies to it.140 
Even vaguer is the expression “other restrictive regulations of commerce” (ORRC). 
Under Article XXIV:8(a)(i) and 8(b), ORRC must also be eliminated on substantially all the 
trade. Again, the WTO agreement and case law have not addressed this definition directly. 
Instead, the Panel in Turkey—Textiles interprets the term “other regulation of commerce” 
(ORC) under Article XXIV:5 and 8(a)(ii), in reference to the external requirement, to mean 
“any regulation having an impact on trade.” 141 In contrast to “duties,” this interpretation is 
very unlikely to be applied to internal conditions, since such an expansive understanding of 
ORRC, combined with “substantially all the trade” requirement, would ultimately command 
all RTAs to implement what is regarded as an internal single market regime.142 To avoid 
this excessive intervention, ORRC has been reconceived as a subset of ORC, with the term 
“restrictive” serving to limit its effects. Thus, the current debate aims to determine whether 
the meaning of ORRC encompasses either border measures between the parties only, or 
some internal measures that discriminate against the goods of CU-partners, or all regulatory 
measures. 
                                                   
139 Turkey–Textiles AB Report: para 53, 58. 
140 Trebilcock et al, 2012: 102-103; Bartels, 2013: para 21, 24; Matsushita et al, 2015: 520-521; 
Trebilcock, 2015: 46-47; Van den Bossche and Zdouc, 2017: 683. 
141 WTO, Turkey–Textiles Panel Report: para 9.120. 
142 Trebilcock et al, 2012: 103-104; Bartels, 2013: para 21; Matsushita et al, 2015: 521-522. 
69 
 
 
“Substantially all the trade” (SAT) 
Under Article XXIV:8, the term “substantially all the trade,” on which barriers between the 
parties must be eliminated, is very controversial.143 Indeed, the AB acknowledged in 
Turkey—Textiles that WTO members had never reached a consensus on its meaning.144 
There are two outstanding questions concerning its interpretation. One is whether this 
definition should be understood in pure quantitative (focusing only on the volume of trade 
liberalised among the partners) or also qualitatively (concerning which specific sectors are 
covered under an RTA) terms. This issue was settled in Turkey–Textile, which finds that the 
meaning of “substantially” in Article XXIV:8(a) refers to quantitative and qualitative 
components.145 
The other question is of what degree of liberalisation, quantitatively or qualitatively, 
is required to satisfy Article-XXIV:8 requirement. This issue has remained unresolved, 
however. Turkey–Textile holds “that [the term] ‘substantially all the trade’ is not the same 
as all the trade, and also [it] is something considerably more than merely some of the 
trade.”146 Although this decision confers WTO members with some flexibility to impose 
restrictive measures consistent with WTO law, it is regarded as having ultimately failed in 
providing clear limits.147 
With regard to the application of the qualitative element, a controversial issue arises 
concerning the segments of trade that must be covered by an RTA to satisfy the SAT test.148 
In 1960, the consistency of the Stockholm Convention with the GATT was assessed by a 
working party, holding that the SAT test requires that no relevant sector of trade can be left 
out of an RTA.149 Despite the importance of such ambiguity, no substantial progress was 
achieved under the GATT. The Article XXIV Understanding acknowledges that the 
expansion of world trade is diminished “if any major sector of trade is excluded.” Although 
the dominant view is that the qualitative component of “substantially all the trade” demands 
that no important segment be excluded from internal liberalisation of an RTA, neither WTO 
case law nor practice has validated such understanding. Rather, the long-standing history of 
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regionalism under the GATT/WTO regime shows that RTAs tend to exclude partially or 
entirely major economic sectors, notably trade in agriculture, which would likely be found 
in violation of Article XXIV:8(a)(b). Partially for his reason, some WTO members have 
proposed, without reaching a consensus, a stricter qualitative test for SAT, which should 
prevent major economic segments be excluded from liberalisation. Nonetheless, a General 
Council’s decision implicitly suggests that the qualitative requirement does not require 
liberalisation of all trade involved.150 
Regarding the quantitative component, the issue concerns the volume of trade that 
must be liberalised by an RTA to meet the SAT standard.151 Neither WTO case law nor the 
Article XXIV Understanding addresses the problem. Yet, a broad understanding, but not a 
consensus, has been formed around the range of 80-90%. The quantitative element has 
recently become subject to an intense dispute. Specifically, the EU and ACP countries 
debated the issue throughout the negotiations leading up to the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA). The controversy was over the EU’s insistence, contrary to the claims of 
the ACP countries152, that a minimum degree of 80% of liberalisation must be achieved by 
the RTA-partners to ensure WTO compliance. 
Therefore, after more than fifty years of negotiations and practice153, WTO 
members have failed to agree on a workable definition for SAT. The literature points out 
that the interpretative disputes might have arisen from the lack of clear policy objectives 
embodied in the term SAT.154 Economically, a comprehensive RTA is not necessarily more 
beneficial than a partial RTA for world trade.155 If an RTA is trade-diverting, demanding it 
to be more comprehensive may diminish global welfare. From a political economy 
perspective, the comprehensiveness requirement aims to increase the costs and difficulties 
to create RTAs.156 By containing the proliferation of RTAs, the WTO would reduce the 
possibility of a return to the interwar world of discriminatory and preferential agreements. 
Another argument is that the comprehensiveness requirement prevents countries from 
concluding RTAs covering only their competitive sectors, while shielding their politically 
sensitive segments from liberalisation.157 Thus, the political economy arguments tend to 
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support the comprehensiveness requirement on the ground of it leads to the reduction of 
trade diversion while enhancing global welfare.158 
 
(b) External Conditions 
 
The external requirement disciplining the relationship of RTAs to non-partner WTO 
members is under Article XXIV:5 and 8(a)(ii).159 Whereas adverse effects on trade with 
third countries is an almost inevitable consequence of RTAs, this does not mean that CUs 
and FTAs need to increase or impose new barriers to trade with non-partner WTO 
members.  
Paragraph 5 of Article XXIV prescribes that the “duties and other regulations of 
commerce” imposed on non-partners after the creation of an RTA should not be “higher or 
more restrictive” than before. In practice, the formation of an FTA does not require any 
change in the external trade policies of its partners, so FTA-partners are entitled to set up 
unilaterally their foreign commercial policy. Still, Article XXIV:5(b) precludes individual 
trade instruments from becoming more restrictive after the formation of an FTA. By 
contrast, the establishment of a CU requires some degree of harmonisation of a common 
external policy (CEP). For this reason, Article XXIV:8(a)(ii) requires CUs to apply 
“substantially the same duties and other regulations of commerce” to non-partners. 
 
“The provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent […] the formation of a customs union 
or of a free-trade area” 
Article XXIV:5 asserts that GATT provisions shall not prevent the formation of a CU.160 
While the AB in Turkey–Textiles held that Article XXIV can justify certain WTO 
violations, it interpreted Article XXIV:4 and 5 as imposing a test of necessity, aiming to 
assess whether inconsistent measures would make impossible the formation of a CU.161 
This two-prong test requires CU-partners claiming the benefit to demonstrate that (i) the 
inconsistent measure is introduced upon the formation of a CU in full compliance with 
Articles XXIV:8(a) and 5(a), and (ii) the formation of the CU would be prevented if it were 
not allowed to introduce the measure at issue. 
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“Duties and other regulations of commerce” 
As examined above162, the term “duties” in Article XXIV:5 refers to applied, rather than 
bound, rates of duty. Also discussed above, the wording “other regulations of commerce” 
has important ambiguities, which were addressed in Turkey–Textiles. The Panel held that 
the meaning of ORC encompasses “any regulation having an impact on trade,” but noted 
that, given “the dynamic nature of [RTAs]”, it is an “evolving concept.”163 Thus, in contrast 
to Article XXIV:8 that refers to “other restrictive regulations,” Article XXIV:5(b) contains 
no exhaustive list of regulations of commerce. 
 
“Higher or more restrictive” 
Article XXIV:5 precludes RTA-partners to apply duties and ORCs that are “higher or more 
restrictive” than those applied before the creation of an RTA. It regulates FTAs and CUs 
slightly different as to reflect their unique characteristics. 
Article XXIV:5(a) specifies that “the duties and other regulations of commerce 
imposed at the institution of [a CU] […] shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive 
than the general incidence of the duties and regulations” applicable before its formation. 
This wording reflects the special quality of CUs, which requires the adoption of a CEP 
through a process of adjustment in the constituent CU-partners’ policies.164 Considering that 
the CEP results from the harmonisation of existing unilateral tariffs of CU-partners, the 
formation of a CU is likely to impose greater trade barriers for third parties with respect to 
one of the constituent partners, while it is expected other third parties benefit from lower 
barriers. Through the terms “on the whole” and “general incidence,” Article XXIV:5(a) 
grants some flexibility to the formation of CUs by accepting particular trade barriers may 
increase as far as the overall effect of the CEP does not increase the constraints on trade 
with third parties.  
Although Article XXIV:5(a) provides no assessment test for determining whether 
duties and ORCs increase “on the whole” after the creation of a CU, paragraph 3 of the 
Article XXIV Understand prescribes an ‘economic test’ to assess the consistency of CUs 
with Article XXIV. In Turkey—Textiles165, both the Panel and AB endorsed the economic 
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test to compare the extent of trade restriction before and after the formation of a CU; 
however, its application remained underspecified. The DSB provided no adequate answer 
as to how to evaluate individual ORCs and how to determine whether their overall effect 
would cause the violation of Article XXIV:5(a). 
The rule on external trade barriers for FTAs is provided under Article XXIV:5(b).166 
The key difference from the discipline on CU is that the term “on whole” is lacking and the 
wording “the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce” is replaced by 
“the corresponding duties and regulations of commerce.” These divergences express the 
distinct institutional design of CUs and FTAs. While CUs require a CEP, FTAs do not. The 
consequence is that rather than the overall ‘economic test’, a measure-by-measure approach 
to the external requirement applies to an FTA under Article XXIV:5(b) to determine 
whether the “duties and other regulations of commerce” imposed on third parties by each 
constituent partner are not higher or more restrictive after the formation of the FTA than 
before. 
 
“Substantially the same” 
Article XXIV:8(a)(ii) requires CU-partners to apply “substantially the same duties and 
other regulations of commerce” to third parties.167 Although the Article XXIV 
Understanding does not address the meaning of this requirement, the DSB clarifies it in 
Turkey—Textiles in two ways.168 First, “substantially the same” bears both a qualitative and 
quantitative component. Second, this term grants constituent CU-partners some flexibility 
in implementing a CEP, since it allows them to adopt quantitative restrictions under a 
special transition regime. 
 
(c) Rules of Origin (RoO) 
 
RoO are key institutions devised to implement FTAs and CUs.169 If goods and services 
were entirely exchanged on the MFN basis, it would not be necessary to determine their 
origin. However, WTO law allows its importing members to apply distinct RoO, which 
entail different treatment to products depending on the territory from where they were 
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produced or substantially transformed. Although the WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin170 
establishes various RoO for certain situations in which the MFN treatment is suspended, it 
does not regulate them under RTAs, leaving entirely up to the partners’ discretion. 
The purpose of RoO is to distinguish between products originating in the territory of 
a partner, and so entitled to the advantages provided under the RTA, and products 
originating in the territory of a non-partner.171 In FTAs, RoO are central to ensure the 
integrity of the RTA, which could be undermined by a problem known as ‘trade reflection’. 
That is the process in which a non-partner exporter routes its products through the market of 
an FTA-partner with lower external tariff in order to take advantage of the tariff differential. 
Hence, RoO are established to prevent trade reflection by requiring products to qualify for 
tariff-free trade. This is achieved by imposing minimum levels of domestic content or 
substantial transformation in order to a good be designed as originating within a partner’s 
territory rather than only passing through it. In CUs, RoO perform a special function of 
assisting the partners to maintain a CEP that is “substantially the same” but not identical. In 
Turkey—Textile, Turkey was authorised to adopt a different external policy on textiles 
import from the EU; however, this solution was only possible because the products at 
dispute did not constitute a substantial amount of trade for the purpose of Article 
XXIV:8(a)(i)-(ii).172 
A relevant, but unsolved, question concerns the protectionist use of RoO in 
RTAs.173 Origin designation rules could be employed to exclude from preferential treatment 
under RTAs products that use non-partners’ inputs. The issue is, thus, whether RoO may be 
used to determine the amount of trade that must be liberalised under Article XXIV:8. If 
RoO were regarded ORRC, then they could be subject to the Article XXIV:8 requirement 
of eliminating restrictive regulation of commerce with respect to “substantially all trade.” 
The result would be to assess whether RoO restrict too large fraction of trade. Similarly, it 
raises the issue of whether RoO could be qualified as ORC under Article XXIV:5. If so, the 
formation of RTA could not lead to the adoption of RoO that would be “higher or more 
restrictive” than those previously applied. Another issue is related to the potential 
protectionist effects on non-partners’ exports entailed by the changes to existing RoO under 
RTAs. If more restrictive RoO under RTAs were adopted, they could be regarded as an 
ORC, and so in violation of Article XXIV:5.174 
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4. Interim Agreements 
 
Article XXIV also disciplines interim agreements leading to completed RTAs within a 
“reasonable length of time.”175 The purpose of interim agreements is to grant to constituent 
partners reasonable time to adjust from unilateral trade policies to full implementation of an 
FTA or CU. During this period, they might fall short of the standards and requirements 
established under Article XXIV. Although Article XXIV:5(c) does not define “reasonable 
length of time, ” paragraph 3 of the Article XXIV Understanding clarifies that it “should 
exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases.” In practice, there is no consensus on the 
meaning of “exceptional cases,” and so this maximum period is regularly exceeded, in some 
cases by up to 20 years.176 
 
5. Procedural Conditions  
 
The procedural requirements provided in Article XXIV and their respective implementation 
have proven challenging.177 Three key aspects are examined in this section: notification, 
‘multilateral’ review by the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements and ‘judicial’ 
review by the Dispute Settlement Body. 
 
(a) Notification 
 
Under Article XXIV:7, WTO members deciding to conclude an RTA have to notify the 
WTO of their intention to do so.178 Specifically, notification must be submitted to the 
CRTA if an RTA is North-North and South-North, and between a WTO member and a non-
WTO member. The text of Article XXIV:5 sets forth that only a WTO member is entitled to 
constitute WTO-consistent RTAs. Consequently, unless justified under XXIV:10, RTAs 
with non-WTO members would entail that any advantage granted would have to be 
automatically and unconditionally extended to all WTO members. However, Matsushita et 
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al. explain that trade practice has evolved to ensure that the notification by any WTO 
member to an RTA prevents the operation of MFN clause. 
Furthermore, there is a controversy over the formation of a dual-notification regime. 
South-South RTAs must be notified under the Enabling Clause to the Committee on Trade 
and Development (CTD) and so not to the CRTA. Nonetheless, the Mercosur notification 
was also submitted to the CRTA under Article XXIV. Some developing countries 
challenged this practice of dual notification, which remains an unresolved issue.179  
The text of Article XXIV:7(a) suggests that the constituent partners to an RTA 
should notify the WTO as early as possible and, in any case, immediately following its 
ratification.180 Nonetheless, due to the lack of retroactive remedies in WTO law, the 
practice is that notifications can take place after the entry in force of the RTA. This 
understanding was later institutionalised by a decision of the General Council.181 Yet, the 
WTO noted in 2016 that 72 RTAs, which were in force, had never been notified.182 
 
(b) Multilateral Review Mechanism 
 
The multilateral review mechanism operates under Article XXIV:7.183 Since 1947, it has 
undergone considerable transformations. Article XXIV:7 grants WTO members authority to 
make recommendations on notified RTAs. Before the WTO, ad hoc working parties were 
established to examine the consistency of notified-RTAs with GATT law and then to report 
to the GATT Council.184 Each RTA “should be considered on its own merits. The case 
under consideration could not create a precedent.”185 The Council was expected to adopt the 
report; however, history proved that the multilateral review mechanism did not fulfil its 
mandate.186 Starting with the notification of the South Africa-Southern Rhodesia Customs 
Union in 1949, crystallised in the examination of the Treaty of Rome, and reproduced by 
over fifty working parties, the diplomatic consensus reached by the contracting-parties was 
that a unanimous conclusion or endorsement that a specific RTA met the Article XXIV:7 
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requirement was almost impossible.187 Indeed, only six decisions found RTAs consistent 
with GATT law, and none was held inconsistent.188 Despite the apparent ineffectiveness, 
the multilateral review mechanism was in fact used by GATT contracting-parties, which 
were non-partners to the notified RTA under examination, to express their concerns and 
negotiate changes.189 
In 1994, the Article XXIV Understanding reformed the multilateral review 
mechanism aiming to increase the effectiveness of the Council for Trade in Goods in 
examining the notified-RTAs. To improve the review proceedings, the WTO General 
Council established the CRTA in 1996, a permanent mechanism mandated to produce a 
report and recommendations on notified RTAs.190 However, the CRTA proved once again 
to be unsatisfactory. Between 1995 and 2007, it did manage to complete the factual 
examination of a total of 66 RTAs, of which 45 in the area of trade in goods and 21 in trade 
in services.191 However, no report has ever been agreed upon for subsequent transmission to 
the Council for Trade in Goods. This was partly due to continuing disagreements over the 
ambiguities of Article XXIV, lack of information provided by the RTA-partners, and the 
fact that a report can only be approved by positive consensus by all WTO members, 
including the RTA-partners that are likely to refuse any changes. 
A further effort took place in 2006, resulting in the establishment of the new 
Transparency Mechanism.192 The Transparency Decision set forth new procedural 
obligations. It also shifted the central authority from the CRTA to the WTO Secretariat.193 It 
mandated the Secretariat to elaborate the factual presentation based primarily, but not 
exclusively, on information provided by the RTA-partners. The CRTA serves now only to 
hold a single meeting at which notified-RTAs are considered. The Transparency 
Mechanism has not increased the effectiveness of the multilateral review mechanism but 
rather turned it into a mere exercise in transparency. Thus, the purpose of the Transparency 
Decision was to increase the amount of information about RTAs, while introducing an 
institutional reform that in practice shifted the burden of assessing the consistency of 
notified-RTAs to the DSB. 
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(c) Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
 
Considering the failure of the multilateral review mechanism, the Dispute Settlement Body 
is left as the only procedure empowered to determine the consistency of RTAs with WTO 
law.194 The DSB is the (quasi-)judicial review mechanism of the WTO with authority to 
adopt binding decisions. Thus, it can be required by a WTO member to resolve disputes 
concerning the consistency of notified-RTAs with WTO law. Nonetheless, relatively few 
cases have so far been brought before the DSB.195 
Up-to-date, some important issues have been decided by the DSB. The first was the 
questions concerning the authority of the DSB over disputes involving Article XXIV. Until 
the adoption of the Article XXIV Understanding, there was a debate over whether the 
GATT dispute settlement had jurisdiction over such matters. Although GATT panels 
faltered (or perhaps prevaricated) on the issue196, paragraph 12 of the Article XXIV 
Understanding provides that dispute settlement proceedings may be used for “any matters 
arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to [RTA]”. This 
understanding was directly reaffirmed by the Appellate Body in Turkey—Textiles197, and 
indirectly in several other cases.198 
Moreover, the second issue concerned the conditions under which Article XXIV 
could be invoked as a defence to adopt WTO-inconsistent measures when members are 
constituting an RTA.199 In Turkey–Textiles, the AB held that the burden of establishing that 
the challenged RTA meets the requirements of Article XXIV falls on the respondent WTO 
member, since it invokes the exception as a defence to justify a discriminatory measure. 
Finally, the DSB was also called to decide on controversies over the meaning of central 
terms of Article XXIV: 4200, 5201 and 8 (a)(i) 202. 
Nonetheless, five reasons seem to explain the overall lack of interest of WTO members 
in challenging the consistency of RTAs.203 First, the initial steps of the European integration 
projects clearly violated GATT law. Also, the US-Canada Auto Pact would have also been 
held inconsistent with Article XXIV. In addition to these historical reasons, mainstream 
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literature has suggested three pervasive rationales. WTO members are unwilling to enforce 
Article XXIV, because they are all partners to at least one RTA. Moreover, the strategy of 
sustaining legal uncertainty may serve the objectives of WTO members that intend to use 
RTAs in case of not achieving their goals through MTN. Finally, the institutional design of 
DSB seems inadequate to govern this sort of conflicts.204 
 
E.  The Relationship between the WTO and RTAs 
 
The challenge involved in managing the relationship between multilateralism and 
regionalism through international trade law and governance is nothing new. In the early 
days of the world trading system, the interaction between the GATT and RTAs was mostly 
about tariff reductions.205 Multilateral liberalisation was seen as superior to, but not 
necessarily contradictory with, regional opening. In the first wave of regionalism, the 
GATT sought to ensure coherence and stability, understood as accepting that regional and 
multilateral regimes could complement each other while imposing disciplines to minimise 
the negative effects that RTAs could entail. In the second wave of regionalism, issues of 
coherence and stability were brought back to the forefront but this time the controversies 
were over the systemic effects of RTAs.206 The GATT/WTO and RTAs were perceived as 
either mutually-complementary or contingently-incompatible. In the latter cases, the 
GATT/WTO was assumed as the superior system with which RTAs were required to ensure 
their consistency. The policy blueprint was to strengthen the WTO disciplines aiming to 
increase their influence over the development and mitigate the discriminatory and market-
distorting effects of RTAs. Despite the potential tension, the WTO accommodated the 
expansion of regionalism by avoiding direct diplomatic or judicial confrontation between its 
members. 
The third wave of regionalism made RTAs increasingly important to WTO law and 
governance.207 It held significant differences with the previous surges. Quantitatively, the 
number of RTAs had more than sextupled between 1995 and 2017, reaching 455 RTAs in 
force. Qualitatively, part of them intensified the central features of the second wave, while 
the other part aimed to widen and deepen the coverage of both policy areas and products. 
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Until 2016, the consensus over the idea that the WTO should ensure coherence and stability 
through its disciplines seemed to be rapidly eroding. Although it is premature to envisage 
what kind of long-term effect Brexit and Trump’s foreign trade policy will have on 
multilateralism and regionalism, it is already clear that in the short-term South-North RTAs 
will be at the centre stage, with the NAFTA renegotiation and the British and American turn 
to bilateralism. As of today, regionalism has posed two particularly relevant challenges. 
 
1. Coherence and Conflicts in the International Trade Law and Governance of 
Regionalism 
 
The first challenge concerns the effort to maintain coherence and stability of international 
trade law and governance in the context of the third wave of regionalism.208 The focus of 
RTAs is perceived as shifting from tariff preferences and diplomatic reciprocity towards 
domestic (trade and non-trade) barriers and juridification. This has led to regulatory and 
jurisdictional overlaps between the WTO and RTAs. Different from the past surges, the 
recent RTAs have not only incorporated and expanded on WTO trade rules but also 
established dispute settlement mechanisms. The potential consequence is the fragmentation 
of the normative order and jurisdictional authority of international trade law.  
Regional negotiations on behind-the-border policies or reforms for deep integration 
are regarded as a threat to the regulatory coherence and stability of international trade law 
and governance.209 These new RTAs are motivated by production sharing, cross-border 
service expansion, intellectual property protection and investment attraction. For these 
reasons, they are likely to be concluded between developed and developing countries under 
the leadership of only a few countries with economic power. Given their specificity, these 
trade policies are arguably not suitable subjects of MTS or even multilateralisation. To 
avoid fragmentation, four solutions have been widely debated within the IEL field: (i) 
accelerating multilateral liberalisation210, (ii) fixing the deficiencies of the WTO disciplines 
on RTAs211, (iii) adopting a soft law approach as a complementary strategy to WTO law212, 
and (iv) multilateralising regionalism213. These proposals aim essentially at ensuring that 
RTAs contribute to the WTO.  
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Nonetheless, the recent trend in regionalism is likely to challenge the authority of 
international trade law and governance on two fronts. Where the WTO and RTAs adopt 
conflicting policies and rules, there is the possibility of a single act of a WTO-member 
partner to be held in breach of an obligation by either the multilateral or a regional dispute 
settlement mechanism. Where WTO and RTAs adopt similar policies and rules, there is a 
chance of ‘double breach’ by a single act of a WTO-member partner. In this scenario, a 
complaining partner may be able to engage in forum shopping by choosing whether to bring 
the trade dispute to either the RTA or WTO dispute settlement mechanism, or perhaps to 
both. The WTO case law on this matter is extremely limited, leaving the issue unsettled. 
 
2. Coherence and Conflicts in the WTO Law and Governance of Regionalism 
 
The second challenge relates to the suitability of the WTO law for governing contemporary 
regionalism.214 The large surge in RTA activity in the last decade has increased the pressure 
over the WTO disciplines. Three main issues concerning, particularly, Article XXIV have 
attracted the most attention. First, some Article XXIV rules have been widely regarded as 
normatively ‘contradictory’, institutionally ‘ill-defined’ and authoritatively ‘inefficient’.215 
For instance, the controversies have mainly focused on the interpretation of paragraphs 5 
(external conditions), 8 (international conditions) and 7 (procedural condition) of Article 
XXIV.  
Second, the core principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity underpinning 
Article XXIV have been losing effectiveness, since its disciplines (which are largely 
reproduced in GATS Article V) “were designed for simpler agreements than those currently 
in existence and being negotiated.”216 In contrast to preferential tariffs on trade in goods, the 
policies and measures established in the ‘twenty-first century’ RTAs are devised to reduce 
the costs of doing business by promoting deep integration, implementing mutual 
recognition policies, regulating domestic trade and non-trade matters, and governing special 
and differential treatment between developed and developing countries.217, they are 
complex and might be held inconsistent with Article XXIV for producing discriminatory or 
protectionist effects.  
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Finally, although Article XXIV may have shaped RTAs negotiations, it has been rarely 
used to discipline RTAs through the DSB.218 Indeed, Article XXIV has only been invoked, 
although never successfully, four times in WTO disputes219. The consistency of RTAs with 
Article XXIV has never been assessed by the Appellate Body and only once by a panel220. 
The compliance problem exists because the WTO rules are weak. This weakness is caused 
partly by their institutional design and normative ambiguity and partly by the political 
unwillingness of WTO members with economic power to follow them. They are not so 
vague or defective as to make compliance impossible. Besides, only a few cases were 
brought before the WTO.221  
 
F.  The WTO Law and Governance of South-North Regional Trade 
Regimes 
 
The previous sections described the prevailing understanding within the IEL field of the 
international trade law and governance of regionalism. They also discussed the most critical 
issues, ambiguities, and divergences, underscoring and surrounding the specific debates 
under that common-sense framework. The purpose of this section is to identify the widely 
accepted and the most controversial features and preoccupations that sustain the dominant 
view of the law applicable to South-North RTAs. The conclusion is that South-North RTA 
must comply integrally with the requirements of GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V 
to be considered as valid and legitimate under WTO law. This implies that legal expertise 
largely disregards the development stage, economic imbalances, or the share of world trade 
of partners as relevant to the ideational, formal, and substantive considerations underlying 
the formation and operation of RTAs.  
The controversies over the WTO law of South-North regionalism that are discussed 
below are marginal. They represent the efforts of some developing countries, international 
lawyers, non-legal experts and policymakers to broaden the common-sense around and 
surrounding WTO law by trying to reintroducing the question of development. Their 
strategy is to reform the way in which Article XXIV has been interpreted and applied. 
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Specifically, they seek to incorporate the notion of special and differential treatment into the 
processes of making, interpreting and governing South-North RTAs. So far, they have not 
succeeded in influencing decision-making in and over the WTO and RTAs. Although many 
proposals have been offered, six of them seem to have succeeded to at least some small 
degree in reframing the debate. 
 
1. The Membership to South-North RTAs 
 
The first question concerns the existence of special rules disciplining the formation of 
South-North RTAs. The current interpretation of Article XXIV:5 and 10 acknowledges that 
any WTO member can conclude RTAs with another country on the basis of formal 
sovereign equality and reciprocity.222 This implies that their stage of economic development 
is not legally relevant. The only exception is the Enabling Clause, which can be invoked by 
developing countries to conclude an RTA among themselves on the mutual reduction of 
tariffs and non-tariff measures. Under the Enabling Clause, South-South RTAs may be 
created with no need to eliminate duties nor liberalise “substantially all trade” within a 
“reasonable length of time.” Consequently, the minimum requirements for South-South 
RTAs are less restraining than those under Article XXIV. Thus, except for South-South 
RTAs under the Enabling Clause, the qualification of RTAs as either North-North or North-
South entails no legal consequence. 
Nonetheless, there have been disputes over the full application of Article XXIV to 
South-North RTAs for not taking into consideration Part IV of the GATT. Whereas Article 
XXIV requires RTAs to reciprocally eliminate all duties and restrictive regulations on 
“substantially all the trade” between their partners within “reasonable length of time,” 
Article XXXVI:8 sets out that “[developed partners must] not expect reciprocity for 
commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other 
barriers to the trade of [developing partners].” This implies that there is a legal difference 
between South-North and North-North RTAs on the basis of countries’ material conditions. 
WTO law practice, however, overlooks the application of that provision entirely. 
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2. Non-Reciprocity 
 
Another important issue is whether the principle of non-reciprocity between developed and 
developing countries under Part IV applies to Article XXIV.223 In EEC–Bananas II, the 
GATT Panel held that Article XXXVI:8 does not constitute an exception to Article 
XXIV:8(b).224 The consequence is that non-reciprocal South-North RTAs are prima facie 
inconsistent with WTO law. Although the adoption of this report was blocked by the EU, 
and the reasoning challenged by the ACP countries (claiming that the provisions of XXIV 
and XXXVI had to be considered in conjunction with one another), the holding in EEC–
Bananas II has become conventional wisdom in WTO practice. 
 
3. Minimum Degree of Liberalisation 
 
This question concerns whether Article XXIV imposes a minimum degree of liberalisation 
regardless of the developmental stages of the partners.225 Under Article XXIV:8, a WTO-
consistent RTA must eliminate all barriers on “substantially all the trade” between partners. 
As discussed above,226 WTO practice, jurisprudence and case law have never reached a 
consensus on a quantitative definition for “substantially all the trade.” This interpretative 
uncertainty tends to be perceived as more acute by developing countries. While proposals 
ranged from 51% to 99% and earlier RTAs liberalised between 70-80%, present-day 
common-sense is that Article XXIV:8 requires around 80-90%. Developing countries have 
resisted this understanding, claiming it deprives them of the necessary ‘policy space’ for 
development policies. Nonetheless, unless WTO members or the DSB decides otherwise, 
the broader consensus is that South-North RTAs are required to liberalise at least 80% of 
trade. 
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4. Asymmetrical Liberalisation 
 
The fourth unsettled issue is whether Article XXIV allows trade to be liberalised on an 
asymmetrical basis taking into consideration the different level of development between the 
partners.227 Although EEC–Bananas II held that non-reciprocal RTAs are inconsistent with 
WTO law, it does not mean that asymmetrical liberalisation is entirely prohibited by Article 
XXIV:8.  
By reading Article XXIV:8 in light of Article XXXVI:8, the “substantially all the 
trade” criterion in respect of duties might be interpreted as not preventing a South-North 
RTA to establish a partially asymmetrical elimination of trade barriers taking into account 
development needs.228 This means that a South-North RTA could establish that its partners 
would split the liberalisation covering 80% of an existing trade so as to that 90% of trade 
restrictions would be eliminated by the developed partner while a developing partner, 70%. 
Alternatively, developing countries would be allowed to systematically exclude a larger 
share of their trade from tariff elimination, if they justify it is necessary for achieving their 
development goals.  
Moreover, if Article XXIV:8 is read side-by-side with Article XXXVI:8, the 
“substantially all the trade” criterion in respect of “other restrictive regulations of 
commerce” might be understood as allowing a South-North RTA to authorise developing 
partners to apply safeguards and non-tariff measures on other RTA-partners aiming to 
preserve their necessary policy space for development purposes.229 Furthermore, to protect 
the development dimension of North-South RTAs, developing partners could not be 
allowed to impose these trade restrictions upon other developing partners. 
Not surprisingly, asymmetrical liberalisation has not found wide support in WTO 
practice, jurisprudence, or case law. In contrast to the dominant understanding, Bartels 
argues that Article XXIV authorises some degree of asymmetry similar to GATS Article V, 
which specifically “allows for ‘asymmetry’ in regional integration agreements between 
developed and developing countries.”230  
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5. Transition Period 
 
A less contentious, but not irrelevant, issue relates to the transition period enjoyed by 
partners to an interim agreement leading to a South-North RTA. Paragraph 3 of the Article 
XXIV Understanding clarifies the language “reasonable length of time” in Article 
XXIV:5(c) by stating that this transition period “should exceed 10 years only in exceptional 
cases.” 231 Since there is no definition for “exceptional cases,” developed countries advocate 
that this special and differential treatment should “only be applied to a very limited number 
of products under RTAs, should not unreasonably postpone the end of the transition 
periods, and should be used only for prolonged phase-in of commitments by developing and 
especially least-developed countries, not by developed countries.”232 By contrast, 
developing countries claim that “exceptional circumstances” should allow them to enjoy a 
transition period longer taking into consideration their trade, development, and financial 
needs.233 However, this SDT interpretation of “exceptional cases” is not commonly 
accepted by WTO practice, jurisprudence and case law.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This Chapter started off by anticipating the discussion in Chapter 4 on the role of lawyers 
and legal expertise, generally, and of legal doctrines, particularly, in global governance, 
trade regionalism, and economic development. It was necessary to state clearly and 
beforehand the premise, which will be further justified, that legal doctrines perform a 
pivotal function in structuring the way international lawyers think and practice international 
trade law. It then offered an analysis of mainstream literature and official documents to 
evidence not only the existence, authority, and legitimacy of a specific legal doctrine on the 
WTO law and governance of South-North regionalism but also its dominant position inside 
the IEL field and influence over the world trading system. 
The investigation of legal doctrine closely followed the mainstream argumentative 
practice of the IEL field. The presentation, organisation and analysis of WTO disciplines 
replicated the structure, content, and style of academic, policy, and official texts. 
Specifically, this Chapter showed how history teachings play a fundamental function in 
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validating and legitimising norms, concepts, theories, and methods that constitute the legal 
doctrine. In this sense, I argue that the process of translating history into doctrine is central 
to understand how lawyers give meaning to WTO law as a way to exert authority over 
South-North RTAs. Thus, the past and present understandings of and controversies over the 
WTO law of regionalism were examined to reveal their contribution to the formation and 
application of the prevailing doctrinal framework. 
I want to conclude by stressing the constitutive features of the dominant legal 
doctrine. Grounded in the comprehensive analysis in this Chapter, I argue that the 
fundamental purpose of the contemporary legal doctrine is to address the three challenges 
foregrounded by the history lessons: the ideational mission of the GATT/WTO in 
promoting multilateral liberalisation and directing regionalism; the institutional defects of 
GATT/WTO rules that allow surges in regionalism; and the lack of jurisprudential solutions 
to normative ambiguities and policy contradictions weakening GATT/WTO law. The 
doctrinal responses to them have brought into being a stable and coherent model that seems 
to govern the thinking and practice of the WTO law of South-North regionalism 
undertaken. 
The first challenge concerns the ideational dimension of GATT/WTO law of 
regionalism. Its primary focus is on the ways to understand the relationship between 
multilateralism and regionalism. The legal doctrine deals with this preoccupation by 
reinterpreting the WTO mandate to govern RTAs according to its own embedded ideational 
programme. Although the doctrinal framework seems to provide an ahistorical ‘menu’ of 
economic and non-economic theories for supporting or prohibiting regionalism, history 
returns to explain that the continuous changes in regionalism thinking are closely associated 
with the underlying material, institutional, and intellectual transformations occurring at the 
same time. Thus, the ideational programme that is entrenched in the legal doctrine began to 
emerge in the 1980s as part of the ascension of neoclassical economics and the second wave 
of regionalism. 
Neoclassical economics was the heart of an ideational revolution leading to a 
profound redefinition of the meanings of ‘market’, ‘state’, ‘international economy’, and 
‘politics’.234 Firstly, the market was reconceived from a tool for organising domestic 
economies to a model for governing society. This market fundamentalist vision replaced 
politics with competitive markets as the most efficient and fairer mechanisms for 
maximising societal welfare. The role of the state in society was then minimised to create 
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the institutional conditions for sustaining well-functioning markets. This included the 
protection of private rights and exceptional measures to intervene in market failures. 
Finally, international economy was reconceptualised as a global market whose production 
and welfare potential are to be realised through ‘deep’, ‘broad’ and ‘fair’ economic 
integration. 
The second wave of regionalism operated as a concrete laboratory for neoclassical 
ideas.235 The concept of multilateral and regional trade regimes as ‘political communities’ 
was replaced with the notion of ‘marketplaces’. The GATT/WTO and RTAs were 
reimagined as normative and institutional fora where states bargain and exchange trade 
concessions. Their function is to facilitate the deepening and expansion of international 
economic integration by protecting traders from states’ market-distorting interventions and 
illegitimate and unfair behaviour. This requires expanding the reach of multilateral and 
regional rules to discipline ‘behind-the-border’ policies and regulations. This includes not 
only clearly trade-related (e.g. services, investments, intellectual property and competition) 
but also not-clearly trade-related (e.g. labour, environment, safety and sanitary) areas. The 
ultimate purpose of regionalism is to contribute to the GATT/WTO’s effort of constituting a 
global market, the key driver for wealth creation worldwide. Over time, these set of 
neoclassical ideas and practices evolved into a comprehensive programme called 
neoliberalism. 
The second challenge refers to the failures of the institutional architecture of the 
GATT in controlling the proliferation of RTAs. The GATT operated as an international 
institution devised to ensure a stable and relatively open international economy, and above 
all a continuous process of multilateral liberalisation. This also meant to help to create the 
conditions necessary for the development of the welfare state domestically and regimes for 
economic integration regionally. This changed in the 1980s with a profound transformation 
in the US credo about the relationship between regionalism and multilateralism. The 
reimagination of their respective model of governance took concrete form in the NAFTA 
and WTO. 
Normatively, the model was devised to protect traders and promote the 
development of a global marketplace.236 This was meant to be achieved by setting up 
international rules intervening deeply in the ‘behind-the-border’ policies and regulations of 
states. Modelled on the ‘Washington Consensus’ blueprint, these legal disciplines covered a 
broad range of matters including goods and agriculture, regulatory standards and non-tariff 
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barriers, government procurement, services, investment, intellectual property rights, and 
competition policy. Structurally, the model reconceived governance institutions and 
practices through the introduction of the rule of law, which carried with it the values of 
“neutrality, predictability, certainty, generality, and objectivity.”237 To ensure the 
enforcement of legal disciplines, rule-oriented dispute settlement mechanisms were also 
established. This mode of legal governance was devised to apply substantive and procedural 
rules, in concert with technical knowledge (e.g. economic and scientific expertise) to solve 
trade controversies over (mainly) the legality and legitimacy of state intervention. 
Currently, the WTO is regarded as the model for designing governance institutions 
and rules of the majority of South-North RTAs. The debates about “deep integration and 
shallow integration” and “narrow mandate and broad mandate” assume the WTO as the 
institutional benchmark. There are three clear examples. The policy coverage found in 
RTAs is classified into two groups called ‘WTO+’ and ‘WTO-X’. The provisions that fall 
under the mandate of the WTO are called WTO+ (e.g. manufacturing goods, agricultural 
goods, and GATS services), whereas WTO-X relates to provisions that are outside the 
current mandate of the WTO (e.g. competition policy, anti-corruption, labour regulation).238 
Moreover, the intensity of integration reflected in RTAs is qualified along the deep-shallow 
axis (WTO à FTA à FTA+ à CU à Common Market à Monetary Union à Fiscal 
Union).239 Likewise, FTAs tend to be modelled on the GATT, the FTA+ on the WTO and 
so on. The last evidence is provided by a recent empirical study that employs a textual 
analysis to show that almost all RTAs refer explicitly to the WTO (most doing so on 
average 25 times), and implicitly to the language of WTO (which is widely copied into the 
RTAs).240 
Lastly, there is the challenge posed by unsatisfactory jurisprudential responses to 
normative ambiguities and policy contradictions of GATT/WTO law. Until the 1980s, the 
making and interpretation of the GATT law of South-North regionalism were dominated by 
diplomatic practice and economic thinking. The reason was the inability of lawyers to 
provide adequate solutions to the GATT’s problems with governing RTAs. Specifically, the 
formalist jurisprudence was self-constrained to identify the legal rights and obligations 
under Article XXIV, stress its textual ambiguities, and determine the abstract compliance of 
concrete RTAs with its legal rules. The turn-to-functionalism in the IEL field equipped 
lawyers with theories and methods open to integrating policy-oriented expertise in legal 
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thinking and practice. The notion of Article XXIV as a (quasi-)autonomous legal norm to 
be enforced was replaced with the view of it as a formal instrument for determining the 
policies, rules, and arguments that would contribute to the development of a global market 
under the WTO. More broadly, lawyers employed the functionalist approach to arguing for 
legalisation and juridification of the world trading system as a way to protect free and fair 
trade from protectionism and discrimination. 
The rise of functionalism profoundly affected the international trade law of South-
North regionalism. Grounded in economic and non-economic rationales, international trade 
law is roughly equated to GATT/WTO law, while South-North RTAs are not different from 
(North-North) FTAs and CUs. These two definitions mean that economic and development 
inequalities are regarded as jurisprudentially irrelevant for regulating South-North RTAs. 
Article XXIV is understood as authorising members to depart from the general principles of 
WTO law only if the RTAs are constructed formally and purposefully consistent with the 
WTO mission. This has led the interpretation of Article XXIV:4 and the practice of 
members to converge towards a consensual view that juxtaposes the function of the WTO 
and RTAs; that is, to serve as institutional mechanisms for the formation of a global free 
market.  
Furthermore, those economic and non-economic rationales have supported the 
interpretative practice that reinforces the authority of the substantive requirements of 
Article XXIV:5 and 8 while disregarding the application of Part IV. Consequently, norms 
and institutions established in South-North RTAs embed the principles of reciprocity and 
non-discrimination but not the principles of special and differential treatment. For instance, 
the MFN and the national treatment clauses are understood as mandatory, while provisions 
setting out a degree of liberalisation below 80%, non-reciprocity in trade liberalisation, or 
asymmetrical liberalisation tend to be avoided ex ante for being either illegitimate or likely 
to be held inconsistent by the DSB. 
In synthesis, the dominant legal doctrine on the WTO law and governance of South-
North regional trade regimes embraces neoliberal programme of market-led growth, the 
WTO as an institutional model of governance, and functionalist approach to lawmaking and 
interpretation. As a result, the legal doctrine dissolves the difference between North-North 
and South-North RTAs. 
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PART II – FROM DOCTRINES TO HISTORY: 
EMPOWERMENT, LIMITATIONS, AND IMAGINATION  
 
The legal history and doctrine of international trade law and governance of South-North 
regionalism described in Part I are regarded today as neither novel nor controversial. Except 
for my own reflections and conclusions, they represent the conventional vernacular of facts, 
concepts, theories, methods, and arguments, that is widely accepted, complemented, and 
repeated by mainstream literature. The notion of a shared vocabulary does not mean that 
contemporary international lawyers have reached one agreement to solve each legal issue 
arising out of transactions or disputes taking place in the world economy. My claim is more 
modest. I believe that the way in which legal history and doctrine are thought and practised 
has served to govern the range of possibilities for conceiving of and engaging with South-
North regionalism through international trade law. History lessons are applied to constitute 
the doctrinal framework, whereas the legal doctrine is used to structure lawmaking and 
interpretation of South-North RTAs. Both are produced and validated within the IEL field, 
which in turn lends its authority and legitimacy to their influence over global trade 
governance. Thus, to inquire into legal history and doctrine, the first step is to understand 
their relationship to the IEL field. 
Ever since its (contemporary) origins in the 1940s, the field of international 
economic law has undertaken a variety of disciplinary strategies to differentiate itself as an 
autonomous field. Part of the process was to cultivate a distinct expertise for thinking and 
reasoning about certain norms and behaviours.241 Building on international law traditions, 
the IEL field developed its own varieties of an especially ‘legal’ technique called doctrinal 
analysis, which consists of an ‘objective’ and ‘impartial’ description and examination of 
rules and processes against a normative or sociological criterion.  
One of the central consequences of this long-standing tradition is to separate 
‘doctrine’ from ‘history’ and (also) ‘theory’ of IEL. Although this distinction does not 
automatically undermine the authority or legitimacy of legal expertise, it contains a 
potential for causing distortions.242 Specifically, it has led most lawyers to maintain a 
certain distance between what they ‘think’ and ‘say’ about global governance, trade 
regionalism, and economic development, and what they ‘claim’ to be IEL. To preserve the 
field, they position themselves between two approaches: doctrines have either a narrow 
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scope focusing exclusively on the normative dimension of the international economy or a 
broad scope seeking to ‘appropriate’ of and ‘speak’ about theories and histories of IEL. In 
either case, lawyers routinely undertake a ‘doctrinal’ analysis, which consists of applying a 
certain framework (contingently validated and legitimised within the IEL expertise) to 
understand, evaluate, and argue about legal norms (narrow scope) and other norms, facts, 
and hypotheses (broad scope). 
In the case of doctrinal analysis of IEL divorced from reflections about its 
ideational, institutional, and jurisprudential features, or about its economic, political and 
sociological contexts or consequences, the outcomes are often experienced as disappointing. 
They are frequently attacked for excessive formalism, and so accused of being either 
‘empirically irrelevant’ for securing the compliance of state behaviour and policies with 
legal rules, or ‘authoritatively controversial’ due to normative indeterminacy.243 In an 
attempt to overcome these limitations, some lawyers turn doctrinal analysis to facts to 
produce outcomes that are not only ‘valid’ and ‘legitimate’ but also ‘effective’ and 
‘determinate’. Histories, empirical data, and theories are instrumentalised to serve the 
purpose of a particular legal doctrine. The result is also unsatisfactory, since disputes about 
history lessons, empirical findings, and theoretical postulates reproduce, instead of 
resolving, the problems of indeterminacy and compliance.244 In spite of the perils of 
marginalising or instrumentalising history and theory, doctrinal analysis remains a 
constitutive part of the IEL field. Therefore, legal doctrine is acknowledged as a specifically 
‘legal’ (or perhaps ‘juridical’) mode of governing the making and interpretation of 
international trade law. 
Part II provides a critique of the most important underpinnings of the legal history 
(as told in Chapter 1) and doctrine (as described in Chapter 2) of the international trade law 
of South-North regionalism. By juxtaposing doctrine and history, it is possible to 
foreground and examine how these apparently independent outcomes of legal activity 
interact with one another within legal expertise. Therefore, it is an essential premise of the 
following Chapters that legal history and doctrine play a particularly pivotal role in making 
and interpreting WTO law and RTAs and that this function is not well understood. With this 
in mind, Chapter 3 examines the central features of history-telling in mainstream literature 
and how it relates to legal doctrines. In Chapter 4, the nature and functions of legal 
doctrines of international trade law are analysed in detail.  
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My conclusion suggests that the lack of alternatives to resolve the contemporary 
challenges to the international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism rests 
not only on the disagreement among politicians, policymakers and trade negotiators, and on 
the political and economic forces. It also lies in the disciplinary constraints imposed on 
lawyers’ imagination by the prevailing ideas and practices in legal expertise. I argue that the 
dominance of a legal doctrine within the IEL field empowers lawyers’ influence in and over 
the world trading system; however, it also constrains their ability to think ingeniously about 
solutions to the problems concerning WTO law and governance, trade regionalism, and 
economic development. 
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CHAPTER 3.  LEGAL HISTORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND GOVERNANCE OF SOUTH-NORTH REGIONAL TRADE 
REGIMES 
 
Introduction 
 
A significant part of this thesis is dedicated to the history of the international trade law and 
governance of South-North regionalism. Chapters 1, 5 and 6 account for their 
jurisprudential and institutional stories in two distinct periods of time and spaces. This 
Chapter is different from those others. It does not provide a historical narrative but rather 
reflects on the legal style of telling history. It aims at examining the way international 
lawyers approach the past in order to reconstruct, in the present, the temporal evolution or 
decline of legal rules, regimes, ideas, and practices situated in specific contexts. History-
telling is, thus, conceived as a disciplinary mode of governance of meanings across time. 
Finally, the Chapter will analyse the relationship of history with doctrines (in particular), 
and with legal expertise (generally). 
To better understand the interaction between history and doctrine, two questions are 
central. First, what have we – international lawyers – learned from the historical accounts of 
international trade law and governance of South-North regional trade regimes? Recall I 
argued in Chapter 1 that the conventional narratives provide three history lessons, in which 
the normative consensus underlying the contemporary IEL field lies. They assert that the 
purpose of Article XXIV is to contribute to furthering trade liberalisation by providing a 
choice between regionalism and multilateralism. These two tracks must, nonetheless, be 
managed to achieve a global free market progressively. To do so, countries agreed to 
reinvent the world trading system as a rule-oriented regime operated by legal expertise. This 
means that WTO law was chosen as the primary mode of legitimate and authoritative 
governance over policy decisions and disputes concerning multilateralism and regionalism. 
Finally, lawyers were acknowledged as the experts equipped with formal-technical 
knowledge (generally) and legal doctrine (particularly) developed to interpret Article XXIV 
and balance its application to structure the decision-making in and over RTAs. 
This leads to the second question: how does history relate to doctrine in the IEL 
field? It is common-sense that international lawyers use history-telling as a way of 
95 
 
governing the movement of meanings across time. Mainstream literature often offers 
narratives both to manage and support a wide variety of norms, theories and methods that 
constitute legal expertise. As analysed above, these accounts may take the form of 
institutional histories of the formation and development of rules and regimes that nowadays 
underscore the world trading system. Likewise, they may contribute to the understanding 
and diffusion of current ideas or techniques by reciting their jurisprudential evolution. By 
connecting past and present, history lessons produce and validate legal doctrines, which in 
turn affect lawmaking and interpretation. Moreover, these teachings are continuously 
reasserted as a strategy to sustain the authority and legitimacy of legal doctrines in the 
global trade governance. This suggests that the way in which lawyers tell their own history 
plays a vital role in shaping (directly) legal doctrines and asserting (indirectly) their 
influence in and over the WTO and South-North RTAs. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to analyse in detail (what I call) the traditional 
approach to history-telling aiming to reveal its core assumptions, bias, and limitations. 
Section A outlines the traditional approach to historicising IEL and its limitations. This 
follows a discussion in section B of the ways conventional narratives are used to empower a 
variety of projects, norms, knowledge, and techniques by connecting their past to the 
present. Not surprisingly, history lessons shape legal doctrines affecting, ultimately, 
lawyers’ imaginary of the WTO law and governance of South-North regionalism. Building 
on this analysis, section C reflects on the possibility of adopting an alternative approach to 
history-telling. I conclude by claiming that the conventional narratives have contributed to 
constitute and sustain the dominant legal doctrine, and suggesting how we might go about 
rethinking the historical justifications and doctrinal limitations that constrain lawyers’ 
ability to answer innovatively to the contemporary challenges. 
 
A.   The Traditional Approach to History of International Economic 
Law  
 
The description of the legal histories of the world trading system in section 1.A and of the 
South-North regional trade regimes in section 1.B suggest the operation of the traditional 
approach, a characteristic style of history-telling that widely dominates legal expertise. 
Chapter 1 illustrates how history lessons are drawn from a ‘grand narrative’ that merges 
institutional and jurisprudential stories about the origins and development of international 
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trade law and governance, while Chapter 2 exemplifies the way in which these teachings 
are habitually translated into legal doctrines. Together they show how the traditional 
approach has been used to combine institutional and jurisprudential stories with the purpose 
of drawing a line dividing whom and what are parts of the IEL field. This prevailing style of 
history-telling is, particularly, used to determine what/who matters or not to the field’s past, 
and also to control what lessons should be taken into consideration today to produce and 
apply legal doctrines. 
Against this backdrop, I suggest that the majority of international lawyers have 
successfully employed conventional narratives to construct and sustain the legal doctrine on 
the WTO law and governance of South-North regionalism. Within the IEL field, the 
traditional approach is used as a disciplinary technique of governing the legitimacy and 
validity of knowledge, actors, and norms. It is employed to draw a temporal timeline 
dividing past and present for international trade law. For instance, legal rules not 
understood as being part of the (re-)foundation of the world trading system around the 
WTO are mainly regarded as belonging to the past. Consequently, they do not or should not 
inform today’s practices and ideas that constitute legal doctrines. 
Moreover, the traditional approach entails a spatial effect, separating which 
elements fit in and out international trade law. For instance, legal rules historically related 
to the WTO are often acknowledged as part of the doctrine on the international trade law of 
regionalism, while the ones identified with environmental, social, labour and development 
issues tend to fall outside, regardless of their trade relevance. Similarly, arguments 
associated historically with functionalist jurisprudence are habitually received without 
ideological suspicion or intellectual scepticism, whereas the ones associated with 
formalism, post-colonialism, legal feminism, and human rights are frequently marginalised. 
Furthermore, the disciplinary consensus produced through the traditional approach 
around today’s legal doctrine entails important external consequences. By using the 
conventional narratives to assert the authority of the dominant doctrine, lawyers intend to 
claim exclusive authority over the interpretative practice of WTO law and also to legitimise 
their participation in decision-making over RTAs. This, in turn, affects their interaction 
with non-legal experts and other international economic regimes. The purpose of using the 
traditional approach is, I argue, to empower the legal doctrine with legitimate authority to 
be used to make sense of and legal arguments about the WTO and RTAs to politicians, 
diplomats, and experts, including themselves. This suggests that it operates less like a mean 
to reflect upon how past acts and choices led up to the present. Instead, it works backwardly 
by selecting and mobilising historical events to legitimise and validate the consensus around 
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the linear connection between the origins, development, and present-day legal doctrine. 
Hence, lessons that are ‘discovered’ in history tend to reflect commitments to intellectual 
traditions, normative programmes and professional groups. 
My analysis in this Chapter indicates that the majority of international lawyers has 
continuously applied the traditional approach to sustaining the prevailing legal doctrine on 
the WTO law of South-North regionalism. I argue that their limitations in addressing the 
current challenges to world trading system have a great deal to do with how historical 
narratives have been used to lend authority to the dominant doctrine. Furthermore, I explore 
what an analysis of histories and doctrines can tell us today about the repertoire of ideas, 
practices, rules and institutions that was relegated to the dustbin of past due to disciplinary 
consensus. I am specifically interested in uncovering and criticising the strategies 
undertaken to entail constraining and path-dependency effects so as to assist in broadening 
the horizons of possibility to propose alternatives to rethink the relationship between 
international trade law and regional trade regimes. 
 
B.  The Limits of the History of the International Law and 
Governance of South-North Regional Trade Regimes 
 
In legal expertise, history-telling and doctrine-making tend to be assumed as independent 
disciplinary techniques. However, the traditional approach – I argue – instrumentalises 
history to craft doctrines. It subordinates the past to the present in order to determine as to 
whether a rule, idea or method is either a present-day outcome of the progressive 
development of (and so belonging to), an old (and non-applicable) relic of, or just non-part 
of international trade law. I suggest, therefore, that one possibility to rethink the 
international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism is through the 
understanding and critique of how the traditional approach has structured the interaction 
between history and doctrine. 
There are numerous possibilities to approach the IEL history.245 Martti 
Koskenniemi explains that “international law histories of late 20th century have usually 
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combined accounts of the development of the States system with brief excursions into a 
well-defined circle of canonical texts.”246 This also seems to capture how IEL has been 
historicised since the contemporary literature often combines stories of the institutional 
development of state practice with brief doctrinal analysis of official documents and policy-
scholarly texts. For instance, Chapter 1 provides an account of the traditional history of the 
international trade law and governance of regionalism. It reveals how conventional 
narratives merge a linear account of crises and institutional responses involving the 
GATT/WTO regime with rather simple progress in jurisprudence from formalism to 
functionalism, in order to tell a ‘David and Goliath’ story of Article XXIV and its attempts 
to control the waves of regionalism. 
Moreover, the traditional approach tends, consciously or otherwise, to 
instrumentalise GATT/WTO history in order to justify and legitimise legal doctrines by 
claiming they are the natural or logical consequence of a neutral and universal set of history 
lessons. The peril is to blur the line drawn to differentiate historical reconstructions from 
normative projects. The effect of this style of history-telling is to emphasise aspects of 
history that support legal doctrines’ underlying policy-ideational-intellectual commitment 
as factual determinants while leaving others necessarily (and perhaps strategically) in the 
forgotten realm of the past. For instance, Chapter 1 accounts for a conventional narrative 
that has been consistently employed to support the dominant legal doctrine on the WTO of 
regionalism (as described in Chapter 2). 
 
1. The Institutional Story of the International Trade Law and Governance of 
Regionalism  
 
The first type of storyline – found enmeshed in conventional narratives247 – chronicles the 
progressive institutionalisation of world trade. Specifically, it historicises the evolution of 
multilateralism and regionalism as institutional practices of constituent states in pari passu 
with the continuous expansion of global economic interdependence and regional 
integration. The turn-to-institutions in inter-state trade relations teaches that the foundation 
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of the contemporary world trading system undergoing from 1944 to 1994 was realised in 
two gradual stages. The initial stage is presented as precursory serving to set up the 
institutional and normative architecture underscoring the multilateral trade regime. The 
GATT is portrayed as the central, but weak guardian of a multilateral system of non-
discriminatory and reciprocal trade in a world of protectionist measures and discriminatory 
regionalism created by preference-maximising, but economically unequal, states. However, 
GATT rules are accounted as mostly defective or incomplete, while their application was 
highly dependent on economic interests and material conditions of contracting-parties. Due 
to external political pressure and internal normative contradictions, the GATT did not 
impose an effective discipline on RTAs. Rather, those factors ensured that the flawed 
Articles I:2, XXV:5 and XXIV would constrain the authority and legitimacy of the GATT 
to control the formation and operation of systems of imperial, preferential and regional 
trading. 
Article XXIV is commonly accounted as the cornerstone of the GATT law of 
regionalism. Institutional stories chronicle that powerful contracting-parties used their 
influence to take advantage of its ill-designed rules so as to progressively subvert its 
original function: from a specific exception (mainly) devised to make possible the economic 
integration of Europe towards a wide loophole used to circumvent the general prohibition to 
benefit from trade preferences. The conventional history suggests that the flawed 
institutionalisation is the cause for the prevalence of a diplomatic and technical character, 
rather than legal or juridical, of the GATT, which in turn provided the conditions for the 
first wave of regionalism. 
The 1970s was described as a turbulent moment marked by the return of 
discriminatory and protectionist policies and arrangements. On the one hand, the 
introduction of pro-development reforms to the GATT aimed at softening, even more, its 
disciplines on regionalism. Part IV and the Enabling Clause served either to exempt 
developing countries from fully complying with Article XXIV (due to the principle of non-
reciprocity) or to exclude GSP schemes entirely from the authority of Article XXIV. On the 
other hand, the rise of New Protectionism consisted of a strategy undertaken by the 
developed world to use domestic measures to exert pressure over developing contracting-
parties to make them accept the introduction of sectorial waivers to Article XXIV. By the 
end of its initial stage, the GATT is regarded as the impotent or ineffective gatekeeper of 
multilateralism. While the first wave of regionalism is described as reflecting the individual 
interests of contracting-parties, which were indifferent to the negative externalities wielded 
by the RTAs, the GATT is in contrast perceived as a collective enterprise evolving from the 
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ashes of World War II towards an institutionalised community of interdependent economies 
through non-discriminatory and reciprocal liberalisation.  
The situation began to change in the 1980s with several initiatives to deep the 
institutionalisation of the world trading system. This second stage is the efforts of 
contracting-parties under the Uruguay Round to advance the institutional reforms devised to 
expand trade liberalisation and increase the constraints over state discretion by moving 
incrementally the GATT towards a more rule-oriented system. This included the idea that 
regional trade agreements would be progressively eliminated through a rigid and formalist 
application or improvement of Article XXIV. However, controversies among the leading 
developed contracting-parties prevented the multilateral negotiations from reaching a 
common agreement. The deadlock of the Uruguay Round encouraged them to look for 
alternatives. Ironically, they found it in the form of regionalism. The consequence was that, 
instead of tightening the loopholes of Article XXIV, the contracting-parties widened them 
even more, triggering the second wave of regionalism. 
The establishment of the World Trade Organisation in 1994 led the second stage of 
institutionalisation to an end. It is accounted as an effective response to contain the second 
spread of regional trade agreements. Nevertheless, the adoption of the Article XXIV 
Understanding is narrated as a futile attempt of multilateralist contracting-parties to prevent 
another wave of regionalism. Since powerful developed economies, notably the US and EU, 
engaged in a competitive liberalisation from the late-1990s onwards, the Article XXIV 
Understanding turned out to be an institutional fiasco. The number of RTAs in force under 
the WTO increased from roughly 70 in 1990 to 455 by 2017.  
This institutional story tends to overemphasise political or economic forces as 
structural drivers of the WTO regime while downplaying the role of moral, social or legal 
norms. While the 1940s is remembered as the constitutive moment in which states 
committed to the contemporary world trading system, the late-1980s is narrated as the 
moment when WTO law began to be used more extensively to govern inter-state trade 
affairs. Between 1947 and 1995, two waves of regionalism challenged the world trading 
system, triggering institutional reactions that culminated in the WTO. Therefore, this 
storyline of conventional narratives organises history lessons underscoring the consensual 
imaginary of present-day international trade law and governance as resulting from the 
gradual institutionalisation of the GATT/WTO from politics to diplomacy to law. Similarly, 
Article XXIV is chronicled as evolving progressively from a political compromise to a set 
of diplomatic guidance for debating solutions to controversies over trade preferences and 
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then to (contemporary) legal rules for balancing multilateral and regional policies and 
practices of WTO members. 
 
2. The Jurisprudential Story of the GATT/WTO Law and Governance of 
Regionalism 
 
The second type of storyline – found entangled in conventional narratives248 – accounts for 
the advancement in the jurisprudence of the GATT/WTO law of regionalism. It often 
reduces WTO law to the succession of jurisprudential writings that provide a vernacular of 
facts, concepts, theories and methods to make sense of the prevailing institutional 
interactions and state behaviour within the world trading system. The conventional 
narratives tend to emphasise how questions about the GATT/WTO law and governance of 
regionalism were framed, evaluated and answered through doctrinal analyses of Articles 
I:2, XXV:5 and XXIV, the Enabling Clause, and (more recently) GATS Article V. Chapters 
1 and 2 show that the almost exclusive focus of traditional accounts lies in jurisprudential 
debates as to the legality and legitimacy of RTAs. They stress how evidence was offered to 
prove or disprove the formal and functional consistency of South-North RTAs with 
GATT/WTO law through the primary examination of Article XXIV.  
Since 1947, lawyers have provided interpretations to Article XXIV. This 
characteristic exercise is historicised as having been influenced by formalist and 
functionalist approaches developed in response to normative gaps, institutional reforms, and 
intellectual transformations, and also to the attempts of political and economic interference 
in the world trading system. Specifically, the formal uncertainty and functional ambiguities 
of Article XXIV are historicised as reflecting one of the most controversial of the GATT’s 
‘birth defects’. On the one hand, this institutional deficiency has been blamed for generating 
uncertainty as to the ‘real’ purpose of Article XXIV. The entrenchment of the compromise 
between multilateralism and regionalism has led to divergent interpretations as to how the 
GATT should govern their relationship. On the other hand, the institutional shortcomings 
have been accused of formalising the vague rules of Article XXIV, which have validated 
the abusive use of exceptions to create CUs and FTAs. 
To minimise the relevance of questions about the nature and function of Article 
XXIV while highlighting the need to constrain state discretion over RTA-formation by 
promoting the enforceability of its disciplines, the jurisprudential story often foregrounds 
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the evolution from a formalist to a functionalist approach. The conventional narratives 
chronicle that in the early years only a few lawyers participated in the governance of the 
GATT or RTAs. Most of them are remembered for their academic attitude and intellectual 
commitment to formalism and the foundation of international economic law as a 
disciplinary field. The 1940s generation was led by Georg Schwarzenberger to focus on 
formal and legalist dimensions of the GATT, leaving outside issues of policy and 
governance. The consequence was that they limited themselves to discuss the legal status of 
GATT and its implication to Article XXIV and RTAs. This formalist-oriented mindset is 
understood as responsible for letting international lawyers enclose themselves in excessive 
academicism for decades, while other fields of international economic policymaking 
occupied the central position in global trade governance.  
This view is further reinforced by stories suggesting that legal expertise bore no 
significant relevance throughout the GATT era. The combination of doubts about the 
GATT’s legal character and the rise of the epistemic authority of policy-oriented disciplines 
on trade matters led GATT ‘law’ to be perceived as more ‘technical’ or ‘diplomatic’ than 
‘juridical’. The consequence was that the ascendency of rival fields over a domain 
historically associated with international law. The traditional history portrays, therefore, the 
interpretative practice of Article XXIV and the making of RTAs as activities undertaken by 
diplomats, officials and non-legal trade experts specialising in GATT law. Conversely, 
lawyers were perceived as assuming instrumental roles in formalising policy choices or 
neutral academic positions devoted to developing a conclusive, general and ahistorical legal 
solution for the conflict between multilateralism and regionalism.  
Side-lined for three decades, the IEL field is considered to have been reborn to 
global economic governance only in the 1980s thanks to the determination of more 
pragmatically-driven, rather than academically-oriented, lawyers. The 1980s generation was 
led by John Jackson to rethink legal expertise as a way of reclaiming their participation in 
international trade law. The conventional account chronicles how they gradually shifted the 
mindset towards functionalist, realist and pragmatic attitudes and mentality. They were less 
interested in debates over the legal nature of the GATT and more preoccupied with its 
functions, effectiveness, and the application of its rules to solve problems of world trade. 
This turn-to-functionalism is perceived as having empowered lawyers to participate in the 
institutionalisation process leading up to the creation of the WTO, the adoption of the 
Article XXIV Understanding, and the move from a power-oriented to a rule-oriented 
system, which later underpinned their efforts to strengthen Article XXIV through litigation 
before the DSB. 
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3. The Modernist and Anglocentric Limits of the Conventional ‘Grand’ 
Narratives 
 
The institutional and jurisprudential storylines are often united through the commitment of 
the traditional approach to a view of history as a single and universal phenomenon. Lawyers 
often try to merge these stories by assuming that both are somehow intertwined 
teleologically and progress linearly.249 The purpose of converging them into one common 
trajectory seems to be an attempt to scientifically capture the single, universal reason 
driving the history of international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism. 
This grand narrative is remembered as a conflict against the proliferation of RTAs, which is 
associated with autocracy, discrimination, and protectionism, as well as against formalism 
and academicism. By contrast, the GATT is accounted for as a ‘legitimate’ and ‘fair’ 
system centred on free trade cooperation, non-discrimination, and reciprocity, as well as 
functionalism and pragmatic attitude. At the core, international trade law is narrated as a 
universally accepted mode of institutionalised, expert governance of world trade that aspires 
to impose formal and effective constraints upon sovereign discretion over trade policies, 
while promoting a more peaceful world and economic welfare through interdependence.  
Mainstream literature aims to validate and legitimise its underlying programmes 
through conventional narratives that vindicate the naturalness, necessity or superiority of 
GATT/WTO law. The traditional approach is employed to root the rules, ideas and 
practices of WTO law in history lessons, so as to ascribe them meaning as part of an 
unfolding story of institutional and jurisprudential progress that serves to support the 
dominant programme.250 For instance, the institutional story about the ITO failure and the 
formation and development of GATT/WTO governance of South-North regionalism under 
Article XXIV is strategically tied up to the jurisprudential story about the evolution from 
formalist questions about the existence and legality of the GATT to the issues of formal and 
functional defects of Article XXIV followed by the functionalist interpretation and 
application of its disciplines to govern the making and operation of South-North RTAs. The 
ultimate aim is to instrumentalise history to lend authority to the contemporary legal 
doctrine. Therefore, the dangerous consequence of combining these storylines through the 
traditional approach is to produce a teleological view of the history of GATT/WTO law of 
South-North RTAs as a single and universal phenomenon.  
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Recently, a new trend in literature has extensively criticised the traditional approach 
for its shortcomings.251 For the aim of my discussion here, I highlight two critiques of 
mainstream literature’s commitments to modernism and Anglocentrism that seem to bear 
great explanatory power. It will become soon clear that the combination of these two 
assumptions shapes the interaction between legal history and doctrine in a particular way 
that has the effects of imposing disciplinary limitations over legal expertise and of 
impacting adversely international trade law.  
The critique of modernism calls attention to the argumentative structure embedded 
in the traditional approach. The initial step to history-telling is to define international trade 
law. This definition is habitually constructed upon two moves. It first assumes international 
trade law can be ‘objectively’ isolated from other social phenomena, such as morality, 
politics, and economics, as well as from domestic and international law, in order to provide 
a definitive, abstract ‘concept’. This definition is often a specialised variation of the notion 
of international economic law as a universal and neutral set of positive norms and 
authoritative processes that are ‘legitimately’ produced and can be ‘objectively’ interpreted.  
These premises produce blind spots that often lead the traditional approach to 
overlook how political and intellectual struggles shape GATT/WTO law. This implies that, 
to produce a universal history, conventional narratives frequently fail to take into 
consideration the impact of socio-economic contexts on the making and interpretation of 
international trade law, while obscuring disciplinary bias and marginalising alternative 
ideas and practices within the IEL field.252 Therefore, embedded into the traditional 
approach, the modernist commitment to teleology requires the adoption, preceded or not by 
theoretical justification, of a universal concept of international trade law as the condition 
sine qua non to begin the process of uncovering its history. This restricts, in turn, legal 
history to the jurisprudential and institutional stories that often support the dominant 
programmes underpinning the concept chosen ex ante. 
Chapters 1 and 2 illustrate the perils of modernism. Two shortcomings are 
particularly important. First, the traditional literature narrows the notion of international 
trade law to GATT/WTO law, accompanied or not by methodological reasons. The 
consequence is to impose a disciplinary demarcation that disregards any rule or institution 
existing from 1947 to 1995 that falls outside that concept. Second, to reinforce this 
conceptualisation, the conventional narratives seem to function as an apologetic conduit 
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providing authoritative justifications for using the contemporary legal doctrine to apply 
Article XXIV in the making and interpretation of South-North RTAs. 
The second critique is concerned with the overwhelming Anglocentrism embedded 
into conventional accounts.253 From physical places to intellectual debates to global policy-
making, GATT/WTO law is frequently experienced in present-day mindset as an Anglo-
American phenomenon. Locations such as Bretton Woods, New York, and Washington in 
the United States, London and Torquay in the United Kingdom are central to the 
historiography, where international lawyers have been found, in some way, even today. Of 
course, other key places such as Geneva, Paris, Annecy, Brussels, Tokyo, and Havana, have 
also been historically important; however, the traditional approach portrays them as islands 
of Anglocentrism elsewhere.  
It feels discouragingly difficult and sometimes impossible to engage with 
international trade law without delving into Anglo-American history, referring to ideas and 
practices about multilateralism and regionalism as imagined in the US and UK, or even 
communicating in the English language. This suggests the existence of an affinity between 
lawyers’ disciplinary preference and their acceptance of an Anglocentrism. The IEL field is, 
hence, experienced as dominated by Anglocentric-inspired norms and knowledge. 
This Anglocentrism leads one to wonder what kind of history it would be possible 
without resuming it to the role of the US (mainly), the UK (secondarily) and Western 
Europe and Japan in the construction and maintenance of the world trading system? The 
overwhelming majority of the contemporary narratives, following either institutional or 
jurisprudential storyline, seem to drive back to what and how British and Americans have 
done and written.  
Institutionally, the literature tends to equate international trade law to GATT/WTO law 
by either foregrounding their ancestors in the 19th-century, liberal economic system led by 
Great Britain, or emphasising their origins in the Anglo-American negotiations that resulted 
in the Atlantic Charter. It often retells the debate between the American Cordell Hull and 
Harry Dexter White, and the British John Maynard Keynes about free-trade multilateralism 
and imperialist regionalism.  
Jurisprudentially, mainstream literature emphasises unequally ideas and practices 
produced by Anglo-American (trained) lawyers.254 In the 1940s, the ‘father of IEL’, Georg 
                                                   
253 Likewise, see Anghie (2005), Gathii (2008) and Koskenniemi (2012a, 2012b, 2012c and 2013) for 
Eurocentrism in international law, and see Carvalho (2011), Pahuja (2011) and Orford (2015 and 2016) 
for Eurocentrism/Anglocentrism in IEL. 
254 D.W. Kennedy, 1994a: 61; Charnovitz, 2014: 616-624. 
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Schwarzenberger (1908–1991), was a German-British professor of the University of 
London. In the 1980s, the ‘great champion of IEL’, John Jackson (1932-2015), was an 
American-born practitioner turned into a professor of the Georgetown University who on 
different occasions served the Office of the US Trade Representative. Therefore, the 
traditional approach makes a quite impossible task to offer a credible history of 
international trade law and governance of South-North regional trade agreements without 
adopting an Anglocentric viewpoint. 
 
C. Towards an Alternative Approach to History of the International Economic 
Law 
 
In an attempt to address some of the shortcomings of the traditional approach, I provide 
below the contours of an alternative grounded in four strategies. The purpose is to rethink 
the history of international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism through 
this proposed alternative. 
 
1. Widening History Boundaries  
 
I purport to place the origins and development of international trade law within a broader 
historical trajectory. The goal is to widen the scope to analyse how IEL was ‘founded’ in 
relation to the ‘rest’ of international law and also to the ‘other’ policymaking domains and 
institutionalised regimes of trade governance existing between 1944 and 1994. This consists 
of retelling institutional and jurisprudential stories in a more comprehensive frame. Hence, 
the aim is to prevent the failures of conventional narratives from constraining today’s legal 
expertise in two important ways.  
Firstly, the consensus on the GATT/WTO as the unique, or perhaps ultimate, 
institutional and normative experiments of international trade governance since 1944, is 
challenged. Specifically, the conventional portrait of the GATT/WTO as the single 
multilateral trade regime to emerge from the postwar period is confronted. Secondly, the 
traditional perspective that confines the history of international trade law of regionalism to 
an antagonistic debate between free-trade multilateralism versus preferential regionalism is 
rejected.  
107 
 
Chapters 1 and 2 evidence that present-day legal doctrine on international trade law 
and governance of South-North regionalism is grounded in (almost singularly) institutional 
and jurisprudential stories of GATT Article XXIV. How the history of Article XXIV is 
narrated already does a great deal of work in setting up the history lessons that are taken 
away about the necessity, inevitability, and desirability of the WTO disciplines on South-
North regionalism. In this sense, history should be understood as doctrine.255 The doctrinal 
rework would consist of providing alternative accounts in which international trade law is 
juxtaposed to the ‘rest’ of international economic law, whereas the GATT/WTO and the 
regional trade regimes are resituated in relation to the ‘other competing’ international 
regimes for trade cooperation. The aim would be to rescue legal questions, projects, 
concepts, ideas and practices related to regional trade regimes that were historically 
marginalised for having been regarded as falling outside WTO law and IEL expertise.  
Part III retells the history of the GATT law of South-North regionalism within the 
wider frame of postwar international economic law and governance, which were 
characterised by normative heterogeneity, institutional experimentalism, and jurisprudential 
innovation. The institutional story looks different from the conventional narratives if, 
instead of focusing exclusively on the GATT, it accounts for the role of GATT (as the 
embodiment of a normative and institutional model) in the battle against the UNCTAD and 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) for global trade governance. 
Likewise, conventional stories of IEL jurisprudence single out an innovative body of legal 
knowledge produced since the 1940s. Not only has the traditional history led legal expertise 
to relegate a rich repertoire of norms and ideas to the dustbin of the past, but also has 
crystalised a disciplinary boundary that prevents recent preoccupations, rules, and theories 
from growing or entering international trade law.256 For instance, it has marginalised 
relevant questions related to social justice and economic development by justifying 
historically that redistributive policies, environmental and labour concerns, and humans 
rights considerations fall outside the IEL field (generally) and WTO law (specifically).  
 
2. Endogenising History  
 
I suggest that we suspend our habit, nurtured by an intellectual compromise and a 
professional common-sense, of imagining international trade law as a special body of 
                                                   
255 Likewise, see Orford (2016: 703). 
256 Likewise, see Howse (2017: 188).  
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positive rules and processes, which can be empirically identified and scientifically analysed. 
International trade law can be conceived not as a result of a unilateral process of normative, 
jurisprudential or institutional specialisation or fragmentation, which is possible to be 
‘discovered’ and ‘apprehended’ by lawyers, regardless their historical context, through the 
identification of a distinguishable group of universal norms and regimes holding a natural 
or logical speciality. Instead, I propose to approach international trade law as (part of) the 
creation and advancement of the IEL field, which have been undertaken by contextualised 
groups of lawyers since the 1940s.257  
This thesis aims to explore the consequences from understanding that the ‘origins’ 
and ‘progress’ of international trade law were intertwined with the ‘invention’, 
‘maturation’, and ‘defence’ of the IEL expertise. In this sense, international trade law is 
neither equated to GATT/WTO law nor only regarded as bodies of positive rules and 
process, but also a way of legal thinking and practising it. It involves the production and 
transmission of knowledge among lawyers so that ideas and methods are routinely 
embedded in legal expertise ceasing to be politically or intellectually contested.258 
Particularly, I will reveal how mainstream consensus on the IEL field’s history and 
doctrines reflects, emblematically, the continuous labour of lawyers to encapsulate a 
specific set of political decisions, intellectual commitments, and normative positions into 
conventional narratives that sustain the contemporary legal doctrine on the international 
trade law of South-North regionalism.  
Moreover, I will show that lessons from the traditional history smooth the process 
of decision-making and consensus-building within the IEL field.259 They are employed to 
‘construct’ international trade law having more or less influence depending on contingent 
factors related to the authority and legitimacy of their proponents and reasoning. This 
suggests that jurisprudential and institutional stories are neither neutral nor apolitical. 
Rather, they are produced by lawyers pursuing, personal or collective, projects, who are 
located in different jurisdictions, educated according to distinct legal traditions, and 
committed to divergent political groups and ideational mindsets. The consequence of this 
view is to contest the IEL field’s traditional claim to the universalism and perpetuity of 
WTO law (as the formalisation of the ‘single’ and ‘global’ international trade law) since it 
cannot be sustained empirically but only aspired intellectually.  
                                                   
257 This approach is inspired by D.W. Kennedy (2005 and 2016), Lang and Scott (2009), Koskenniemi 
(2011), and Roberts (2017). 
258 D.W. Kennedy, 2002: 408-414; Roberts, 2017: 1-6. 
259 Santos, 2002: 178-179; Roberts, 2017: 8-9. 
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Therefore, Chapter 6 will combine an analysis of the IEL field’s intellectual history 
with an investigation of the performance of its members as designers, managers and 
interpreters of international trade law. My specific purpose is to show how intra-
disciplinary struggles and outside political-economic conflicts shaped the construction of 
history lessons that contributed to constituting competing legal doctrines on the GATT law 
of South-North regionalism between 1947 and 1980. 
 
3. Breaking up with Modernism: History as Temporal Contestation of 
Doctrines 
 
I will depart from the modernist commitment to a progressive, linear and universal style of 
history that often instrumentalises institutional or jurisprudential stories to reassert a 
consensus on international trade law so as to support particular programmes.260 This means 
to resist to our impulse born out of the traditional approach to constructing narratives of 
WTO norms and practices by working backwards in order to ‘uncover’ a single lineage 
from the GATT that justifies the natural or logical teleology we want to see hidden in 
history. To do so, I suggest recalibrating three main elements of history-telling about 
GATT/WTO law: frame, scope and scale. 
Following the shift from positive norms to differentiated expertise, the focus is not 
on retelling how legal rules and regimes have continuously and progressively evolved into 
their contemporary manifestations. Rather, I aim to foreground how legal norms and 
knowledge are produced by contextualised groups of lawyers who pursue their projects 
through practice. This does not mean to impose a dogmatic separation between past and 
present aiming to completely sterilise history from critical engagements. I suggest 
emphasising, instead of erasing, intellectual and political conflicts that historically produced 
compromises, ruptures, or transformations within the normative, institutional, and 
jurisprudential dimensions of international trade law. This new approach enables us to 
understand better how conventional narratives have constrained legal imagination by 
continually retelling the lessons that ultimately reinforce the disciplinary consensus on 
today’s legal doctrine on South-North regionalism. Part III highlights not only the 
conditions of possibility that (did and do) frame decision-making in and over legal doctrines 
on the international trade law of South-North regionalism but also empower a critical 
engagement with lawyers’ past and present expertise and choices. 
                                                   
260 This strategy is inspired by Koskenniemi (2012b and 2013). 
110 
 
 
4. Departing from Anglocentrism: History as Spatial Contestation of Doctrines 
 
This strategy consists of breaking up with Anglocentrism.261 If IEL is understood as a 
transnational field that aggregates lawyers from and working in multiple jurisdictions, 
historical narratives shall also be conceived as produced in sites located outside the Anglo-
American world. This move entails two consequences. It is necessary to take into 
consideration that international trade law has been thought and practised in distinct 
contexts. Nonetheless, the validity and legitimacy of norms, ideas, and techniques hinge on 
the dynamic interplay between different legal communities within legal expertise. This 
disciplinary interaction is affected by the unequal distribution of authority and resources. 
Consequently, it is important to be aware of the effects of certain ‘spatial’ differences over 
the production of histories, as well as of the extent to which particular associations of some 
lessons with some doctrinal frameworks have come to dominate understandings of what 
counts or not as (part of) international trade law in a way that can make them appear neutral 
and universal.  
I propose, instead of equating the history of international trade law with Anglo-
American stories of GATT/WTO law, to foreground the variety of historical narratives 
chronicled according to different approaches, each produced by the interplay of 
contextualised groups of lawyers (within and across jurisdictions) facing political and 
intellectual communalities, dissimilarities and conflicts. Thus, the interaction between 
histories and doctrines would be different if lessons produced by lawyers situated in distinct 
states and regions and often associated with different communities were to be accepted as 
part of the IEL field rather than obfuscated by Anglocentrism. 
Chapter 1 makes us think of Anglo-American stories as the universal history of 
international trade law of South-North regionalism. By contrast, Part III leads us to rethink 
how international trade law was thought and practised in non-Anglo-American contexts, as 
well as on the conditions that led GATT/WTO law to be employed as legal expertise to 
support trade interactions with Anglo-Americans. Furthermore, it shall become evident that 
the formation and development of the international trade law of South-North RTAs were 
undertaken in sites located outside the Anglo-American world. Indeed, the European Paris, 
Brussels, Geneva, Athens and Istanbul, the Mediterranean Tunis, Rabat, and Cairo, as well 
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as the African Yaoundé and Lomé were among the most relevant places where lawyers 
negotiated and drafted mainly in French the South-North RTAs between the European 
Union and its former colonies or neighbouring countries between 1947 and 1985. Thus, I 
intend to historicise international trade law taking into consideration how history teachings 
were dispersedly produced not only to shape legal expertise but also to justify and 
legitimise legal doctrines to be used in making or interpreting RTAs in locations outside the 
Anglo-American world. 
 
5. An Alternative to the History of International Law and Governance of 
South-North Regional Trade Regimes 
 
All in all, my alternative approach has three aspirations. It intends to offer a way to rethink 
legal history as a window to unveil how different groups of lawyers have participated in the 
foundation and development of international trade law. It aims to assist us in understanding 
how jurisprudential and institutional stories have been produced to govern the formation of 
doctrines. It seeks to highlight how conventional narratives have connected ‘certain’ past to 
‘certain’ present in order to establish and sustain relations of difference, dominance, and 
disruption inside and outside the IEL field. Thus, this new style of history-telling purports 
to reveal how lessons have been mobilised to support legal doctrines on GATT/WTO law 
and governance of South-North regionalism in ways that have affected lawyers’ 
understanding of and engagement with international trade law. 
It also intends to improve our understanding of how international trade law has been 
employed to control the formation of ideational, institutional, and jurisprudential 
programmes operating within the international economic order. It aims to foreground the 
continuous involvement of lawyers in the naturalisation and essentialisation of WTO/GATT 
law as (the core) international trade law. Specifically, it seeks to unveil how lawyers labour 
to embody this project into legal rules, institutions and doctrines on regionalism, through 
lawmaking and interpretation. With this new approach in mind, Chapter 7 provides one case 
study of how legal doctrines were reworked through practice in order to reflect, shape, and 
sustain ideational, institutional and jurisprudential programmes. Some of these doctrinal 
frameworks were successfully incorporated, while the ‘rest’ was ‘forgotten’, into legal 
expertise, which underscores present-day international trade law of South-North 
regionalism. 
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It finally intends to contribute to contemporary debates on international trade law by 
rethinking the history of the present. Understanding history as part of today’s practice 
involves revealing how the work of embedding ideational, institutional and jurisprudential 
programmes into international trade law through lessons has shaped the IEL field’s identity, 
mission and influence over the world trading system. Present-day challenges arising out of 
economic globalisation, political nationalism, and trade populism, seem to put a real threat 
not only to the WTO but also to South-North regional trade regimes that were once 
celebrated and have recently become controversial, such as the European Union, NAFTA, 
TPP, and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). In providing a new way of 
understanding the interaction between history and doctrines, an alternative approach aims at 
penetrating into the IEL field to illuminate how historical narratives and doctrinal analysis 
constitute the conditions of possibility that enable and constrain lawyers to engage WTO 
law in producing imaginative solutions to current problems. 
 
Conclusion 
 
I opened this Chapter by suggesting that the interaction between history and doctrines is key 
to understanding the participation of international lawyers in the construction of 
international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism. Throughout the 
sections, I showed that legal doctrines result from the interplay between intellectual debates 
meaningfully grounded in history lessons and political disputes arising from collective and 
individual pursuits of authority and legitimacy. In this context, the function of the 
traditional style of history-telling is two-fold. It narrates the past as teachings to support 
ideational, jurisprudential, and institutional projects for governing world trade. It chronicles 
the past as lessons to frame and argue about trade problems through international trade law. 
This means that the traditional approach has great responsibility for producing and 
sustaining legal doctrines. Therefore, I claim that the conventional narratives are implicated 
in the imposition by the present-day legal doctrine of limitations on legal imagination, 
which prevents lawyers from offering inventive solutions to contemporary issues.  
If my analysis is correct, the IEL field should seek to relax the disciplinary frontiers 
of international trade law in order to produce alternative ways to reform and transform 
South-North RTAs. This would partially include welcoming inventive projects, norms, 
ideas, and techniques from legal and non-legal experts located outside Anglo-American, 
orthodox sites. Since these ‘innovations’ could be found out not only in present-day but also 
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in the past, the IEL field should rethink its own history in order to recover the sense it once 
had that international trade law was characterised by normative heterogeneity, institutional 
experimentalism and jurisprudential innovation. I hope that the proposed alternative 
approach will assist in broadening the boundaries of legal history so as to lessen the 
disciplinary constraints while empowering lawyers to re-imagine the international trade law 
of South-North regionalism in response to current problems. I want to conclude by 
highlighting my core arguments. 
The IEL field is directly implicated in the production and transmission of legal 
histories and doctrines. Specifically, history-telling functions as an expert mode of 
governance of meanings across time. It is employed to control the range of choices of who 
and what matters or not for ‘today’s’ international trade law and governance of regionalism. 
Studying legal history as a practice of disciplinary differentiation, domination, and 
disruption is thus studying the conditions of possibility sustained by the IEL field for 
lawyers to engage in alternative (past or present) ways to transform the South-North RTAs. 
As evidenced by Chapters 1 and 2, the link between conventional narratives and 
doctrinal frameworks is constructed and justified through views of world trade’s telos. This 
approach enables legal reasoning to work backwards in order to ‘discover’ lessons 
accounting for a single lineage that validates and legitimises the natural or logical teleology 
embedded into legal norms, regimes and doctrines governing international trade relations. 
As demonstrated further in Chapters 5 and 6, the alternative approach can be used to 
uncover the effects entailed by the imposition by the traditional style of disciplinary 
demarcation between international trade law and ‘the others’. The definition of the ‘others’ 
has been contingently reworked relying upon the efforts to delineate spatial and temporal 
dedifferentiation.  
Moreover, I argued that modernism and Anglocentrism embedded in the traditional 
style often constrain rather than empower lawyers to rework today’s legal doctrine on the 
international trade law of South-North regionalism, in order to provide new and alternative 
responses to current issues. To avoid those shortcomings, I proposed to resituate the 
foundation and development of the international trade law of the South-North regionalism 
within a wider temporal trajectory and spatial context. The aim is to cause history-telling to 
take into consideration the ‘rest’ of international law and trade policy existing between 
1945 and 1985. More specifically, I argue that the history of international trade law of the 
South-North regionalism should be retold not as single, universal, and neutral accounts of 
past events, but rather as contingent and partial stories carrying out ideational, institutional, 
and jurisprudential projects.  
114 
 
The alternative style of history-telling has the potential to uncover the normative 
and material roots of modernism and Anglocentrism that are entrenched in mainstream 
literature. Normatively, the Anglo-American view of international trade law as an 
instrument for realising a specific (initially, liberal-welfarist and, now, neoliberalist) 
programme has been tied up with the modernist idea of universal and linear evolution. The 
result has been the production of history lessons to legitimise the contemporary legal 
doctrine by demonstrating that its origins and development go back to past events that are 
central for neoliberalism and Anglo-American diplomacy. Materially, the dominance of 
modernism and Anglocentrism has a great deal to do with the political and economic power 
of the United States and the United Kingdom in shaping international trade law and 
governance since the postwar period. The alternative approach I offered can assist us to 
produce a better map of the prevailing doctrinal framework that structures decision-making 
in the WTO and the South-North RTAs, and so critically engage in a dialogue with lawyers’ 
past and present expertise and choices.  
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CHAPTER 4.  LEGAL DOCTRINE IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND GOVERNANCE OF SOUTH-NORTH REGIONAL 
TRADE REGIMES 
 
Introduction  
 
Most of this thesis is devoted to expose and examine the role of legal doctrines in the 
making of South-North regional trade regimes. I started Chapter 2 by defining legal 
doctrines as loosely as possible without departing radically from how most international 
lawyers think about them. I did this by conceptualising legal doctrine as a coherent and 
stable framework of positive and non-positive norms and legal techniques that serves as a 
mode of legal governance. The concept was left slightly ambiguous and open-ended to 
allow a detailed study of mainstream scholarly and policy literature and official texts. This 
Chapter inquires into the nature and functions of legal doctrines of international economic 
law by addressing two central questions. 
What do we – international lawyers – know about the role of legal doctrines of 
international economic law? Section A describes the prevailing understandings of legal 
doctrines aiming to highlight their commonalities and differences. It shows that all 
approaches share similar assumptions, which, in turn, constitute a characteristic way of 
thinking and reasoning about legal doctrines – I call this distinctive style of legal doctrine 
the mainstream approach. Section B explores the singularities and limits of the mainstream 
approach to legal doctrines of international economic law. Based on these findings, I argue 
that one of the main reasons for our collective legal knowledge being ill-equipped to 
perceive the nature and functions of legal doctrines is the dominance of the mainstream 
approach in the IEL field. In section C, the Chapter makes a case for adopting a socio-legal 
approach with the aim of (re-)conceiving legal doctrines as an expert mode of governing 
legal decision-making. My argument is that the socio-legal approach is a useful analytic to 
enhance our understanding of how legal doctrines empower and constrain lawyers’ 
authority to make legal arguments about choices concerning the legality, legitimacy, 
effectiveness, and fairness of WTO law and RTAs. It also assists us to be aware of the costs 
of sustaining such authority based on the continuous and uncritical use of legal doctrines.  
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That leads to the second question: what are the constitutive features of a legal doctrine 
of international trade law and governance, and which effects do they entail? Section C 
conceptualises legal doctrines as coherent and stable frameworks of projects and histories, 
facts and norms, and ideas and methods. This moves our attention away from legal 
doctrines as descriptions and evaluations of positive norms or authoritative processes as 
well as from validity as their central preoccupation. Instead, the focus should be placed on 
the constitutive features of legal doctrines and how the relationship with one another is 
crafted so as to lend meaning to norms and regimes of international trade law. The aim is to 
foreground the use of legal doctrines as a way of governing the movement and authority of 
meanings across space.  
In conclusion, I consider the application of the socio-legal approach to examining and 
reflecting on the specific role of legal doctrines of international trade law in the context of 
South-North regionalism. My aim is to use it to better understand the connection between 
the disciplinary construction and application of doctrinal frameworks and the range of 
possibilities that may empower or constrain lawyers’ imaginative interaction with the WTO 
and RTAs.  
 
A. The Mainstream Approaches to Legal Doctrine and Doctrinal Analysis 
 
Although any lawyer educated according to a Western legal tradition has some idea of what 
‘legal doctrine’ and ‘doctrinal analysis’ are about, these terms are more difficult to define 
than the first impression would suggest. Terms such as ‘black letter law’, ‘doctrinalism’, 
and ‘dogmatism’ are also used to denote (the outcome of) a ‘scientific’ approach to ‘the 
law’. For this reason, I begin by examining the polysemous meaning of the term legal 
doctrine and slightly less controversial meanings of doctrinal analysis. Since the particular 
relevant variations in their understandings seem to be somehow related to ‘grand Western 
legal traditions’ rather than strict national or jurisprudential boundaries, I start by outlining 
the main differences in their meanings associated with the conventional division of legal 
expertise in civil and common law. 
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1. The Common and Civil Law Approaches  
  
In the common law tradition, legal doctrine is usually equated to positive law, while 
doctrinal analysis is often defined as a methodology that ‘replicates’ judicial decision-
making in order to describe and evaluate the ‘correctness’ of ‘legal doctrines’.262 The terms 
doctrine and precedent are interchangeably used to mean “the law, at least as it comes from 
courts. Judicial opinions create the rules or standards that comprise legal doctrine.”263 The 
language of legal doctrine represents the law, and so it sets the normative terms for future 
resolution of disputes. Thus, the nature of legal doctrine is consensually understood as “the 
currency of the law.”264 
The common law approach consists of examining the content of a legal opinion to 
assess the validity of its reasoning, or to explore its implications for future cases.265 
Doctrinal analysis is regarded as a ‘scientific’ process to provide ‘apolitical’ and ‘value-
neutral’ descriptions and explanations of judicial decisions. The specific functions of the 
explanatory activity are to evaluate and criticise the existing legal doctrine, by showing the 
courts the error in their legal reasoning, and so provoking change in or new legal doctrine. 
This is only possible because the relationship between doctrinal analysis and legal doctrine 
is premised on the idea of “reasoned response to reasoned argument.” 266 In other words, 
doctrinal work is structured ‘as if’ it were judicial decision-making with the aim of 
generating a ‘correct’ outcome holding equal validity and legitimacy (but not authority) to 
legal doctrine. If the law is assumed to be comprised of objective legal norms, the identity 
of lawyers should not determine the decision itself but only its formal authority.  
Legal doctrine in the civil law tradition is generally understood as ‘non-positive’ 
law arguments produced by lawyers through ‘doctrinal analysis’, a ‘scientific’ methodology 
that loosely ‘mirrors’ legal decision-making in order to describe and assess the ‘correctness’ 
of ‘positive’ lawmaking, judicial decision, and legal interpretation.267 In contrast to the 
common law tradition, legal doctrine is not regarded as a precedent that creates legal rules 
and standards. Rather, it is a coherent and persuasive argument in the form of professional, 
non-judicial writings, such as commentaries and textbooks. The language of legal doctrine 
is how the law is communicated and reasons about the validity or legitimacy of ‘concrete’ 
                                                   
262 For an introduction to the common law approach, see Redish (1985) and Tiller and Cross (2006). 
263 Tiller and Cross, 2006: 517-518.  
264 Ibid. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Shapiro, 1987: 737.  
267 For an introduction to the civil law approach, see Peczenik (2001), Pattaro (2005), Lepsius (2014), and 
Smits (2015). 
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legal rules, decisions, and claims. However, in no way, it ‘binds’ individuals, ‘prohibits’ or 
‘authorises’ conducts, ‘modifies’ the legal state of things, or ‘threatens’ with state force. 
The nature of legal doctrine is commonly conceived as ‘a systematic and analytical 
exposition’ of the law.  
The civil law approach to legal doctrine consists of describing the existing legal 
rules and arguments in order to evaluate their correctness or explore their implications for 
future developments of positive law.268 Doctrinal analysis is regarded as a ‘scientific’ 
process performed by lawyers to provide ‘objective’ and ‘value-neutral’ descriptions of and 
explanations about the law.269 The descriptive function aims to provide some kind of 
rationalisation of the law as a coherent, stable, and intelligible system. The explanatory 
functions seek to offer justifications to the existing legal rules, judgments, and claims, by 
demonstrating error or correctness in their legal reasoning with the aim of validating, 
reforming or overriding them. This is only possible because doctrinal analysis is premised 
on the pursuit of a knowledge of (the not clear-cut notion of) ‘what the law is’ (de lege lata) 
rather than the promotion of ‘what the law should be’ (de lege ferenda).270 This disciplinary 
commitment to knowledge-production, which may lead to a change of the law, links legal 
academia and legal practice. Thus, doctrinal work is structured ‘as if’ it were legal decision-
making with the aim of reaching a ‘correct’ outcome with equivalent validity and 
legitimacy (but not authority) to judicial and legislative decisions. Thus, if the law is 
assumed to be comprised of objective legal norms, the identity of lawyers should not 
determine the outcome of doctrinal analysis but only its formal authority. 
 
2. The International Economic Law Approach  
 
Legal doctrine plays a central role in international law, perhaps more than in other fields of 
law.271 Similar to the civil law tradition, it is understood as ‘non-positive law’ arguments 
produced through ‘doctrinal analysis’. Yet, there is one aspect that approximates its 
meaning to the common law view: while common law regards legal doctrine as ‘positive 
law’ in the form of judicial decisions, international law may acknowledge a concrete legal 
doctrine “as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of [international] law” under 
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Consequently, 
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legal doctrine may serve as ‘evidence’ of positive international law.272 Although there is no 
exact equivalent to Article 38(1)(d) in the WTO agreements, legal doctrines have been 
brought into WTO law by the DSB through Articles 3.2 and 7 of the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).273  
More specifically, legal doctrines are defined as a coherent and credible argument 
about international economic law, which may take many forms of legal (non-judicial) 
writings, including treatises, textbooks, journal articles, and reports. Their language of legal 
doctrine is regarded as a universal medium which speaks about IEL, and reasons the 
validity or legitimacy of its ‘concrete’ legal rules, decisions, and claims.274 Even if they 
were acknowledged as a subsidiary source, legal doctrines would be a vehicle for, but 
never, legal norms that express a sense of imperativeness over the conscience of IEL 
subjects. Therefore, the nature of legal doctrines is commonly conceived as ‘teachings’, and 
so it does not entail ‘binding’ effects on international actors or ‘threaten’ with coercion and 
force.  
The mainstream approach to doctrinal analysis shares the core assumptions that 
underpin its civil and common counterparties. Doctrinal analysis is conceived of as a 
‘scientific’ method for describing and evaluating existing legal rules, interpretations and 
judgments.275 It often begins with an overview of IEL as it stands today by mapping and 
organising the ‘legal’ vocabulary applicable to the concrete matter at stake. Then, it 
rationalises IEL as a coherent and stable legal system, which governs the valid and 
legitimate forms of relationship between norms, decisions and outcomes.276 This 
argumentative process is fundamentally shaped by a consensual set of underlying 
assumptions about the goal of legal doctrine, the authority of styles of legal reasoning, and 
the types of materials to be included in the system. Although distinguishing doctrinal work 
from other legal activities may be challenging, the core premise is that the former is a 
disciplinary mode of governance that controls the production of knowledge of ‘what IEL is’ 
rather than ‘what IEL was or should be’. Particularly, it is acknowledged as an ‘objective’, 
‘impartial’, and ‘disinterested’ technique for knowledge production rather than political or 
moral opinion, sociological or historical description.  
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It is the disciplinary commitment to scientific knowledge-production that has 
oriented legal scholarship towards practice.277 The perceived authority of legal doctrines is 
based on their objective claims to universality. Historically, they have been relied upon for 
resolving international legal disputes. Alike the domestic approaches, doctrinal tasks are 
thought and practised ‘as if’ they were a legal decision-making process for attaining a 
‘correct’ outcome with equivalent validity and legitimacy (but not authority) to treaty-
making and judicial decisions. If IEL can be scientifically ascertained and evaluated, the 
identity of lawyers should not determine the outcome. Thus, ‘practice-oriented’ legal 
doctrines may affect IEL by changing (indirectly) how concrete legal rules are understood 
and interpreted or providing (directly) authoritative teachings that are formally 
acknowledged as subsidiary formal sources.  
By comparing the three traditions, it is possible to highlight their central features. 
The fundamental disagreement stems from the meaning of ‘legal doctrine’. This term, for 
common lawyers, refers to positive law in the form of judicial decisions, while, for civil 
lawyers, it connotes non-positive law arguments. International lawyers side with their civil 
law peers conceiving legal doctrine as non-positive IEL arguments; nevertheless, they 
acknowledge the possibility of those arguments be qualified as “teachings” under the ICJ 
Statute or DSU. Although understanding these differences is relevant to evaluate the formal 
authority of ‘legal doctrine’, it does not affect the ‘outcome’ of doctrinal analysis, which, in 
all traditions, means a non-positive law argument.  
Turning to the shared views, the first one is regarding the nature of doctrinal 
analysis as ‘science of law’. Although the underlying premises vary, the notion of science 
of law is deeply grounded in the core tenets of modernism: objectivism, (moral and 
political) neutrality, universalism, and verifiability. This means that ‘the law’ is universally 
defined as comprised of the ‘present’ and ‘applicable’ (and so neither the ‘past’ nor 
‘future’) body of legal rules arising out of concrete social processes. Second, this aggregate 
of legal norms is, in turn, assumed to be a universal phenomenon able to be objectively and 
impartially described and evaluated. Consequently, there is a common-sense understanding 
of what distinguishes doctrinal analysis from any other form of legal inquiry. The third 
shared feature is the rationalisation of the law.278 Despite methodological variations, law is 
rationalised as a ‘legal system’. This makes doctrinal analysis not a mere recording of 
existing case and statutory law but rather a combining descriptive and evaluative task aimed 
at determining out of social norms which ones are positive law and organising them into a 
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coherent and stable system of legal rules and institutions. Finally, doctrinal analysis is 
committed to an internal perspective.279 This means that, although the inquiry may contain 
other considerations, its core consists of the identification, interpretation, and 
systematisation of existing law. This internal view is what makes law an autonomous 
discipline. 
Those core features provide, therefore, the basic contours of what lawyers tend to 
imagine doctrinal analysis as science of the existing law, which is rationalised as an abstract 
legal system, in order to serve as the criterion against which concrete legal rules and claims, 
and judicial decisions are assessed to determine their validity and legitimacy. This 
understanding allows the law to be conceived as an objective reality that can be evaluated 
as a scientific subject, and as a self-contained system that provides the normative and 
sociological boundaries for an objective and value-free inquiry. Doctrinal analysis provides 
the vocabulary through which lawyers communicate to one another, in order to address 
concrete issues, craft arguments, suggest solutions, and reach decisions on their own terms. 
This strong orientation towards legal practice lends to doctrinal work legitimacy to 
reinforce the imaginary of the law ‘as if’ it were a legal system. 
It is fair to say that any Western-trained lawyer recognises these consensual features of 
the mainstream approaches. The vast majority of them are instilled with the doctrinal 
mindset when attending law schools, and so are able to acknowledge it as a distinctive 
mode of thinking and practising the law.280 Not rare it is implicitly transmitted as ‘the’ legal 
approach or method: to students, it is a way to learn to “think like a lawyer”; to scholars, it 
is described as the “nerve centre” of legal science or the “mother’s milk to academic 
lawyers.”281 It is difficult to imagine the existence of ‘the law’ without doctrinal analysis. If 
IEL is about norms for governing economic relations, legal doctrine communicates which 
of them are ‘positive norms’, how they relate to one another and also to social contexts. 
However, the widespread consensus on the centrality (or, perhaps, supremacy) of doctrinal 
work does not suggest that lawyers are aware of its exact nature and functions. While law 
students are habitually taught how to undertake doctrinal analysis dissociated from any 
reflection on its theoretical or methodological assumptions, legal academics have woefully 
understudied its role and effects. 
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B. The Limits of Legal Doctrines of International Economic Law 
 
The disciplinary common-sense tells that the IEL field has never reached a consensus on ‘a 
general theory’ or ‘a single method’. Nor is it clear that these are necessary or desired.282 
Instead of convergence, legal expertise seems to promote intellectual eclecticism. As a 
result, there are numerous possibilities to approach the international trade law and 
governance of South-North regionalism. Each of these ‘approaches’ offers a unique 
combination of philosophical, normative, historical, theoretical, and methodological 
tendencies. Although the assumption is that the choice of approach falls to each 
international lawyer, the reality is that the decision is profoundly conditioned by both the 
(objective) social and material relations and (subjective) intellectual, political, and 
disciplinary commitments, sustaining the IEL field and global trade governance (and the 
relationship between them). As the previous section implies, however, doctrinal analysis is 
traditionally conceived as a primus inter pares technique within the IEL profession.  
 Despite the disciplinary preference, the way doctrinal analysis should be carried out 
is not consensual either. It depends on which specific features are chosen to determine the 
legitimate mission of legal doctrines, the authority of methods of legal reasoning, and the 
validity of materials to be included in the ‘legal system’. For the specific purpose of this 
thesis, the overall function of (what I have called so far) the mainstream approach is to 
legitimise and validate doctrines of IEL (generally) and trade law (in particular). This is 
achieved by governing their production within the IEL field, and by ensuring their influence 
over an exclusive domain of lawmaking and interpretation. By controlling foundational 
questions underpinning international trade law, doctrinal work seeks to dictate how 
preoccupations about and challenges to the WTO law and governance are to be framed and 
addressed. I suggest, therefore, that one possibility to rethink the international trade law and 
governance of South-North regionalism is through the understanding and critique of how 
the mainstream approach produces, legitimises, and applies legal doctrines.  
Contemporary, mainstream jurisprudence offers two broad strands of possibilities to 
undertake doctrinal analysis.283 Formalist and functionalist approaches have been applied to 
produce distinct legal doctrines for interpreting WTO law and making RTAs. While 
formalism focuses primarily on ‘rules’ and ‘legal sources’ seeking to create reliable 
concepts of ‘validity’ and ‘binding force’, functionalism emphasises ‘processes’ and 
‘objectives’ in order to conceive ‘legitimacy’ of rules and link international trade law to its 
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social context. These jurisprudential views reflect how international trade law is 
historicised, thought, and practised today by the majority of international lawyers. The 
effort to realise the jurisprudential project of constructing a ‘universal’ international trade 
law and governance in the form of the GATT/WTO has been led by the dynamic interaction 
between formalist and functionalist perspectives since World War II. While section 1.B.4 
accounts briefly for their past, the next sections examine their present, core features. 
A common trait of mainstream jurisprudence is to ground their doctrines of 
international trade law in theories about the nature and functions of GATT/WTO law in the 
world trading system. These theories have posed three particularly important sets of 
questions.284 A first set is drawn from the recognition of the heterogeneity of international 
actors, their full range of preferences or policies, and the differences in their political and 
economic backgrounds. Is international trade law between such actors possible? Might there 
be common norms and regimes governing, or an overarching political economy programme 
uniting, all or perhaps some of them? Are multilateral and regional trade regimes ‘public or 
private interests communities’?  
A second set of questions emerges from the assumption that those actors are 
independent of each other and entitled to pursue their interests and objectives 
autonomously. How can any international trade law institution or rule be really ‘binding’ on 
such actors and what might their ‘binding force’ mean? What is the justification for 
multilateral and regional trade agreements to coerce autonomous actors? A third set probes 
into those actors and their relationship with one another. Who are the relevant actors in the 
first place, and how can international trade law assist them in attaining their preference or 
goal? Finally, what to do if their interests and objectives are different – as they often are?  
As I shall discuss below, these three sets of questions deal, respectively, with the 
‘universality’ of international trade law, its ‘binding force’, and its ‘relation’ with the 
surrounding political and social environment. Formalism and functionalism have been the 
most influential jurisprudential strands supporting doctrinal answers to those questions 
since the postwar. Indeed, they have assembled and empowered sets of stories, norms, 
theories, and methods to be used in constructing legal doctrines of international trade law. 
These jurisprudential views tend, consciously or otherwise, to overemphasise specific issues 
and instrumentalise ideas, facts, and rules, in order to justify and legitimise legal doctrines’ 
constitutive features. Conversely, they often downplay the importance of other concerns 
and marginalise other history lessons, theoretical and methodological options, and social 
norms due to their ‘subjective’, ‘political’, ‘value-laden’, or ‘ideological’ character.  
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The most of the questions raised above are contemporarily overlooked, to the extent 
that since the late-1980s the IEL field has dramatically shifted its attention away from 
theories and methods of international trade law and towards legal doctrines of GATT/WTO 
law.285 This change was caused partly by the formal-technical turn, and partly by the 
emerging managerial attitude. Together they narrowed the focus of legal expertise, 
privileging doctrinal analysis of WTO law or concerns about its effectiveness over 
transcendental reflections about the universality of WTO law and about the nature and 
functions of IEL in organising the relationship between world trade and ‘non-trade’ issues 
(e.g. development, inequality and environment).  
 
1. The Formalist View of Legal Doctrine of International Trade Law  
 
The formalist approach to doctrines of (contemporary) international trade law was initially 
developed by a generation of lawyers working in the post-World War II period.286 They 
shared an anti-idealist attitude and a realist concern with elaborating the conditions of 
international coexistence in a world economy divided into ideological regimes of trade 
cooperation. The German-American Ernst Feilchenfeld (1898–1956), the British Leslie C. 
Green (1920-2011) and David Hughes Parry (1893-1973), and the Hungarian-American 
Stephen A. Silard, alongside Georg Schwarzenberger, engaged in an intellectual task of 
identifying and justifying an emerging province of international law. By employing a 
formalist-inspired jurisprudence, they advocated for the existence of this new branch – 
which they came to name ‘international economic law’ – and the application of its distinct 
features to the regulation of inter-state trade affairs. Their core mission was, therefore, to 
demonstrate that the universal, objective and neutral character of IEL made it a suitable 
instrument to promote the institutionalisation of multilateral trade governance.  
As the leading figure, Schwarzenberger produced seminal literature over three 
decades.287 His definition for IEL is distinctively grounded in Austin’s concept of law as 
rules consented by sovereign nations coexisting in a Hobbesian (political) society. IEL is 
understood as a specialised province of public international law constituted of a sufficiently 
coherent, self-contained corpus of positive norms created by self-interested states.288 In 
turn, international trade law is defined as a sub-branch of IEL.  
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The doctrinal work for Schwarzenberger consists of employing an “inductive 
approach” to providing evidence of the formal authority of international trade law.289 The 
question about sources is used to scientifically determine what counts as law (lege lata) and 
what counts as moral or political opinions (de lege ferenda). To determine the valid sources 
of law, the inductive method seems to merge a ‘teleological’ with a ‘conceptualist’ style of 
reasoning.290 The first step is to use sociological and historical analyses to account for the 
power politics of sovereigns as the determinant of international trade law. This aims to 
show that legal rules emerge from verifiable hard facts of power politics and not utopian 
morality.291 After determining the existence of law, the doctrinal task is to undertake a 
normative analysis. Specifically, sociological or historical methods are supplementary to the 
normative examination. This approach allows, therefore, to ‘scientifically’ reason about the 
separation of international trade law from trade politics, since the former is conceived as an 
‘objective’ legal norm distinct from the latter that is ‘subjective’, but verifiable, political 
opinion.  
From a lawmaking viewpoint, international trade law would consist solely of 
special norms that are legally binding, and they must be established by objective criteria. 
Schwarzenberger aims to create verifiable or falsifiable hypotheses to determine whether 
law exists by focusing on the regular functioning of the “law-creating processes”.292 The 
making of international trade law is carried in by states, and not by deductions from general 
principles. This implies that law is based on consent, which, unlike morality, has an 
objective character that can be tested. Particularly, “the emphasis of International [Trade] 
Law is on treaties.” 293 By employing a teleological style of reasoning294, Schwarzenberger 
argues that the ultimate test is to verify the capacity of international trade law to sustain a de 
facto world trading system. Thus, the current purpose of legal doctrine is to distinguish, 
scientifically, WTO law (essentially objective and so binding) from trade policies and 
politics (inherently subjective and so non-binding). 
From an interpretation standpoint, the formalist approach provides a conceptualist 
style of inductive/deductive reasoning295. The doctrinal work starts by analytically 
distinguishing legal from political-moral disputes, and also acknowledging that many 
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disputes contain elements of both.296 It purports to objectively analyse and systematise legal 
norms, as defined in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, in order to inductively determine the 
fundamental principles of international trade law. Put differently, the WTO principles are 
determined by examining the valid rules as defined in Articles 3.2 and 7 of the DSU. This 
formalist method of inductive reasoning provides the ‘correct’ approach because it is able to 
scientifically determine the degrees of objectivity of each legal rule by analysing “law-
determining agencies” (e.g. courts, lawyers, states).297 This means that legal interpretation 
can be more or less objective, depending on the skill and technical qualification of each 
agency. 
The formalist view suggests that the authority of doctrines of international trade law 
is based on two premises. Methodologically, they must be capable of determining the 
validity and legitimacy of rules through scientific methods. For instance, to demonstrate the 
normative status of WTO law, some lawyers (like Schwarzenberger) focus primarily on 
questions about the validity and legal sources (internal explanations), while others 
emphasise questions about legitimacy and substantive justice (external explanations). 
Theoretically, the authority of legal doctrines is grounded in their scientific capacity to 
demonstrate that norms are valid and legitimate, and so maintain their objective distance 
from subjective policies and opinions. The Schwarzenberger’s type of formalist doctrine 
seeks to show that WTO rules, which are initially based on state consent, can a posteriori 
direct the behaviour of WTO members irrespective of their interests (internal explanations). 
The other formalist variant aims to demonstrate that those WTO norms are grounded in an 
‘international economic constitution’ (external explanations).  
Thus, the authority of formalist doctrines lies in their contingent autonomy, since 
they are produced out of scientific examinations of the relatively clear and determinate 
content of WTO law and RTAs, and not just instrumentalise what states, or other powerful 
actors, do or intend. Indeed, there is a strong assumption that, once the rule of WTO law or 
RTAs is ‘correctly’ determined, its meaning and effects are readily identifiable. This 
relative determinacy of WTO law is a premise on which formalist analysis rests.  
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2. The Functionalist View of Legal Doctrine of International Trade Law  
 
The functionalist approach to doctrines of (contemporary) international trade law emerged 
in the 1980s with a group of lawyers enmeshed in a moment of radical transformations.298 
This generation was mainly marked by the rise of neoliberalism, the end of the Cold War, 
the conversion of the GATT into the WTO, and the second wave of regionalism. These 
events renewed the possibility of reimagining a world economy ruled by (a universal) 
international law. The Dutch Pieter VerLoren van Themaat (1916-2004), in his treatise The 
Changing Structure of International Economic Law of 1981, proposed a revision of the 
Schwarzenberger’s definition of IEL in light of the new contexts. His effort was followed 
by the German Norbert Horn and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, the Austrian Ignaz Seidl-
Hohenveldern (1918-2001), and the American John Jackson and Robert Hudec (1934-
2003).  
Over time, John Jackson became known as “the greatest champion” of IEL for his 
extensive contributions.299 Jackson’s classical work was an entry on the term international 
economic law in the Encyclopaedia of Public International Law of 1985.300 This definition 
was later employed in his masterpiece of 1989, The World Trading System, whereby IEL is 
not precisely characterised. Rather, a functionalist method is offered to identifying IEL 
rules and institutions, while avoiding the rigid demarcation between financial, monetary and 
trade law, and between international and domestic law. In contrast to the Schwarzenberger’s 
(very narrow and detailed) definition, Jackson conceives IEL as “a very broad inventory of 
subjects: embracing the law of economic transactions, government regulation of economic 
matters, and related legal relations including litigation and international institutions for 
economic relations. Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that ninety per cent of international law 
work is in reality international economic law in some form or another.”301 In this sense, 
international trade law is purposefully defined as a branch of IEL, whereas GATT/WTO 
law is conceptualised as the centrally organised system of trade law norms. 
From a lawmaking viewpoint, Jackson argues that ‘practical’ needs of lawyers drive 
the choice of legal materials and techniques.302 The doctrinal task consists of making use of 
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a “functional[ist] approach” to analysing policy objectives of establishing international 
trade law norms.303 A broad variety of scientific methods from distinct disciplines (e.g. 
economics and international relations) can be employed to objectively test whether a 
proposition is legally authoritative by evaluating empirical evidence and conclusions arising 
from both the economic forces shaping policy preferences and the common values and 
needs of the international society.304 This dual aspect of IEL – concrete politics/abstract 
normativity – is reconciled by imagining international trade law as a set of legal instruments 
for policy-making, which express, or must comply with, the consensual, interdependent 
values embedded in the constitutional economic legal order.305 Although the distinction 
between law and politics seems to collapse, Jackson removes subjective discretion, abstract 
formality, and political bias in doctrinal practice by conceiving that authoritative sources of 
law can be scientifically determined based on the verification of actual, effective, and 
imperative will of the majority of international economic actors, rather than on the 
preference of an individual state, or on the lawyers’ interest.  
Concerning interpretation, Jackson’s functionalism adopts a policy style of 
conflicting considerations.306 Doctrinal analysis is carried out by a process of “balancing 
competing policy goals in contexts where each has considerable merit.” 307 Rules, values, 
and functions can be weighted with effectiveness, the rule of law, and constitutional 
provisions, in order to produce an authoritative response.308 Lawyers’ work is to objectively 
identify within this vast universe of possibilities the international trade law norms that are 
not only internal to the legal order but also part of the social norms shared by the relevant 
community of international economic actors.309 This objectivity is attained by adopting 
multi-disciplinary methods and pragmatic attitude, while rejecting legal norms based on 
exclusive moral or political preferences of individual actors.310 Once acknowledged their 
validity and legitimacy, these legal rules can enter into decision-making, and may determine 
the balance when weighting between competing norms and techniques, states’ values and 
preferences, and the needs for international cooperation.311 Jackson conceives his 
functionalist style as the ‘right’ approach to interpreting international trade law because it is 
able to scientifically determine among conflicting norms the one with legal character. 
Therefore, legal doctrines use multi-disciplinary methods to test whether such a norm 
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reflects both the changing conditions of international economic relations and the particular 
purposes of the global economic constitution. 
Functionalism suggests that the authority of legal doctrines of international trade 
law is based on two premises. Methodologically, the validity and legitimacy of legal norms 
are determined through a scientific analysis of lawmaking and interpretation. Some lawyers 
seek to evidence the concreteness of WTO law by showing its function in a globally 
interdependent economy (external explanation). Others aim to demonstrate that the WTO 
law’s empirical force rests on the material power of its members (internal explanation). 
While the former examines WTO rules as reflections of international economic relations, 
the latter analyses those norms as elements of policy-making processes of aggregating 
WTO members’ preference. The functionalist methodology consists of approaching WTO 
law as an institutional instrument for the realisation of collective policymaking, values 
embedded in the constitutional order, or economic forces. 
Theoretically, legal doctrines are depended on their scientific ability to evidence the 
responsiveness of international trade law to the realities of the world economy. Three main 
strategies are employed to examine the processes and objectives of WTO law.312 Some 
doctrines investigate the expanding scope of WTO disciplines to take account of either 
development promoted by economic globalisation or policy preferences of members with 
economic power. Others aim to widen the focus of doctrinal analysis to examine the growth 
and diversification of non-state economic actors in decision-making within and about WTO 
law. Finally, another strand studies questions about ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ of legal 
rules leading up to reimagining WTO law as a managerial instrument for global trade 
governance.  
The authority of functionalist doctrines rests on their ‘valid’ descriptions of 
institutional processes of decision-making in WTO law. Since they are constructed as 
objective and neutral recordings, legal doctrines have no normative authority over 
lawmaking and interpretation of WTO norms. Instead, their persuasiveness is restricted to 
inform and examine whether the relatively clear and determinate content of WTO rules or 
RTAs ‘reflects’ either state interest and values or political and economic forces. This 
relative determinacy of meanings, functions, and consequences of international trade law is 
a strong presumption underlying doctrinal analysis.  
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3. The Limits of Mainstream Legal Doctrine of International Trade Law 
 
Despite their differences, formalism and functionalism are often united within the IEL field 
by the shared understanding of legal doctrine as the universal science of international trade 
law. The mainstream approach assumes that legal doctrine is the product of (some kind of) 
scientific analysis. This implies that the historical, theoretical, and methodological contrasts 
between functionalism and formalism are experienced as mere ‘scientific variations’, 
‘jurisprudential eclecticism’, ‘plurality of rationalities’, or just ‘multiplicity of methods’, all 
with a claim to be ‘the’ legal (doctrinal) approach. At the core, international trade law is 
imagined – I argue – as a universally accepted mode of institutionalised governance of 
international trade that is managed by legal and non-legal experts with the purpose of 
imposing formal and effective constraints upon sovereign discretion over policies and 
measures, while promoting a more peaceful world and economic welfare through 
interdependence.  
The mainstream commitment to the notion of the science of international trade law 
aims to validate and legitimise its underlying programme that asserts the naturalness, 
necessity, or superiority of legal doctrines as a mode of legal decision-making over the 
world trading system. The promise of the mainstream approach is to empower lawyers to 
influence lawmaking and interpretation in WTO and RTAs by asserting the centrality of 
WTO law, the objectivity and neutrality of doctrinal analysis, and the authority of legal 
doctrine.313 The first commitment of the mainstream approach is to defend the legitimate 
authority of international trade law over global governance by demonstrating the centrality 
and universality of the WTO as both a legal system for regulating state policies and 
behaviours, and as an institutional space for state interaction. The second commitment is to 
create and apply rules of and arguments about WTO law by carrying out doctrinal analysis. 
Finally, the mainstream commitment to presenting the IEL field as the only legitimate and 
authoritative voice capable of defending the science of international trade law against its 
inside ‘rebels’ and outside ‘detractors’.314 
The mainstream approach is applied to determine which norms and ideas count as 
(constituent of) international trade law, so as to ascribe them meaning as part of legal 
doctrines of WTO law that serve to support certain programme. For instance, as examined 
in section 2.F, the dominant legal doctrine has reached a relative consensus on the full 
                                                   
313 This argument is inspired by Trubek and Esser (1989) and Schachter (1977) and draws from Lang and 
Scott (2009) and Lang (2011: chapter 8, 2014). 
314 Jackson, 2006: 227-230; Schachter, 1977: 223-226. 
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application of GATT Article XXIV to South-North RTAs, regardless of Article XXXVI:8 
provides otherwise. Put differently, mainstream literature asserts that the majority of 
doctrinal analyses have found that Article XXIV is validly and legitimately applicable to 
govern South-North regionalism, while Article XXXVI:8 is not. This means that WTO law 
serves as instrument to assign authority to the contemporary legal doctrine. Thus, by 
conceiving doctrinal analysis as ‘scientific process’, the mainstream approach has sustained 
a consensus around the existing legal doctrine on GATT/WTO law of South-North RTAs as 
a single, logical and universal phenomenon. 
As already introduced in Chapter 3, a new trend in literature has extensively 
criticised the mainstream approach for its philosophical limitations.315 For the aim of my 
thesis, I highlight two critiques of mainstream literature’s (consciously or otherwise) 
commitments to modernism and Anglocentrism that seem to bear great explanatory power. 
It will become soon clear that the combination of these two features produces legal 
doctrines in a specific way that empowers and constrains the IEL field, impacting, in turn, 
the international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism.  
 
(a) The Modernist Critique of Mainstream Legal Doctrines 
 
The critique of modernism brings to the fore the argumentative structure embedded in the 
mainstream approach. A doctrinal analysis begins with a definition to international trade 
law, which is routinely presented upon five steps. It, first, assumes that international trade 
law is an immanent, unified, and distinct phenomenon that regulates all forms of trade 
norms. Second, international lawyers can scientifically isolate international trade law from 
other sociological and normative phenomena, to the extent that it bears the qualities of 
‘objectivity’ and ‘universality’. Conversely, morality, politics, and economics are perceived 
as ‘subjective’, while domestic laws are regarded as local and international laws as holding 
distinctive substantive and procedural features. Third, lawmaking is at the same time unique 
and universal, which means that social norms are converted into legal norms only if they are 
subject to a ‘transcendental’ procedure discovered as capable of entailing authority to them. 
Fourth, after being recognised as international trade law, legal norms are regarded ‘as if’ 
they were a non-subjectivist resolution of value struggle and social conflict, and able to be 
rationalised as a part of a coherent and stable legal system. The result of this analytical 
work is a (relatively) conclusive and abstract concept of international trade law, which is 
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often a specialised variation of the notion of international economic law as a universal, 
objective, and neutral body of legal rules and institutions that are created out of an 
immanent and authoritative process or source, and are validly justified and legitimately 
recognised by IEL subjects, who in turn accept to have their universal freedom 
(sovereignty) governed by those legal norms and regimes. The final step is to assert that 
WTO law is the only, or the most relevant, body of positive international trade law, which 
is legitimately and validly produced and can be scientifically interpreted.  
These ontological and epistemological assumptions produce shortcomings and blind 
spots that often lead the mainstream approach to overlook how intra-expertise political and 
intellectual disputes impact legal doctrines on the international trade law and governance of 
South-North regionalism. This implies that, to produce a universal legal doctrine, 
mainstream literature often fails to take seriously into account both the ‘objective’ relations 
and the ‘subjective’ dimensions that are responsible for carrying out doctrinal analyses, 
which in turn structure and direct lawmaking and interpretation of rules and institutions of 
international trade law.316 Put differently, the mainstream approach operates to empower the 
influence of international lawyers over decision-making in and over multilateral and 
regional trade regimes, while obscuring disciplinary bias and marginalising alternative ideas 
and practices within the IEL expertise. Therefore, the mainstream commitment to 
modernism requires the adoption, preceded or not by theoretical or historical reasons, of a 
universal concept of international trade law as the condition sine qua non to carry out 
doctrinal analysis. This restricts, in turn, legal doctrines of international trade law to the 
formalist and functionalist views that often support the programmes underpinning the 
concept chosen ex ante. 
Chapters 1 and 2 illustrate the dangers resulting from the modernist style of 
approaching legal doctrine. Two shortcomings are particularly important. First, mainstream 
literature narrows the notion of international trade law to GATT/WTO law, accompanied or 
not by theoretical or historical justifications. The consequence is to impose a disciplinary 
boundary that disregards any (past or present) concept, theory, method, history, as well as 
rule, institution, or doctrine that is regarded as ‘unfitted’ into such narrow concept. Second, 
to reinforce this philosophical framing, the mainstream approach often works as an 
apologetic instrument for crafting valid and legitimate arguments about the application of 
GATT/WTO law (generally) and Article XXIV (in particular) to govern the making and 
interpretation of South-North regional trade agreements. 
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(b) The Anglocentric Critique of Mainstream Legal Doctrines 
 
The second critique calls attention to the overwhelming Anglocentrism surrounding and 
embedded into the mainstream approach.317 From geographical places to doctrinal debates 
to multiple sites of global trade governance, GATT/WTO law is frequently experienced 
within the IEL field as an Anglo-American phenomenon. Institutional settings such as the 
IMF, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Office of the US Trade 
Representative, and the Georgetown University, in the United States, as well as the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Department for International Trade, the London Court of 
International Arbitration, and the University of London in the United Kingdom, have been 
central to the formation and consolidation of legal doctrines on international trade law of 
South-North regionalism. Of course, the GATT/WTO, UNCTAD, WIPO, ICTSD, and the 
Graduate Institute in Geneva, the OECD in Paris, and the EU Trade Commission in 
Brussels have also played a key role; nonetheless, mainstream literature often represents 
these places as islands, or perhaps containers, of Anglocentrism elsewhere.  
In fact, it feels overwhelmingly challenging and sometimes even impossible to 
engage with international trade law without delving into projects, theories, methods, 
histories, and doctrines about multilateralism and regionalism as conceptualised, promoted, 
and applied by the United States and the United Kingdom, or communicating in the English 
language. This suggests closeness between international lawyers’ thinking and practice and 
their acceptance of an Anglocentrism. Thus, legal doctrines are often experienced as 
dominated by the Anglocentric vocabulary of concepts, ideas, and practices. 
The Anglocentrism causes one to consider what kind of legal doctrine on 
international trade law of South-North regionalism would it be possible without resuming it 
to either the role of the US (mainly), the UK and EU (secondarily), and Japan in global and 
regional trade governance, or to the vernacular of legal rules, institutions, knowledge, and 
techniques developed and implemented in Anglocentric-inspired regimes for multilateral 
and regional trade law- and policy-making. The overwhelming majority of the 
contemporary doctrinal arguments and analyses, following either the formalist or 
functionalist view, seem to overemphasise what and how American and British, and to 
some extent ‘Western’ (trained) lawyers have done and written.318  
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For formalists, doctrinal analysis of international trade law has been ‘created’ by the 
1940s generation led by Schwarzenberger. Despite its decline and almost disappearance in 
the 1970s, formalism was recently recovered mainly by the mainstream (European) 
literature in the form of international economic cosmopolitanism. For functionalists, 
doctrinal analysis was pragmatically ‘re-created’ by the 1980s generation. Today, 
functionalism is not only dominant within the IEL expertise but is also very influential in 
WTO law and governance as a result of its prominent role in fostering the formalisation and 
technicalisation of the multilateral trade regime. Therefore, mainstream literature seems to 
make a quite unbearable task to craft a persuasive and authoritative legal doctrine on the 
international trade law and governance of South-North regional trade agreement without 
adopting an Anglocentric perspective. 
 
(c) The Modernist and Anglocentric Limits of Mainstream Legal Doctrines 
 
I have argued so far that since 1947 the mainstream approach has limited how we conceive, 
historicise, theorise, craft, and apply legal doctrines of international trade law. Now, it is 
important that I be clear what I mean when I suggest the practical and intellectual 
impossibility to escape from its modernist and Anglocentric limits. Part of this has to do 
with the (objective) socioeconomic relations which structure the IEL field independently of 
lawyers’ mindset; and part with their (subjective) professional identities and intellectual 
habits, as well as the relationship between them. Put differently, what matters for the 
present argument is simply that the characteristic ways of conceiving and applying legal 
doctrines in the IEL field have an important (broader) effect on the choices that are made in 
the creation, elaboration, application, and interpretation of the international trade law and 
governance of South-North regionalism. More concretely, the rise of (what some have 
called) the ‘managerial mindset’ in the United States and United Kingdom in the 1980s, 
which spread out to the rest of world from the 1990s onwards, is a very important aspect of 
the reproduction, naturalisation, and legitimation of modernism and Anglocentrism that go 
on in and around the WTO regime.319  
The managerial mentality was involved in the formation and legitimation of the 
negotiation positions of the US and UK during the Uruguay Round, and so they have a 
significant influence over the change in the character of the GATT/WTO that led to the 
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formalisation and technicalisation of its legal system.320 On the one hand, the formalisation 
empowered the IEL expertise (generally) and legal doctrines (specifically), to the extent 
that they were chosen as the valid and legitimate techniques to ensure, through the new 
dispute settlement body, an objective and neutral enforcement of WTO rules and trade 
concessions. This consolidated, in turn, a redistribution of authority and resources from the 
diplomatic community to the legal profession. On the other hand, the technicalisation was 
deepened as part of the strategy to use objectivity and neutrality of WTO law to constrain 
Members’ discretion over trade matters. Specifically, policy sciences, notably neoclassical 
economics, were combined or translated in different ways into the IEL expertise so as to 
constitute a mode of legal governance, which marginalised trade diplomacy within the 
WTO governance.  
The Anglo-American style of trade managerialism has entailed transformations in 
the WTO regime and the IEL field. The colonisation of the WTO governance by managerial 
governmentality reveals a tendency towards the dominance of characteristic modes of legal 
governance, which can be described as institutionalised processes of administering and 
balancing trade problems through formal-technical reasoning and objective and neutral 
solutions.321 This trend was reflected in the empowerment of legal doctrines and the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body, and in the attempted depoliticisation of lawmaking and 
interpretation. In this world of Anglo-American managerialism, trade decision-making 
shifted from diplomatic conflicts settled down through politics towards disputes solved by 
legal rules and a modernist style of legal governance.  
Running in parallel, the infiltration of managerial mindset into the field of international 
economic law in the 1980s entailed pervasive effects. This began with the effort to combine 
formalisation and (policy-science) technicalisation by reworking legal knowledge and 
techniques. Specifically, the mainstream approach to legal doctrine was reformed through 
the lens of functionalism, in order to conceive international trade law as an instrument for 
trade policy. This move allowed international lawyers to sometimes borrow directly from 
policy disciplines, and sometimes try to appropriate ideas and techniques of other expert 
domains by translating them into legal expertise. The effects of managerialism went on in 
and around the IEL field causing a progressive change of its professional identity. 
Reflecting the influence of the Anglo-American legal community, lawyers reimaged 
themselves as ‘legal experts’322, participating in the reconstruction and administration of the 
world trading system. They rethought world trade as increasingly covered in international 
                                                   
320 Lang, 2011: 252-254. 
321 Ibid. 
322 Lang and Scott, 2009: 611.  
136 
 
law, and so increasingly governed by legal experts.323 Yet, IEL expertise was not the only 
technocratic domain in global trade governance. It had to compete among other professional 
fields to become the prevalent and most influential expert mode of governance in the WTO 
regime.  
 
C. Towards a Socio-Legal Approach to Legal Doctrines of International Trade 
Law 
 
In an attempt to address or avoid some of the predispositions, limitations and blind spots 
inherent to the mainstream approach to legal doctrines of international trade law, I provide 
below the contours of a socio-legal approach grounded in four strategies. The ultimate 
purpose is to rethink the legal doctrine of international trade law and governance of South-
North regionalism through the novel lens offered by the proposed alternative. 
 
1. Redrawing Doctrinal Boundaries: From Doctrine to History 
 
The first strategy purports to redraw the doctrinal boundaries of international law of 
economy (generally) and trade (in particular). The task is less about widening the scope but 
more about refocusing the doctrinal analysis. The aim is to understand the ways in which 
norms, regimes, histories, projects, ideas, and practices have been ‘discovered’ or 
‘determined’ as belonging to international economic law and governance, while the ‘rest’ as 
‘found’ not to. Part of this effort consists of retelling institutional and jurisprudential stories 
as proposed in section 3.C.1, in light of a more comprehensive historical frame. The other 
part is to historicise decision-making inside and outside the IEL field so as to bring into the 
fore the contingent justifications and choices for inclusion and exclusion of the main 
constitutive features of legal doctrines. Thus, the purpose is not only to prevent the 
uncritical application of the mainstream approach to legal doctrines, but also to understand 
their constraining and empowering effects on the IEL expertise and global economic 
governance. 
To avoid overlooking the dynamics of differentiation, dominance, and 
marginalisation, I suggest moving beyond the narrow concern of mainstream literature on 
legal doctrines with either positive norms (formalism) or authoritative processes 
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(functionalism). Instead, I propose to refocus our attention to legal doctrines on 
understanding their constitutive features. These structural elements are found (implicitly or 
explicitly) entangled in each doctrinal framework. Nonetheless, they can be intellectually 
organised in three domains of projects, norms, histories, ideas and practices. This means 
that the separation is merely heuristic, since each domain shapes and, at the same time, is 
shaped by the others. By unravelling these intertwined domains, I seek to understand their 
individual influences over the formation, validation, legitimation, and application of legal 
doctrines of international trade law. In turn, this analytical task will illuminate what is at 
stake when international lawyers uncritically apply the dominant legal doctrine to affect 
decision-making of South-North regional trade agreements within WTO governance. 
The domain of (what I call) ideational programmes of international political 
economy aims to shed light on the abstract options and concrete choices made by 
international lawyers concerning with the meaning and telos of global governance, trade 
regionalism, and economic development that are embedded into legal doctrines. It seeks to 
emphasise the contextual interaction between normative, theoretical, and methodological 
ideas as well as the social and material conditions that frames the contingent range of 
possibilities for imagining legitimate goals and valid forms of ordering international trade. 
The choice of those goals and forms entails a disciplinary commitment to specific 
understandings of what should be achieved through trade; how international trade law and 
governance should be used to attain it; how economic, political, and normative outcomes 
and processes should be described and evaluated; who has the authority to decide about the 
distribution of benefits, burdens, and consequences.  
More concretely, I propose to foreground and challenge the ideational programme 
of international political economy embedded into the dominant legal doctrine on the WTO 
law of South-North regionalism. On the one hand, this doctrine conceives South-North 
regional trade regimes as institutional instruments for the development of a free and fair 
market among partners through reciprocal bargaining of trade concessions and policies. On 
the other hand, it assumes that the WTO is the guardian of the world trading system, the 
ultimate mechanism for regulating international trade. The consequences are that 
mainstream literature not only narrows the ideational debate to the dichotomy between 
(utopian, non-discriminatory) multilateralism and (apologetic, preferential) regionalism, but 
also naturalises it within the IEL field. Thus, lawyers routinely experience WTO law as 
either an ‘institutional instrument’ or a ‘body of legal norms and processes’ devised for 
constituting a global free and fair marketplace through the purposeful balancing of 
multilateralism and regionalism. 
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The other dimension relates to the pattern of institutional ideas and practices 
involved in international trade law and governance. This opens the possibility to examine 
the existing institutions of multilateral and regional trade regimes in order to identify the 
repertoire of (more or less credible) design choices324 and (more or less acceptable) social 
and economic constraints325 faced by international lawyers. In this sense, concrete 
arrangements and abstract models are analysed so as to unveil the set of institutional 
alternatives available throughout the decision-making of inclusion and exclusion leading up 
to present-day WTO and RTAs. Specifically, I suggest that the dominant legal doctrine 
idealises the WTO as a universal institution, from which a model for South-North regional 
trade regimes is rationalised. As the doctrinal referent for designing RTAs, the WTO lends 
credibility to ideas and techniques that draw from it, while alternative norms, theories, and 
methods that depart from or contest it are marginalised.  
For instance, the debate about “narrow mandate and broad mandate” assumes the 
WTO as the institutional benchmark for classifying policy coverage of RTAs into two 
groups called WTO+ and WTO-X. The RTA provisions that fall under the mandate of the 
WTO are qualified as WTO+ (e.g. manufacturing goods, agricultural goods, and GATS 
services), whereas WTO-X relates to provisions that fall outside the mandate of the WTO 
(e.g. competition policy, anti-corruption, and labour regulation).326 Therefore, the study of 
(what I call) institutional visions of international trade governance opens the possibility to 
cast doubt on the consensus around the WTO as a natural, necessary, or superior regime for 
institutionalised management of inter-state trade. 
The last domain is composed of (what I call) jurisprudential views of international 
trade norms and processes. It focuses on the vocabulary of concepts, norms, stories, 
projects, theories, and methods, that constitutes legal doctrines of international trade law. 
Specifically, it emphasises the political and intellectual processes of selecting-discounting, 
negotiating, and formalising rules, ideas, and practices as South-North regional trade 
agreements. I assert that the policies, provisions, and institutions established in these RTAs 
are highly similar to the ones under the WTO agreements. This is partly because of the 
constitutive, substantive, procedural, and informative effects of GATT Article XXIV on 
RTA-making. Partly also because international lawyers employ the same IEL expertise 
developed for the WTO to conceive, debate, craft, and manage RTAs. And part, finally, 
because RTAs must be notified, and eventually assessed or challenged before the WTO’s 
CRTA and DSB on the grounds of WTO law. Hence, by questioning the jurisprudential 
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consensus, it is possible to broaden the horizons of possibility to rethink the legal doctrine 
on the WTO law and governance of South-North regionalism in distinct terms from the 
mainstream, mindset dichotomies between regulatory and jurisdictional coherences and 
conflicts, power-oriented and rule-oriented regimes, diplomatic and juridical ethos, and, 
finally, between functionalist and formalist thinking and reasoning.  
Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate that present-day legal doctrine on the WTO law and 
governance of South-North regional trade regimes is described, analysed, and justified by a 
constitutive vernacular of norms, concepts, stories, theories, methods, and arguments. The 
way this vocabulary is ‘spoken’ and ‘practised’ by international lawyers when negotiating, 
designing, and implementing RTA does a great deal of work in embedding into them the 
ideational programme, institutional vision, and jurisprudential view that are dominant in 
both, the IEL field and WTO governance. How South-North RTAs are thought, made, and 
interpreted through the lens of Article XXIV imposes from the outset the centrality, 
necessity, and persuasiveness of the WTO as an authoritative blueprint for economic 
development; as a legitimate model for institutionalised governance of free and fair 
marketplaces; and as a credible system of legal rules and principles. In this respect, that 
legal doctrine should be understood as a shared framework of positive and non-positive 
norms and processes, which serves as an expert medium of communication about the WTO 
law and governance of South-North regionalism. It is through such a coherent and stable 
framework that RTAs are thought, communicated, and practised. Put differently, if 
international trade law is about legal norms or processes for regulating trade policies and 
behaviour, legal doctrines select and articulate the ‘whats’, ‘hows’, and ‘whys’ concerning 
these norms or processes.327  
Any attempt to reimagine South-North regional trade agreements through international 
trade law would require the reworking of its background legal doctrine. This disciplinary 
endeavour would begin by according primacy to (present or past) norms, regimes, 
knowledge, and practices that are excluded from the dominant legal doctrine for not fitting 
within its framework. This might lead to the reconceptualisation and repositioning of 
international trade law with regard to the ‘rest’ of international economic law. Also, the 
hierarchical relationship between the WTO and regional trade regimes might be contested 
and levelled in light of lessons from and experiences of ‘other competing’ international 
regimes for trade cooperation. These efforts would open the possibility to recover and 
accommodate a broader or distinct range of questions, projects, stories, concepts, ideas and 
techniques related to RTAs that are marginalised for falling outside WTO law and the IEL 
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expertise. In Chapter 7, I propose a case study that examines the GATT law of South-North 
regionalism through my proposed notion of legal doctrines. This alternative conception 
allows a more comprehensive understanding of postwar international trade law and 
governance, which were characterised by normative heterogeneity, institutional 
experimentalism and jurisprudential innovation. My ultimate aspiration is, therefore, to 
offer new avenues for rethinking South-North regionalism so as to enable the formation of 
alternatives to present-day legal doctrine. 
 
2. Endogenising Legal Doctrine: a Contestation of the Centrality of 
International Trade Law 
 
Drawing from the argumentation offered in section 3.C.2 for endogenising history328, I 
propose to approach the rise, decline and fall of legal doctrines on international trade law 
and governance of South-North regional trade regimes as (part of) the formation and 
development of the field of international economic law and as (part of) the (re)construction 
and transformations of global governance and world trade.  
As examined in section 4.A.2, mainstream scholarship has approached legal 
doctrines from two distinct angles. On the one hand, lawyers committed to functionalism 
conceive legal doctrines as instrumental expressions of either state consent and interest or 
political and economic forces.329 Legal doctrines are understood as valid descriptions and 
analyses of institutional processes of decision-making in international trade law. For 
instance, legal doctrines on the WTO law and governance of South-North RTAs are 
perceived by functionalist lawyers as normatively irrelevant, to the extent that they either 
serve to inform the substantive and procedural rules of Article XXIV (at best) or bear no 
significant meaning (at worse), since the ill-designed Article XXIV deprives them of any 
authority. Thus, their persuasiveness is restricted to the communication and examination of 
the relatively clear and determinate contents, meanings, functions, and consequences of 
Article XXIV in light of GATT/WTO members’ preferences, international constitution of 
economic order, or global economic interdependence. 
On the other hand, lawyers pledging to formalism understand legal doctrines as 
possessing a relative normative autonomy.330 While certain legal doctrines may be 
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acknowledged as “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists,” or even embodied into 
“judicial decisions,” pursuant to Articles 3.2 and 7 of the DSU, and so enjoying binding 
force derived from formal sources; the persuasiveness of the vast majority rests on their 
contingent autonomy, which results from valid descriptions produced through the scientific 
examination of relatively clear and determinate content of WTO law and RTAs. Some 
formalist lawyers adopt a narrow understanding of legal doctrines, which limits the scope of 
doctrinal analysis to the text of the WTO and regional trade agreements, whereas others 
include the examination of additional sources ranging from WTO case law only to the 
(disputed) list of subsidiary sources provided in DSU Article 3.2. Once the rule of WTO 
law or RTAs is ‘correctly’ determined through doctrinal analysis, its meaning and effects 
are assumed to be readily identifiable. This relative determinacy of international trade law 
rules and institutions is a premise on which doctrinal analysis rests.  
I propose to depart from the mainstream approach to legal doctrines so as to replace 
it with a socio-legal approach that opposes a purely functionalist and a purely formalist 
view. On the one hand, the socio-legal view shares with functionalism the understanding of 
legal doctrines as instrumental manifestations of state consent or political-economic forces. 
On the other hand, it sides with formalism on the relative autonomy of legal doctrines, 
although on different grounds. As shall be clear as this and next sections progress, legal 
doctrines are not regarded as independent by their transcendental nature or theoretical 
presupposition of the IEL field, states, or a wider social-economic context. Instead, the 
autonomous validity and legitimacy of legal doctrines are asserted and sustained through 
specific forms of mutually constitutive interactions between the IEL expertise and the other 
domains of global trade governance. The socio-legal approach opens, therefore, the 
possibility to rethink legal doctrines of international trade law. While the next section re-
examines the conditions for their construction and application, this section focuses on their 
role inside and outside of the field of international economic law.  
I start by moving away from mainstream understanding that defines legal doctrines 
as valid and legitimate (non-positive) arguments about objective law resulting from some 
sort of scientific analysis carried out by apolitical and impartial lawyers in a de-
contextualised, ‘laboratorial’ place. As examined above, mainstream literature generally 
acknowledges the existence and relative importance of the IEL field and the doctrinal work 
of lawyers in the making and interpretation of international trade law. However, I shall 
argue that the way their concrete functions and interactions are theoretically and 
methodologically conceived leads the mainstream views to intentionally bracket the 
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influence of the IEL expertise (generally) and legal doctrines (in particular) over legal 
decision-making in global trade governance.  
To understand how that conventional understand is (re)produced, my strategy is to 
examine the premises and effects of the centrality of international trade law, one of the core 
commitments underpinning the mainstream approach.331 Conventional literature asserts that 
international trade law is a central institution for governing world trade.332 This legal fiction 
is built on an idea of international trade law as a special body of universal, superior, and 
objective norms or processes applicable to all legal subjects regardless of their (subjective) 
will, formal particularity, or socioeconomic inequality. In other words, the centrality of 
international trade law lies in ‘demonstrating’ its universality, supremacy, and objectivity 
vis-à-vis the ‘rest’ of law or ‘other’ forms of global trade ordering. 
Universality is the idea of a world governed by a single legal corpus. There are 
distinct justifications for a universal international trade law, which can express formalist 
and functionalist theories as well as institutional and jurisprudential stories.333 For instance, 
formalist doctrines make use of normative criteria of validity (e.g. Schwarzenberger’s 
power politics or moral preferences) to justify the dominance of international trade law, 
whereas functionalist doctrines reason its ascendency over the other legal domains 
grounded on sociological criteria of validity (e.g. effective applicability or Jackson’s factual 
acceptance of international economic constitution).334  
Distinctively, supremacy conceives a world governed by a normative plurality in 
which the legal system is the ultimate authority. By imagining global trade governance as 
ruled by competing forms of decision-making expertise or by fragmenting normative 
orders, the idea of superiority is employed to ‘find’ a single and universal hierarchy of 
‘authoritativeness’ so as to place international trade law at its top and the other domains of 
trade policy- and norm-making downward the ladder. This hierarchisation is often described 
as either static degrees of ‘formalisation’ or a continuum process of ‘institutionalisation’ 
from (subjective and non-binding) social norms to (objective but non-binding) ‘soft’ law, 
and then to (objective and binding) ‘hard’ law.335  
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respective formalist and functionalist variations. See also Picciotto (2005: 479-481).  
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Objectivity paints a world as a complex social phenomenon governed by multiple 
regimes and polycentric sites intertwined with a global normative pluralism, all with 
varying degrees of authority and institutionalisation. What makes a specific body of norms 
international trade law is a special quality that allows it to be objectively ‘identified’, 
‘categorised’, ‘systematised’, or ‘analysed’ regardless of one’s moral belief, political 
preference, or intellectual commitment. The core of the objectivity claim consists of 
understanding international trade law as ‘law’ because its rules and institutions arise as 
social processes of decision-making.336 Although there are jurisprudential variations in their 
explanations for what that ‘social processes’ is337, formalism and functionalism commonly 
agree that concreteness and normativity are necessary and sufficient conditions for 
international trade law’s objectivity.338 
These three assumptions provide the justification of the centrality of international 
law in global trade ordering.339 The validity of the centrality claim depends on segregating 
(objective) legal norms from (subjective) political, moral and expert opinions, which also 
includes excluding the influence of the IEL field (generally) and legal doctrines (in 
particular). This ideal is operationalised in the form of two legal fictions. On the one hand, 
the values enshrined in legal rules and institutions are conceived ‘as if’ they are coherent 
and/or unproblematic. On the other hand, the law is regarded ‘as if’ it drives itself legal 
decision-making towards the realisation of its own natural or logical truth or teleology.340 
Thus, the mainstream approach brackets, or even denies entirely, the influence of legal 
doctrines over the production or interpretation of international trade law (generally) and the 
GATT/WTO law of South-North regionalism (in particular).341 
Grounded in the move from positive norms to differentiated expertise342, I suggest 
approaching international trade law as (part of) a transnational field, and legal doctrine as 
an expert mode of legal governance. In this sense, international trade law is neither equated 
to GATT/WTO law nor a special body of positive rules and institutions. Rather, it is 
regarded as a way of thinking, reasoning, and applying these norms, regimes, or techniques. 
Similarly, legal doctrines are neither ‘functionalist recordings’ nor ‘formalist descriptions’. 
Instead, they are regarded as stable and coherent frameworks for legal decision-making 
over particular areas or issues of international trade. Part of their collective work is to build 
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consensus around international trade law as objective, universal, and superior body of legal 
norms and institutions, in order to employ the authority generated through this process to 
determine its position in relation to the ‘rest’ of the domain of law and to ‘other’ areas of 
international trade policy-making.  
If international trade law is understood as a transnational field, legal doctrines are 
conceived as produced and applied in distinct contexts based on a valid vocabulary of 
projects, history lessons, theories, methods, rules and institutions, in order to achieve 
legitimate purposes. Amongst their functions, some strategic uses of legal doctrines to deal 
with worldwide issues have become part of the disciplinary common-sense. My particular 
emphasis is on their use as another technique for controlling the expansion and contraction 
of international trade law’s boundaries. They are tactically employed to constitute and 
structure the continuous process of decision-making and consensus-building that undergirds 
the political and intellectual dynamics of differentiation, dominance and disruption both 
inside and outside the IEL field.343 By ‘finding’, ‘describing’, and ‘systematising’ what 
counts or not as (part of) international trade law in a way that constructs and reinforces its 
centrality in the world trading system, legal doctrines contribute significantly to the IEL 
field’s control of its boundaries by giving concrete application to the centrality claim. 
More concretely, international trade law is different from other social norms 
because of its norms and processes hold three special features. The claim to objectivity 
asserts that there is a qualitative difference between the (objective) law and (subjective) 
opinions, policies, and measures of international trade. The objective criterion operates as a 
disciplinary tactic for legitimising and validating the normative frontiers drawn by the IEL 
expertise. This is followed by the claim to the supremacy of the rule of international trade 
law. This premise is grounded in the ‘finding’ that social processes produce two 
qualitatively distinct norms, objective (superior) or subjective (inferior). The objectivity 
criterion determines whether a certain norm is ‘legal’ by examining concrete processes of 
lawmaking and interpretation. Law is then ‘acknowledged’ as a singular corpus of legal 
norms. The superiority criterion lends to legal doctrines not only the authority to exercise 
control over which sources and procedures produce (objective and superior) legal norms, 
but also to determine how they relate to other (inferior) forms of (subjective) social 
orderings. Finally, the claim to universality serves to differentiate international trade law 
from other realms of law itself. The role of legal doctrines is to instrumentalise history 
lessons, theories, and methods so as to choose and justify out of the broad range of social 
norms the rules and regimes holding those special features required to be (part of) 
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international trade law, and so holding the exclusive authority to regulate the international 
trading system. In this sense, doctrinal frameworks are used to draw the international trade 
law’s frontiers inside and outside the domain of law and policy. 
My understanding is that the commitment to centrality entails powerful effects on 
international trade law. Its assumptions are enabled by legal doctrines to exert control over 
disciplinary boundaries at three different dimensions. Each of them involves constructions 
of dichotomous categories and fictions, and their use to determine and justify ‘what is’ and 
‘what is not’ international trade law: universality versus particularity, singularity versus 
plurality, superiority versus inferiority, and objectivity versus subjectivity. More concretely, 
the legal doctrine on the WTO law of South-North regionalism reformulates these 
dichotomies as, for instances, (universal) WTO versus (particular) RTAs, (singular) 
multilateralism versus (plural) regionalism, (superior) WTO rules versus (inferior) RTA-
rules, and (objective) WTO law versus (subjective) WTO members’ policies and measures, 
including RTAs. In this sense, legal doctrines are implicated (directly) in enabling the use 
of legal assumptions, categories and fictions to support the IEL field’s borders, and 
(indirectly) in shaping the relations of differentiation, dominance, and disruption within the 
law, and between law and other domains of international trade. 
Part of the persuasiveness of the centrality commitment is due to the use of legal 
doctrines to erase the IEL field’s own influence.344 Specifically, the mainstream approach 
seeks to make legal assumptions, categories and fictions appear natural, necessary, or 
transcendental, while bracketing the role of legal doctrines in their construction and 
operation. This erasure is in large measure achieved by the disciplinary effort to validate 
and legitimise a consensus around the WTO as an objective, superior, and universal law for 
governing international trade. Particularly, the claim to be ‘international trade law’ is 
employed by legal doctrines to separate the IEL field from others, while denying their own 
work as part of boundary-drawing and consensus-building. Thus, I argue that part of the 
legal doctrines’ authority resides in ‘bracketing’ and ‘denying’ their role in legal decision-
making with the aim of ‘immunising’ their outcomes against disconfirmation and critiques. 
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3. Breaking up with Modernism: a Contestation of the Science of International 
Trade Law 
 
My strategy is to depart from the modernist commitment to objective, impartial, and 
universal ideals of doctrinal analysis, to the extent that it often leads to the 
intrumentalisation of histories and projects, theories and methods, norms and regimes to 
support particular programmes for international trade law and governance. This means to 
resist to our professional and intellectual habit to conceive legal doctrines as outcomes of  
‘objective’ and ‘impartial’ examinations of the validity or legitimacy of GATT/WTO rules, 
judgements, and arguments. To do so, I suggest rethinking the commitment of the 
mainstream approach to the modernist science of international trade law. 
Modernism is the most influential and long-lasting philosophical paradigm345 in 
present-day IEL expertise. Since World War II, it has provided the normative, theoretical 
and methodological tenets that shape our understanding of how international trade law is 
made and interpreted within global economic governance. As discussed below, its central 
assumptions underpin specific common-sense ideas of the nature and functions of doctrinal 
analysis. Most legal and non-legal professionals as well as laypersons, regardless of 
intellectual or political allegiance, perceive international trade law as portrayed by 
modernism. I begin by calling attention to the second commitment of the mainstream 
approach that is to the view of legal decision-making as an outcome of doctrinal analysis 
carried out by international lawyers. This will be followed by an examination of the 
modernist conception of doctrinal analysis. In conclusion, I will propose an alternative way 
to conceive doctrinal work. 
Inspired by modernism, international trade law is (understood as) created, 
interpreted, transformed, and repealed through neutral and objective descriptions and 
evaluations (which I have called doctrinal analysis) undertaken by impartial and rational 
lawyers. This mainstream understanding of doctrinal analysis underpinning lawmaking and 
legal interpretation produces two complementary fictions (legal objectivity and 
impartiality).346 As examined in the previous section, international trade law is conceived as 
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an objective (or transcendental) reality that can be discovered, apprehended, and translated 
into a doctrinal language. To do so, lawyers are portrayed as rational experts in law who are 
both independent of the object of analysis and essentially, or at least sufficiently, 
unconstrained by political, moral or intellectual influences. The result is an imaginary that 
canvasses lawmaking and interpretation as no more than ‘objective’ routines through which 
‘the’ international trade law is found by apolitical and rational lawyers. Put differently, 
doctrinal analysis is understood as science of international trade law, whose ultimate 
purpose is to reveal its governing truth (e.g. historical, economic or technological 
development, rule of law, constitutional values, collective or individual will, economic 
function, efficiency).347  
Despite that mainstream consensus around the general idea of doctrinal analysis, its 
specific features vary according to jurisprudential views. Formalism conceives doctrinal 
work as a ‘scientific’ methodology for providing ‘valid descriptions’ of ‘social processes’ 
underlying the production of international trade law. This involves identifying the ‘social 
facts’ (e.g. rules, institutions, and conducts); determining their legality or lawfulness against 
a body of positive (e.g. GATT/WTO or RTA) law; and, rationalising them as a legal 
system, and assessing ‘correctness’ of international trade law. Functionalism defines 
doctrinal labour as a ‘scientific’ methodology for providing ‘valid descriptions’ of ‘social 
processes’ underlying the authoritative decision-making in global trade governance. This 
includes identifying the ‘social facts’ (e.g. norms, regimes, policies, measures, and 
behaviour); assessing them by an anterior criterion of authority, effectiveness, common 
values and needs, and economic functions; rationalising them as part of a legal system; and, 
evaluating policy- and rule-based alternatives to achieve legitimate objectives.348 The 
mainstream approach acknowledges, therefore, that the authority of legal doctrines rests on 
the combination of an accurate description of those ‘social processes’, a scientific 
evaluation of legal norms or processes against a pre-determined criterion, a valid 
rationalisation of the legal corpus, and a persuasive argumentation leading up to an 
objective and neutral conclusion.  
The participation of international lawyers in global trade decision-making is 
perceived as realised through the IEL expertise (generally) and doctrinal analysis (in 
particular). The mainstream approach asserts that the authority of the IEL field is often 
exerted in lawmaking and legal interpretation through doctrinal analysis. Its influence is, in 
turn, conditioned by the modernist commitment to objective methodologies, political 
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impartiality, and moral and intellectual neutrality. The particular way these scientific 
features are embedded into and employed through doctrinal work is dependent on the 
prevailing jurisprudential view. The application of doctrinal analysis to lawmaking has been 
viewed with some scepticism by the majority of mainstream literature. The central reason is 
the uneasy effort to conciliate the (value-laden and political) process of creating new law 
with objectivity and impartiality.349 To legitimise their ‘legislative’ role, international 
lawyers are imagined as apolitical professionals equipped with an (almost) exclusive 
expertise that entitles them to analyse objectively norms, policies, values, interests, and 
facts against a valid and legitimate criterion, based on which ‘legal’ rules and institutions 
are produced out of authoritative sources or processes. A norm or regime is acknowledged 
as ‘legal’ if it arises from an objective reality named as ‘source’ or ‘process’. 
The doctrinal work in international trade lawmaking begins by ‘discovering’ and 
‘examining’ social facts in order to determine which of them is a source or process of legal 
authority that exists independent of lawyers’ moral, political or intellectual preferences.350 
The next step is to objectively ‘describe’ and ‘analyse’ the legal phenomenon without 
influencing it or being influenced by it. However, mainstream literature has never reached a 
consensus on which facts count as ‘objective reality’ in global trade governance. This 
means that the ‘descriptive’ task of international lawyers does not flow automatically from 
‘the facts’ but rather rests on choosing a (functionalist- or formalist-inspired) concept to 
assist in their identification. For instance, international trade law can be objectively found in 
Schwarzenberger’s formal notion of law as rules consented by sovereigns or Jackson’s 
functionalist idea of law as rules of an international economic constitution. Consequently, 
the participation of lawyers in international trade lawmaking is somehow shaped by the 
need to make anterior jurisprudential choices, which structure, in turn, their doctrinal 
analysis.  
In contrast to lawmaking, legal interpretation does not raise as much suspicion in 
mainstream literature. There is a broad consensus on the virtues of using doctrinal analysis 
to scientifically identify and apply international trade law. To ensure the neutrality and 
objectivity in legal interpretation while uncovering hidden moral or political bias, the 
mainstream approach is employed to examine the validity and legitimacy of the relationship 
among legal rules and institutions and the application of these norms to concrete facts. 
Since the end of the 19th century, legal expertise has produced three ‘scientific’ styles of 
legal interpretation that have been adapted into a broad portfolio of ‘legal methods’ by an 
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eclectic variety of jurisprudential projects: the conceptualist style of inductive/deductive 
reasoning, the teleological style of purposive reasoning, and the policy style of conflicting 
considerations reasoning.351  
These styles are singularly or jointly employed to interpret international trade law, 
in order to apply abstract rules to particular facts, find the correct rule applicable between 
ambiguous norms, fill a gap or solve antinomies, and introduce new principles or policies 
into considerations.352 For instance, Schwarzenberger’s inductive method seems to be a 
hybrid of teleological and conceptualist styles of reasoning about international trade law, 
whereas Jackson’s functionalist method appears to adopt a policy style of conflicting 
considerations.353 Thus, despite their particular differences, international lawyers believe (or 
at least pretend to) that is possible through doctrinal analysis to reach a value-free and 
objective outcome by correctly identifying the valid and legitimate source/process from 
which international trade law drives itself the legal interpretation towards the realisation of 
its own truth.354 
The mainstream commitment to the science of international trade law has been 
criticised in recent literature. For the purpose of this study, I propose to rethink doctrinal 
analysis through the critiques to the modernist science of law. In the remainder of this 
section, I take aim at objectivity and impartiality in doctrinal analysis, while the next 
section focuses on universalism. In so far, I have shown that the consensus within the IEL 
field is that the superior authority and legitimacy of legal expertise (generally) and legal 
doctrines (specifically) in the context of global trade decision-making reside in their 
modernist commitment to a scientific process of lawmaking and legal interpretation. The 
scientific ideal conceives doctrinal analysis as capable of immunising legal thinking, 
reasoning, and practice against subjectivity, discretion, and unpredictability associated with 
moral beliefs, intellectual preferences, professional interests, and political pressures. Two 
legal fictions support this conventional understanding of legal doctrine: objectivity and 
impartiality.  
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(a) Objectivism in Doctrinal Analysis 
 
As examined above, the mainstream approach assumes that doctrinal analysis is equipped 
with scientific methods capable of uncovering the objective reality that structures the 
process of legal decision-making in the world trading system. This presupposes that the 
world trading system as a self-evident reality that can be externally approached in order to 
be observed, described, and evaluated independently of the mindset of lawyers living in that 
social context.355 As intuitive as this objectivist explanation appears to be at first glance, it 
has serious inadequacies. The problem is that the reality that constitutes the world trading 
system does not appear automatically. Instead, it requires lawyers to find and choose ex 
ante doctrinal frameworks in order to approach it. For instance, to answer the conventional 
question ‘what are the legal norms governing the world trade system?’, Schwarzenberger 
and Jackson offer distinct doctrinal solutions. While Schwarzenberger proposes to approach 
the world trading system through the doctrinal lens of legal sources, Jackson suggests 
approaching it by undertaking a doctrinal analysis of values and needs shared by 
international society.  
However, the choice of doctrinal reference cannot be assessed against an anterior 
criterion offered by a specific doctrinal framework, because accepting such standard will 
already assume that a decision is made.356 The impossibility to determine prior to the 
doctrinal analysis itself what constitutes the relevant reality demonstrates the lack of 
consensus on the ‘true nature’ of the world trading system. If there is no agreement on what 
counts as ‘transcendental realities’, the legal fiction that it is possible to produce objective 
descriptions, against which the correctness of legal doctrines can be verified, lacks validity 
and so persuasiveness. Consequently, the choice of doctrinal frameworks results from the 
international lawyers’ contingent discretion. Their decision cannot be made based on an 
‘objective reality’ but only by comparing among jurisprudential views and legal doctrines 
accepted within the IEL field. 
This philosophical inconsistency of modernism affects the mainstream approach in 
multiple ways. Two explanatory failings are particularly relevant for changing our shared 
understanding of lawyers’ role in making and interpreting international trade law. As 
examined above, the first step of doctrinal work is to objectively identify the ‘social reality’ 
in order to produce a valid description. Since there is no disciplinary consensus on what 
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count as ‘objective reality’, a choice of doctrinal frameworks becomes a condition sine qua 
non for carrying out the descriptive task. “Here lies the indeterminate character of 
modernism.”357 Lawyers can select out of a range of legal doctrines offered by the IEL 
expertise. This decision is obviously not unconstrained, but often limited to mainstream 
doctrines grounded in functionalism and formalism, each of them claiming to provide a 
framework to find and describe the ‘objective reality’ in order to determine the ‘correct’ 
response or solution to an international trade law question.  
To avoid challenges to its claim to objectivity, the mainstream approach hides the 
indeterminacy by adopting two combined strategies.358 On the one hand, it builds styles of 
legal reasoning using descriptive language. On the other hand, it denies the agency of 
lawyers by suppressing or minimising any form of theoretical and methodological 
disagreements from legal doctrines, or even treating such disputes as intellectually 
suspicious or irrelevant to doctrinal analysis. 
The second shortcoming concerns the assumption of that the relative determinacy of 
international trade law and governance flows from objective reality.359 Functionalism 
roughly equates ‘objective reality’ to the ‘facts’ of the world trading system, while 
formalism broadly defines ‘objective reality’ as its ‘norms’. Despite their ontological 
differences, both views presuppose that a relatively clear and identifiable meaning and 
consequence can be drawn from either facts or norms. However, this assumption fails to 
take into consideration the indeterminacy arising from the lack of consensual definition of 
‘objective reality’ as well as from the ambiguity inherent to concrete ‘facts’ or ‘norms’. 
Whereas the former cause of indeterminacy rests (as discussed above) on the anterior 
choice of doctrinal framework, the latter resides in the lack of clarity and precision of 
behaviour and rules. This implies that the meanings of facts or norms cannot be 
apprehended in their pure form. Rather, lawyers need to use doctrinal and other techniques 
to ‘make sense of’ facts and norms.  
The functionalist attempt to produce an accurate description of international trade 
law through pure observation of the ‘transcendental facts’ of the world trading system fails, 
because ‘objective facts’ must be found out of the amorphous mass of things and events, 
described, and explained through language.360 Since language does not automatically reflect 
trade affairs, these social phenomena must be identified and portrayed as ‘facts’ through the 
application of particular concepts and categories provided ex ante by legal doctrines. In this 
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sense, ‘objective facts’ are not self-evident but constructed as they are perceived through 
doctrinal analysis.  
For instance, Article XXIV:8(a)(i) and 8(b) require countries concluding an RTA to 
eliminate “other restrictive regulations of commerce” on substantially all the trade. The way 
to characterise a particular government measure as “ORRC” is not self-evident, and 
obviously involve doctrinal analysis to determine whether the notion of ORRC refers only 
to border measures between the parties, or to some internal measures that discriminate 
against the goods of CU-partners, or all regulatory measures.361 Thus, the indeterminacy 
arises out of the use of an ambiguous vocabulary to determine in the form of a descriptive 
language what counts as ‘objective facts’ of world trade. 
Not surprisingly, formalism enjoys no better result in its efforts to render an 
accurate description of international trade law through a pure examination of norms.362 The 
rules of the WTO and regional agreements produced out of negotiations or case law are 
treated as expressing a relatively clear and identifiable content and effects. However, the 
official documents contain ambiguities, which may entail their meaning and impact very 
indeterminate. To deal with this problem, doctrinal analysis is employed to determine the 
true meaning of an ‘objective norm’ by referring to its external reality. Since ‘facts’ (as 
examined above) are constructed by language and so indeterminate, the extra-conceptual 
reference takes the form of a transcendental source, from which the ‘objective meaning’ of 
a norm can be found through customary methods of interpretation.363 Yet, ‘objective 
meaning’ is neither self-evident nor found in transcendental places. Rather, it is produced 
through doctrinal analysis. Thus, indeterminacy arises from the reliance in the ambiguous 
content and effects of ‘texts’, ‘contexts’, and ‘purposes’ to determine in terms of a 
descriptive language what counts as ‘objective meaning’ of norms of international trade 
law. 
To preserve the fictional validity of legal objectivity, the mainstream approach 
hides the above sources of indeterminacy through the adoption of two combined strategies. 
On the one hand, the commitment to the science of international trade law is realised by 
building styles of legal reasoning using descriptive language.364 However, the effort to 
conceal indeterminacy by founding the validity of doctrinal analysis on ‘description’ causes 
legal doctrines to be assessed in terms of its empirical or normative nature. This creates 
tension in lawyers’ mindset since any attempt to conduct a (empirical) cognitive inquiry 
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into ‘the law’ ends up facing indeterminacy in every step, demanding them, in turn, to 
engage in (normative) interpretations, evaluations, and justifications. 
On the other hand, such commitment denies the agency of lawyers in choosing 
doctrinal frameworks by concealing or dismissing any disagreements.365 The common-
sense in the IEL expertise is that lawyers’ theoretical, methodological or historical premises 
are regarded as practically inconsequential to doctrinal analysis. Indeed, there is an implicit 
understanding that the problems of theory, method and history are non-legal problems, and 
so sociological and normative issues of global governance, trade regionalism, and economic 
development can be best dealt with through doctrinal thinking and reasoning. Thus, the 
effect of these two strategies is to conceal indeterminacy by ‘erasing’ international lawyers’ 
interpretation and choice so as to make facts and norms appear objective, natural, 
transcendental or self-evident. 
 
(b) Impartiality in Doctrinal Analysis 
 
Juxtaposed with objectivity, impartiality is the other legal fiction underpinning doctrinal 
analysis. The mainstream approach portrays lawyers as rational and impartial experts in 
international trade law, who are separate from the political domains of diplomacy and 
policymaking and from the moral realms of international justice and ethics. These provinces 
are regarded as suspects for their subjectivity, discretion, and unpredictability. Put 
differently, impartiality serves to immunise legal thinking and practice against moral 
beliefs, intellectual preferences, professional interests, and political pressures. This 
disciplinary commitment is deeply embedded into the IEL field’s mission and identity, 
which gains expression, for example, into the visible separation of ‘legal doctrine’ from 
‘policy’, of legal offices from foreign affairs and trade ministries, of legal from diplomatic 
ethos366, of rule-oriented from power-oriented regimes367, and, ultimately, of law from 
politics and morality. Thus, by embracing neutrality and rationality, international lawyers 
claim to be able to carry out doctrinal analysis in the context of multilateral and regional 
trade regimes without having to involve themselves in choices about political, policy, moral 
or intellectual preferences. 
The commitment to impartiality has led formalism and functionalism to produce 
two almost antagonistic views of doctrinal analysis being carried out by either quasi-
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autonomous or quasi-mechanical lawyers (respectively).368 As quasi-autonomous, lawyers 
engage objectively with international trade law without influencing, or being influenced by, 
it or any other external factor. The outcome of doctrinal analysis is portrayed by formalism 
as if it is driven by the law itself. As quasi-automata, lawyers serve as perfect conduits for 
external forces to intervene in international trade law. The outcome of doctrinal 
examination is canvassed by functionalism as if it reflects impersonal forces, over which 
lawyers have no influence.  
These contradictory fictions produce strategically two significant effects on the IEL 
expertise. On the one hand, they hide the relevance of material struggles and ideational 
disputes within the IEL field to determine which concepts, histories, theories, and methods 
are regarded as valid and legitimate to be part of doctrinal practice. On the other hand, by 
assuming an instrumental rationality, they obfuscate the effects of moral values, political 
views, intellectual understandings, and professional allegiances on lawyers’ individual and 
collective decisions taken throughout concrete doctrinal work. Therefore, the mainstream 
approach brackets material and ideational conditions for the production and performance of 
doctrinal analysis under the understanding that they distort the disciplinary commitment to 
the neutral and apolitical treatment of international trade law. 
However, as suggested above, doctrinal analysis does presuppose choices of 
concepts, histories, theories, and methods, which require ‘subjective’ and ‘arbitrary’ 
decisions according to political, policy, moral and intellectual preferences and affiliations. 
By trying to bracket lawyers’ agency and erase the background debates about ideational and 
material conditions, the mainstream approach does fail to acknowledge the existence of 
interpretative acts underpinning doctrinal work. Put it simply, it is throughout doctrinal 
labour that trade policy and law choices are conceived, framed, and mobilised in support of 
ideational projects, institutional visions, and jurisprudential views. The mainstream 
literature’s lack of adequate explanation of rational actions in doctrinal analysis has, 
therefore, produced the caricatures of lawyers as (neutral, impartial, apolitical, value-free) 
automata or autonomous.369 
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(c) Breaking up with the Modernist Scientificism of International Trade Law  
 
As shown above, mainstream literature has produced a consensus on the nature of doctrinal 
analyses as the modernist science of international trade law. It is through these scientific 
processes that legal rules and institutions can (aspire to) be readily identified, accurately 
described, precisely designed, unambiguously interpreted, and clearly applied, by impartial 
and rational lawyers irrespective of their moral and political preferences or professional and 
intellectual allegiances within the IEL field. The overall purpose of modernist science is to 
attain a valid description of how lawmaking and legal interpretation are undertaken by 
international lawyers.  
By suggesting that lawmaking and legal interpretation are routinely portrayed as 
objective and impartial forms of legal decision-making carried out by (quasi-)mechanical or 
(quasi-)independent lawyers, I do not imply that these fictions (i.e. legal objectivity and 
impartiality) are homogeneously produced or uniformly accepted by all mainstream strands 
of IEL jurisprudence. Naturally, I do acknowledge that my representation of the mainstream 
approach to doctrinal analysis offers only a high abstraction of its most common features, 
which, as any simplification, loses the nuances and details of each specific view.  
To break up with the modernist commitment, I propose to adopt a distinct 
philosophical paradigm, interpretivism.370 This means that the differences between 
modernism and interpretivism lie not at the theoretical or methodological level but rather at 
the philosophical level. For this reason, I will provide some brief ground-clearing before 
outlining an alternative view of doctrinal analysis. 
The first key difference between those two philosophical traditions concerns the 
idea of truth. Interpretivism conceives that international trade law and governance are not 
important because they are ‘objective realities’, but rather because they have ‘social 
meanings’.371 This leads to the rejection of any explanation of law and governance 
grounded in an absolute, transcendental foundation. Instead of conceiving them as universal 
and natural entities, law and governance are regarded as social constructions. Consequently, 
‘facts’ and ‘norms’ cannot be found true or false, only arguments about them can. The focus 
of doctrinal analysis shifts, therefore, away from determining the descriptive validity of 
                                                   
370 The concept of interpretivism is borrowed from Porta and Keating (2008b: 24-25), Sale et al (2002: 
45), and Bevir and Rhodes (2002: 131).  
371 Different interpretivist strands define ‘meanings’ in distinct ways: expressions of beliefs, ideas, 
discourses, consciousness or systems of signs and norms (Porta and Keating, 2008b: 24-25; Sale et al, 
2002: 45; Bevir and Rhodes, 2002: 131).  
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transcendental sources/processes of law and towards the construction, interpretation, and 
challenge of doctrinal frameworks. 
Second, the knowledge of a legal phenomenon is not an objective description to be 
impartially evaluated against a discoverable reality.372 Rather, it is a partial way of 
reconstructing factual and normative realities from distinct perspectives. In other words, it 
is not possible to access ‘social realities’ independent of lawyers’ mind. Two important 
consequences flow from this interpretivist understanding. On the one hand, there is no 
external, objective referent against which to test claims to validity or legitimacy of rules and 
institutions of international trade law. Instead, meanings of facts and norms are socially 
constructed by strategic reference to definitions, projects, histories, and theories widely 
accepted by the IEL field. On the other hand, the idea of lawyers as impartial actors is 
replaced with the notion of meaning actors, in order to emphasise the importance of 
understanding and interpreting objective and subjective meanings that motivate their 
contextualised actions. The consequence is to abandon the modernist claims to objectivity 
and impartiality. This does not mean, nonetheless, that lawyers are unconstrained actors 
who are entitled to freely engage in interpretative processes aiming to craft or interpret 
abstract legal rules, and link them to concrete decisions or actions. 
The modernist distinction between legal ideas and actions, which assumes changes 
in behaviour as responses to external causal factors or internal pure volition, is revised. The 
third key difference is concerned with the interpretivist focus on meanings that essentially 
shape and constrain legal ideas and actions, and how they are produced, disseminated, 
received and contested. This move does not imply a complete rejection of external or 
internal explanations. While material realities might also be explained by ‘causation’, ideal 
factors fall into the category of ‘reasons for actions’, which accounts for the justification for 
the causal elements.373 In this sense, lawyers’ actions are understood as legal thinking and 
practices, which are carried out based on a variety of doctrinal frameworks of response to 
an array of changing situations and unsettled disputes. The way doctrinal analysis structures 
lawmaking and legal interpretation is by enabling a specific range of possibilities for 
addressing certain issues or solving particular controversies, and not others.374  
However, as I suggested above, the mainstream approach makes those potential 
choices enabled by doctrinal analysis either disappear from the sight of or feel irrelevant for 
the majority of lawyers, because they are experienced as natural or self-evident. In other 
                                                   
372 Porta and Keating, 2008: 24-25; Trubek and Esser, 1989: 17-19.  
373 Trubek and Esser, 1989: 17-19; Ruggie, 1998: 869. 
374 See, for instance, section 2.F. 
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words, legal doctrines are not free or really open to being chosen. As I shall discuss in the 
next section, these decisions are constrained by material and ideational conditions of 
possibility co-produced by the IEL field and global trade governance. The consequence is 
that legal practitioners and intellectuals do not feel they have agency or discretion over 
doctrinal frameworks. Indeed, this ‘taken for granted’ attitude is an effect of power caused 
strategically by the mainstream approach, in order to make a specific form of doctrinal 
analysis appear natural, self-evident, and authoritative.375 Thus, the fourth move is to 
highlight these effects so as to enable the contestation of dominant legal doctrines and the 
understanding of how alternatives might be proposed. 
The fifth insight is to understand international trade law and lawyers as partly 
constituted by, and partly constitutive of, the IEL field. Yet, neither lawyers nor law are 
regarded as determinate products of legal expertise, to the extent that the IEL field is also 
subject to transformations caused by (internal and external) political and intellectual 
conflicts. Specifically, law and lawyers are interactively connected through doctrinal 
analysis, so that objective and subjective meanings are mutually created within the context 
of lawmaking and legal interpretation.  
This brief excursion into interpretivism provides the building blocs to suggest an 
alternative understanding of the nature of doctrinal analysis. I propose to move away from 
the modernist scientificism of law and towards a socio-constructivist idea of argumentation 
framework. Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet define argumentation frameworks as 
“[m]odes of governance […] for constructing rules and for applying them to concrete 
situations.”376 They are conceived as cognitive, evaluative, and discursive structures that 
organise how normative claims are made through the mediation between macro-abstraction 
and micro-particularities. Given changing circumstances, they serve both to create and 
evolve rules and institutions, and to prevent and solve disputes.  
Building on the work of Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, I suggest rethinking legal 
doctrines as argumentation frameworks for governing cognitive, evaluative, and discursive 
processes through which lawyers engage in legal decision-making in the world trading 
system. In this sense, lawmaking and legal interpretation are reconceived as legal thinking 
and practice empowered and limited by doctrinal frameworks. Legal doctrines are, in turn, 
produced, transformed and legitimised through continuous processes of interaction within 
                                                   
375 Lang, 2011: 173-174. ‘Naturalisation’ is an effect of power whereby existing legal practices and 
knowledge come to be experienced as self-evident, as if they were natural phenomena belonging to a 
world ‘out there’. In this sense, legal doctrines make norms and facts, projects and histories, theories and 
methods that are contested may be treated as ‘predetermined’, ‘given’, or ‘beyond question’. 
376 Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 2004: 245-247. 
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the IEL expertise, and between the IEL field and global trade governance. They are 
constructed through the selection and combination of projects and histories, concepts and 
norms, theories and methods, with the purpose of assuring normative coherence and 
persuasive power to international trade law and governance. Thus, lawyers not only produce 
and benefit from legal doctrines, but also defend them against other competing alternatives 
by asserting their legitimacy and authority. 
I will use the concept of doctrinal framework to capture the way in which legal 
meanings are produced not from either objective facts or norms, but rather from 
contextualised legal practices and arguments inside the IEL field and outside global 
economic governance. This understanding of legal doctrines does not subscribe to radical 
indeterminacy, to the extent that the valid and legitimate range of meanings is constrained 
by internal and external disciplinary mechanisms (i.e. the IEL expertise and multilateral and 
regional trade regimes, respectively). Therefore, the idea of doctrinal framework represents 
an innovative way of inquiring into how doctrinal analysis structures lawyers’ engagement 
in legal decision-making. 
 
4. Departing from Anglocentrism: a Contestation of the IEL Field as the 
Guardian of International Trade Law  
 
This strategy consists of breaking up with the Anglocentricism embedded into the 
mainstream approach to legal doctrine.377 As anticipated in section 3.C.4, international 
economic law can be reconceived as a transnational field that aggregates lawyers from and 
working in numerous jurisdictions. This suggests that not only international trade law is 
thought and practised in distinct contexts, but also legal doctrines are produced in sites 
located inside and outside the Anglo-American world. However, the validity, legitimacy, 
and influence of legal doctrines are subject to political and disciplinary dynamics 
underlying and between distinct legal communities within the IEL expertise. Thus, I argue 
that the examination of legal doctrines of international trade law without taking into 
consideration the role of the IEL expertise is severely undermined, while conceptualising 
the IEL field as a neutral and homogenous profession would overlook the impact of its 
internal dynamics on legal doctrines. 
                                                   
377 This strategy is based on the writings of Anghie (2005), Gathii (2008) and Koskenniemi (2012a, 
2012b, 2012c and 2013) and the works of Carvalho (2011), Pahuja (2011) and Orford (2015 and 2016), 
all of which provide historical or analytical accounts of how Eurocentrism and Anglocentrism have 
shaped international law and international trade law (respectively). 
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Two important consequences derive from this understanding. It is possible to 
disaggregate ‘the IEL field’ (i.e. the unit of analysis) so as to examine the continuous 
processes of intellectual and professional differentiation, domination, and disruption, 
involving these legal communities. Specifically, it opens the opportunity to explore how the 
unequal distribution of authority and resources constitutes and reproduces a ‘transnational 
division of legal labour’. This ‘global legal chain’ is understood in recent literature as a 
transnational network of legal experts and their shared legal knowledge,378 according to 
which certain places have (‘naturally’ or ‘historically’) ‘specialised’ in the production and 
export of legal ideas and techniques (generally) and legal doctrines (in particular), while 
others in their import and consumption. Not surprisingly, these relations within the IEL 
field tend to be structured as a centre-periphery by having, at the core, the Anglocentric 
hubs, which are surrounded by other sites located in Northern-developed countries, while 
legal communities in Southern-developing countries are at the margin. As a result, intra-
expertise production of legal doctrines is deeply conditioned by the ‘geographical’ position 
of their proponents and advocates. 
The other consequence is to draw the enquiry towards the effects on legal doctrines 
of the mainstream commitment to presenting the field as the guardian of international 
economic law. The project of empowering international trade law by aggregating lawyers 
located across jurisdictions under a unified professional front tends to render an opaque 
picture of the IEL field. Indeed, this raises important questions: who is speaking on behalf 
of the IEL expertise? With which authority and legitimacy? Granted by whom? Who does 
(or should) have the authority and competence to determine the field’s positions concerning 
international trade law and governance (generally) and legal doctrines (in particular)? The 
historical and doctrinal analyses in Part I suggest that the mainstream approach has 
overlooked these questions in order to build a consensus around the IEL field as the unique, 
legitimate and authoritative protector of international trade law. The result, however, is to 
reinforce and naturalise the intra-expertise patterns of production, specialisation, 
subjugation, and marginalisation.  
My argument does not intend to suggest that mainstream literature conceives the 
IEL expertise as single-minded or one-voiced. Rather, I argue that the existing disciplinary 
common-sense is that worldwide international lawyers acknowledge themselves as 
members of the same field, regardless of local differences. This general understanding does 
a great deal of work to naturalise not only the ‘transnational division of labour’ but also to 
legitimise the leadership of groups of lawyers in dominant positions. In this sense, the 
                                                   
378 D.W. Kennedy, 2005: 4-6; Lang and Scott, 2009: 610-611. 
160 
 
influence of Anglo-American legal communities is regarded as playing a disproportional 
role in the rise, decline, and fall of legal doctrines in multilateral and regional trade 
governances. Thus, the claim to guardianship serves as a disciplinary technique for 
mainstream literature to either bracket the ‘internal differences’ or deflect its causes to 
external, political-economic forces beyond the profession’s control, with the purpose of 
building authority for the IEL field’s prominent ‘founders’, ‘champions’ and ‘leaders’ over 
legal doctrines. 
Against this backdrop, I propose to move away from the mainstream approach. 
Instead of equating legal doctrine of international trade law with the Anglo-American 
doctrine of the WTO law, the purpose is to bring to the fore the variety of doctrinal 
frameworks produced according to different approaches by contextualised groups of 
international lawyers (within and across jurisdictions) facing political and intellectual 
communalities, dissimilarities and conflicts. Thus, the creation, validation, legitimation, 
application, and contestation of legal doctrines of international trade law would be different 
if approaches elaborated by lawyers situated in distinct states and regions and often 
associated with different communities were to be accepted as part of the IEL expertise 
rather than obfuscated by Anglocentrism. 
Chapter 2 makes us to think of the dominant doctrine born out of Anglo-American 
settings, functionalist jurisprudence and managerial mindset as the universal doctrinal 
framework for international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism: since 
the ITO/GATT negotiations, the debates have been framed around the formal possibility 
and policy desirability of accommodating discriminatory RTAs under a non-discriminatory 
regime for multilateral trade. With the creation of the GATT, the controversies took the 
form of legal disputes about the content, meanings, and effects of the (defective, 
ambiguous, or flexible) rules of Article XXIV. Since then these issues have been rephrased 
in a variety of ways depending on which policy expertise the IEL field was ‘allied’ at a 
particular time.  
For instance, questions asked about the formal, substantive, or even teleological, 
consistency of RTAs with GATT/WTO law, as well as about their legitimate and effective 
function as complementary instruments for promoting global free and fair trade, were 
widely examined and addressed through the use of the mainstream approach. From the 
postwar negotiations until the present-day, two main positions have caused polarisation of 
the majority of international lawyers as either supporters of free trade multilateralism or 
supporters of preferential trade regionalism. Therefore, the legal doctrine is understood as a 
mode of legal-technical governance through which lawyers argue with one another to 
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determine the credibility or correctness of legal arguments and decisions concerning the 
validity and consistency of South-North RTAs with WTO law; interact also with other trade 
experts and policy-makers to negotiate, design, and operate WTO-consistent South-North 
RTAs; and participate in the continuous conversation about the nature and functions of 
multilateralism and regionalism and their relations to international law and global 
governance, free and fair trade and economic development, discrimination and non-
discrimination, as well as reciprocity and non-reciprocity. 
By contrast, Part III purports to open our horizons by examining a period in the 
history prior to the rise and domination of the contemporary legal doctrine. My aim is to 
show that, between 1947 and 1980, there were doctrinal alternatives to be used in 
conceptualising, making, and operating regional trade regimes between developing and 
developed countries distinct from the existing legal doctrine. Specifically, I will account for 
the rise, decline, and fall of these legal doctrines in a context characterised by normative 
heterogeneity, institutional experimentalism and jurisprudential innovation. This will 
involve examining the disputes over the authority and legitimacy of projects and histories, 
rules and institutions, theories and methods (produced in sites located inside and outside the 
Anglo-American world) in the formation, validation, legitimation, contestation and 
application of those legal doctrines. As it will be clear, the European Paris, Brussels, 
Geneva, Moscow and Belgrade, the Mediterranean Tunis, Rabat, and Cairo, as well as the 
African Yaoundé and Lomé were among the most significant locations where international 
lawyers were found not only crafting legal doctrines but also applying them in the 
negotiation and operation of the South-North RTAs between the European Union and its 
former colonies. Therefore, legal doctrines will be historicised and examined taking into 
consideration how groups of lawyers participated not only in their construction, but also in 
their use in making and interpreting multilateral and regional regimes for trade cooperation 
under the GATT law between 1947 and 1980. 
 
5. An Alternative to the Legal Doctrine of International Law and Governance 
of South-North Regional Trade Regimes 
 
The general purpose of offering an alternative approach is to call attention to the aims and 
methods through which lawyers produce and apply legal doctrines of international 
economic law. Despite the long tradition of construing and challenging them, we – 
international lawyers – are not sufficient aware of their nature and function inside the IEL 
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field and outside global governance. There is little doubt that doctrinal analysis is an expert 
way of thinking and reasoning about international trade law, but both its proponents and 
critics seem too little interested in understanding its foundations and operations. Therefore, 
this Chapter has intended to shed some light on what the legal doctrines of international 
trade law is really about.  
Bearing that in mind, my alternative approach has three specific ambitions. The first 
one is to use legal doctrines as an entry-point to foreground the political and intellectual 
dynamics of groups of international lawyers in making and interpreting the international 
trade law and governance of South-North RTAs. It seeks to explain why and how legal 
projects, history, knowledge and techniques are experienced as crafted in polycentric 
places, but subjected to validation and legitimation by only a small circle of settings 
acknowledged as authoritative within the IEL field. In this sense, it helps us to unveil the 
reasons for the mainstream strands of functionalism and formalism have become prevalent 
in the IEL expertise and have, in turn, governed the way doctrinal analysis is carried out.  
On the one hand, it aspires to explain, by examining the relationship between these 
mainstream views and the transnational division of legal labour, the choice of ‘certain’ (and 
not ‘other’) constitutive features of doctrinal frameworks. On the other hand, it aims to 
investigate the ways legal doctrines have contributed to establishing and sustaining relations 
of difference, dominance, and disruption within the IEL field and between it and other 
expert fields. Thus, this new approach purports to reveal how legal doctrines have been 
strategically produced, validated, and legitimised in ways that have affected lawyers’ 
understanding of and engagement with the international trade law and governance of South-
North regionalism. 
The second goal is to improve our understanding of the role of international 
economic law in governing the production, implementation, and challenge of political 
economy, institutional, and jurisprudential programmes operating within the international 
economic order. The alternative approach seeks to highlight the ways legal doctrines are 
applied in continuous and routinised processes of lawmaking and interpretation to entrench 
particular programmes into the international trade law and governance of South-North 
regionalism. Doctrinal analysis assists in the universalisation, naturalisation, and 
essentialisation of those distinct projects by embedding them into the meaning of rules and 
institutions. More concretely, Part III examines how legal doctrines were continuously 
reworked between 1947 and 1980 in order to sustain particular programmes through the 
making and interpretation of multilateral and regional trade regimes. Furthermore, Part I 
examines the history and constitutive features of the legal doctrine that provide the 
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underlying vocabulary of meanings and the boundaries around what today we call 
international trade law and governance of South-North regional trade agreements. 
The third aspiration is to contribute to debates on contemporary issues of 
international economic law by rethinking legal doctrine. Understanding the role of legal 
doctrine in international trade law and governance requires breaking up with cognitive 
gridlocks imposed by the mainstream approach. The doctrinal work has served to 
universalise, naturalise, and essentialise political economy, institutional, and jurisprudential 
programmes by embedding them into international trade law. This involves the combination 
of four expert moves: define legal doctrine as a valid description; use a descriptive and 
explanatory style of legal reasoning to sustain claims to objectivity and impartiality so as to 
conceal the normative elements behind the façade of ‘science of law’; defend GATT/WTO 
law as a special body of universal, superior, and objective norms or processes applicable to 
all legal subjects regardless of their (subjective) will, formal particularity, or social 
inequality; and assert the IEL field as the only legitimate guardian of, and ultimate authority 
over, the domain of international trade law and governance.  
To bring the embedding process up to the surface, I suggest reconceiving legal 
doctrines as coherent and stable frameworks of legal meanings, whereas their function is 
rethought as a mode of legal governance. Within the IEL expertise, they assist in 
ascertaining or rejecting the validity and legitimacy of legal projects, histories, norms, ideas 
and practices. In global trade governance, they structure the making and interpretation of 
the international trade law and governance of South-North regional trade agreements. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The socio-legal approach is an alternative to what I perceive as the shortcomings and gaps 
of the consensual understanding of the nature and functions of legal doctrines in 
mainstream literature. More specifically, the mainstream approach is inadequately equipped 
to apprehend, assess and criticise legal doctrines of the international trade law and 
governance of South-North regionalism. The consequence of its weaknesses is to prevent 
international lawyers from acknowledging and dealing with the existence and effects of a 
dominant legal doctrine in present-day world trading system.  
Nowadays, it is common-sense to argue that the World Trade Organisation is 
somehow losing its effectiveness or perhaps heading towards a critical moment. The 
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reasons lie partially in doubts about the limits of the WTO regime itself, and partially in 
fears about the capacity of WTO law to provide solutions to current problems. Challenges 
arising out of (what has been called) ‘economic globalisation and inequality’, ‘political 
nationalism’, ‘trade populism and protectionism’, ‘divergent models of economic 
development’, ‘dysfunctional multilateralism’, and ‘unfair regionalism’, seem to put a real 
threat to the WTO (generally) and South-North regional trade regimes (in particular). 
Celebrated by the vast majority of policymakers and experts for promoting free and fair 
trade liberalisation and economic development since the 1990s, the RTAs between 
developed and developing countries, such as the NAFTA, TPP 379, and EPAs, have recently 
become controversial. In providing a new way of understanding the role of legal doctrines 
in the making and interpretation of these RTAs, the socio-legal approach aims at 
illuminating how they have constituted and shaped the conditions of possibility that enable 
and constrain the ways lawyers think and practice international trade law in their 
engagement with the contemporary challenges to the world trading system.380  
If the reflections in this Chapter were correct, the IEL field should open up to 
alternative ways of conceiving and transforming the WTO and RTAs. This would partially 
involve welcoming innovative rules and ideas from legal and non-legal experts critical to 
mainstream mindset and situated inside as much as outside Anglo-American settings. Since 
these ‘alternatives’ could be (re-)discovered in the present and past stock of legal norms, 
knowledge and techniques, lawyers should rethink their approach to legal doctrines in order 
to recover the sense it once had that international trade law was constituted by normative 
heterogeneity, institutional experimentalism and jurisprudential innovation. My aspiration is 
that the proposed socio-legal approach will help us in breaking up with the imaginative grip 
imposed by the dominant legal doctrine, while empowering lawyers to rethink the 
international trade law and governance of South-North RTAs in the face of the 
contemporary challenges. The alternative approach will be applied in the next chapters with 
a view to advance the understanding of the nature and functions of legal doctrines in 
decision-making in and over multilateral and regional trade regimes. 
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380 Likewise, see Howse (2017: 188).  
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PART III – BETWEEN HISTORY AND DOCTRINE: LAW 
AND LAWYERS IN THE MAKING OF SOUTH-NORTH 
REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES (1947-1985) 
 
The purpose of Part III is to foreground the particular roles of legal history and doctrines in 
the formation and evolution of the international trade law and governance of regional trade 
agreements between developed and developing countries (South-North) from 1947 until 
1985. On the one hand, I aim to go beyond mainstream literature that often reduces 
international trade law and governance in that historical period to both the progressive trade 
liberalisation and institutionalisation of the GATT through multilateral rounds of 
negotiations and the GATT’s power-oriented system of dispute settlement, which 
developed a unique style of diplomatic jurisprudence to solve trade disputes. On the other 
hand, I seek to depart from the conventional understanding of the international law of 
regionalism as the tragedy of GATT Article XXIV that allowed contracting-parties to 
conclude RTAs by circumventing its weak disciplines. 
An alternative to these accounts is to examine how legal doctrines were implicated 
in the ‘invention’ not only of international trade law but also of South-North regional trade 
agreements. Legal doctrines have been produced as shared frameworks of concepts and 
norms, theories and methods, projects and histories serving as media through which 
international trade law is thought, practised and communicated. They frame interests and 
conflicts as legal issues and articulate legal rules and institutions into a set of valid and 
legitimate claims and solutions. For the questions of what regional trade agreements are or 
what functions they may perform, legal answers were crafted through doctrinal frameworks. 
In this sense, legal doctrines ‘created’ South-North RTAs as legal phenomena. My purpose 
is to historicise and examine the participation of legal doctrines in the making of South-
North regional trade regimes between 1947 and 1985. While Chapters 5 and 6 narrate how 
legal doctrines shaped institutional and jurisprudential thinking and practice underlying 
those RTAs, Chapter 7 delves into those doctrines to reveal which and how their features 
were chosen and combined into their constitutive frameworks. 
In Chapters 1 and 3, the traditional history was retold to account for the significant 
participation of South-North regional trade regimes in the evolution of the world trading 
system. Indeed, the progress of the GATT is historically portrayed as in a dialectical 
relation to the waves of regionalism. The uneasy coexistence between multilateralism and 
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regionalism took the form of a continuous movement through which the ascension of the 
latter caused the downfall of the former, and vice-versa. The conventional narratives merge 
the jurisprudential development with the institutional evolution of GATT law (generally) 
and its rules on regional trade agreements (in particular). Their aim is to provide history 
lessons to assist us to understand the origins, development, and rationales behind the 
present-day world trading system. 
However, the current way these teachings have been produced and transmitted has 
adversely affected the field of international economic law. They have minimised the 
importance of historical discontinuities caused by political and intellectual conflicts, 
ideational and policy disagreements, normative ambiguities, and doctrinal divergences. 
Instead, they highlight past events that reinforce the disciplinary understanding of 
institutional and jurisprudential progress towards the realisation of world trade’s telos in the 
form of WTO law and governance. Although simplifications are widely acknowledged for 
their relative degree of imprecision, the issue at stake is that the traditional style of history-
telling has reduced the ambivalence of historical accounts by obscuring intellectual bias, 
factual gaps, and unfortunate outcomes of core decisions made about regional trade 
agreements that might threat or undermine the legitimacy or authority of the GATT/WTO 
regime. 
In Chapters 5 and 6, I will approach the history of international trade law of South-
North RTAs from an angle distinct from that which characterises mainstream literature. 
Neither is the GATT accepted ex ante as the natural, necessary, or unique institutional and 
normative regime with universal authority to apply a superior body of legal rules and 
institutions to govern trade affairs, regional agreements, and economic development; nor 
are formalism and functionalism received as the only schools of international law that 
produced relevant jurisprudential projects for international economic law. To move beyond 
these tendencies, my overall strategy is to focus on the role of legal doctrines in conceiving, 
constructing, operating, interpreting, and opposing the international trade law and 
governance of South-North trade. To do so, I will offer two very brief, and not exhaustive, 
overlapping historical accounts of international law and lawyers in the making and 
management of regional trade regimes between developed and developing countries under 
the GATT. 
The general purpose of these historical reconstructions is to reveal what kind of 
institutional and jurisprudential stories of the international trade law of South-North RTAs 
can be told if contemporary lawyers do not instrumentalise them to support the dominant 
legal doctrine. The two accounts intend to show that the traditional history is neither a mere 
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objective and neutral account, nor a suspect teleology, or a frozen set of lessons that can 
only sustain a universally applicable legal doctrine. I will argue that these storylines are 
rather built on ideas and facts that are less clear and determinate than the conventional 
narratives suggest. In reality, the selection and understanding of historical events are neither 
self-evident nor neutral. They result from lawyers’ choices and interpretations, which are 
conditioned (consciously or unconsciously) by the IEL field. Although the relative 
indeterminacy of the past allows those storylines to accommodate competing narratives 
about the origins and development of international trade law and South-North RTAs, only a 
subset of them – the ones incorporated into legal doctrines – is regarded as sufficiently 
meaningful to affect legal thinking and practice. Thus, Chapters 5 and 6 provide two 
historical backdrops to illuminate the way history teachings are selected and embedded into 
legal doctrines, with the aim of enabling lawyers to conceive, pursue, and express state and 
non-state preferences, and also coordinate those interests and solve disputes concerning past 
and present challenges to global governance, trade regionalism, and economic development. 
In Chapter 7, I analyse the role of international law and lawyers in the making and 
interpretation of South-North RTAs through the socio-legal notion of doctrinal framework. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, legal doctrines are expert techniques devised for using 
international law to influence decision-making in and over multilateral and regional trading 
systems. They are constituted of a relatively coherent and stable framework of positive and 
non-positive norms, ideas and practices, that serves as a mode of legal governance. Taking 
into consideration the historical accounts provided in Chapters 5 and 6 and my analysis of 
primary and secondary sources, my central hypothesis is that three legal doctrines were 
routinely applied to interpret and apply GATT law and make and manage South-North 
RTAs from 1947 to 1985. Chapter 7 aims to test, partially, this postulate by providing a full 
account of the legal doctrine underlying the regional trade regimes between the European 
Union and the newly independent African states. I conclude by arguing that the Yaoundé 
and Lomé Conventions were negotiated and interpreted grounded in a (significant part) 
doctrinal framework, which I shall call the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine. 
In conclusion, Part III seeks to address two central questions. First, how were 
jurisprudential and institutional stories employed to empower and constrain international 
lawyers in their construction and application of legal doctrines devised to provide a legal 
mode of international trade governance for regional trade relations between developed and 
developing countries? The second question purports to recall the debate proposed in 
Chapter 4: how might the analysis of legal doctrines contribute to expanding the 
imaginative boundaries of the contemporary field of international economic law?
CHAPTER 5.  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LAWYERS IN 
THE INSTITUTIONAL  MAKING OF SOUTH-NORTH TRADE 
REGIMES 
 
Introduction 
 
The history provided in this Chapter focuses, particularly, on the institutional story of the 
GATT law of South-North regional trade agreements. This unorthodox account does not 
(and should not) begin by reinforcing today’s disciplinary consensus around the 
conventional narratives that support the myth of universality and continuity of the GATT as 
the single, necessary, or ultimate governance regime for international trade cooperation. 
Recall that one of the key shortcomings of the traditional approach (as examined in 
Chapter 3) was to take the contemporary world trading system as its starting point and 
works backwardly to reconstruct the history of international trade law as a gradual 
evolution towards the maturity of our present rules and institutions, such as the World 
Trade Organisation and European Union.381 Often, the conventional accounts purposefully 
select state and institutional practices that tend to overshadow the increasing fragmentation 
of international economic relations into three distinct regimes for multilateral trade 
cooperation in the aftermath of World War II. This disciplinary strategy is strengthened by 
a conceptual triple-move. 
First, the traditional style of history-telling equates international trade law to GATT 
law. The second move is to reinterpret the abstract category of multilateral regime for trade 
cooperation as the description of the GATT. Finally, the general definition of regional 
trade agreements universalises the two specific archetypes of RTAs enshrined in Article 
XXIV: free trade agreement and customs union. The consequence is that contemporary 
international law, global governance, and regional regimes are conventionally narrated as 
having their legitimate origins and valid sources found in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade of 1947. The powerful effects of such reductionism are to consolidate the 
legitimacy and authority of the dominant legal doctrine on the WTO law of South-North 
regionalism, while rejecting or marginalising historical accounts of competing, institutional 
experiments and state practices.  
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My purpose is to emphasise, instead of erasing, the ideational disputes and 
diplomatic battles that historically produced, maintained, and opposed to the construction 
and development of institutional regimes of multilateral and regional trade governances. I 
highlight not only compromises but also ruptures and transformations underlying the 
construction of international trade law rules and institutions. Consequently, my starting 
point cannot be the apparent moment of consensus achieved by Anglo-American lawyers 
around the establishment and evolution of the GATT and the subsequent spread out of 
regional trade agreements. Rather, I begin when lawyers were living in a time of normative 
and doctrinal inflexion concerning the possibilities of engaging international law in the 
postwar efforts to (re)build universal, multilateral, or regional regimes for governing trade 
affairs. 
According to mainstream literature in the postwar period, the allied leaders (the 
United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – USSR) 
kicked off the negotiations for establishing an institutional architecture for a new 
international economic order in the early 1940s.382 The general plan consisted of preventing 
the traumatic events that fuelled the outburst of World War II by building a global 
economic order centred on international law. Grounded heavily in the Anglo-American 
blueprint383, the project envisaged three interlinked specialised organisations: one devised to 
deal with monetary matters; another designed to govern financial flows; and, finally, a third 
institution for regulating transnational trade. Although these specialised organisations 
would function independently of one another, they all would be subject to the future 
universal political organisation, the United Nations. The combination of institutional 
linkage and hierarchical subordination aimed at mutually reinforcing the support for the 
new global regime under the UN. Hence, the ally leaders hoped that this embryonic plan for 
a postwar international economic order would be perceived as beneficial enough to attract 
most, or perhaps all, sovereign countries.  
However, the Anglo-American blueprint failed to come into being. The ally leaders 
agreed that the first step for the plan’s realisation depended on ensuring strong participation 
and commitment of most countries to the future international economic law and 
organisations.384 With this strategy in mind, the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 was 
organised to negotiate the creation of two out of the three specialised institutions. The 
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proposal for establishing the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank aimed at 
setting out the institutional and normative regimes to deal with monetary and financial 
matters, respectively. The Bretton Woods negotiations were initially perceived as successful 
since the IMF and World Bank were duly created with the support of all ally leaders. This 
early optimism did not last long though. The project deeply suffered from diplomatic 
manoeuvres, economic interests, political tensions, and ideational conflicts, which reflected, 
or perhaps contributed to, the beginning of the Cold War and decolonisation.  
The following sections narrate how these disputes prevented the general agreement on 
a ‘universal’ economic order institutionalised and regulated by a single and coherent body 
of international law norms and regimes. Instead, they led up to the fragmentation of 
international trade governance into three regimes for multilateral trade cooperation. 
Therefore, the history of the GATT law and governance of South-North RTAs starts not 
with a progressive account from the 1930s trade wars to Anglo-American negotiations to 
the political failure of ITO to the GATT to the waves of regionalism and so on. Rather, it 
begins with the foundational moment of dissensus marked by the disagreements of the 
Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, followed up the Third-World divergences, with the 
Anglo-American blueprint for a universal regime for governing international trade. 
 
A.  One World Economy? The ‘-ism’ Governance of International 
Trade by Three Postwar Regimes for Multilateral Trade 
Cooperation: Liberal-welfarism, Socialism and Developmentalism 
 
1. From the Liberal-welfarist Programme to the GATT Regime 
 
In the postwar period, international lawyers were predominantly concentrated in developed 
countries, notably in Western Europe. The two World Wars forced the profession to 
reassess the core commitments underscoring its identity and mission. One of the most 
chastened assumptions was the notion of (European) public international law as a universal 
phenomenon.385 Consequently, legal doctrines produced after 1945 were not only less 
Western-centric but also had to acknowledge the institutional and normative diversity of the 
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period. Their core purpose was to elaborate the conditions of international cooperation in a 
fragmented world economic order. 
These legal doctrines recognised that the Anglo-American proposal was a political 
and economic compromise reached by developed countries about how to govern their 
trading relations after the end of World War II.386 These countries aimed at departing from a 
liberal regime of trade coexistence, constructed on the idea of balance of power between 
sovereign countries underpinned by a classical notion of international law.387 They often 
rejected inter-state governance of free trade organised under a set of liberal ideas and legal 
institutions that produced a legitimate space for countries make choices on trade and 
economic matters disregarding the potential spillover effects on other states. The principle 
of freedom of commerce was regarded as the quintessential representation of the liberal 
trading system since it provided legal ground for states to freely and inconsequently choose 
between different economic programmes, trade policies and relations with other nations. 
Mercantilist, protectionist and free trade policies and measures were perceived as not more 
than lawful and legitimate expressions of sovereign economic freedom.388  
This liberal regime of trade coexistence was, nevertheless, blamed by postwar 
lawyers for not having prevented state actions, which were perceived as responsible for 
interrupting the gradual restoration of the world economy after the shocks of World War I 
and the Great Depression.389 They understood that the failure of classical international law 
and liberal governance in imposing some constraints upon state discretion was responsible 
for allowing the disastrous rise of national protectionism, on the one hand, and international 
predatory competition, on the other hand. These trade policies, together with economic 
downturns and political events, were conceived as the primary causes leading up to the 
collapse of the liberal trading system. Thus, legal doctrines consistently defended that a new 
international trade regime was needed to safeguard universal peace and global economy 
from the perils of the interwar period. 
The Anglo-American proposal for a postwar international regime for trade 
cooperation was expected to strike a compromise between the liberal aspiration for a 
universal system of non-discriminatory and reciprocal trade relations, on the one hand, and 
the welfarist call for national intervention on economic and social spaces, on the other 
                                                   
386 See generally Carreau et al (1980: 26-27, 78-83, 256-258), Nguyen et al (1999), Bennouma (1983), 
and El-Naggar (1969). 
387 Carreau et al, 1980: 78-83, 257-258; Nguyen et al, 1999: 946-948; Bennouma, 1983: 212-213; El-
Naggar, 1969: 256-260.  
388 Jouannet, 2012: 158. 
389 Carreau et al, 1980: 67-78, 257-258; Nguyen et al, 1999: 906-908, 946-948.  
  
172 
hand.390 The role of international law was imagined as the legitimate and authoritative 
instrument to ensure stability to interdependent economic relations. More specifically, 
international law rules and institutions were needed to be reconceived to structure and 
operate an international legal order where states could coordinate their trade policies 
multilaterally, while preserving domestic space for economic and social policies. In other 
words, the postwar international trade law and governance should be able to accommodate 
these two goals without triggering a race to discriminatory behaviours and protectionist 
measures, which were regarded as responsible for producing mutually destructive 
consequences in the interwar period.391 This ideational project purporting to compromise 
free trade at the international level and socioeconomic interventionism at domestic level 
received different labels, but hereinafter is called liberal-welfarism.392 Contemporarily, this 
programme has been understood as possessing a constitutional character, to the extent it is 
claimed to have made possible the establishment of a new economic order. Thus, the 
liberal-welfarist programme set up the political-economy parameters for imagining a new 
international trade law and organisation.393  
The Anglo-American Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organisation 
embedded liberal-welfarism.394 However, in contrast to traditional narratives, the proposal 
was only partially successful. It failed not only in getting the approval of the US Senate (as 
acknowledged by traditional accounts) but also in gathering the consent of the majority of 
countries. Indeed, developed countries were its primary supporters, actively contributing to 
the negotiations of the ITO as well as to the conclusion and operation of the GATT. 
Nevertheless, their diplomatic support was directly conditioned to the legitimacy of the US 
leadership and the benefits obtained under the Marshall Plan. Socialist and developing 
countries, despite their initial backing, held ambiguous attitudes towards the liberal-
welfarist programme. The majority of them either ratified the constitutive agreements only 
to ignore them later or rejected them entirely. This suggests, therefore, that, to understand 
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the institutional development of postwar international law and governance of trade 
relations, it is necessary to juxtapose the liberal-welfarist story to historical narratives 
underscoring the competing projects – socialism and developmentalism – that succeeded in 
giving birth to alternative regimes for multilateral trade cooperation.  
 
2. From the Socialist Programme to the Comecon Regime 
 
It is not surprising that international lawyers in, or supporting, the socialist bloc constructed 
different legal doctrines aimed at historicising, conceptualising, and influencing the 
formation and consolidation of postwar international economic order.395 They tended to 
focus primarily on the active role of the Soviet Union in shaping global economic 
governance and institutions. Their emphasis was on the Soviet diplomatic efforts to create 
an institutional regime at the international level for the development of a socialist division 
of labour. However, these attempts were hampered, or perhaps sabotaged, by its Western 
‘allies’.  
The historical narratives underpinning those legal doctrines often began with the 
invitation for the USSR to participate in the Anglo-American negotiations for a project to 
structure the postwar governance of international economy.396 The Soviet Union not only 
attended the Bretton Woods Conference and signed the Articles of Agreement in 1944, but 
also contributed continuously until the first meeting of the IMF Board of Governors in 
1946. However, it refused to ratify the Bretton Woods Agreement. The majority of socialist 
countries did participate in the foundation of IMF, but not in the World Bank. Yet, by mid-
1960s most of them either ignored or withdrew from the Bretton Woods system.397  
More importantly, those historical accounts highlight that the USSR and other 
socialist countries did give initial support to the Anglo-American Suggested Charter.398 
Nonetheless, the Soviets attended neither the meetings of the Preparatory Committee 
(London in 1946, New York and Geneva in 1947) nor the Havana Conference in 1947.399 
Despite their absence, other socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Yugoslavia, engaged in the deliberations on the ITO Charter and the GATT. Yet, only 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia signed the ITO Charter, and only the former signed and 
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ratified the GATT. Under the shadow of the Cold War, legal doctrines expressed the 
socialist position, which claimed that the ITO was a strategic instrument devised by the 
United States to influence economically and politically trading relations in the emerging 
socialist world.400 Moreover, the ITO regime based on non-discrimination and reciprocity 
would entail two adverse effects. It would make more burdensome the transformation of 
Eastern European countries into centrally-planned economies. It would also reinforce, 
instead of preventing, the imperialist domination of Western countries over trade relations 
among socialist countries. Thus, the ITO was accused of reproducing and legitimising a 
world divide between powerful, rich countries and dependent, poor countries.401 
In response to the conclusion of the GATT in 1947, the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance was founded in 1949, with the purpose of establishing an 
international regime for economic assistance and development of the world socialist system. 
Since it is not the scope of this study to go at length into legal doctrines produced in the 
context of the Comecon, I offer here only a very brief account of their core features.  
Since after World War II, the Eastern European countries were engaged not only in 
reconstructing their devastated economies but also in a deeply transformative process of 
adapting them to planned development.402 From 1945 until 1949, they organised their 
economic relations by concluding a number of bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation 
and mutual assistance. The Comecon was established in this context to perform two general 
functions. As a defensive organisation, it aimed to protect their members against 
discrimination and economic abuse perpetrated by the Western states. As an assistance 
institution, its central purpose was to promote mutual technical support and economic 
cooperation among fully equal socialist countries. These functions reflected a balanced 
compromise between the two core goals of the socialist programme403: the comradely 
aspiration for a multilateral regime devised to achieve formal and substantive equality 
among states through the implementation of “the international socialist division of labour in 
the interest of building socialism and communism in their countries,”404on the one hand; 
and, the voluntary desire to protect national sovereignty as the mean for avoiding foreign 
interference in the state control of centrally planned domestic economies, on the other hand.  
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The development of Comecon law and governance sought to realise such socialist 
programme.405 More precisely, the notion of “assistance” enshrined in the mandate of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was born in the idea that socialism was a superior 
and richer model of governing cooperation than liberal-welfarism.406 This was supposedly 
manifested into the principle of mutual assistance, which was conceptualised as a legal right 
to receive support from other socialist countries. To prevent interference in domestic affairs, 
the principle of mutual assistance was counterweighted with the principle of sovereignty. 
These two legal principles should govern state behaviour and institutional practices under 
the Comecon regime.407  
At the international level, the Comecon ought to ‘assist’ its members in freeing 
themselves from economic dependence on the capitalist system through the socialist style of 
economic integration. This consisted of safeguarding the planned development of national 
economies, the acceleration of economic and technological progress, the higher levels of 
industrialisation, and the gradual equalisation of economic developments.408 At the 
domestic level, the Comecon should ‘assist’ its members to implement and consolidate the 
socialist economic system through nationalisations, economic planning and monopolist 
control of production. Under the Comecon, socialist countries coordinated their reciprocal 
trade, through bilateral agreements, according to their long-term plans for the progress of 
national economies. Additionally, their common trade policies sought to introduce a wide 
variety of innovative, non-liberal-welfarist rules and mechanisms, such as the Sofia 
principles409 and multilateral commissions of experts.  
Somehow similar to the GATT, the origin of the institutional architecture of the 
Comecon was also unorthodox. The Charter of the Comecon was adopted only in 1959, 
more than 10 years after its foundation.410 This means that during the initial years Comecon 
members relied heavily on state and customary practices rather than treaty for their 
normative and institutional guidance. Since then, the socialist regime evolved gradually 
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towards a more diversified and open form of cooperation, but still within the boundaries 
circumscribed by the balance between sovereignty and equality.  
The next step was the approval of key amendments to the Charter of the the 
Comecon in the 1962 Moscow Conference.411 Normatively, the Basic Principles of 
International Socialist Division of Labour were adopted aiming to set forth the main goals 
and methods of economic cooperation between member countries. Institutionally, the 
Charter was also amended to remove the membership to European states only. The 
amendment to Article 2:2 transformed the socialist regime from its initial defensive, 
inward-looking, regional vocation into a multilateral regime for trade cooperation, open to 
contributing to the world economy.412  
In 1971, the Comecon adopted the “Comprehensive Programme” that aimed to 
organise the collective efforts of its members to further deepening the international socialist 
division of labour through joint actions towards greater economic integration. In contrast to 
other international organisations, socialist governance and law were neither conceived nor 
constructed upon supranational organs reproducing the competences of liberal state and 
bestowed with authority to intervene in the affairs of sovereign states.413 Instead, they set up 
a complex institutional machinery to govern economic and technical relations among 
socialist countries, firmly grounded on equality and sovereign principles.414 
The multilateral trading system constituted and operated under the Comecon was 
centred on the interests and needs of socialist states.415 While their national economies were 
organised around the notions of central planning and state ownership of the means of 
production, consumption, investment and reserve, their foreign trade was carried out by 
state-owned enterprises (SOE). Comecon members manifested their preferences in 
economic plans, which in turn were reflected in trade policies. To secure imported goods 
necessary to fulfil their economic goals, long-term trade agreements were concluded 
between Comecon members. These bilateral arrangements provided what goods would be 
imported or exported. However, the actual exchange of goods was undertaken by authorised 
SOEs through private law transactions.416 Hence, while (public international) treaties set 
forth the details of goods exchange, (private law) contracts had to be entered into between 
domestic legal entities to the implementation of foreign trade. 
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The operation of the Comecon did not preclude socialist countries from trading with 
non-socialist countries and later changing their view of the ITO.417 Further on, some of 
them came to reposition their trade policies towards the GATT, and, eventually, some 
acceded to it. As a bloc, socialist countries were committed to the Comecon and used the 
United Nations as the neutral forum to debate general trade matters. Individually, some of 
them began to enter into closer contact with Western countries, and the liberal-welfarist 
regime.418 From the late-1950s on, Czechoslovakia (an original member of the GATT) and 
Cuba (acceded in 1948) were progressively joined by other socialist countries. First, 
Yugoslavia and Poland became associate members in 1959 and received full membership in 
1966 and 1967, respectively. This made Poland the first Comecon member to become a 
GATT contracting-party. In 1971, the Comprehensive Programme acknowledged the 
economic and technical value of maintaining relations with capitalist developed and 
developing countries.419 This led Romania and Hungary to accede to the GATT in the early-
1970s. The accession of Comecon members seemed to indicate that GATT law and 
governance had to become even more flexible and resilient during this period to 
accommodate not only trade relations between liberal-welfarist and socialist countries but 
also to accept the participation of centrally-planned economies.420 
 
3. From the Developmentalist Programme to the UNCTAD Regime 
 
In the Third World, international lawyers also sought to craft legal doctrines to historicise, 
analyse, and influence the (re)construction of the postwar international economic order. 
Similar to socialist states, they accounted that the initial attitude of developing countries 
was to participate and support the Anglo-American project. Throughout World War II, they 
engaged extensively in deliberations for establishing the liberal-welfarist economic regime. 
They contributed significantly with pro-development ideas, policies and rules to the 
preparatory work that paved the way to the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference and the 1947 
Havana Conference.421 Leading developing countries sought to strike a more equal balance 
between liberal free trade at the international level and welfarist policies at thedomestic 
level by proposing some amendments to the draft ITO Charter. Indeed, different from 
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Bretton Woods, Third-World countries were more vocal and influential in Havana. This 
diplomatic effort resulted in some concessions, including the inclusion of new chapters on 
economic development and commodities trade. However, throughout both negotiations, the 
United States moved to withdraw progressively its support from rules and institutions on 
development matters.  
The adoption of the Bretton Woods Agreement, the US refusal in ratifying the ITO 
Charter, and the durability of the ‘interim’ GATT were sources of considerable criticism by 
developing countries.422 Although their support to the ITO varied, the idea of having an 
international regime for trade cooperation was central to their economic development plans. 
By contrast, the GATT in their eyes was irrelevant at best, and a threat at worse. It not only 
disregarded developmental issues, focusing only on lowering trade barriers to trade in 
industrial goods, but also rejected any attempt to have pro-development rules introduced. 
When finally the GATT turned to development in the form of the 1958 Haberler Report, 
developed contracting-parties decided not to implement the expert recommendations. 
Moreover, when in the 1960s and 1970s Third-World countries succeeded in increasing 
their exports in agricultural and manufactured goods, GATT provisions were turned against 
them by First-World countries.  
Not surprisingly, these strategies were perceived as imperialist attempts to use the 
IMF, World Bank and GATT to marginalise and subjugate developing countries.423 The 
consequence was twofold. On the one hand, the liberal-welfarist governance was formally 
or practically rejected by the Third World. On the other hand, the political dissatisfaction 
and ideational suspicion of the too strong bias of the GATT towards free trade caused 
developing countries to experience a lack of institutional representativeness coupled with 
their factual irrelevance in policy- and rule-making. This context led to the formation of a 
vacuum, which would be progressively filled up by developing countries’ move to the 
United Nations, where they began to organise themselves around what would become a 
multilateral regime for economic cooperation, development promotion and protection 
against neo-imperialism.424 
Lagging behind socialism and liberal-welfarism, the origin of what is called 
developmentalism finds its roots in the different way of thinking about the world economy 
developed in the 1950s under the United Nations Commission for Latin America 
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(CEPAL).425 Taking into consideration his policymaker experience in trying to manage the 
disastrous consequences for Argentina of the 1930s Great Depression and trade war, the 
economist Raúl Prebisch offered the initial ideas and techniques that would be at the core of 
developmentalist programme: the Prebisch-Singer thesis on a secular decline in the terms of 
trade; the view that GATT law and governance were systemically biased against developing 
countries for their failure in recognising the distinct economic dynamics of central and 
peripheral countries and in providing adequate institutional solutions; and the trade policies 
that aimed at promoting regional integration of developing countries and trade preferences 
for their manufactured exports.426  
These development-centric ideas found fertile soil in developing countries 
constrained by the dynamics of Cold War and decolonisation. From the 1955 Bandung 
Conference to the 1961 Belgrade Conference to the 1962 Cairo Conference, Latin 
American and Asian countries, which had experienced great disappointment after the 
Havana Conference, joined the increasing number of Asian-African postcolonial countries 
in building an interregional solidarity and furthering developmentalism. Specifically, they 
aimed at converting those initial theories and observations into proposals for trade and 
development policies, rules and institutions. By 1962 the First- and Second-World countries 
could not ignore or postpone Third-World claims for reshaping international trade law and 
governance.427 In December 1962, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 
1785(XVII) calling for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1964.  
The UNCTAD was firstly convened as a conference in March 1964, but was rapidly 
transformed by UN General Assembly into a new organisation by December 1964. Its main 
purpose was to “formulate principles and policies on international trade and related 
problems of development.”428 Its institutional arrangement was devised to assist Southern 
economies to establish a development-centric international trade law and governance. 
During its first ten years and so, the basic policy agenda presented in 1964 was expanded, 
refined and turned into a pro-development programme. Grounded on a lineage of 
international trade theories and observations starting with Prebisch’s work, the idea at the 
core of the project was that economic development is “activity-specific,” and so a country is 
defined by its production and import-export activity.429 This means that growth of 
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peripheral developing countries, which specialise in producing and exporting agricultural 
goods and raw material, tends to be slow and fragile due to the structural bias of global 
markets. On the one hand, their primary good exports are more exposed to price and 
demand fluctuations. On the other hand, their economic growth is more likely to suffer from 
a trade gap created by a qualitative difference in income elasticity between goods exported 
from and imported to developing economies.430  
Drawn from those theories and observations, the core vision that informed 
UNCTAD consisted of two basic tenets. Since developing and developed economies were 
substantially different, their trade needs were also different. To promote convergence in 
welfare standards between countries, it was necessary to foster economic diversification of 
developing economies through some degree of industrialisation and international economic 
integration.431 Consequently, the UNCTAD shared with the GATT the view that 
international trade can benefit all countries. However, it diverged from the liberal-welfarist 
notion that free trade at the international level and socioeconomic welfare at the domestic 
level would achieve that goal. Instead, the UNCTAD defended that, in a context of a 
demand-led economy, a structurally biased trading system, and a politically polarized 
world, for countries fully benefited from the international division of labour, it was 
condition sine qua non to establish a new set of global and regional democratic institutions. 
This institutional programme would have authority to implement adequate demand 
management and policies, which would take into consideration countries’ diverse stages of 
economic development.432 
Building on this programme, an international regime for trade cooperation between 
developed and developing countries was imagined to strike a compromise between two 
goals: the aspiration for fairer, though (inter-)dependent, international economic integration 
through a multilateral system of preferential trading; and the desire for economic 
emancipation through import-substitution-industrialisation policies and state intervention.433 
The role of international economic law was to serve as legitimate instruments to promote 
economic development, reduce inequalities and vulnerabilities, and guarantee policy space 
at the domestic level and equal participation in decision-making processes at the 
international level. To do so, legal rules and institutions had to be reformed, whereas legal 
ideas and practices reconceived.  
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The overall strategy of the emerging legal doctrines in the Third World was to 
contest the dominant liberal-welfarist international economic law and governance while 
assisting, through continuous reforms or revolution, the construction of a new international 
economic order. The UNCTAD’s Generalised System of Preferences was devised to 
achieve the foreign trade objectives by constituting a venue for negotiations and policy, 
while the Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO 
Declaration), along with its Programme of Action and Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States (NIEO Charter), were conceived as the central pillars of a comprehensive 
plan for bringing a new international economic order into existence. These normative and 
institutional proposals reflected the efforts of lawyers to entrench developmentalism into 
international economic law. The ultimate aspiration was to accommodate the two pro-
development goals (preferential cooperation and emancipatory development) without 
increasing dependency or falling into isolationism. Therefore, this compromise between 
trade preference at the international level and development interventionism at the domestic 
level was at the heart of the developmentalist programme. 
In contrast to the conventional narratives, socialist and Third-World countries played a 
very active (now strategically forgotten) role in both the deliberations that led up to the 
formation of the liberal-welfarist GATT and the construction of alternative regimes for 
multilateral trade cooperation, the socialist Comecon and developmentalist UNCTAD.434 
Under the shadow of the Cold War and decolonisation, these multilateral trading systems 
were conceptualised, implemented, and managed according to their distinct political 
economy missions, institutional arrangements, legal norms and state behaviour. Although 
the dynamics of East-West and North-South politics might have increased tensions pushing 
them to aspire to trade isolationism, the reality was that these multilateral trade regimes 
were neither politically nor economically self-contained. Instead, they coexisted 
simultaneously and sometimes overlapped one another within specific domains. These 
institutional encounters were experienced differently hinging on the contingent 
circumstances. From harsh clashes to compromising small differences, they increased or 
reduced political or economic frictions, depending on states’ policies and behaviour as well 
as regimes’ institutional adaptability and normative resilience. Furthermore, unforeseeable 
and highly complex processes of structural transformation (including political, economic, 
technological, social and cultural) converged to shape and defy each of these multilateral 
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trading systems. Contrary to conventional wisdom435, this reveals that lawyers living in the 
period experienced the postwar as a rich period of ideational, normative and institutional 
experimentalism, which was materialised in the fragmentation of the international economic 
order into three multilateral regimes for trade cooperation centred around competing 
projects: liberal-welfarism, socialism and developmentalism.  
 
B. One Multilateral Trading System to Rule Them All? South-North Regional 
Trade Agreements as Battlefields between the Liberal-welfarist GATT and 
the Developmentalist UNCTAD  
 
The previous section shows that international lawyers produced legal histories as a way to 
engage in the construction and operation of the postwar international economic order. These 
historical narratives were used to create legal doctrines in order to justify and legitimise the 
distinct projects for re-organising and managing trade relations among countries. 
Specifically, lessons were extracted from institutional stories in order to defend the 
superiority or necessity of a specific multilateral trading system. Despite all their 
differences, these legal histories and doctrines shared an understanding that the period was 
not characterised by an ideational consensus, institutional homogeneity, and normative 
harmonisation around one correct model of governing world trade. Rather, ‘global trade 
governance’ was experienced as a fragmented order, under which three, juxtaposed, 
regimes for multilateral trade cooperation competed for supremacy: the liberal-welfarist 
GATT, the socialist Comecon, and the developmentalist UNCTAD.  
Running in parallel, the postwar period also witnessed the formation and 
development of legal histories and doctrines on the international trade law of regionalism. 
They were used to structure the creation and management of bilateral, preferential and 
regional agreements devised to regulate trade affairs of distinct groupings of countries. In 
the beginning, the majority of these international treaties were experimental and did not 
follow a particular institutional design or policy formula. Out of the constellation of trade 
agreements, some were concluded by GATT contracting-parties, and so attracted the 
jurisdiction of the GATT. This section aims to account for the institutional stories about 
regional trade agreements between developed and developing countries (South-North) in 
the context of the postwar fragmentation of international trade law and governance. 
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Specifically, it focuses on how South-North RTAs were conceived, designed, operated and 
contested under GATT Article XXIV, while framed, shaped and challenged in the course of 
confrontations and détentes between liberal-welfarism and developmentalism.  
 
1. The GATT Law and Governance of South-North Regionalism 
 
The institutional story begins by acknowledging the existence of not one but two rival 
projects for regulating South-North regional trade agreements: the dominant liberal-
welfarism and the challenger developmentalism. Historically, liberal-welfarism was the first 
programme to be conceived and implemented. As discussed above, its roots go back to the 
1940s when the US and UK negotiated the ideational, normative, and institutional 
architecture for reorganising the postwar world trade. The outcome of such diplomatic 
effort was the compromise reached by the Western developed countries around liberal-
welfarism.436 Its teleological mission was to prevent the interwar economic disaster and 
trade wars through the establishment of a less discriminatory, and more reciprocal regime 
for multilateral trade cooperation under an international organisation. This programme was 
primarily embodied in the Suggested Charter, and then embedded into the ITO Charter and 
finally into the GATT.  
In this context, one of the main controversies between the United States and the 
United Kingdom was concerning with their views of South-North regional trade 
agreements. While American diplomacy pushed towards a multilateral system of non-
discriminatory trade, the British negotiators resisted the pressure to dismantle its imperial 
system of trade preferences.437 Despite their divergent positions, a diplomatic agreement 
was reached that free trade was to be gradually achieved through the adoption of a 
multilateral version of most-favoured-nation clause at the heart of the future liberal-
welfarist trading system, while regional preferences, progressively phased out. Concretely, 
Article I established the MFN clause in the GATT, whereas Articles I:2 (Imperial Systems 
of Preference), XXV:5 (General Waiver) and XXIV (RTA) created the exceptions. These 
GATT disciplines were devised to operate together to accommodate (the American) free 
trade multilateralism and (the British) preferential regionalism. In this context, the liberal-
welfarist programme envisaged assigning to the GATT the legal authority to govern the 
formation and operation of South-North RTAs.  
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Prior to the GATT, a number of South-North trade arrangements were in operation. 
The vast majority was established as colonial regimes between European empires and their 
colonies.438 The British Commonwealth, the French Union, and the Benelux Customs 
Unions were the most important of those imperial systems. They employed discriminatory 
and protectionist policies and measures to hinder the growth of trading flow between their 
colonies and third countries. Despite their dismantlement was a key priority of the United 
State’s project postwar for multilateral trade cooperation, the imperial preference question 
was settled by excepting the most significant of those imperial systems from the core rules 
of the GATT. Behind that compromise, there was an American ideal that in due time those 
imperial systems would either disappear or lose their function.439 Article I:2 was the 
formalisation of that understanding, to the extent that it grandfathered a list of pre-GATT 
preferential arrangements, which would, otherwise, be subject to the prohibition on any 
increase of preferential margins under Article I:4. The effect of Article I:2 was, therefore, to 
grant a ‘special and differential treatment’ to GATT contracting-parties who were imperial 
powers and conditioned their support on excepting their South-North preferential regimes 
from the general principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity. 
While Article I:2 grandfathered existing preferential arrangements, Article XXV:5 
established a waiver power ensuring that new preferential schemes could be created if a 
two-thirds majority of contracting-parties agreed with them.440 This ‘waiver provision’ 
enabled countries to act jointly to suspend GATT obligations. During the ITO/GATT 
negotiations, the power for waiving was progressively broadened to cover all obligations.441 
In practice, Article XXV:5 provided justification for new preferential agreements outside 
the Article XXIV discipline.  
From 1947 until 1985, the waiver power was exercised to grant ‘special and 
differential treatment’ to South-North preferential arrangements.442 The first application of 
Article XXV:5 took place already in 1948 to allow the United States to accord trade 
preferences to Pacific islands formerly under Japanese trusteeship. In 1951, Italy was 
authorised to grant trade preferences to its former colony, Libya.443 In 1953, Australia was 
granted a waiver to depart from the general provisions in order to accord preferential 
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treatment to its trustee territory of Papua-New Guinea.444 All these waivers were authorised 
on the argument that preferential trade was beneficial to the recipients’ economic growth.445  
This ‘benign’ view of trade preferences encouraged the United Kingdom to propose 
as early as 1951 an amendment to the GATT creating a general waiver for imperial 
countries to establish new preferential arrangements with their colonies to promote the 
economic development of the latter. The reform proposal was rejected in 1955 by the 
contracting-parties; nonetheless, European countries were continuously granted waivers to 
support the economic development of their colonies or newly independent countries.446 
Thus, Article XXV:5 was widely used to authorise the formation of South-North 
preferential arrangements insulated from the discipline of Article XXIV. 
Looking back, what has been described as an American ‘ardent’ opposition to RTAs 
was not only tamed only by Articles I:2 and XXV:5, but mainly by the acceptance of the 
exception enshrined in Article XXIV. Taking into consideration the powerful US position 
during the ITO/GATT negotiations, the adoption of Article XXIV has often caused 
confusion and bewilderment.447 This partly explains the reason for historical narratives of 
its origins have always been controversial. Another explanation has been the 
inconclusiveness that has arisen out of GATT’s preparatory work.448 Against the 
conventional wisdom of present-day literature, historical accounts have often not accepted 
the British imperialism as the determinant factor for the inclusion of Article XXIV since its 
core interest was already secured under Article I:2. Instead, it seems Article XXIV was 
constructed in two steps, each of them accommodating interests of distinct groupings: the 
early drafts of GATT referred to an exclusive exception for customs unions, while only 
after the Havana Conference the free trade areas were added to Article XXIV.  
Concerning customs unions, the central arguments for accepting their inclusion 
were practical and theoretical.449 From a pragmatic viewpoint, the CU exception aimed to 
provide a solution for countries participating in the negotiations who were already members 
to customs unions, the Syrian–Lebanese customs union and the Benelux (formed by 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg). From a theoretical standpoint, customs unions 
were not conceived of as preferential or protectionist arrangements. Rather, they were 
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regarded as institutional arrangements employed to promote economic or political 
integration. This historical narrative underlines the widely accepted explanation connecting 
the establishment of Article XXIV to the process of European integration. However, this 
common understanding has been recently challenged by the lack of archival evidence to 
back-up its historical-causal connection.450  
Furthermore, the inclusion of free trade areas in Article XXIV was even more 
opaque. While the CUs-exception had already been included in the Atlantic Charter, the 
FTAs-exception only appeared in draft proposals after the Havana Conference of 1947.451 
The reasons for the acceptance of such amendment are also contentious. Part of mainstream 
literature tells that a formal amendment was presented by Syria and Lebanon, with the 
support from France and other developing countries, on the grounds that FTAs would be a 
better-suited mechanism than CUs to foster economic integration among the latter. A 
minority view postulates that the US acceptance of the FTA-exception served not to strike a 
compromise with the United Kingdom, France, Syria, Lebanon or developing countries. 
Instead, the motivation of the United States was to create a valid exception for an FTA it 
had secretly negotiated with Canada.  
It was hence in the form of Article XXIV that contracting-parties transferred to the 
GATT the legal authority over regional trade agreements. Article XXIV set forth the legal 
conditions for the formation, implementation, and operation of RTAs. In the GATT 
vernacular, RTAs were abstractly understood as treaties entered between at least one 
contracting-party and one or more countries, through which trade concessions were 
reciprocally exchanged, aiming at advancing trade liberalisation and economic integration 
among themselves.452 Concretely, Article XXIV established a distinction between three 
forms of RTAs: free trade areas, customs unions, and interim agreements. For an FTA to be 
consistent with GATT law, its partners had to liberalise trade between themselves, while for 
a CU to be GATT-consistent its partners were additionally required to agree on a common 
external tariff. Both FTAs and CUs were thus perceived as forms of promoting economic 
integration and trade liberalisation.453 Finally, interim agreements consisted of a temporary 
trade agreement leading to either FTAs or CUs.  
Taking Article XXIV into consideration, the United States designed the Marshall 
Plan, a liberal-welfarist proposal for assisting the European economic reconstruction from 
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the devastation of World War II.454 The Marshall Plan played an important role in 
sponsoring the trade and economic integration projects in Europe. The 1957 Treaty of 
Rome establishing the European Economic Community and the 1959 Treaty on the 
European Free Trade Association were made possible by the combination of both the 
Marshall Plan’s economic support and the GATT’s Article XXIV exception. However, the 
EU and EFTA were not single instances, since a wave of regionalism followed their 
creation. Whereas very few RTAs were established in the 1950s, there was a significant 
surge in numbers in the 1960s and 1970s.455 Of the many regional trade agreements signed 
and notified to the GATT under Article XXIV, 28 were between developed and developing 
countries.456 This represented roughly 60% of all notified RTAs in the late 1970s.457  
The European Union was the most important trading economy interested in 
concluding South-North RTAs. It figured as the Northern partner in 23 of those RTAs, 
while Finland entered into 4 and Australia, 1. As I shall analyse below, from the outset of 
the European integration projects to 1985, developing countries, especially former 
European colonies, were present in the EU policies for foreign trade and development aid. 
Given the economic and political differences among developing countries and changes in 
the interests of European countries over time, it seems that three institutional models of 
regional governance were developed and implemented to regulate the economic relations of 
the European Union with Third-World countries. Each model had distinct goals and levels 
of complexity depending mainly on the identity assigned by the EU to developing partners. 
Moreover, the South-North RTAs concluded between either Finland or Australia with a 
developing country appear to have been closely shaped on one of the European models for 
trade cooperation.  
Throughout this period, regionalism became one of the most controversial issues 
within the GATT governance.458 The supporters of multilateralism argued that Article 
XXIV established too vague or insufficient rules to discipline the formation of RTAs. Such 
legal ambiguities were understood to be responsible for not preventing the resurgence of 
‘preferential’ trade agreements in the 1960s and 1970s, increasing fears of a return to 
discriminatory and protectionist measures, which had the potential of eventually conducting 
countries to trade wars. By contrast, the supporters of preferential regionalism reasoned that 
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Article-XXIV consistent RTAs were created under a valid and legitimate exception to 
GATT law.  
More importantly, they claimed that these trade agreements did not represent a 
threat to the GATT regime for two reasons.459 First, the GATT agreement contained not 
only Article XXIV but also a variety of other exceptions that enabled its contracting-parties 
to adopt a wide range of trade policies and arrangements in a manner consistent with GATT 
law. Second, RTAs were not like imperial systems of preferences. Rather, they were useful 
mechanisms to promote economic integration and trade liberalisation under the liberal-
welfarist programme. For instance, not only the EU found its genesis in the Marshall Plan 
and Article XXIV, but also the majority of South-North RTAs served only to formalise 
‘special’ economic and political ties existing between European countries and their former 
colonies whose economies were almost insignificant for world trade. Under liberal-
welfarism two competing views of the institutional story emerged to influence the 
interpretation of Article XXIV and shape the design of South-North RTAs. As I shall 
discuss further, the GATT and EU models offered different institutional possibilities for 
striking a balance between multilateralism and regionalism. 
 
2. The UNCTAD Law and Governance of South-North Regionalism 
 
Before delving into those two liberal-welfarist perspectives (GATT and EU), it is important 
to retell how critical visions of GATT Article XXIV were inspired by developmentalism. 
The controversies as to multilateralism-versus-regionalism were dominant among GATT 
developed partners. While at the superficial level, these debates reflected the conflict 
between the general rules of non-discriminatory trade enshrined in Article I:1 and the 
particular exception for discriminatory economic integration under Article XXIV; at the 
core level, the root of their disagreements went down to the normative tension of the GATT 
between liberalism and welfarism. These liberal-welfarist perspectives of the interplay 
between Article I:1 and XXIV were regarded as widely accepted within legal expertise. 
They tended, however, to obfuscate two significant features of fundamental impact on 
developing countries. Either under the GATT or an RTA, partners were subject to two legal 
principles: formal equality of treatment and conventional reciprocity.460  
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Formal equality of treatment was similarly expressed in Articles I:1 and XXIV. This 
entailed that any trade concession granted by a partner would automatically and non-
discriminatorily be extended to the other parties to specific agreements provided exceptions 
apply. If the external operation of ‘Article I:1’ multilateral regime and ‘Article XXIV’ 
regional regimes might cause mutual discrimination, their internal activities were carried 
out on the basis of formal equality of treatment.  
The equivalent can be found as to conventional reciprocity. GATT preamble and 
Articles I:1 and XXVIIIbis provided that contracting-parties commit themselves to 
negotiate non-discriminatory concessions on reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis 
towards to the substantial reduction of trade barriers. The basic assumption under the GATT 
regime was that partners were not obliged to grant advantages unilaterally, but they were 
indeed expected to accord and receive concessions. Article XXIV regimes also operated 
under the assumption of reciprocity with a significant difference: partners were not free to 
choose not to exchange trade concessions.461 Under Article XXIV:8, RTA-partners were 
legally required to reciprocally exchange advantages that would eliminate barriers to 
“substantially all the trade.” Therefore, formal equality and conventional reciprocity were 
perceived by developed countries as core principles necessary for the construction and 
function of both the GATT regime and regional trade regimes. 
Contrariwise, developing countries from the ITO negotiations through the GATT 
governance contested the application of the principles of equality and reciprocity to all 
countries alike. They persistently argued, with very little success, that an international 
regime for trade cooperation could not be founded on the principles of formal equality and 
conventional reciprocity. These legal principles, they claimed, would blind the trading 
system to the profound material inequality between Southern and Northern countries, and 
so the need to grant differential treatment to the former. More concretely, GATT law 
ensured, mainly through the combined operation of Articles I (MFN), XXIV (RTAs), XXV 
(general waiver), and XXVIIIbis (tariff negotiations), the economic and political dominance 
of developed countries in both multilateral and regional negotiations. GATT rules 
concentrated the bargaining on manufactured goods of interest to developed countries, in 
detriment of developing countries’ key exports.462 These GATT disciplines on bargaining 
processes constrained developing countries’ space for negotiating. On the one hand, they 
could not engage in concessions exchanges on an equal basis, because tariff and non-tariff 
measures were widely employed by them to implement pro-development policies and to 
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increase revenues. On the other hand, developed countries could refuse to negotiate on any 
product, notably the ones vital for developing economies.  
Developing countries experienced similar perverse dynamics throughout RTAs 
negotiations under Article XXIV. Either developed countries concluded RTAs among 
themselves producing discriminatory effects against developing countries, or Northern 
economies used their dominant position to dictate the terms of RTAs to Southern 
economies.463 The EU and EFTA exemplified the first tendency, in which the consequence 
of intra-trade barriers increased the difficulties of developing countries in expanding their 
exports of agricultural or manufactured goods to European markets; whereas the Yaoundé 
Conventions464 and Association Agreements with the Maghreb countries represented the 
second tendency, under which developing countries were demanded to offer reverse trade 
concessions to developed countries. Thus, the principles of reciprocity and non-
discrimination enshrined in the GATT agreement not only reinforced the already powerful 
bargaining position of developed countries but also constrained the range of possible 
concepts, ideas, rules and institutions available to constitute ‘pro-development’ RTAs. For 
these reasons, since its creation in 1947 developing countries sought to reform GATT law. 
The continuous denials of developed countries to take into consideration developing 
countries’ demands caused Southern economies to conclude that the GATT regime was 
heavily biased in favour of Northern economies and so responsible for hampering their 
efforts to use international trade as means to promote economic development.465 GATT 
rules were deemed to be obstacles rather than promoters of developing countries’ 
participation in world trade, since they supported a mutually advantageous liberalisation of 
trade in manufactured goods while authorising the relatively high tariffs on agricultural 
goods and escalating tariff rates applied to export products that were vital to developing 
countries. More specifically, developed economies tended to shield their agricultural 
production with high tariffs, on the one hand; and, discourage the imports of manufactured 
goods from developing countries by increasing the duties with the degree of processing, 
which entailed a double effect: protection against manufactured goods and incentive to 
importing primary commodities from Southern economies. Thus, after struggling for two 
decades, developing countries decided to embrace and realise the developmentalist 
programme by challenging the GATT regime through the construction of the UNCTAD as 
an alternative regime for multilateral trade cooperation. As we shall discuss, this alternative 
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programme shifts the focus of the GATT governance of South-North RTAs from a 
multilateralism-versus-regionalism controversy to a debate on strengthens and weaknesses 
of either preferential dependency or economic emancipation. 
The developmentalist plan offered by the UNCTAD aimed at reforming 
international trade law and governance in three fronts: international commodity agreements, 
South-North arrangements on preferential access for developing countries’ manufactured 
goods, and South-South preferential agreements.466 Due to the limited scope of this study, 
the following analysis focuses only on the interaction between the UNCTAD and GATT 
concerning South-North RTAs under Article XXIV.  
To deal with the challenges highlighted above, the UNCTAD sought to reshape 
entirely the governance of South-North trade relations through the introduction of a new set 
of legal concepts, rules, and institutions. The purpose was to establish a pro-development 
system of trade in order to stimulate manufacturing exports of developing countries by 
granting them preferential treatment. It was expected that this system of preferences would 
reduce their high initial costs. By lowering initial costs and opening up larger markets on a 
temporary and preferential basis, weak industries in Southern economies would have the 
opportunity to develop and compete internationally.  
Similar to other protectionist measures employed by developed countries in the past 
to self-industrialise, preferential access would work as a justifiable instrument for protecting 
infant exporting industries in developing countries. Also, preferences would level the 
playing field by softening the real effects of the non-discriminatory principle. Indeed, 
preferential reductions would enable developing countries to come closer to material 
equality of treatment. Thus, a multilateral regime of preferential treatment would symbolise 
the international acceptance of the necessity for asymmetry in the regulation and 
governance of trade relations between Southern and Northern economies, on the one hand; 
and the recognition that law reform was required to introduce ‘differential and special’ rules 
aiming at achieving material equalisation, on the other hand. 
At the 1964 Geneva Conference, the UNCTAD Secretariat presented its first 
proposal to reform international trade law and governance.467 Several suggestions and 
reservations were offered to the establishment of a multilateral system of trade 
preference.468 Three distinct positions were advocated by Northern economies. The United 
States presented the strongest reservations to the proposal. The US defended the GATT 
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regime by claiming that any departure from its core rules, notably Article I:1, should be 
entirely justified and rigorously scrutinised, while arguing that the multilateral rounds of 
negotiations would cause any preferential margin to be of little relevance. The UK, 
supported by Germany and the Netherlands, defended a single preferential scheme applied 
to all developing countries by all developed countries. By contrast, the French-Belgian 
position was to internationalise the Association regime already in operation under the 
Treaty of Rome to regulate trade relations between the EU and its former African colonies. 
It would consist of a selective regime of preferences constituted around a committee where 
exporting and importing countries would negotiate preferences bilaterally on a reciprocal 
basis.  
The Southern economies did not share a single view either, despite their joint 
negotiating position. Developing countries who already benefited from preferences were 
not willing to forgo them unless given new advantages. This was mainly the case of African 
countries associated with the Yaoundé Convention469. Also, the least developed countries 
argued for introducing a further distinction based on the different levels of development 
with the purpose of narrowing the control over the allocation of trade concessions. Despite 
great effort, developed and developing countries could not reach an agreement on the 
institutional design for the multilateral system of preferences, except for the General 
Principle Eight acknowledging the need for preferential treatment.470 
From the 1964 Geneva Conference to the 1968 New Delhi Conference, the political 
power gathered around the UNCTAD increased. This opportunity led developing countries 
to push forward the developmentist-inspired reform of international trade law and 
governance.471 Initially, developed countries sought to weaken the pressure of the 
UNCTAD by shifting the negotiations back to the GATT. They introduced the ‘Part IV 
amendment’ to the GATT agreement in 1964. Although it did not discipline trade 
preferences, Part IV acknowledged the structural differentiation between developed and 
developing countries, and so created an exception in favour of the latter for the non-
application of the principle of reciprocity. In 1965, developed countries set up a special 
group to study preferential treatment for developing countries under the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It concluded that trade preferences 
could stimulate developing countries’ exports of manufactured goods. These efforts were 
seen as important but not enough, and so developing countries continued demanding a 
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permanent solution. By 1967 developed countries were ‘convinced’ to accept the principle 
of preferential treatment, but required further specification. This came in the 1968 
Conference when Resolution 21(II) setting forth the basis for the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) was passed by unanimous approval. It recognised the need for 
establishing “a mutually acceptable system of generalised non-reciprocal and non-
discriminatory preferences which would be beneficial to the developing countries.”472 
Developing countries believed that UNCTAD Resolution 21(II) represented a 
critical watershed decision reached by unanimity. It provided the general normative and 
ideational contours for the Generalised System of Preferences. Normatively, the GSP 
should rest on three pillars: (a) preferences should be generalised to all developing 
countries, on the basis of (b) non-reciprocity, and (c) non-discrimination. Ideationally, the 
aim of preferential treatment was to (i) increase export earning, (ii) promote 
industrialisation, and (iii) accelerate the economic growth of developing countries.  
However, the implementation of Resolution 2(II) was surrounded by enormous 
challenges. The United States, together with Nordic countries, Switzerland and Japan, 
defended the establishment of a common scheme by all major developed countries and the 
elimination of special and reverse preferences; whereas Western European countries 
rejected the single system approach and defended a system of individual schemes that 
aspired towards harmonisation. 473 The UNCTAD received all developed countries’ 
unilateral submissions, organised trade negotiations, and finally published the “Agreed 
Conclusions,” which consisted of a resolution adopted by its Trade and Development 
Board, expressing the consent given by all states to the establishment of the Generalised 
System of Preference.  
The formation of the developmentalist regime had direct influence over the GATT 
law and governance of South-North RTAs. As we shall discuss below, the GSP represented 
an institutional alternative to the three schemes in operation under the GATT to regulate 
trade arrangements between developed and developing countries. The first incursion into 
the GATT was through the need to reform its rules and institutions to make room for GSP 
schemes.474 The GATT Secretariat prepared a technical note suggesting three possible ways 
of incorporating GSP preferences into the GATT regime: (a) waivers to general rules of 
GATT law, (b) an amendment to the GATT agreement, or (c) a unanimous declaration by 
the contracting-parties authorising such preferences. The Secretariat recommended the 
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adoption of the latter since the other two faced substantive and procedural limitations. 
Nevertheless, the contracting-parties decided to accord a temporary waiver to the GSP 
schemes.  
The decision on granting a waiver was made not without careful consideration.475 It 
strategically avoided crystalising the developmentalist inroad into the GATT, which would 
have happed if an amendment were approved. Further, the temporary waiver made no 
reference to either Part IV, Article XXV:5, or any other rule of GATT law. This again 
served to contain the ‘infection’ of developmentalism for a limited period of time. This 
situation partially changed with the Tokyo Round, when developing countries pushed 
through the negotiations for a permanent legal status of GSP schemes.476 At the end of the 
Round, developing countries’ position seemed to have prevailed, leading contracting-parties 
to approve by consensus the Enabling Clause, which created under the GATT a permanent 
mechanism for GSP schemes. This approval came at a high price, nonetheless: the Enabling 
Clause was constructed as an exception to Article I:1, under which any preference under the 
GSP did not constitute a legally binding trade concession under Article II477 (Schedules of 
Concessions). This left the possibility for developed countries to withdraw in whole or in 
part any of trade preferences granted in accordance with the GSP. 
The Enabling Clause represented a major ideational advance, institutional 
innovation and normative breakthrough for developmentalism. It not only operated a 
permanent insertion of developmentalist concepts, ideas and practices into the liberal-
welfarist regime for trade cooperation but also forced a reorganisation of the three 
mechanisms for regulating trade arrangements between developed and developing countries 
under the GATT. With the Enabling Clause, Articles I:2 and XXV:5 lost their function of 
providing procedural and substantive rules for according wavers to preferential 
arrangements between developed and developing countries.478 Nonetheless, the Enabling 
Clause seemed to have entailed two (unexpected or unintended) effects. It assisted the 
former European empires by replacing uncertain or too limited legal provisions with a 
permanent legal instrument devised to establish preferential arrangements with developing 
countries. It also established legal rules authorising develop countries to unilaterally accord, 
modify and withdraw such preferences under the GSP.  
                                                   
475 Ibid.   
476 Ibid. at 90-93.   
477 Pursuant to Article II:7, the schedules of concessions are integral part of the GATT and so legally 
binding upon contracting-parties.   
478 Yusuf, 1982: 90-93.   
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By contrast, the relationship between the GSP and Article XXIV was regarded as 
more complex. The UNCTAD’s General Principle Eight set out the normative basis for the 
GSP on two principles: non-reciprocity between developed and developing countries and 
non-discrimination among developing countries.479 The implementation of these two 
principles into the GSP revealed to be politically difficult since affected powerful interests 
protected under Article XXIV.  
The non-discriminatory aspect of Principle Eight provided that GSP schemes should 
not discriminate among developing countries, whereas the existing preferential 
arrangements should be “abolished pari passu with the effective application of international 
measures providing at least equivalent advantages to the developing countries 
concerned.”480 In other words, “preferential arrangements of a discriminatory nature 
between developed and developing countries” should be gradually phased out and replaced 
with the GSP schemes guaranteeing at least equivalent advantages.481 The normative effect 
was to introduce the principle of non-discrimination among developing countries into 
GATT law of South-North RTAs, in order to prevent the use of the so-called vertical 
preference. 482 More concretely, it commanded not only the elimination of preferential 
arrangements under Articles I:2 and XXV:5 but also the South-North RTAs under Article 
XXIV.483 This view was pushed forward by certain developed countries, along with 
developing countries not benefited from Article XXIV preferences,484 which insisted that 
the abolition of Article XXIV preferences be a pre-condition for the inclusion of Southern 
economies as recipients under the GSP. However, after prolonged negotiations, the 
preference-free condition to access the GSP was dropped. The political abandonment of the 
principle of non-discrimination represented, therefore, the victory of Article XXIV over the 
GSP. 
The non-reciprocity aspect of Principle Eight set forth that “developed countries 
should grant concessions to all developing countries and extend to developing countries all 
concessions they grant to one another and should not, in granting these or other 
concessions, require any concessions in return from developing countries.” 485 This legal 
                                                   
479 Ibid. at 83-87, 112-113; El-Naggar, 1969: 275.   
480 UNCTAD Proceedings 1964-I: 10-11.   
481 Ibid. at 121-122.   
482 Vertical preferences referred to the preferential arrangements under GATT Article XXIV between 
‘some’ developed countries and ‘some’ developing countries. This type of South-North RTAs was seen 
as potentially accruing discriminatory effects on third developing countries (El-Naggar, 1969: 275). 
483 Yusuf, 1982: 83-87, 112-113; El-Naggar, 1969: 275.   
484 See supra note 483. 
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norm clashed directly with the so-called reverse preferences.486 Again, certain developed 
countries declared that developing countries granting and benefiting from Article XXIV 
reverse preferences should not have access to the GSP.487 Conversely, developing countries 
argued that there was a large number of them benefiting from reserve preferences and so 
they would be excluded from the GSP in contrary to the all-inclusive objective of Principle 
Eight. The result of this controversy was twofold. Normatively, Article XXIV prevailed, 
since the GSP did not require the elimination of reverse preferences to consider a 
developing country eligible for benefits. Nonetheless, the introduction of the GSP seemed 
to be a determinant factor for the gradual elimination of reverse preferences in South-North 
RTAs. 
At the end of the 1972 Santiago Conference, the Generalised System of Preference 
was institutionally established under the UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences. By 
1980, sixteen GSP schemes were in operation involving 25 donor countries (19 First-World 
countries and 6 Second-World countries).488 Until this point in time, the results from 
unilateral granting of non-reciprocal preferences to developing countries were meagre at 
best, and disappointing at worse. Almost all preference-giving countries only accorded 
preferential access to developing countries’ manufactured goods, and so excluding by large 
their main exporting products, such as agriculture and textiles. Concerning raw materials, 
GSP schemes did not actually apply since these products were often admitted free of duty. 
Moreover, GSP schemes contained a number of provisions to safeguard developed markets 
from undue disruption potentially caused by products designed as “sensitive,” notably 
textiles, leather and petroleum-based products. Finally, the effectiveness of GSP schemes 
was limited by the erosion of GSP preferences caused by MFN tariff reductions taking 
place within the Tokyo Round.489 All of these factors contributed to reducing the universe 
of developing countries’ exports benefiting from the GSP. It was estimated that no much 
more than 13.4% of these products were covered under GSP schemes. Developing countries 
interpreted these weak outcomes as a reaction of developed countries to open their markets 
through either GSP schemes or MFN concessions within the Tokyo Round.  
In light of the above, the creation of the Generalised System of Preference under 
UNCTAD was perceived by the Third World as the most profound transformation of legal 
rules and institutions underlying international trade law and governance since the end of 
                                                   
486 Reverse preferences referred to trade concessions reciprocally and mutually exchanged between some 
developed countries and some developing countries under Article XXIV (El-Naggar, 1969: 276).   
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World War II.490 It was never considered a panacea for solving all their problems of 
economic development, to the extent that its shortcomings and limitations resulted from the 
weak compromise reached by developed and developing countries. Nonetheless, it 
represented a series of ideas, practices, policies and norms designed exclusively for 
attaining the interests of developing countries to promote industrialisation and accelerate 
their economic growth led by exports. More importantly, it constituted an institutional 
alternative to the Article XXIV mechanism under the GATT.  
The Generalised System of Preferences symbolised, in this sense, the possibility of 
replacing the GATT regime of South-North RTAs, which were employed to reproduce 
historical and political ties between European imperial powers and their former colonies, 
wih the UNCTAD regime of GSP schemes grounded on special and differential treatment, 
reflecting differences in the level of economic development, which was expressed in the 
form of trade preferences.491 Indeed, Abdulqawi Yusuf argued that the GSP was viewed “as 
a significant step in the overall struggle for restructuring economic relations among 
States.”492 In other words, it offered an opportunity to move away from the liberal-welfarist 
law and governance of South-North RTAs based on the principles of equality of treatment 
(vertical preferences) and conventional reciprocity (reverse preferences); and towards a 
developmentalist law and governance of GSP schemes centred on non-reciprocity between 
developed and developing countries and non-discrimination among developing countries.  
As I shall discuss in the next section, two distinct institutional views arose out of the 
developmentalism to shape the interpretation of GATT Article XXIV and the making of 
South-North RTAs. Whereas the GATT-centric and European-centric understandings 
provided for distinct approaches to dealing with the tension between GATT multilateralism 
and RTA regionalism, the UN-centric and UNCTAD-centric visions offered alternative 
possibilities for governing South-North regional trade agreements by reframing the liberal-
welfarist contradiction as between preferential cooperation and emancipatory development. 
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C. One International Law and Governance of South-North Regional Trade 
Agreements? From the Liberal-welfarism and Developmentalism Struggle to 
the Emergence of Four Institutional Models for Trade Governance 
 
From the clashes and détentes between the liberal-welfarist GATT and the developmentalist 
UNCTAD, four institutional models for trade governance emerged from the legal histories 
and doctrines on the international law and governance of South-North regional trade 
agreements. Regardless of their doctrinal angle, some events were shared in every account: 
political and economic factors that contributed to economic turmoil and trade wars of the 
1930s leading up to the outburst of the Second World War, followed closely by the 
formation of a new international political order under the United Nations, which was in turn 
shaped by the Cold War and decolonisation. After accounting for these facts, the legal 
histories then shifted to the international economic governance by focusing, with varying 
degrees of relevance, on the establishment of the GATT and UNCTAD at the multilateral 
level, and the creation of the EU and EFTA, as well as South-North RTAs and GSP 
schemes at the regional level. The relative importance of each event and its respective 
lessons for the GATT law and governance of South-North RTAs under Article XXIV 
hinged on the way the institutional story was retold by legal doctrines created and applied in 
different settings.  
Two visions of how the transformations carried out by the formation and 
implementation of the liberal-welfarist GATT regime caused developed countries, mostly 
European, to change their interactions with developing countries, mainly post-colonial 
states located in Africa, Caribbean, Pacific and Mediterranean. Some emphasised the stories 
and lessons about the efforts of the United States to persuade and direct the European 
empires to make their imperial systems of preferences progressively compliant with GATT 
law. Others stressed the developmental aspects of the imperial system and the need to adapt 
them to accommodate the European integration projects. Both focused on how to transform 
South-North preferential arrangements under Articles 1:2 and XXV:5 into either South-
North RTAs under Article XXIV or trade concessions under Article II. Not surprisingly, 
these two views were dominant in the Global North. They were linked by their shared 
commitment to liberal-welfarism and often reframed as part of the multilateralism-versus-
regionalism controversy. The legal doctrines supporting these visions highlighted a 
particular set of relevant events for the First-World countries, while tended to ignore or 
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overlook other facts and lessons related to the socioeconomic transformations driving the 
process of decolonisation and development in the Third World.  
By contrast, the legal histories produced in the Global South gave birth to two 
competing visions of how political independence and international trade relations should be 
reconciled. Some viewed decolonisation and interdependence as moments of the restoration 
of political sovereignty and economic glory for Third-World countries. Others understood 
the same events as moments of political subjugation and new forms of economic 
exploitation. These two institutional visions underscored the developmentalist programme 
for establishing a new regime for multilateral trade cooperation between Northern and 
Southern countries. Therefore, grounded on the story of institutional practices examined in 
the previous sections, I argue that from 1947 to 1985 different patterns of legal doctrines 
gave rise to four institutional models of governance for structuring and managing South-
North RTAs under GATT law. 
The GATT model of trade governance emerged from legal doctrines that emphasised 
the historical tension between multilateralism and regionalism embedded into GATT 
Article XXIV. The institutional stories began by retelling how protectionist and 
discriminatory measures contributed to the outbreak of World War II.493 Throughout the 
interwar period, European empires created systems of preferences with their former 
colonies, dominions and protectorates. These trade regimes involved the imposition of 
higher duties on non-member goods and lower duties on member goods. The GATT 
negotiations had these imperial systems as one of the most contentious issues. The United 
States led by Secretary Cordell Hull was pushing the postwar policy agenda towards a 
complete dismantling of such discriminatory schemes, while the United Kingdom 
represented by John M. Keynes defended its maintenance.494 This understanding of 
institutional story calls attention to how the GATT was established to promote free trade 
against the discriminatory practices of former European empires. Consequently, the telos of 
Article XXIV was to impose constraints on the formation and operation of regional trade 
agreements, with the purpose of attaining their complete elimination. In this context, the 
South-North RTAs were mostly perceived not as mechanisms to foster economic 
prosperity, but rather as preferential trading systems, serving to perpetuate imperialist 
policies under a different label, which were tolerated only for political reasons. Thus, to 
                                                   
493 For this GATT-centric vision, see generally Carreau et al (1980) and Flory (1968). Also, see supra 
notes 436-459, and accompanying text. 
494 Carreau et al, 1980: 80; Flory, 1968: 17; Irwin et al, 2008: 12. See also supra notes 436-459, and 
accompanying text. 
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aspire to be not only formally but also teleological consistent with Article XXIV, RTAs 
should reproduce the GATT model at the regional level. 
The European model was grounded on a particular thread of legal doctrines that 
placed the European integration projects at the centred and then focused on the relationship 
of the EU and EFTA with developing countries in light of their mandates and members’ 
foreign strategies.495 The European model of trade governance was chiefly influenced by 
interests and policies of France, Belgium, and the UK. The Association regime established 
under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome transposed the French-Belgium colonial arrangements 
to the European Union.496 After decolonisation, these preferential arrangements under the 
Association regime served as models for designing RTAs between the European Union and 
the newly independent states. The French-Belgium models were later reformed by the UK 
accession. Despite their particular differences, the EU sought to govern its trade with 
developing countries by creating an institutional hierarchy among Southern economies 
through regional arrangements.  
To circumvent the GATT rules of non-discrimination (Article I:1) and of the 
prohibition on expanding imperial systems of preference (Article I:2), the European Union 
made use of RTAs as an open frame to accommodate its trade and development practices 
under GATT Article XXIV. The outcome was two-fold. On the one hand, the post-
decolonisation RTAs between the EU and the newly sovereign states served to regulate 
trade relations while providing development assistance. On the other hand, EU-South RTAs 
did not seem to be experienced by the European Union as preferential trade instruments 
under the GATT regime. Instead, they were conceived as economic integration mechanism 
under EU law and governance.497 Thus, the understanding of South-North RTAs as 
welfarist mechanisms for development, which were almost part of the EU’s ‘internal’ 
affairs, led the European-centric view to be favourable to regionalism. Whereas the GATT 
model was often associated with pro-multilateralism, the European model tended to align 
with pro-regionalism arguments. 
These two liberal-welfarist narratives were not perceived as compelling in the 
Global South. Two alternative models of trade governance were constructed drawing from 
legal doctrines and histories that accounted for institutional practices associated with 
developmentalism. The UN-centric and UNCTAD-centric views were better succeeded in 
                                                   
495 For this European-centric vision, see generally Luchaire (1975), Gautron (1987), and Vignes (1988). 
See also supra notes 43-459, and accompanying text. 
496 Broberg, 2013: 676. 
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penetrating and influencing legal reform proposals, trade policies and behaviour of 
developing countries, notably the ones emerging from decolonisation processes.  
The UN model was built in legal doctrines that focused on institutional stories about 
international socioeconomic processes of transformation leading up to both decolonisation 
and economic integration of Third-World countries under the auspice of the United 
Nations.498 The independence of colonies, dominions and protectorates was historically 
accounted for as the single most important event, to the extent that it opened the opportunity 
not only to defend the sovereignty of the colonised peoples but also to reassert their dignity, 
identity and self-determination. Neither the GATT nor the European Union, but rather the 
United Nations was regarded as the institutional model that would allow the rehabilitation 
of post-colonial states. Under the UN Charter, newly independent countries were to be 
equated to the Western states, dispelling the colonial images of their backwardness and 
primitiveness. Indeed, they supported the formation of new (or strengthening of old) 
majoritarian UN specialised agencies, such as the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the UN 
Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO), and the UNCTAD, which could assist 
developing countries to realise their key goals: the promotion of their domestic economic 
and social development, and their re-assimilation to their righteous place in the international 
community. Regional trade agreements and GSP schemes were understood as institutional 
mechanisms to help developing countries not only to foster economic growth but also to 
reclaim their legitimate participation in international trade law and governance. To be 
perceived as sovereign states, developing countries embracing the UN-centric view tended 
to support the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity, and consequently the 
concession of vertical and reverse preferences contained in South-North RTAs. Hence, 
GATT Article XXIV was understood as the legal disciplines applicable to regional trade 
regimes between (sovereign) developed countries and (sovereign) developing countries 
which often shared historical and cultural ties; whereas GSP schemes were regarded as 
legal regimes open to all Third-World states. 
Alternatively, the UNCTAD model of trade governance arose from legal doctrines 
stressing institutional stories that cast doubts on the celebratory view of decolonisation, 
economic interdependence, and harmonious trade.499 The political independence was 
accounted for a moment of treachery; since the visible colonial regimes under the liberal 
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trading system was replaced with a less visible international system of neo-imperialist 
exploitation in the form of the GATT. The UN General Assembly was initially envisaged as 
the institutional locus to strive for legal transformation that would protect developing 
countries’ economic sovereignty and self-determination from attempts of developed 
countries to assert neo-colonial controls. Once First-World countries contested the legality 
and legitimacy of the United Nations, while Second-World countries stood up only for their 
interests, developing countries sought to establish the UNCTAD as the symbol of the Third-
World aspiration for a developmentalist regime for multilateral trade cooperation. While the 
GSP was regarded as a legitimate alternative, the UNCTAD-centric understanding 
condemned the South-North RTAs under the GATT by claiming they were institutional 
mechanisms to exchange vertical and reserve preferences. In other words, these Article-
XXIV RTAs reinforced institutionally the principles of discrimination among developing 
countries and reciprocity between developed and developing counties in direct contradiction 
to the General Principle Eight of UNCTAD law. Thus, South-North RTAs should be phased 
out and replaced by GSP schemes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter opens with an invitation to revisit the history of the postwar multilateral and 
regional trade regimes through the lens of an alternative approach. This involved avoiding 
the disciplinary bias and intellectual shortcomings that have produced and universalised the 
‘grand narrative’ provided in the contemporary mainstream literature. Specifically, I sought 
to foreground the role of international law and lawyers in the institutional practices that 
constituted, governed, and challenged the GATT and South-North regional trade 
agreements between 1947 and 1985. The analysis of official and archival documentation, 
canonical writings, and jurisprudential works reveals that this chapter of the institutional 
story of the GATT governance of South-North regionalism was characterised by a high 
intensity of ideational conflicts, political and intellectual struggles, jurisprudential 
transformations, and normative fragmentation. Thus, this period cannot, and should not, be 
remembered (as suggested in today’s legal historiography) as a mere formative era of 
progressive trade liberalisation and continuous institutionalisation of the GATT regime. 
With this in mind, this chapter conveys two core arguments.  
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The clashes and détentes between the liberal-welfarist GATT and the 
developmentalist UNCTAD influenced the production of a number of innovative and 
eclectic legal doctrines. Four (relatively coherent) institutional models for regional trade 
governance emerged out of that moment of doctrinal creativity and experimentation. Since 
they were modelled on the institutional architecture and practice of concrete international 
organisations, I have named the models after their respective source of inspiration: the 
GATT, the European Union, the United Nations, and the UNCTAD. My first argument is 
that, in the postwar period, four (and not only one) institutional models were part of legal 
imaginary, and so regarded as valid and legitimate options to design and manage South-
North regional trade regimes. 
Less noticed but equally important, the historical narratives underpinning the four 
institutional visions did a great deal of work in assigning authority to and building 
disciplinary consensus around their models of trade governance. My second argument is 
that these accounts were characterised by their diversity, contestability and rivalry. This 
might sound counter-intuitive for most contemporary lawyers trained in the Global North. 
The reason for the lack of familiarity with these competing narratives seems to result from 
the bias and blind spots created by the traditional style of legal history. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, this mainstream approach tends to combine an overemphasis in state and non-
state practices in the Anglo-American world with a narrow definition of international trade 
law. The consequences over time have been to overlook or rule out concepts and facts, 
history lessons and ideas, regimes and norms found in the rival legal doctrines underpinning 
the UN and UNCTAD models; while containing or reframing the minority understanding 
(EU model).  
It seems that any attempt to re-appreciate, or construct new models based on, those 
institutional visions of regional trade governance by retelling legal history would be more 
disruptive for today’s legal doctrine and the IEL field than when they were produced 
originally. The main reason for this destructive impact is, at the time these competing 
models arose, there was no strong consensus around a specific thread of historical narratives 
that underscored the overwhelming majority of legal doctrines. Consequently, it is not 
unexpected that the relative influence of each institutional vision was contingent depending 
on the context in which it emerged and was applied. The degree of relevance of each model 
of trade governance shall become even more evident in Chapter 7, where I analyse the 
negotiation, construction, and operation of the 28 South-North regional trade agreements 
under the GATT regime. 
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In conclusion, postwar lawyers were called to participate in the institutional making 
of the multilateral and regional trade regimes through international law. They employed 
legal doctrines to influence decision-making in and over the South-North regional trade 
agreements while defending or challenging the institutional models that prevailed in a 
particular setting. Hence, what seems to be more surprising nowadays is the realisation that, 
despite its European origins and Anglo-American appropriation, international trade law and 
governance were subject to highly disputed controversies from 1947 to 1985. This chapter 
provided the institutional story of how state behaviours, post-traumatic events, and the 
process of institutionalisation of the GATT and South-North regional trade regimes were 
understood and translated into history lessons. The next chapter shifts the focuses towards 
the jurisprudential story, in order to chronicle how canonical writings and official 
documents were crafted and interpreted by lawyers to offer legal doctrines to deal with and 
solve the foundational controversies over international trade law rules and institutions. 
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CHAPTER 6.  INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LAWYERS IN 
THE JURISPRUDENTIAL  MAKING OF SOUTH-NORTH 
TRADE REGIMES 
 
Introduction 
 
The history of the international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism has 
been traditionally articulated along two different, but complementary, storylines. The 
previous chapter examined the distinct narratives produced by postwar lawyers to make 
sense of and engage with the new institutional practices and projects underlying the rival 
regimes for multilateral and regional trade cooperation between 1947 and 1985. It focused 
particularly on the institutional patterns underlying the liberal-welfarist and 
developmentalist trade governances, which were accounted of as history lessons. Grounded 
partially in these teachings, legal doctrines were crafted to influence the formation and 
evolution of the GATT and the South-North regional trade agreements. Four institutional 
visions emerged from the wide range of legal histories and doctrines produced through the 
period. Each of them was centred on a model for regional trade governance based on the 
following international organisations with trade vocation: GATT, European Union, United 
Nations, and UNCTAD.  
This chapter takes a different pathway. Instead of focusing on state behaviour, 
institutional practices and regimes, and socio-economic events, its purpose is to provide the 
history of international law in the jurisprudential making of South-North regional trade 
regimes from a perspective different from mainstream literature. The alternative approach 
proposed in Chapter 3 is employed to historicise the formation and development of legal 
ideas and techniques underlying the postwar international trade law and governance. 
Specifically, I aim to demonstrate that distinct narratives, which aspired to, but not 
necessarily achieve, a certain degree of coherence, were constructed to validate and 
legitimise jurisprudential programmes. Not only history lessons but also jurisprudential 
projects were influenced by the surrounding ideational conflicts, institutional and normative 
fragmentation, and professional and intellectual struggles. Grounded in these stories and 
teachings, a variety of legal doctrines were produced and employed to craft arguments 
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about, and offer solutions for, foundational controversies over the GATT law and 
governance of South-North regionalism. The result was the emergence of three 
jurisprudential visions of GATT Article XXIV and the South-North RTAs. 
Following the same steps of institutional story, an alternative account of GATT 
jurisprudence between 1947 and 1985 requires departing from today’s conventional 
narratives that often narrow the intellectual history to canonical writings that provide a 
vernacular of facts, concepts, theories and methods to make sense of the prevailing 
institutional interactions and state behaviour under the world trading system. Recall that 
mainstream literature often stresses how ontological and epistemological issues on the 
GATT law and governance of South-North regionalism were framed, evaluated, and 
answered through doctrinal analyses of Articles I:2, XXV:5 and XXIV and the Enabling 
Clause. Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate that the almost exclusive focus of traditional accounts 
rests on jurisprudential debates as to the legality and legitimacy of regionalism under the 
GATT/WTO regime. They underscore the way evidence was offered to prove or disprove 
the formal consistency of South-North RTAs with GATT law through the examination of 
the disciplines in Article XXIV. This interpretative practice of GATT law is narrated as 
overwhelmingly influenced by formalism, which was developed by few (Anglo-American) 
lawyers engaged in the construction and implementation of the postwar international 
trading system. 
As examined in Chapter 3, the traditional history tells that in the first decades of the 
GATT the field of international economic law was progressively disregarded within 
international trade governance, because lawyers were unable to provide an effective legal 
solution to the unhindered use of Article XXIV. The ‘too soft’ discipline imposed by 
Article XXIV on RTAs-making was explained as resulting from GATT’s ‘birth defect’. The 
opacity and ambiguity of GATT rules (generally) and Article XXIV (in particular) were 
understood as the main reason for the ‘abusive’ resort by contracting-parties to the 
exception for creating CUs and FTAs. To constrain state discretion, the 1940s generation 
applied their doctrinal analysis to determine both the formal validity of the rules of Article 
XXIV themselves and the compliance of RTAs with them. For leaving aside issues of 
policy and governance, this conceptual style of doctrinal analysis was criticised for 
rendering ineffective solutions to tame the ‘misuse’ of GATT law. The consequence was a 
gradual displacement of legal expertise as a mode of international trade governance in 
favour of less abstract and legalist and more policy-oriented and technical forms of 
expertise. This was manifested through the substitution of international lawyers for 
economists, diplomats and officials as experts in decision-making under the GATT.  
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In light of the above, I argue that the (contemporary) mainstream literature portrays 
the history of international trade law and governance of regionalism as a jurisprudential 
tragedy with powerful and long-lasting effects over the IEL field’s identity and mission. 
Ideationally, the conventional narratives tell that the central problem faced by postwar 
lawyers was the conflict between multilateralism and regionalism. Institutionally, the 
present and past ineffectiveness of Article XXIV is deterministically attributed to the 
GATT’s ‘original sins’. Jurisprudentially, those accounts acknowledge the failure of 
formalism in applying GATT rules to discipline RTAs in a way that was politically and 
economically sound and effective. Hence, legal expertise had no significant role in 
decision-making in and over the GATT law and governance until at least the 1980s. 
The effects of the traditional history are to reinforce the legitimacy and authority of 
the current mainstream jurisprudence of the international trade law of South-North 
regionalism. This is achieved by narrowing the jurisprudential story to the contributions of 
Anglo-American lawyers and blaming formalism for letting legal expertise to be 
powerlessly trapped in itself. The legal doctrine of Article XXIV is narrated as overly 
committed to abstract formalities rather than to policy issues concerning the factual 
proliferations of South-North RTAs. Likewise, lawyers are historically painted as the tragic 
heroes, who were unable to develop a general, ahistorical, conclusive solution for managing 
the conflict between multilateralism and regionalism. Consequently, the IEL field was 
‘forced’ to defer the authority to policy-oriented experts.  
To avoid telling a jurisprudential story as a tragedy starring Anglo-American 
lawyers and focusing solely on Article XXIV, this chapter accounts for the stories produced 
between 1947 and 1985 to understand and give meaning to the international trade law and 
governance of South-North regionalism. It intends to emphasise, instead of overlooking, the 
intellectual and political conflicts that generated, supported and challenged legal doctrines 
employed to negotiate, design, and operate South-North RTAs under the GATT. Making 
use of the alternative approach introduced in Chapter 3, the following jurisprudential story 
does not move backward to tell how Article XXIV was created and had its rules been 
progressively interpreted with the purpose of refining their application to constrain state 
discretion on RTA-making. Instead, it consists of historicising how Article XXIV was 
conceived and interpreted in the context of profound transformations undergoing inside and 
outside the field of international law. It narrates the efforts of international lawyers to 
engage with the (re)construction of the postwar international economic order (generally), 
and also to manage its fragmentation in multilateral and regional regimes for trade 
governance (in particular).  
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Moreover, GATT law is neither equated to international trade law nor narrated as a 
special body of positive rules and institutions, or as technocratic, policy-oriented expertise 
resistant to formal thinking and legalistic practice. Rather, it is accounted as part of the 
struggled for legitimacy and authority over legal decision-making within and over 
multilateral and regional regimes for trade cooperation. Jurisprudentially, this conflict was 
manifested as foundational questions and crucial preoccupations about the making and 
interpretation of new concepts, rules and institutions concerning GATT law and South-
North RTAs.  
My alternative history begins when lawyers were living in a period of professional 
and intellectual disarray mainly caused by the challenges posed to international law by the 
diplomatic efforts to construct, operate, and challenge new universal, multilateral or 
regional regimes for trade cooperation in the aftermath of World War II. It was in this 
complex and tense background that the trade dimension of international law gained 
currency into legal expertise as part of controversies about international economic law. The 
jurisprudential debates shaped and were influenced by the attempts to establish ‘the’ 
postwar international economic order. Throughout these processes of making of and 
resisting to multilateral and regional regimes for trade cooperation, legal doctrines were 
constructed to empower lawyers to craft, manage and reason about legal rules and 
institutions of international trade affairs. They also imposed limits to the legal imagination 
by drawing the boundaries of what constituted valid and legitimate idea and technique as 
well as by determining what is (part of) international trade law.  
As I shall discuss in detail below, the jurisprudential controversy over the autonomy of 
the field of international economic law serves as an entry-point to capture the intellectual 
and political struggles underlying the formation and development of the GATT and South-
North regional trade regimes. Although this debate was sometimes foregrounded and 
sometimes hidden within legal expertise, I will show that a lawyer’s view on the matter 
affected, consciously or otherwise, the construction and application of legal doctrines on the 
GATT law (generally) and on the South-North RTAs (in particular). Put differently, this 
theoretical, and perhaps overly abstract, question veiled a core battlefield where opposing 
ideational programmes and rival jurisprudential projects were argued and then clashed 
against one another, with the purpose of producing meanings with authoritative and 
legitimate effects over the international trade law and governance of South-North 
regionalism. 
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A. The Genesis of the Controversy over International Economic Law: In the 
beginning was international law, and international law was with international 
lawyers, and international law was international lawyers… 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, the founding fathers of the emerging field of international 
economic law were the heirs of European legal traditions. The first lawyers interested in 
thinking about international regulation of economic affairs were German jurists who sought 
to extend to international law the same sort of jurisprudential debates about disciplinary 
demarcation, which was common among their domestic law peers. The foreground issue 
animating such dispute was to whether legal rules governing economic life should be 
studied as a new discipline due to its specialised subject-matter, or should be categorised 
and examined according to the traditional public-private and international-domestic law 
conceptualisation. Although these controversies might sound overly formalist or 
excessively detached from reality, they were not mere abstract speculations by legal 
academics locked up in their Ivory Towers. Instead, they were the embryonic 
manifestations of jurisprudential projects for global economic governance proposed by 
groups of lawyers, which were subject to disciplinary mechanisms for consensus-building 
within legal expertise. The emergence of two rival strands led up to a core set of legal 
questions, ideas and techniques that would shape the field of international economic law 
and governance for the next decades.  
Georg Schwarzenberger was a Jewish born in Germany who found refuge in 1934 
in the United Kingdom. As a professor at the University of London, he published as early as 
1942 his first piece in international economic law.500 Yet, it was his masterpiece of 1948, 
The Province and Standards of International Economic Law, that provides the still 
influential conceptualisation of the discipline.501 His formalist view emphasised the role of 
international law subjects in the process of lawmaking, while reinforced the centrality of 
legal sources for legal interpretation.502 At the outset, the central controversy was framed as 
to whether IEL is procedurally limited to the public aspect of international law that 
regulates inter-state economic relations or whether it also extends to domestic, or even 
transnational, law dealing with private business transactions.503 In summary, 
Schwarzenberger’s jurisprudential project purported to empower international economic 
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law by narrowing it to the formal rules and institutions created and employed only by 
sovereign states to regulate their economic interactions. Over the years, his pioneering and 
magisterial project sought to influence the construction and management of the postwar 
international economic order by advocating the existence of IEL as a specialised branch of 
international law.504  
In contrast to Schwarzenberger’s formalism, Georg Erler (1905-1981), a Nazi-
German law professor, developed an alternative project in his outstanding and also 
influential work Grundprobleme des Internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts of 1956.505 He 
argues that international economic law should not be limited only to public rules of 
international law, but should rather cover the bodies of law having a regulatory effect on 
cross-border economic transactions. A functionalist approach was employed to determine 
whether a rule or institution is valid and legitimate by assessing evidence of its force in 
constituting and shaping the ‘factual’ structure regulating international economic 
relations.506  
Erler’s move challenged the central role of ‘normative’ structure as the distinctive 
benchmark for a specialist branch of international laws. In other words, legal rules and 
institutions governing international economy were deemed to be created and shaped by an 
interconnected web of (state and non-state) actors and (private, transnational and public) 
sources of international law. His weak antiformalist perspective underscored the ‘object’ of 
international law in the law-creating process, while blurred the traditional distinctions 
between hard law and soft law, and between public and private, constraining legal 
interpretation. As a result, the central polemic was reframed as to how to maintain the unity 
of the discipline, given the difficulties to practically and intellectually control whether a 
certain rule is legal or non-legal or whether all the legal rules are normatively equal 
regardless their origin or content. Hence, Erler’s jurisprudential project consisted of 
strengthening the role of international economic law as the expert technique for governing 
world economy by expanding its material reach in order to regulate almost any economic 
affair having a tenuous international connection. 
By the 1950s, these two jurisprudential projects sowed the seeds that led to the 
formation of Schwarzenberger’s Formalist School and Erler’s Functionalist School. As I 
shall discuss below, their jurisprudential debate spread out across Europe, causing 
international legal practitioners and intellectuals to choose sides or reject the controversy 
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entirely. More importantly, this conflict shaped the emerging IEL field by framing in what 
was regarded as ‘acceptable’ concepts and histories, norms and regimes, ideas and practices 
while outflowing the rest as ‘unsuitable’. Over time, it has also influenced international 
lawyers’ legal doctrines of international trade law and governance and impacted ultimately 
their conceptualisations of and interactions with the GATT law of South-North regional 
trade agreements.507  
Despite their particular differences, the Formalist and Functionalist Schools seem to 
embrace the same transcendental premise, namely the sufficient uniqueness of international 
economic law. Building on the claim that IEL’s distinctive common features are self-
evident, their lawyers sought to establish disciplinary boundaries, separating the IEL field 
from the others, and also to increase its authority over international economic governance. 
Inside legal expertise, this involved undertaking concrete steps to assert the existence of the 
IEL field by rewriting its history and reshaping its professional identity and mission, while 
reorganising its disciplinary commitments, characteristic vocabulary, and differentiated 
styles of reasoning. Outside, the task consisted of promoting IEL norms, regimes, and 
doctrines as techniques of legal governance to be strategically deployed by lawyers to make 
and manage international economic affairs. 
 
B. The IEL Controversy in France: From the Disruptive Effects of Formalist 
Specialisation to Liberal-welfarist Programmes on International Law of 
South-North Trade Governance 
 
Before proceeding, it is important to explain why the French history of international law is 
particularly relevant for the analysis of South-North regional trade agreements (generally) 
and EU-South RTAs (in particular). As shall become clear in Chapter 7, France and its 
lawyers were the most interested and influential in shaping the RTAs concluded between 
the EU and developing countries in Africa and the Mediterranean.508 The main reasons for 
the French protagonist position are the following. The majority of the original African and 
Mediterranean states participating in RTAs were former French colonies. France, alongside 
with Belgium, was the primary advocate of establishing EU policies towards those 
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developing countries. France had built ‘special relations’ with them, which ranged from 
strong historical and cultural ties to considerable economic interests. As a consequence, the 
international law arrangements between the EU and the newly independent African and 
Mediterranean countries were initially modelled on the French law of overseas countries 
and territories, underlying the French Union and the French Community. Hence, 
considering the prominent role of France, I will use French lawyers as an entry-point to 
investigate the role of legal thinking and practice in the making of EU-South RTAs. 
The penetration of the jurisprudential controversy over international economic law 
in France led to a sophisticated debate among its most prestigious international lawyers, 
resulting in a deep disciplinary turmoil.509 It began with Paul Reuter’s (1911-1990) 
introduction of the formalist-functionalist quarrel over the IEL autonomy into the French 
international law community as early as 1952. The IEL controversy rapidly spread out, 
impacting the major French schools of international law adversely. Indeed, legal 
practitioners and intellectuals were called to support or reject the claim for the autonomy of 
international economic law. Their choice often indicated their allegiances to one of the two 
primary French schools of international law, the Voluntarist and Sociological Schools. 
Although both Schools had pledged their commitment to legal neo-positivism, the question 
about IEL pushed them towards two opposing directions.510 Whereas voluntarist lawyers 
rejected the IEL project by conceptually arguing that there were not enough distinctive 
empirical features to support a claim for disciplinary independence, their sociological peers 
defended the IEL project by employing interdisciplinary approaches to demonstrate 
empirically that the IEL’s unique characteristics justified its autonomy.  
The ramification of voluntarist and sociological positions was pervasive across the 
French legal community, profoundly affecting how lawyers conceived the international 
trade law and governance of South-North regional trade agreements.511 From a voluntarist 
viewpoint, international trade law was a sub-speciality of IEL devised to regulate trade 
affairs among First-World countries. Under liberal-welfarism, the GATT was regarded as 
the multilateral regime for trade cooperation among advanced capitalist-market economies, 
while the European Union was conceived of as a regional regime for economic integration 
of developed countries. Distinctively, international development law was conceptualised as 
another sub-speciality of IEL developed to discipline trade matters between First- and 
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Third-World countries.512 Under developmentalism, the UNCTAD was understood as the 
multilateral regime for trade cooperation between developed and developing countries, 
whilst South-North RTAs, such as Lomé Conventions and EU-Mediterranean Cooperation 
Agreements, were regional arrangements for First-World states assist Third-Word states to 
promote economic development.513 Thus, voluntarist lawyers defended the notion of duality 
in international economic law, through which two IEL bodies of concepts, histories, norms, 
regimes, ideas, and techniques were constructed and applied to govern two different kinds 
of trade interactions: North-North and North-South. More specifically, since South-North 
RTAs were deemed to be subject only to international development law, GATT Article 
XXIV should not apply to them. Instead, those trade agreements were constituted and 
regulated by the special and differential regime under GATT Part IV. 
Building on the idea of international economic law as autonomy expertise, the 
Sociological School reached very different understandings of international trade law and 
governance of South-North RTAs.514 Conceived as a branch of IEL, international trade law 
was imagined as a body of concepts, histories, rules, institutions, theories, and methods 
applicable to all trade affairs. The GATT was conceptualised both as an international 
organisation with universal vocation devised to preside over cross-border trade transactions 
and as a liberal-welfarist code to regulate trade relationships according to the ‘laws of the 
economy’.515 The European Union and the European Free Trade Association were 
understood as valid and legitimate exceptions to GATT’s core principles since their aim 
was to promote economic integration among regional trading partners.  
Conversely, sociological lawyers were very suspicious and resistant to accept any 
other institutional regime for multilateral trade cooperation.516 The rival multilateral trading 
systems were seen not only as ‘political’ programmes for the establishment of anti-GATT 
regimes but mainly as ideological attempts to implement artificial divisions of labour 
disassociated from the reality of international economic order. This perspective led the 
Sociological School to reject the institutional and universal character of the UNCTAD and 
the status of NIEO Declaration and Charter as formal, hard law. At the regional level, 
South-North regional trade agreements were deemed to be ‘impure’ forms of regional 
economic integration. This meant that the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions as well as the 
constellation of EU-Mediterranean Association, Trade and Cooperation Agreements, were 
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not perceived as GATT Article XXIX mechanisms for economic integration. Rather, they 
were understood as legal instruments for establishing ‘special’ or ‘exceptional’ regimes to 
promote preferential trade between developed and developing countries.517 
There were two main implications of the French projects to regional trade agreements 
between developed and developing countries.518 At the theoretical level, voluntarist and 
sociological visions appeared not to be directly contradictory: while the latter understood 
South-North regional trade agreements as exceptional regimes only justified by political 
compromises, which ultimately posed a threat to GATT law, the former conceived those 
trade agreements as special and differential regimes operating under the GATT governance. 
Despite their differences, both schools of international law shared the normative assumption 
that the GATT law and governance of South-North RTAs were not truly part of 
international trade law, but rather the legal instances of some sort of special, provisory 
regime grounded on exceptional rules and institutions, and justified by either political 
concessions (sociological vision) or economic inequality or underdevelopment (voluntarist 
vision). While sociological lawyers conceived these exceptional regimes as governed by the 
politically-sensitive province of international development law (in contrast to the 
economically-oriented domain of international economic law), the voluntarists understood 
them as distinct arrangements of international development law (which coexisted side-by-
side with international trade law under IEL). 
 
C. The IEL Controversy in Africa: From the Converging Effects of Antiformalist 
Universalisation to the Developmentalist Programmes on International Law of 
South-North Trade Governance  
 
The introduction of the IEL controversy into Africa seems to have provoked a converging, 
rather than divisive, effect over legal communities. The formalist-functionalist debate on 
the autonomy of international economic law did not find fertile soil to flourish in the post-
colonial context of African schools of international law. This does not mean that African 
lawyers were not interested in legal norms and regimes regulating the global economy. 
Nothing could be further from the truth. Very early after independence, European 
colonisation of Africa was understood as a two-prong approach.519 The colonial strategy 
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combined imperial manoeuvres to acquire political sovereignty over non-European 
territories with a mercantilist policy of economic subjugation and exploitation, which 
employed international law as a legitimising and authoritative mechanism. As a result, a 
consensus was early reached on the centrality of international economic matters to African 
countries, as well as on the desire to use international law and governance to manage and 
deal with them.  
The formation and consolidation of legal communities in Africa took place from the 
1950s until the end of 1970s.520 Lawyers were called to express their support to one of the 
jurisprudential projects for governing the international economy by joining one of the 
emerging African schools of international law. While a minority defended a radical breakup 
with the existing international economic order, the majority pledged their alliance to one of 
the reformist projects undertaken by the African Contributionist and Critical Schools. Each 
jurisprudential programme was grounded in a particular body of legal concepts, histories, 
rules, institutions, ideas and methods. The primary strategy of those leading schools 
consisted of employing identity (contributionism) and structural (critical) approaches, 
respectively, to engage international law in reclaiming and reconstructing the international 
economic order according to the needs and aspirations of the newly independent African 
states.  
The contributionist and critical projects produced pervasive consequences across 
African legal communities, deeply affecting how international trade law and governance of 
South-North regional trade agreements were thought and practised. Contributionists 
conceived international trade governance as a fragmented domain under the modern regime 
for peace and security inaugurated in the postwar era.521 The United Nations was 
understood as the legitimate authority presiding over international life (generally) and trade 
matters (in particular). Subject to the UN Charter, the GATT regime was perceived as the 
embodiment of the liberal-welfarist programme for multilateral trade cooperation, which 
was created by First-World countries according to their own values and operated for their 
own interests.522 By contrast, the UNCTAD regime reflected the developmentalist 
programme for trade cooperation constructed with the participation of developed and 
developing countries for the purpose of reforming international trade law rules and 
institutions. As a consequence, the UNCTAD was regarded as the embryonic institution for 
‘the’ future world trade and development organisation.  
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Contributionist lawyers understood international trade law as a speciality of IEL, 
which in turn was regarded as a branch of modern international law.523 GATT law was 
experienced as serving only the First World’s preferences, and so its legal norms tended to 
suffer from neo-imperialist or Anglocentric biases. Their rehabilitation would require a 
legal reform to adopt concepts, rules, and institutions already enshrined in the NIEO 
Declaration and Charter, as well as in other UN and UNCTAD resolutions.524 This reformist 
project implicitly challenged the European view that narrowed and equated the notion of 
international trade law to GATT law, while openly praised the UNCTAD law and NIEO 
Declaration and Charter as authoritative outcomes of legitimate, inter-civilizational 
lawmaking processes.  
Moreover, the emphasis on reclaiming IEL caused the contributionist project to 
disregard regimes and norms not involved in the Third World realities.525 More concretely, 
the EU and Comecon were overlooked as governance models for trade cooperation, because 
developing countries were not members. Interestingly, South-North RTAs, such as the 
Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions and EU-Mediterranean Cooperation Agreements, seemed 
to be of no great concern either. These regimes were, by contrast, regarded as valid and 
legitimate since developing countries did participate in their negotiation processes, and their 
official documents where compatible with the UN Charter. Thus, contributionist lawyers 
appeared to defend a reformist project for the construction of a ‘modern’ international trade 
law, which consisted of building a new international organisation and a universal set of 
fairer legal rules and institutions through the equal participation of developed and 
developing countries in their making. The ultimate purpose was to assist Third-World states 
to pursue their fully and egalitarian integration into a modern international economic order. 
The Critical School embraced the same normative commitments of denouncing and 
reforming classical international economic law and governance for their colonial complicity 
or origins.526 Likewise to the contributionist understanding, international trade law was 
regarded as a special domain of international (economic) law.527 Further, it rejected the 
reductionist notions promoted by European schools that equated it with either classical or 
liberal-welfarist international trade law.528 These First-World concepts were deemed to be 
behind the international law rules and institutions responsible for reproducing inequality 
and exploitation of the Third World, which in turn prevented these countries from 
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overcoming underdevelopment. Not surprisingly, the GATT was conceived of as a 
politically oligarchical and economically conservative regime for liberal-welfarist trade 
cooperation created by and for the benefit of developed countries. Similarly, the Comecon 
and European Union were understood as rival regional regimes for economic integration, 
equally designed on the same idea of governing trade matters within an economically and 
politically homogenous group of socialist or capitalist (both developed) countries, 
respectively.529 Since all the previous models assumed a certain degree of homogeneity 
among their members that led them to the adoption of the principle of formal equality, none 
of them was deemed to be applicable to the Third World, whose main feature was exactly 
its structural inequality caused by underdevelopment.  
Contrariwise, the UNCTAD was perceived by critical lawyers as the possible 
compromise achieved by developing and developed countries to jointly engage in 
correcting the severe deficiencies contained in norms and regimes of the international 
economic order.530 Indeed, the UNCTAD served as the institutional forum to negotiate the 
introduction of developmentalist policies, such as the GSP schemes and the differential and 
special treatment, into international trade law and governance. The aim of these policies 
was to compensate Third-World countries for the weakness of their economic structures 
aggravated by the deterioration of the terms of trade. Despite the importance of these 
reforms, the Critical School defended that the ultimate attempt to replace neo-imperialism 
by developmentalism would consist of adopting the NIEO Declaration and Charter, while 
the institutional transformation would require the merger of the GATT and the UNCTAD 
into a truly international trade organisation. In this context, South-North regional trade 
agreements, such as Lomé Conventions and EU-Mediterranean Cooperation Agreements, 
were perceived as special systems of trade preference, a regional version of the Generalised 
System of Preference, devised to assist the gradual replacement of the (neo-colonial) 
liberal-welfarist by a developmentalist regime for multilateral trade cooperation.531 
The Contributionist and Critical Schools shared some common visions of the GATT 
law and governance of South-North regional trade agreements, but also important 
differences. Both were committed to some version of developmentalism while rejecting the 
liberal-welfarist programme partially for not expressing an inter-civilizational compromise 
(contributionism) or entirely for embodying an imperialist system of economic exploration 
(critical). Doctrinally, they also overlooked the controversy over the autonomy of 
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international economic law, since both defended the unity of international law. Despite 
grounding their positions on different accounts of history, critical and contributionist 
lawyers offered comparable legal doctrines advocating the need for replacing the GATT 
law and governance by the UNCTAD or a new institutional regime.  
Those two African schools also disagree on central matters. Whereas the 
Contributionist School argued that the negotiations leading up to the GATT lacked the 
effective and equal participation of developing countries, the Critical School claimed that 
the GATT constituted a neo-colonial mechanism devised to maintain Third-World countries 
underdeveloped through their economic exploitation and trade dependence on First-World 
states. Finally, the Contributionist School did not engage with South-North RTAs, while the 
Critical School produced a sophisticated legal doctrine. For critical lawyers, the South-
North regional trade agreements were special systems of trade preference, which were 
constituted not pursuant to GATT law but under UNCTAD law since their purpose was to 
regulate trade affairs between developed and developing countries. Hence, like the GSP 
schemes under the UNCTAD, South-North RTAs were not regarded as subject to GATT 
law. 
 
D. International Law as Battleground: The Three Jurisprudential Visions of 
South-North Regional Trade Governance 
 
The previous sections chronicled the profound and multidimensional transformations that 
caused international law and governance to be recreated in the aftermath of World War II. 
These structural changes were critical in reshaping legal norms and regimes devised to 
regulate inter-state economic affairs. They were also significant in pushing the field of 
international law to review its body of knowledge and techniques and reorganise its 
intellectual and political affiliations. The demand for ideational, normative, and institutional 
renovations served as a call for jurisprudential renewal. Part of the process of reforming 
legal expertise (generally) and legal doctrines (in particular) required lawyers to rethink the 
past events and history lessons in light of a new age of international economic governance. 
Inside the field, legal practitioners and thinkers strove for legitimacy and authority to define 
which concepts, stories, rules, institutions, ideas and practices were regarded as part of 
international trade law and governance. The other part consisted of participating in a 
professional struggle to determine which form of expertise was legitimate and authoritative 
to be applied in and over the postwar international economic order. Outside the field, 
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lawyers sought to position themselves as experts capable of making sense of and managing 
both the reality of world trade and the emerging ideational programmes for governing it 
through the use of international law. 
The specific disputes over ‘the’ international law and governance of South-North 
regional trade agreements was enmeshed in the profound and pervasive process of 
disciplinary renovation. The task of renewing legal knowledge and techniques involved 
rewriting jurisprudential narratives with the purpose of transforming the field’s identity and 
mission, reorganising its intellectual and political commitments, and reviewing its 
characteristic vocabulary and differentiated styles of reasoning. This enterprise appears to 
have destabilised core aspects of disciplinary consensus causing a disruptive effect over 
legal expertise. More concretely, two central disputes arose out of that overhaul.532 On the 
one hand, the collapse of the liberal international economic order was followed up by the 
rise of postwar regimes of international economic governance. These alternative ways to 
organise inter-state economic relations called for a rethinking of contemporary legal rules 
and institutions. On the other hand, the final decay of the ‘classical’ notion of international 
law and the consolidation of the ‘social’ notion of legal thinking and practice as dominant 
in legal expertise pushed to the reconstruction of the legal vocabulary of projects, concepts, 
histories, ideas and methods.533  
From the outburst of the First World War until the end of the Second World War, 
the progressive disruption led to an expert dissensus opening to the possibility of normative, 
institutional, and doctrinal alternatives. These new rules, institutions and doctrines were 
produced by groups of international lawyers through the combination of the emerging 
(ideational, institutional, and jurisprudential) programmes for regulating international 
economy with the social vernacular of legal knowledge and technique. As I shall explain in 
this section, three jurisprudential visions of international trade law and governance South-
North regional trade regimes were built up from, and so partially reflected, those 
innovations carried out by the schools of international law.  
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1. The External Contenders to the Centrality of International Law in the 
Making of the Postwar International Economic Order  
 
Against this backdrop, the postwar jurisprudential projects had to resist assaults coming 
from inside and outside the field of international law. From outside, the jurisprudential 
programmes were confronted by rival disciplines, which were trying to assert their own 
intellectual and political influence over international economic order, notably economics 
and political science. The reality was that the non-legal experts who acted either as 
diplomats, governmental officials, policymakers, politicians or academics sought to employ 
their own body of knowledge and techniques to construct and operate international 
governance of inter-state economic affairs.534 In the battle of disciplines, the British John 
M. Keynes (1883-1946) and William Arthur Lewis (1915-1991), the American Walt W. 
Rostow (1916-2003) and Quincy Wright (1890-1970), the Canadian Jacob Viner (1892-
1970), the German-American Albert O. Hirschman (1915-2012) and Hans Morgenthau 
(1904-1980), the Estonian Ragnar Nurkse (1907-1959), and the Argentinian Raúl Prebisch 
(1901-1986) stood up for having provided projects, histories, theories, methods, and 
doctrines, which, with a variety of degrees, were chosen to (re)construct the postwar 
governance regimes of international economy. The United Nations, GATT, IMF, World 
Bank and UNCTAD are acknowledged as having been inspired, with varying degrees of 
influence, by their seminal works.535 In this context, the disciplinary debates over regional 
trade regimes flourished mainly in the policy-oriented domains.  
In a very brief summary, economics moved as early as the 1950s to organise a sub-
speciality focused on what it named economic integration. The pioneering study of Jacob 
Viner on the welfare consequences of customs unions aimed at challenging the 
conventional wisdom of the economics profession grounded in David Ricardo’s theory of 
comparative advantage.536 The classical view conceived RTAs as beneficial to their partners 
and non-partners alike, to the extent that they produced similar economic gains to the 
multilateral trading system. In his classical work, Viner not only contested this optimistic 
assumption but also offered a static theory of the effects of CUs’ common external policy 
on non-partners, which later was extended to all kinds of RTAs. The central question was 
refined as: would a country benefit from joining a regional trade arrangement? For Viner, 
                                                   
534 See generally D.W. Kennedy (1994a), Weiler (2001), Howse (2002), and Charnovitz (2014). 
535 Okano-Heijmans, 2011: 10, Cypher and Dietz, 2009: 73-103, Meier, 2005: 15-40. 
536 See generally Viner (1950), Tovias (1994), Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), Gilpin (2009: chapter 
13). 
  
221 
RTAs, as distinct regimes from the GATT, could harm both an RTA-partner and the world 
welfare.537 The formation of the EU in 1957 and EFTA in 1960 gave a more direct policy 
dimension to the economics of regional integration, leading to important theoretical 
insights. Therefore, from the 1940s to 1970s, ‘the best and brightest’ in the field joined the 
project of the making of economics powerful expertise to justify or challenge the co-
existence of the GATT and regional trade regimes.538  
Distinct from economics, political scientists produced a broader set of questions, 
concepts, history lessons, theories and methods, to study regional economic integration. 
They tended to fix their attention on the problems arising from the relationship between the 
institutional solutions to economic regionalism and the non-economic challenges posed by 
wars and international political instability.539 The starting point was to rethink the 
traditional doctrines on sovereignty and nationalism so as to undermine the exclusiveness of 
sovereign states while strengthening the political integration perspectives. From the early 
postwar period on, the political science projects for governance of regional trade regimes 
were influenced by five theories: federalism, functionalism, neofunctionalism, 
neoinstitutionalism, intergovernmentalism, and realism.540  
Those political science theories shared some basic assumptions and one central 
argument.541 First, economic regionalism was understood as a voluntary and comprehensive 
phenomenon that emerged in Western European integration projects in the late 1940s and 
subsequently spread out. Consequently, those theories suffered from a profound 
Eurocentrism. Second, economic integration was deemed to be either a process through 
which economic decision-making is handed to a new supra-national entity dependent on 
distinct, progressive steps; or, a stage whereby sovereign states transfer parts or all of their 
economic power over to a supra-national body. Third, states were assumed to be the main 
drivers of economic integration. Fourth, the primary focus was on the processes of formal 
                                                   
537 For details of Viner’s static theory of regional trade agreements, see section 2.C.1.  
538 From the 1950s to the end of 1970s, classical studies on the economics of RTAs were produced by, 
among other, the Canadian Richard Lipsey, Harry Johnson (1923-1977) and Robert Mundell, the 
Australian Kelvin Lancaster (1924-1999), the Austrian Gottfried Haberler (1900-1995), the British James 
Meade (1907-1995), the Dutch Jan Tinbergen (1903-1994), the Swedish Gunnar Myrdal (1898-1987), the 
Hungarian Béla Balassa (1928-1991), and the Indian-American Jagdish Bhagwati (Bhagwati and 
Panagariya, 1996: 82-83; Baldwin, 2008: 5-12, 2012: 633-634; Gilpin, 2009: 346-358; Briceño Ruiz, 
2017).  
539 Gilpin, 2009: 348-347.  
540 From the 1950s to the end of 1970s, four distinct projects for economic integration were developed by, 
among other, the Italian Altiero Spinelli (1907-1986) and Ernesto Rossi (1987-1967), the German-
American Ernst Haas (1924-2003), the Romanian-British David Mitrany (1888-1975), the Czech Karl 
Deutsch (1912-1992), the French-American Stanley Hoffmann (1928-2015), and the American Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph Nye (Gilpin, 2009: 346-347; Söderbaum, 2016: 20-26).  
541 Gilpin, 2009: 346-347; Mansfield and Milner, 1997: 5-6; Söderbaum, 2016: 20-26.  
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institution-building at the regional level. Grounded in this theoretical background, political 
scientists often concluded that economic integration led by states through institutionalised 
regimes increased the welfare of trading partners and so the willingness to jointly solve 
international problems. Therefore, political science projects tended to apologetically 
perceive regional trade regimes as a benevolent phenomenon of economic integration. 
 
2. To Be, or Not to Be, That Is the Question of International Economic Law: a 
Professional and Intellectual Controversy over the Field of International Law 
 
From inside the field of international law, the jurisprudential projects on international 
economic law were widely challenged on distinct grounds: from ontological controversies 
about the existence of international economic law to epistemological debates about the 
identification of IEL norms and regimes, to methodological issues of lawmaking and 
interpretation, to normative arguments about the general purpose of institutional regimes or 
specific goals of legal rules, and to ideational claims to IEL functions and effects. More 
specifically, the clashes between jurisprudential projects took place at the moment of 
framing and answering key questions about the international law and governance of South-
North regional trade regimes: is there an autonomous field of international economic law to 
deal with above issues? Who has the authority and legitimacy to determine which projects, 
concepts, histories, ideas, practices, rules, institutions, and doctrines are part of the 
international law of economy? How is (or should be) an inter-state trade governed by 
international law? Should trading partners be legally differentiated due to their economic 
inequality, development stage, or bargaining power? Is there a need for a special regime to 
regulate trade between developed and developing countries? Which legal norms, regimes, 
and doctrines apply to the international law and governance of South-North regionalism? 
The above set of queries might be initially viewed as foregrounding too abstract and 
theoretical debates about international economic law (generally) and the international law 
and governance of South-North RTAs (specifically). However, these controversies veiled a 
very concrete conflict for authority and resources inside and outside the field of 
international law. The disciplinary renewal affected, and perhaps concealed, the political 
struggle to reshape the professional hierarchy of the legal community. After the Second 
World War, the dominance of European lawyers over the field was progressively weakened 
not only by their American and Soviet peers recently empowered by the military victory but 
also by the legal practitioners and intellectuals from the Third World who were in pursuit of 
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authority and legitimacy in a postcolonial world. The four decades following the Bretton 
Woods Conference of 1944 were marked by the moment where IEL norms and regimes 
were still in the making, which opened the opportunity for lawyers to seek to exercise 
influence over their formative and interpretative processes.  
As it became soon clear, they sought to secure formal positions of authority not only 
in academia but also at foreign affairs ministries, domestic and international courts and 
organisations for economic affairs. In this process, legal doctrines were constructed to assert 
authority over bodies of rules and institutions employed to govern international economic 
transactions. Not surprisingly, there was intellectual and political resistance coming from 
different fronts in a variety of forms and arguments. Therefore, the effective reception, 
selection, adaption and rejection of legal doctrines were dependent not only on their own 
constitutive features and technical merits but also on the distinct historical contexts where 
they were brought into being.  
From the ashes of World War II, the field of international law experienced a quick 
ascendency. Lawyers tended to imagine themselves as being part of a transnational legal 
community, which was constituted by a consensual agreement on a set of historical facts, 
professional ethos, disciplinary vernacular, and differentiated styles of thinking and 
reasoning. They believed that legal expertise empowered them with legitimate and 
authoritative knowledge and techniques to participate in the reconstruction and management 
of the international economic order.542 They perceived themselves as a profession 
committed to using their legal doctrines to the betterment of humanity through the 
realisation of the liberal-welfarist programme for global governance of economic 
interdependency. Specifically, this consisted of using international law in the making and 
interpretation of multilateral and regional regimes for trade cooperation. 
However, this European imaginary began to fade quickly after the Bretton Woods 
Conference. The rival ideational programmes that promised a fairer and more just world 
economy were received, rejected or contested by lawyers and then merged with legal ideas 
and techniques into the jurisprudential projects for governing international economic 
affairs.543 This imaginative process led them to push the transformation of legal norms, 
regimes and doctrines, as well as ideas and practices towards distinct directions. In fact, 
from 1947 to 1985 the legal community witnessed the rise and fall of a wide variety of 
schools of international law, some of them sought to use their jurisprudential projects to 
produce and renovate legal doctrines so as to be applied in the reconstruction of 
                                                   
542 Carreau et al, 1980: 14, 27-29, 35-40; Nguyen et al, 1999: 895-900, 946-947. 
543 See section 5.A. 
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international economic law and governance. The combination of legal innovation and 
disputes over authority generated, or gave more emphasis to, ambivalent positions and 
contradictory responses within the field of international law. Consequently, the legal 
profession, which was generally dominated by a hierarchical organisation, conservative 
attitudes and path-dependence thinking (that tended to narrow the range and moderate the 
volatility of disciplinary experimentation and political initiatives) contributed, consciously 
or otherwise, to wide the horizons of possibility for the emergence, dissemination and 
reception of novel legal norms, institutions and doctrines. 
More concretely, the IEL controversy over the autonomy of international economic 
law symbolises a core battlefield for authority and resources in and over the international 
economic order.544 This debate provided a frame where projects, history lessons, and ideas 
clashed and disputes over norms, regimes, and doctrines were decided. On the one hand, it 
communicated the fundamental differences between these theories, practices, rules, 
institutions, and doctrines. On the other hand, it expressed the conflicts arising from 
political positions and intellectual allegiances. Sections 6.B and 6.C demonstrate the ways 
in which the French and African schools of international law sought to shape international 
economic law and governance by influencing legal decision-making.545 This took the form 
of disciplinary struggles to embed their jurisprudential projects into legal doctrines that 
would, in turn, be employed to craft and interpret IEL rules and institutions.  
In France, the schools of international law pledged their allegiance to legal neo-
positivism; nonetheless, they diverged on the issue of the autonomy of international 
economic law.546 The Sociological School advocated that structural changes of legal norms 
and regimes caused IEL to become an autonomous domain. The sociological strategy was 
to increase its influence by forcing a disciplinary rupture on the grounds of the 
specialisation of IEL. This maneuverer was frontally opposed by the Voluntarist School, 
which not only rejected the specialisation argument but also claimed IEL was nothing more 
than a sub-domain of public international law. The voluntarist position was implicitly 
supported by the African schools, which denied any process of disciplinary 
dedifferentiation. Despite their rejection of legal positivism, the Contributionist and Critical 
Schools shared the view of international economic law as a sub-province of (modern) 
international law.547 
                                                   
544 See section 6.A. 
545 See sections 6.B and 6.C. 
546 Jouannet, 2006: 309; Nguyen et al, 1999: 895-896; Carreau, Flory and Rochère, 1968: 554; Carreau et 
al, 1980: 3-15, 27-28. See also Weil, 1972; Tietje et al, 2006: 21-22. 
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This disciplinary controversy yielded powerful effects over international law and 
governance of international economy. As I shall examine right below but also return to this 
debate later on, it is not difficult to imagine the far-reaching and profound consequences 
that would have entailed over the field of international law if the sociological view had 
prevailed at that time. First and foremost, the sociological project would have caused a 
rupture of the ideal of legal community leading up to a deep disciplinary crisis. Remember 
that the field was already under great pressure due to the shift of authority and resources 
away from the European centres and towards the new hegemons (the US and USSR) and 
the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa. These historical events were gradually 
reshaping the transnational division of legal labour while deteriorating the Eurocentric 
identity and mission of the field. The claim to IEL independence would increase the stress 
over the legal community, to the extent that it expressed the aspiration to create not only a 
theoretical and doctrinal demarcation but also a new field constituted by a distinct identity 
and mission. 
Second, the potential impact of the sociological project was highly indeterminate, 
since it might have caused authority and resources to be redistributed in large-scale 
entailing adverse effects over international economic law. Intra-field, legal expertise 
(generally) and doctrines (in particular) would have been scrutinised to determine whether 
they fit into a much narrower terrain of IEL. Sociological lawyers would have enjoyed the 
authority and legitimacy to select which legal doctrines met their definition of IEL, while 
all other schools would have had to adapt their projects, concepts, ideas and practices to a 
sociological view of IEL. Extra-discipline, the sociological programme might have led IEL 
expertise to be even more marginalised by other disciplines or accepted and empowered to 
control legal decision-making in international economic governance.  
In the latter case, it would have not only reduced the universe of legal norms and 
regimes qualified as IEL but also constrained the range of legal doctrines regarded as 
authoritative and legitimate. More specifically, the sociological claim was grounded on a 
particular variation of the liberal-welfarist notion of international economic law. If any legal 
rule, institution or doctrine had fallen outside the specific variation of such ideational 
programme, it would have been excluded from the IEL domain and subjected to the ‘other’ 
provinces of (public or private) international law. Conversely, if it had met the definition, it 
would have been governed by an autonomous field whose narrow, and likely more 
coherent, set of ideas and practices were inspired by one perspective of liberal-welfarism 
and determined by a smaller group of influential, mostly European, lawyers. Hence, lawyers 
who did not share the sociological project previously would have been required to accept a 
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new vocabulary of concepts, histories, theories, methods, norms and institutions in order to 
construct valid and legitimate legal doctrines.  
The above counterfactual scenario might seem to be at first sight unnecessary or 
speculative. Despite the sociological attempts, the legal community never embraced its 
programme. The consequence was that from 1947 until 1985 the field of international 
economic law was not brought into being. This means that lawyers conceived, made and 
interpreted IEL norms and institutions through international law expertise and its legal 
doctrines. The relevance of the above hypothesis is to point out that where the Sociological 
School failed in the 1960s and 1970s, the Anglo-American functionalism succeeded in the 
1980s and 1990s. The purpose of the functionalist project was also to break up IEL from 
public international law. Sections 1.C and 3.B.2 briefly tell the jurisprudential story of the 
disciplinary schism leading up to the formation of the field of international economic law in 
the 1980s. 
All in all, the IEL controversy and the rejection of the sociological project generated 
a disciplinary inflexion allowing the schools of international law to foster and advocate 
their own jurisprudential projects within a much wider disciplinary boundary. These 
programmes were used to strengthen the field’s identity and mission as well as to shape 
legal knowledge and techniques. Part of expert work was to embed them into legal 
doctrines to be employed to (re)construct, operate and challenge international law and 
governance of trade affairs. After the establishment of the GATT, lawyers tried to build a 
consensus around common expertise for governing inter-state trade relations through 
international law.  
However, this effort was not successful since jurisprudential projects, produced by 
schools of international law located in different settings, did not share enough fundamental 
commonalities. For instance, they disagreed on how to produce and what would constitute a 
fairer and more just world trading system. Their visions of how to regulate regional trade 
regimes also diverged substantially.548 Furthermore, each school of international law aimed 
at introducing changes in legal expertise and proposing very distinct, sometimes even 
radically disruptive, legal doctrines to reshape IEL norms and regimes. The result was a 
fertile period of experimentalism within the field of international law, which interacted with 
the fragmentation of the international trade governance into three multilateral regimes for 
trade cooperation.549 
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3. The Game of Telling Histories of International Law of South-North Trade 
Governance 
 
The previous section’s brief historical account and analysis of the (actual and potential) 
impact of the IEL controversy on the field of international law provide the entry-point to 
historicise the disciplinary battles fought by French and African schools over international 
trade law. It also offers a way to examine in more details how jurisprudential projects were 
constructed and strategically used by schools of international law in their pursuit to shape 
legal expertise and influence, in turn, international economic law. As I shall examine below, 
once the core controversy over the identity and mission of the field of international law was 
contingently tamed, the jurisprudential disputes spread out across other battlefields. In the 
pursuit for realising their jurisprudential projects, international lawyers engaged in the 
reconstruction of legal histories, theories, and doctrines of international trade law and 
governance. 
The African and French schools seemed to accept the importance of certain 
historical landmarks as responsible for the formation and consolidation of postwar 
international economic law. They shared the understanding of which some traumatic events 
contributed decisively to the failure of the liberal trading system and also to the outburst of 
World War II.550 The basic history teaching was the need to constrain sovereign discretion 
from freely adopting protectionist and discriminatory policies and engaging in competitive 
predatory behaviour at the international level. To ensure international peace and security, 
the United Nations was established as part of the postwar consensus on the progressive 
institutionalisation of inter-state relations. This shared agreement also provided the creation 
of UN specialised agencies be necessary to assist with the reconstruction of national 
economies and prevent international economic factors from threatening the new UN regime. 
Thus, worldwide lawyers embraced a common view that the best solution to govern world 
trade was through international law and organisations.  
The similarities as to jurisprudential storyline stopped at this point. The schools of 
international law diverged significantly in their interpretation of key events. These 
divergent understandings of the past led to conflicting lessons, which, in turn, affected 
jurisprudential projects. As I will demonstrate, contradictory history teachings were 
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embodied into legal doctrines entailing a divisive effect over postwar diplomatic 
deliberations, trade policies and institutional outcomes.  
The French schools shared a linear, progressive story of institutional and normative 
evolution. For them, the liberal trading system – which had been a successful private-
ordering regime – collapsed during the interwar period due to its lack of adequate legal 
protections. To solve this problem, it should be replaced by a public-institutional (and so 
not contractual) regime for international trade. Grounded in these lessons, French lawyers 
conceived the establishment of a UN specialised agency as the ideal mechanism for 
restoring international trade flows and regulating them according to a body of international 
law rules and institutions.551 However, with the failure of the ITO Charter, the GATT 
became progressively acknowledged as the embodiment of postwar international trade law 
and governance. Particularly, GATT law represented the formalisation of a delicate balance 
between the two extremes of the liberal-welfarist programme. Hence, the French 
jurisprudential projects were committed to (some variety of) liberal-welfarism, whereas 
rejecting socialism and developmentalism, either for not being universally applicable to all 
countries (voluntarist vision) 552, or for being political-constructs divorced from economic 
order (sociological vision) 553.  
Despite that common understanding, the institutional and ideational transformations 
carried out by inter-state affairs led the French schools to diverge in their jurisprudential 
visions.554 While the Sociological School conceived international trade law as a ‘branch’ of 
IEL, and so only subject to IEL self-contained discipline555, the Voluntarist School defined 
international trade law was a ‘sub-speciality’ of IEL, and so subject to the entire province of 
public international law556. Moreover, the Sociological School claimed that GATT law was 
the only institutional regime and normative order scientifically devised to govern world 
trade through international law due to its economically-neutral character.557 By contrast, the 
Voluntarist School argued that all competing systems of international trade were the 
outcome of political decisions of states and, hence, the socialist and developmentalist 
regimes for multilateral trade cooperation were equally and validly governed by 
international law despite their lack of universal vocation.558  
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The African schools neither shared the history lessons with the French schools nor 
agreed on their conclusions about postwar international trade law and governance. The 
Contributionist School offered a historical narrative of the linear evolution of international 
trade law. This gradual evolvement was drastically interrupted by a single anomalous event: 
the colonial system of exploitation imposed upon non-European territories and communities 
in Africa.559 The Critical School did not support such progressive view, espousing, instead, 
a historically determinist notion of international trade law as the superstructure reflection of 
economic basis.560 Despite these differences, the African schools reached a similar 
conclusion. In direct contrast to the Western imagination, the liberal trading system was not 
regarded as a virtuous international trade regime. African lawyers did not agree it was 
enough to fix it through institutionalisation and legal improvements in order to constrain 
state discretion over trade policies while liberalising transnational trade flows. Rather, the 
liberal trade regime was understood as the enemy to be defeated. Its ideational commitment, 
normative order, and institutional arrangements were perceived as devised to perpetuate the 
same mechanisms of economic exploitation and political dominance of the Third World by 
the First World that were in force before the World Wars. In other words, slave trade and 
colonialism were regarded as regimes constituted and regulated by international trade law 
and operated under the liberal trading system.  
Since the liberal-welfarist GATT was widely acknowledged as the augmented heir 
of the liberal trading system, both African schools rejected it as a legitimate regime for 
governing trade affairs with developing countries. The Contributionist School partially 
refused the liberal-welfarist programme for not embracing an inter-civilizational agenda. 
This would require GATT to be open for reform to ensure effective and equal participation 
of developing countries in the making and interpretation of international trade law.561 The 
Critical School denied any support to the GATT since liberal-welfarism was seen as an 
ideational programme grounded in a neo-imperialist strategy for supporting the economic 
exploitation of Third-World countries.562  
Both African schools reached an implicit agreement on developmentalism as the 
legitimate programme to foster the values and interests of developing countries. Each of 
them committed to some strand of developmentalism.563 The UNCTAD was widely 
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560 Bedjaoui, 1979: 66, 98-99, 104-105; Gutto, 1987: 275, Umozurike, 1979:x, 9-10, 85, 108; 1993: 12-
13, Gathii, 2008: 338-340. 
561 Elias, 1992: 25-28. 
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accepted as the institutional alternative brought into being by the Third World with the 
purpose of establishing a new model of governance for international trade. The 
developmentalist regime for multilateral trade cooperation was regarded by them as a 
progressive mechanism devised to prevent and counterweight neo-imperialist policies and 
arrangements, on the one hand, and to fairly regulate international trade affairs, on the other 
hand. More specifically, UNCTAD law was understood as a body of international trade law 
rules and institutions created to implement the developmentalist programme in the form of 
GSP schemes, special and differential policies and the New International Economic Order.  
The conflicting narratives about the jurisprudential storyline were tactically used to 
prevent any school from building a consensus around history lessons that would give 
authority or legitimacy to a particular programme for global trade governance. The 
controversies over the jurisprudential story caused deep transformations not only to styles 
of history-telling but also to the meanings of history teachings and, to some extent, to the 
field’s identity and mission. The traditional approach to legal history was dominant in 
France and disputed in Africa, where Critical lawyers rejected it. Despite its relative 
preponderance, the traditional style did not assure that history lessons were similarly 
extracted or understood. The ideational and jurisprudential rivalries infused great 
divergence into legal expertise. The consequence was that, from the 1940s until the 1980s, 
rival programmes and divergent historical accounts were produced and entrenched into 
legal doctrines, with the aim of (re)conceptualising and (re)constructing international trade 
law and governance. 
 
4. Bricolaging Liberal-welfarism and Developmentalism into International 
Law of South-North Trade Governance 
 
The most influential ideational programmes for international trade governance in the First 
and Third World were gradually embedded into international trade law. The receptions of 
liberal-welfarism and, later, developmentalism by international lawyers were not 
frictionless or unilateral. The efforts to ‘renew’ legal expertise encountered a challenging 
task of introducing these postwar projects while handling both the declining collection of 
Eurocentric programmes and the increasing fragmentation of disciplinary authority across 
state borders. It was not enough to convince legal practitioners and intellectual of the merits 
of liberal-welfarism and developmentalism. To effectively shape legal mindset, these 
ideational programmes had to be introduced by merging them with jurisprudential projects. 
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Therefore, in the decades following the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, the liberal-
welfarist and developmentalist programmes impinged structural changes on international 
trade law and governance. They displaced liberalism from the heart of legal expertise, 
without, however, building a consensus on a single ideational programme. They also 
supported the emergence of a new generation of jurisprudential projects, which reformed or 
rejected the existing interwar programmes. This process of ideational and jurisprudential 
bricolage was deeply affected by political alliances and intellectual commitments 
undertaken both inside and outside the field of international law. The result was a period in 
which international trade law and governance faced intense normative, theoretical and 
doctrinal reform, renovation and experimentation. 
By the end of the 1940s, not only the liberal programme but also ‘classical’ 
jurisprudential projects were in steady decline in Europe and elsewhere. Prominent 
blueprints, such as Hans Kelsen’s legal formalism, Hersch Lauterpacht’s natural law, and 
Georges Scelle’s sociologism, were either marginalised or reviewed under the pressure of 
emerging ideational and jurisprudential projects.564 In the continuous process of building 
disciplinary consensus, the field of international law narrowed and organised the 
ambivalences and contradictions generated by liberal-welfarism and developmentalism. 
Each school of international law was called to employ legal expertise to resist to or merge 
these ideational programmes with their jurisprudential projects. This involved reworking 
their goals and preoccupations, concepts and histories, knowledge and techniques. 
Therefore, the reception of liberal-welfarism and developmentalism in France and Africa 
varied significantly, and so their influence over jurisprudential programmes (generally) and 
their respective legal doctrines (in particular). 
If liberal-welfarism and developmentalism constituted the ends of an axis, the 
French and African schools would be situated in different places. The Critical and 
Sociological Schools would be found themselves at the opposing extremes.565 Closer to the 
liberal-welfarist end, the sociological lawyers argued that the GATT was the institutional 
expression of a natural world trade order, and so it should be protected and improved to 
produce global welfare. By contrast, the Critical School, which was closer to the 
developmentalist end, defended that the GATT as the epiphenomenal reflection of a 
historically-determined international economic system devised to support the economic 
exploitation of developing countries, and so it should be dismantled and replaced by the 
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UNCTAD. Around the centre, the (liberal-welfarist leaning) Voluntarist School and the 
(developmentalist leaning) Contributionist School took more moderate positions that 
espoused forms of mutual coexistence between distinct international trading systems.566 
Both accepted that the GATT and the UNCTAD were created and regulated by public 
international law to express the consent of states according to their own ideational 
preferences.  
Those profound disagreements on the nature and purpose of the multilateral trading 
systems produced disruptive effects that impacted the field of international law. The 
ideational rivalries and jurisprudential radicalisation became real threats to the profession 
itself. They were, nonetheless, moderated and constrained by legal expertise. Disciplinary 
mechanisms and a relatively stable vocabulary of legal concepts, ideas and, practices 
enabled the expression of the goals, similarities, and differences of each programme, but 
also constrained the range of possibilities for creating, transforming, and contesting legal 
rules, institutions, and doctrines. The consequence was to make their coexistence 
governable within the boundaries of international trade law.  
The strategy to manage these conflicting programmes under international trade law 
was to translate their, more or less, contradictory goals into legal doctrines. More 
specifically, their programmatic objectives were reconceptualised as ‘mandates’ or 
‘principles’ attributed to or ‘functions’ of legal norms or regimes. This doctrinal 
rationalisation involved two main steps. 
The first move was to deal with the inherent contradictions of each ideational 
programme. As examined above567, liberal-welfarism was built upon a compromise 
between the liberal aspiration for a multilateral system for non-discriminatory and 
reciprocal trade relations and the welfarist call for national intervention in economic and 
social spaces. Distinctively, developmentalism was constructed on a compromise between 
the aspiration for a fairer and more just multilateral system for preferential trade (inter-
)dependence, and the desire for economic emancipation through state intervention. Hence, 
liberal-welfarism and developmentalism posed a great challenge to the debate about the 
raison d’être of each regime for multilateral trade cooperation, the GATT and UNCTAD.  
The field of international law was very skilful in dealing with the internal 
contradictions of those ideational programmes. Lawyers used the century-surviving 
contradiction of international law to craft legal doctrines capable of accommodating 
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conflicting purposes of the ideational blueprints. Legal vocabulary and reasoning made use 
of the individualist and communitarian character of international law to tactically translate 
those contradictory ideational goals into the disciplinary issue ‘what is the nature and 
purpose of international trade law and governance?’. Different from an open-ended 
ideational question, a legal issue could be addressed through doctrinal analysis. 
Since legal expertise has never reached a consensus on whether the ultimate source 
of authority of international trade law rests on ‘state consent’ and ‘international society’, 
lawyers used these jurisprudential ambiguities to reconstruct the ideational goals through 
legal doctrines. Liberal-welfarism was reimagined as GATT law centred on the tension 
between a ‘communitarian ideal of non-discriminatory and reciprocal free trade’ and ‘a 
sovereign ideal of domestic socioeconomic intervention’. Conversely, developmentalism 
was rethought as UNCTAD law centred on the tension between a ‘communitarian ideal of 
fairer and more just (inter-)dependent trade’ and a ‘sovereign ideal of emancipatory 
socioeconomic intervention’.  
The management of these tensions inherent to the GATT and UNCTAD demanded 
continuous doctrinal work to craft, interpret and apply their legal rules and institutions in 
accordance with those two sets of contradictory (legal) mandates or functions. Indeed, the 
schools of international law aimed precisily to control the processes of creating, validating, 
and legitimising legal doctrines. 
Jurisprudential projects were conceived as a strategy to empower a preferable set of 
legal concepts, histories, ideas, methods, norms and regimes by arguing it was the outcome 
of rigorous, scientific analysis. For instance, the Sociological and Contributionist Schools 
emphasised the communitarian aspect of their programmes by advocating for the 
importance of either ‘liberal, non-discrimination’ rules or ‘dependent, preferential 
integration’ rules, respectively.568 By contrast, the voluntarist and critical lawyers 
highlighted the individualist facet of their programmes throughout the defence of either 
‘welfarist, socioeconomic intervention’ rules or ‘emancipatory, socioeconomic 
intervention’ rules, respectively.569  
The second move undertaken by international lawyers was to deal with the 
existence of two antithetic, and mutually exclusive, ideational programmes embodied into 
the rivals, GATT and UNCTAD. To avoid the clash between these two multilateral trade 
regimes with universalising aspiration, the matters of direct conflict were rationalised, with 
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varying degrees of nuance, by doctrinal analysis as a set of legal issues, which could be 
mitigated or resolved through international trade law. Each jurisprudential project crafted 
legal doctrines on distinct models for governing world trade under an international 
economic order marked by institutional and normative fragmentation. The French and 
African schools agreed that any international regime for trade cooperation had to find the 
source of its formal authority and legitimacy in the United Nations. Nonetheless, the 
specific ways they conceived and handled the interplay between rival multilateral trading 
systems were contingent on their legal doctrines. 
The Sociological School conceived Article 3 of the UN Charter as the legal 
foundation of the international legal economic order. It seemed to admit “la nouvelle 
division internationale du travail,” and the existence of three regimes.570 Yet, this 
fragmentation was seen as transitory, since only the GATT, as the heir of the liberal trading 
system held a universal character due to its economic nature, while the UNCTAD was a 
politically-contingent regime. Consequently, the conflict between GATT and UNCTAD 
law was only apparent, to the extent that GATT law was the formalisation of international 
trade law, whereas UNCTAD law was international development ‘law’, which was 
‘political’ rather than ‘scientific’ in nature and so it was not part of international economic 
law.  
The Critical School provided a distinct legal doctrine.571 The UN Charter was 
conceived not only as having a constitutional character but also as embodying the postwar 
communitarian principles of justice and social progress. Conversely, the GATT symbolised 
the institutionalised and enhanced version of the liberal trading system, which was 
developed to reproduce the exploitation of the Third World. The UNCTAD was created as a 
developmentalist trading system to rival the liberal-welfarist regime. The consequence was 
a world trade order fragmented into multilateral trade regimes under the presidency of the 
United Nations. GATT and UNCTAD laws were both regarded as international (trade) law, 
each crafted to regulate trade affairs between states with distinct status and qualities. The 
two regimes were inherently contradictory; however, they could coexist provisionally, 
through special provisions such as the GATT Enabling Clause and the UNCTAD GSP 
schemes, until one of them be dismantled by economic forces. Critical lawyers argued, thus, 
that the normative and institutional fragmentation was an exceptional phenomenon that 
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could be anticipatively fixed by merging the GATT with the UNCTAD into a new 
international trade organisation.572  
By emphasising the role of state consent as the central source of international trade 
law, the voluntarist and contributionist Schools shared an understanding in which partial 
trading systems could coexist simultaneously so far they were consistent with the UN 
Charter.573 Indeed, UN law and governance functioned to ensure political and economic 
coexistence not only between countries but also between (rival trade) regimes. The main 
differences between these jurisprudential projects were regarded with their views on the 
ultimate goal and nature of international trade law. For voluntarist lawyers, the GATT and 
UNCTAD transposed into international economic law a factual duality reflecting countries’ 
distinct trade preferences and levels of economic development.574 The GATT was regarded 
as a multilateral trading system created by international trade law to regulate transactions 
among developed countries, whereas the UNCTAD was a trading system established under 
international development law to discipline trade relations between developed and 
developing countries. By contrast, the Contributionist School sought to promote effective 
and equal participation of developing countries by arguing that the universal quality of any 
norm or regime of international (economic) law was only achieved through an inter-
civilizational process of lawmaking.575 In other words, GATT and UNCTAD laws were 
both regarded as non-universal international trade laws. Hence, the contributionist proposal 
consisted of replacing both of them with a world trade and development organisation. 
The debate concerning the ‘nature’ and ‘functions’ of GATT and UNCTAD laws 
produced profound consequences in legal expertise. It seemed to be uncontroversial that 
GATT law was (part of) international trade law; however, there was no agreement on the 
extension of its jurisdiction. Distinctively, UNCTAD law was deemed to be (part of) 
international economic law by all but the Sociological School.576 Nonetheless, the 
Voluntarist School distinguished it as international development law from international 
trade law577, while the African schools conceived it as international trade law.  
Those legal controversies and doctrines were not merely intellectual exercises. 
Rather, they were the manifestation of a deep and pervasive struggle for authority and 
resources inside and outside the field of international law. By claiming that UNCTAD law 
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was not international trade law, the French schools sought to exclude developed countries 
from the jurisdiction of developmentalist-inspired legal norms and regimes by ‘naming’ 
them as a distinct ‘branch’ of international (economic) law only applicable to developing 
countries. Moreover, their legitimacy and validity were also constrained by tactically 
imposing legal qualifications upon them. For instance, UNCTAD rules and institutions 
were regarded as ‘economically unsound’ and ‘politically opportunistic’ (sociologism), or 
‘temporary’ instruments to assist developing countries to ‘catch-up’ with developed 
countries (voluntarism).578 Hence, the French schools argued that the ‘natural’ 
(sociologism) or ‘normal’ (voluntarism) international trade law was established under the 
GATT due to its universal and permanent qualities. 
The African schools also played the doctrinal game of ‘naming in’ and ‘framing 
out’. They counter-argued their French peers by claiming that, since GATT law was created 
by and for First-World countries, its norms either resulted from an illegitimate and unequal 
lawmaking process (contributionism) or constituted an authoritarian and conservative 
mechanism of economic exploitation of Third World economies (critical).579 The GATT 
was conceived as being either a specific body of international trade law rules and 
institutions applicable only to its contracting-parties, or ‘the’ law of international trade, in 
which case it lacked universality and permanency. Conversely, UNCTAD law was 
effectively and equally negotiated, constructed, and implemented by both developing and 
developed countries, with the purpose of establishing a fairer and more just world trading 
system. The limitation of its mandate was due to the refusal of developed countries to 
regulate trade affairs between themselves through UNCTAD law. Hence, the African 
schools argued that both GATT and UNCTAD laws were equally part of a universal body 
of international (trade) law, although only the former is universally applicable. 
Looking back, it seems that to engage with international trade law was to implicate 
oneself in contested ‘grand visions’ about how to govern world trade. From the 1940s 
onwards, the continuous efforts to merge ideational programmes with jurisprudential 
projects through the production, validation and legitimation of legal histories, theories and 
doctrines caused deeply transformation in the field of international law. The above analysis 
suggests that embedding liberal-welfarism and developmentalism into international trade 
law and governance was a complex endeavour that required considerable political and 
intellectual investments from international lawyers. This task was partly related to the 
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formation of ‘formalist’, ‘voluntarist’, ‘sociologist’, ‘contributionist’, ‘critical’ or other 
jurisprudential projects that aimed to (re)construct, reform, maintain or manage the postwar 
world trading system through international law. The other part concerned the international 
division of legal labour. These new jurisprudential blueprints were produced in Western 
Europe and also in other First-World countries and the Third World. However, their 
validation and legitimation were subject to an unequal distribution of authority and 
resources within legal expertise, which affected their credibility and persuasiveness in 
global trade governance. As I will show in Chapter 7, the influence of each legal doctrine 
over decision-making in multilateral and regional regimes for trade cooperation was 
dependent on both social and material conditions and the work of lawyers inside and 
outside the field.  
 
5. The Jurisprudential Visions of the International Law of South-North 
Regional Trade Governance  
 
Against this backdrop, international lawyers were called to turn their attention and apply 
their legal expertise to the law and governance of regional trade relations between 
developed and developing countries. Regardless of their differences, they sought to expand 
their jurisprudential projects to frame in South-North trade affairs. This involved 
developing and using concepts, histories, ideas, and methods to make of ‘regional’ 
governance of South-North trade a subject-matter of ‘international’ law. In this sense, legal 
doctrines already applied to international trading systems were adapted to regional trade 
regimes with minor alterations. This suggests that the above debates over the existence of 
IEL, the nature of international trade law and governance, and the role and functions of the 
GATT and the UNCTAD, were, consciously or unconsciously, incorporated into the ways 
of thinking and practising ‘the’ international law of South-North regional trade governance. 
The choice or rejection of each feature of doctrinal frameworks was made by schools of 
international law and justified on their jurisprudential projects. This intra-disciplinary 
process produced specific legal doctrines to understand, conceive, and argue about regional 
trade regimes between developed and developing countries. If these doctrinal frameworks 
were accepted as authoritative and legitimate in global trade governance, then they could be 
used in the making and interpretation of South-North regional trade agreements. This 
section focuses on the construction of the three jurisprudential visions that were at the heart 
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of the legal doctrines on the international law and governance of South-North regionalism 
between 1947 and 1985.  
The French and African schools did not produce coherent or homogenous literature 
on the topic. In the four decades following the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, their 
jurisprudential visions could be described as highly experimental and inconsistent, since 
lawyers tried to conceive South-North regional trade regimes in light of their preferred 
ideational and jurisprudential projects. It seems that all schools agreed that regional trade 
agreements were international law treaties pursuant to Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. 
However, they mostly diverged on all the other matters.  
For instance, voluntarist lawyers understand South-North trade relations as 
commercial transactions between capitalist economies in different stages of economic 
development.580 Two parallel and equal in dignity models of trade governance coexisted at 
the time. On the one hand, the liberal-welfarist model inspired the creation of the GATT at 
the multilateral level and the EU and EFTA at the regional level. These regimes were 
constituted and regulated by international trade law with the aim of promoting the economic 
integration among their members. On the other hand, the developmentalist model was used 
to construct the UNCTAD at the multilateral level and GSP schemes and South-North 
RTAs at the regional level. Specifically, South-North regional trade agreements were 
created and governed by international development law, with the purpose of assisting 
developing countries to ‘catch-up’ with developed economies.  
Grounded in the voluntarist project, what I call a reformist vision of the 
international trade law of South-North regional governance emerged.581 It was founded on 
the idea that South-North RTAs were legal regimes devised for promoting the economic 
development of developing countries and not economic integration among (equal) 
developed countries (as the EU and EFTA). The implication was that GATT law was found 
not suitable to govern South-North RTAs, since Article XXIV was devised to regulate 
regimes for economic integration. For this reason, voluntarist lawyers welcomed the 
introduction of Part IV as an important step towards adapting the GATT to the needs, 
interests, and values of the Third World. The consequence was to regard South-North RTAs 
as subjects not to the rigid and formalist ‘rules’ of international trade law embodied in 
Article XXIV but rather to the flexible and purposeful ‘standards’ of international 
development law under Part IV. Put differently, South-North RTAs and Part IV were 
understood as international development law regimes and norms (respectively) consistent 
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with the welfare aspect of the GATT regime. However, the voluntarist assumptions 
underlying the reformist vision entailed two apparently unintended consequences. First, 
they reaffirmed the notions of temporality, speciality and hierarchy into international 
economic law, to the extent that the South-North regional trade regimes were defined as 
‘temporary’ mechanisms created by a ‘special’ body of ‘non-universal’ (and so inferior) 
IEL rules and institutions to help countries overcome their underdevelopment. Second, their 
aim to realise developmentalist policies through GATT law seemed to be disfigured by the 
attempt to reconcile them with the dominant liberal-welfarist policies for economic 
development.  
The Sociological School developed a distinct understanding of South-North 
regional trade regimes. They were conceived as international treaties devised to establish 
and regulate trade preferences between states.582 Two key implications followed from this 
conceptualisation. First, South-North RTAs were constituted and governed by international 
trade law rather than international development law. The consequence was that, in contrast 
to the GSP and other schemes under the UNCTAD, they were fully subject to the 
disciplines of GATT Article XXIV. Second, South-North RTAs were regarded as neither 
mechanisms for economic integration nor instruments to implement developmentalist 
policies or any rule or institution of the NIEO Declaration or Charter. Instead, they were 
preferential trading systems under liberal-welfarist governance. Specifically, they were 
understood as legal instruments that expressed not a communitarian desire to promote 
economic interdependence or integration. Rather, they reflected the selfish, interests of 
states that tactically resorted to GATT exceptions to profit from preferential arrangements, 
which, despite their legal validity, were contrary to the core principle of non-discrimination. 
Thus, the sociological project nurtured an apologetic vision of the GATT as the guardian of 
a natural economic order, under which South-North RTAs should be rigorously controlled 
by Article XXIV, and ideally phased out.  
While the French schools mutually agreed on to subject the South-North regional 
trade agreements to GATT law on different grounds, their African peers ignored the GATT 
disciplines altogether. In fact, the Contributionist School was silent on the role of 
international law in the making and governance of South-North regional trade regimes. 
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to infer from the contributionist literature that these RTAs 
would only be regarded as valid and legitimate if they met two conditions: they had to be 
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constituted and regulated by international (trade) law, and result from equal and fair 
negotiations between developed and developing countries.583  
Distinctively, the Critical School engaged extensively with South-North regional 
trade regimes.584 They were initially conceived of as legal arrangements created by 
international (trade) law for the aim of perpetuating the exploitation of developing countries 
by the First World. However, the rise of the Third World caused their transformation into 
‘special regimes’ of trade preference (in contrast to the Generalised System of Preference) 
capable of promoting contradictory goals depending on the contingent outcome of trade 
negotiations. Indeed, multilateral and regional renegotiations tried to shift the authority over 
these special regimes from the GATT to UNCTAD. The consequence was that South-North 
RTAs became hybrid instruments that combined legal rules and institutions devised to 
promote two sets of inconsistent objectives.  
Inspired by developmentalism, part of the policies of South-North RTAs aimed to 
promote cooperative (inter)dependency and emancipatory development. Inspired by liberal-
welfarism, the other part sought to advance free trade and socioeconomic policies. Put 
differently, both the provisions of South-North RTAs and the norms of international law 
applicable to them reflected the sometimes harmonious, and sometimes conflictive, 
interactions between liberal-welfarism and developmentalism (generally) and between 
different jurisprudential projects (in particular). Taking this amalgam of ideational and 
jurisprudential blueprints, critical lawyers advocated a utopian vision that defended the 
continuous reconstruction of South-North regional trade regimes in order to shift their core 
function from liberal-welfarist instruments of economic exploitation and dependency to 
developmentalist mechanisms of economic development and emancipation. 
In light of the above, some conclusions can be reached. First, the schools of 
international law produced three jurisprudential visions of the international law and 
governance of South-North regional trade regimes with varying degrees of sophistication. 
Second, these distinct perspectives were reasonably consistent with the above-examined 
jurisprudential projects with some minor changes. Third, they all seem to agree that South-
North regional trade agreements were constituted and regulated by ‘some kind of’ 
international law, despite the lack of consensus on the specific ‘field’ or ‘branch’. Fourth, 
they also reveal that both these RTAs were highly contested ideational, institutional and 
normative regimes. In this sense, I argue that it would be misleading to use the term ‘legal 
concepts’ to refer to the jurisprudential attempts to define South-North regional trade 
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regimes, to the extent that they would imply that their definitions held a much higher level 
of homogeneity and technical refinement. I prefer, instead, to employ the less value-laden 
term ‘jurisprudential visions’ to the outcome of French and African efforts to conceptualise 
South-North RTAs.  
Furthermore, the widespread disagreement across the schools seems to have slowed 
the formation of a disciplinary consensus around legal doctrines on the international law 
and governance of South-North regional trade regimes. In Chapter 7, I will suggest that 
three legal doctrines reached a sufficient level of authority and legitimacy inside and 
outside the field of international law to be used in the making and interpretation of South-
North regional trade agreements. Their continuous struggles for supremacy produced two 
consequences. On the one hand, the lack of agreement on the constitute features inhibited 
the development of more sophisticated legal doctrines. On the other hand, the disputes 
prevented legal doctrines from entailing effects of power, such as naturalisation and 
reification, over legal expertise. I believe that these were the causes that allowed lawyers to 
engage in attempts to (re)conceptualise, (re)imagine, and (re)construct the international 
trade law and governance of South-North regionalism. Therefore, from 1947 to 1985 the 
field of international law witnessed the rise and consolidation of at least three 
jurisprudential visions, each of them offering a distinct understanding of the relationship 
between GATT law and the South-North regional trade agreements. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I started off this chapter by returning to my critique of the traditional style of telling the 
jurisprudential history of the international trade law of South-North regional trade regimes. 
Drawing from the analysis in section 3.B, I argue that (contemporary) conventional 
narratives tend to strategically obfuscate or forget jurisprudential projects that played a 
prominent role in the past, but might pose a challenge to the dominance of present-day legal 
doctrine. The implication of these accounts of the jurisprudential storyline has been to 
single out or marginalise projects on the grounds of they are old (and non-applicable) relic 
of or non-part of WTO law. Put differently, any history lesson, jurisprudential programme 
or vision that might cast doubt on, or suggest a reconstruction or reinterpretation, of the 
legal doctrine on the WTO law and governance of South-North regionalism, is often 
regarded as outdated, invalid, illegitimate, or distrustful to the present-day field of 
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international economic law. This chapter breaks up this disciplinary grip by retelling the 
jurisprudential story through the official documents and canonical writings produced in the 
aftermath of World War II. Specifically, it intends to recover the histories, projects, ideas, 
and techniques used by lawyers in the (re)reconstruction of the postwar jurisprudence of 
international trade law. 
As examined in Chapter 1, the jurisprudential story provided in (current) 
mainstream literature accounts only for the Anglo-American schools of international law. It 
suggests that other fields of expertise dominated multilateral and regional domains of trade 
governance until the 1980s due to the vices of formalism and the virtuous of functionalism. 
As the traditional history unfolds, functionalist lawyers are praised as the heroes who 
reworked legal expertise (generally) and the legal doctrine on the GATT law of RTAs (in 
particular) in order to reclaim the authority and legitimacy of international law in global 
trade governance. By looking backwards, the debates between Anglo-American strands of 
formalism and functionalism are regarded as the drivers for today’s jurisprudential projects. 
This justifies not only the almost exclusive focus on the Anglo-American contribution to 
the jurisprudence of the international trade law and governance of South-North regional 
trade agreements, but also the lack of reference to other jurisprudential programmes in 
current mainstream literature. The traditional history entails, therefore, a powerful effect 
over the contemporary field of international economic law, which not only reinforces the 
dominant legal doctrine but also imposes a grip over legal imagination by preventing the 
(now heterodox) past from challenging or contributing to contemporary debates. 
The richness and variety of jurisprudential stories, projects, and visions examined in 
this chapter are often received by the contemporary field of international economic law with 
surprise. The suggestion that international trade law and governance, as well as multilateral 
and regional regimes for trade cooperation were highly disputed legal concepts in the 
aftermath of World War II is suspicious to most lawyers who were trained to accept their 
European origins and Anglo-American reformation. This chapter demonstrates that the 
orthodox frame of how international trade law is (or should be) thought and practised today 
is very distinct from the context of jurisprudential competition and innovation that prevailed 
between 1947 and 1985. The postwar dissensus prevented disciplinary effects from limiting 
legal imagination. In practice, lawyers were enlisted in the formation of, and also in the 
infighting between, schools of international law with the view of supporting or contesting 
the autonomous existence of international economic law. This controversy eventually failed 
in bringing the anew IEL field into being. Nonetheless, it did succeed in inaugurating a long 
period of jurisprudential renovation of international trade law. 
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Against this backdrop, legal communities located in different national jurisdictions 
and institutional settings were involved in the process of jurisprudential reconstructions. 
Four relevant projects for international trade law came out of France and Africa. 
Voluntarism and sociologism were creations of French lawyers who sought to reconcile 
specific strands of legal neo-positivism with the liberal-welfarist programme, bearing in 
mind the constraints of the Cold War. Distinctively, the contributionist and critical projects 
were developed by the schools of international law that emerged in the post-colonial 
countries of Africa. Their aim was to rethink the European-centric jurisprudence of 
international (trade) law in light of developmentalism and decolonisation.  
Grounded in these jurisprudential programmes, lawyers selected (or rejected) events 
and actors, rules and institutions, theories and methods to be combined into divergent 
historical narratives, from which teachings were extracted. These conflicting lessons were 
then merged into a wide variety of competing legal doctrines of international trade law. Out 
of this moment of creative destruction, three visions emerged from the French and African 
jurisprudence holding significant legitimacy and authority. The reformist, apologetic and 
utopian visions provided three ways to historicise and conceive South-North regional trade 
regimes as legal phenomena, and how they relate to international law (generally) and to the 
GATT and the UNCTAD (in particular). Their ultimate purpose was to influence decision-
making in and over the GATT law and governance of South-North regionalism. 
Notwithstanding, it is important to reaffirm that I am not claiming that every 
project, vision, or doctrine produced in France and Africa from 1947 until 1985 managed to 
obtain legitimacy and authority inside and outside the field of international law. My claim is 
much more modest. I argue that only three jurisprudential visions were successfully 
developed, disseminated and gathered validity and acceptance. The degree of relevance of 
each vision shall become even more evident in the next Chapter, in which I analyse how 
they were employed in the formation and application of legal doctrines on the GATT law 
and governance of South-North regional trade regimes. 
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CHAPTER 7.  THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW DOCTRINES: THE LEGAL GOVERNANCE OF 
THE EU-AFRICA REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the rise and fall of one legal doctrine on the international law and 
governance of regional trade regimes between developed and developing countries. 
Specifically, it shows how lawyers engaged international law in the creation and operation 
of regional trade agreements between the European Union and the newly independent 
African states from 1947 to 1985. I conclude by arguing that the Yaoundé and Lomé 
Conventions were negotiated, designed, and interpreted based partially on a doctrinal 
framework, which was distinct from legal doctrines underlying other RTAs. 
In the aftermath of World War II, lawyers were under intellectual and political 
pressure to reinvent international law in order to respond to the new demands and 
challenges posed by the (re)construction of the international economic order. Part of their 
task was to rethink legal rules and institutions and apply them to support the initial effort to 
institutionalise international trade governance. The failure to secure a general agreement on 
a universal body of positive norms was followed up by the rapid fragmentation of world 
trade in regimes for multilateral and regional cooperation. Chapter 5 provides an account of 
the participation of lawyers in that attempt to re-make the institutional architecture of the 
international trading system. Drawing from these and other international experiments, four 
(relatively coherent) institutional models of governance were developed through the 
negotiations and management of regional trade agreements. 
The other part of lawyers’ endeavour was to reimagine legal expertise, with the aim 
of reforming or creating a new vernacular of concepts, histories, ideas, and techniques to 
deal with the wide variety of changes and needs arising mainly from the establishment and 
management of rival multilateral trading systems. Chapter 6 historicises the impact of the 
ideational and political polarisation of South-North trade relations between the liberal-
welfarist GATT and the developmentalist UNCTAD on the process of jurisprudential 
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renovation. Due to the chiefly importance of French and African lawyers in the making of 
South-North RTAs, it accounts for their most relevant jurisprudential projects. Three 
(relatively coherent) visions emerged, providing a reformist, apologetic and utopian way to 
conceive of and engage with South-North regional trade regimes as international law 
phenomena. 
In light of the above historical accounts, I intend to approach the participation of 
international law and lawyers in the making and interpretation of South-North regional 
trade regimes through the socio-legal notion of legal doctrine. As discussed in Chapter 4, 
legal doctrines are conceived of as expert techniques devised for using international law to 
influence decision-making in and over multilateral and regional trading systems. They are 
conceived as coherent and stable frameworks of positive and non-positive norms and 
concepts, projects and histories, visions and models, ideas and methods, that serve as a 
mode of legal governance. They are used to frame interests and conflicts as legal issues, and 
articulate legal rules and institutions into a set of valid and legitimate claims about, and 
solutions to, critical questions concerning the legal governance of South-North regionalism. 
For example, they provide answers to questions about the origins, nature and functions of 
South-North RTAs, and how they are, and should be, constituted and regulated and for 
which ends. In this sense, legal doctrines create South-North RTAs as legal phenomena 
under international law.  
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and examine the constitutive features and 
account for the formation and participation of one particular legal doctrine that historically 
played a critical role in the formation and management of South-North regional trade 
regimes. Based on the combination of the historical analysis of Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 and 
an exploratory investigation of primary and secondary sources, I have identified what seem 
to be three distinct legal doctrines that were successful in gathering authority and legitimacy 
to govern lawmaking and interpretation of South-North RTAs between 1947 and 1985. 
Taking into consideration their aspirational goals and legal mandates, I have provisionally 
named them Law and Integration Doctrine, Law and Trade Cooperation Doctrine, and Law 
and Development Cooperation Doctrine. 
At the most general level, my central hypothesis is that the period between 1947 and 
1985 opened a window for legal re-imagination aimed at building a new international 
trading system. Against conventional wisdom that portrays the decades following the 
establishment of the GATT as ‘lost’ for international law, I claim that this period did not 
suffer from any professional ‘apathy’, intellectual ‘lethargy’, or legal ‘underdevelopment’. 
Rather, this epoch was marked by ‘energetic’ and ‘rich’ normative and institutional 
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experiments. International law shaped and was shaped by the fragmentation of world trade 
order driven by profound disagreements on its forms of governance and ultimate purposes. 
From the Anglo-American proposal for a liberal-welfarist trading system under the 
International Trade Organisation, the four decades following World War II witnessed the 
establishment of the GATT, Comecon, and UNCTAD to support the liberal-welfarist, 
socialist, and developmentalist regimes for multilateral trade cooperation (respectively), and 
the formation of a constellation of plurilateral, regional, and bilateral trade agreements. 
Despite their differences, all these arrangements were brought into being by and 
administered through international law. To understand the participation of lawyers in this 
experimental moment of international trade law and governance, I suggest approaching the 
construction and management of that complex environment characterised by multilevel and 
overlapping trade regimes, and also in solving disputes over their normative and 
institutional architecture by focusing on the role of legal doctrines as modes of legal 
governance. 
My point is perhaps best captured by the continuous interactions between legal 
practitioners and thinkers from different jurisdictions engaged in persuading, bargaining, or 
imposing legal rules and institutions into South-North regional trade regimes that reflect 
their countries’ trade policies and preferences. This means that the field of international law 
was at the centre stage of political and intellectual battles for the core set of ideational, 
institutional, and jurisprudential features that would serve to govern legal decision-making 
in and over regional trade. Put differently, the account of disciplinary struggles for shaping 
a doctrinal framework is relevant, because the constitutive elements of a legal doctrine are 
ultimately articulated to influence the making and legal interpretation of the South-North 
regional trade agreements.  
This understanding leads us to conceive RTAs between developed and developing 
countries not as a singular, or uniform, legal phenomenon expressing a series of 
institutional and jurisprudential events marching gradually towards perfection. Instead, it 
helps us to think of South-North RTAs as resulting historically from heterogeneous 
beginnings, and divergent paths that continuously intersected, overlapped and were 
reconfigured through doctrinal conflicts. The awareness of the greater and richer plurality 
of concepts and norms, ideas and practices embedded into the 1947-1985 RTAs compel us 
to question the relationship between their constitutive features and how legal doctrines were 
produced and employed to them. Indeed, this postulate calls for an examination of the 
encounters and practices of Northern and Southern lawyers (generally), and of their French 
and African peers (in particular), as a step to foreground the reasons for the success of 
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some, but not other, legal doctrines in gathering authority and legitimacy. This analysis 
suggests that the existence of competing legal doctrines and processes of differentiation, 
domination, and disruption inside and outside legal expertise were implicated in the 
differences and variation among South-North RTAs. This politics of legal doctrines 
empowered and constrained lawyers’ ability and imagination in constructing and managing 
South-North RTAs.  
The implication of my hypothesis is three-fold. Legal doctrines are understood as 
particular expert modes of international trade law and governance. As such, they enable and 
direct divergent legal avenues for trade regimes between developed and developing 
countries. Further, legal doctrines reveal that South-North RTAs are not naturally biased 
against developing countries. Rather, the controversies over RTAs are subject to continuous 
interactions – negotiations, persuasions, or dominations – to which lawyers strategically 
employ legal doctrines to give legitimacy and authority to their arguments or instruments. 
This means that not only Southern and Northern lawyers struggle to shape trade agreements 
through lawmaking and interpretation, but also that there is a limit to the effects of legal 
doctrines vis-à-vis other expert modes of governance and the political and economic 
conditions.  
Therefore, my general proposition is that those three legal doctrines were the 
winners of political and intellectual disputes inside the field of international law and outside 
the GATT governance of South-North regionalism. This chapter aims to test, partially, this 
postulate by providing a full account of the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine, 
the doctrinal framework underlying the EU-Africa regional trade regimes. 
 
A. Legal Doctrines and the South-North Regional Trade Agreements  
 
For the purpose of this chapter, I examined the 28 South-North regional trade agreements 
concluded and notified to the GATT between 1947 and 1985.585 My general purpose was to 
understand the role of international law and lawyers in the making and interpretation of 
these South-North RTAs. My study focused on the interplay of the three dimensions 
underlying international trade law: (a) legally binding texts, (b) doctrinal arguments and 
practices of international lawyers, and (c) the politics of the GATT governance. 
Specifically, I sought to determine whether, and to what extent, particular legal doctrines 
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shaped, and were moulded, throughout the negotiations, management, and contestation of 
those RTAs.  
The examination of all South-North RTAs revealed the existence of particular 
patterns. First, the European Union was the most active GATT-developed, contracting-party 
engaged in negotiating and concluding RTAs with developing countries. The EU was a 
partner to 23 out of the 28 South-North RTAs, while Finland and Australia figured as the 
developed-party in 4 and 1 RTAs, respectively. Second, from 1947 to 1985 the EU was in 
its formative and consolidating years, yet it managed to aggregate substantive economic and 
political resources. Third, the RTAs concluded between the EU and very distinct 
developing countries were relatively heterogeneous. Nonetheless, some of them shared 
similar characteristics, which allowed me to classify these RTAs according to three 
different ‘archetypes’. Conversely, the other 5 non-EU-South RTAs held features that 
closely resembled one of the EU-South groups, and so received the same classification. 
Hence, I tentatively labelled each archetypical group as: economic integration RTAs, trade 
cooperation RTAs, and development cooperation RTAs. 
Drawing from my preliminary analysis, my hypothesis is that each of those different 
archetypes of EU-South RTAs was grounded in one distinct legal doctrine. These legal 
doctrines were constructed by lawyers throughout their practical and intellectual 
experiences in negotiating, drafting, and, interpreting those RTAs. They operated as modes 
of legal governance, to the extent that they structured how each party could pursue its 
interests through legitimate and authoritative arguments of international trade law. Each of 
these suggested legal doctrines was characterised by a distinguished combination of 
constitutive features that can be apprehended and understood through their ideational, 
institutional, and jurisprudential dimensions. Therefore, I have named the three legal 
doctrines as Law and Economic Integration Doctrine, Law and Trade Cooperation Doctrine, 
and Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine. These terms were coined to reflect their 
‘legal nature’ and ‘archetype’.  
In the following sections, I provide evidence to prove partially my hypothesis. I 
carry out an in-depth analysis of primary and secondary sources related to the South-North 
RTAs that can be hypothetically classified as instances of the same archetype. Specifically, 
I inquire into the Yaoundé Conventions and the Lomé Conventions I and II, in order to 
demonstrate the existence and operation of the Law and Development Cooperation 
Doctrine. My examination is organised in two stages. First, I examine the history and texts 
of those EU-Africa RTAs. Second, I describe the legal doctrine underlying these RTAs. 
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A number of caveats are necessary. The focus of my study is on the construction 
and application of legal doctrines to produce, manage and contest regional trade regimes 
between developed and developing countries within the context of GATT. This goal entails 
two direct implications. First, the role of international law and lawyers are foregrounded, 
and hence treating other aspects less comprehensively. Second, the analysis does not 
address (i) RTAs concluded among contracting-parties but not submitted to the GATT, (ii) 
RTAs that fall outside of the GATT mandate, such as commodities and textiles agreements, 
and (iii) RTAs whose parties are either exclusively developed countries (North-North 
RTAs) or solely developing countries (South-South RTAs). The circumscribed scope of this 
chapter does not preclude the possibility, however, that its discussions and arguments have 
relevance outside the immediate context.  
Moreover, I am aware that choosing to provide an in-depth analysis of 
representatives of only one of the three legal doctrines, which I claim to have existed and 
operated as legal modes of trade governance, has evident limitations. The most relevant 
consequence is to limit not only my findings’ generalisation but also to leave part of my 
claim to the existence of three legal doctrines incomplete. Nonetheless, the need to narrow 
the examination to the EU-African South RTAs and their underlying Law and Development 
Cooperation Doctrine is due to material, technical, and time constraints. These research 
design and approach are also open to additional criticisms. The analysis of relations 
between the EU and the African bloc may be regarded as not giving sufficient recognition 
to each individual Sub-Saharan countries, such as Nigeria or Cameroon. However, this lack 
of individual level of analysis is the necessary and unavoidable price to be paid for 
providing a broader perspective of legal doctrines operating in EU-Africa RTAs.  
Finally, this chapter is not intended to be normative, insofar as this implies any 
argument for or against any South-North RTAs, their archetypes, or legal doctrines. My aim 
is to provide an account and critique of, rather than advocate for, one legal doctrine 
underlying South-North regional trade agreements concluded between 1947 and 1985. 
 
B. Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine: Legal Governance of the EU-
Africa Trade Regime 
 
The postwar period caused profound transformations to the relationship between developed 
and developing countries. This chapter examines the evolution of economic affairs between 
Western European and African countries under the liberal-welfarist trade governance 
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centred on the GATT. It inquires into the establishment and management of a regional 
regime of trade cooperation between the European Union and a group of post-colonial 
African states through international law. Specifically, it analyses the way lawyers were 
involved in the formation, operation, and contestation of EU-Africa RTAs.  
My argument is that the role of legal expertise (generally) and a legal doctrine 
(particularly) in the making and interpretation of EU-Africa RTAs has been overlooked by 
contemporary literature. This section aims to fill that gap by showing that a particular legal 
doctrine was deeply implicated in the re-invention of regional trade between a ‘post-
imperial’ Europe and a ‘newly independent’ Africa. This legal doctrine was developed 
through the ‘dual-work’ of lawyers. On the one hand, they participated in the production of 
a doctrinal framework to understand and argue about the international trade law and 
governance of regional trade regime between the EU and African countries inside the field 
of international economic law. On the other hand, they engaged in the doctrinal practice 
involved in the negotiation, craft, and interpretation of EU-Africa regional trade 
agreements. More concretely, the Conventions of Yaoundé and Lomé were landmark 
international law treaties, to the extent that they were the legal expression of a distinct 
archetype of regional regimes for South-North trade governance, which was significantly 
conceived and operated by the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine. 
As explained in Chapter 4, legal doctrines are composed of constitutive features, 
each of them is articulated to hold a specific relation with the others, so as to lend particular 
meanings to norms and regimes of international trade law. The core elements are deeply 
entangled in doctrinal frameworks; nonetheless, they can be intellectually organised in three 
domains: ideational, institutional, and jurisprudential. By disentangling these spheres, this 
section seeks to reveal how each domain continuously interacted as part of the Law and 
Development Cooperation Doctrine with the Yaoundé and Lomé regimes.  
To better explain those reciprocal relations, I will address three central questions. 
Firstly, what were the ideational programmes of political economy (generally) and their 
regional projects for economic development (particularly) on which the EU-Africa regional 
trade regimes were inspired by? Secondly, what were the institutional programmes that 
provided valid and legitimate models of trade governance for constituting the EU-Africa 
trade regionalism? Thirdly, which concepts and histories, theories and methods, norms and 
institutions were regarded as legally valid and legitimate to be part of the jurisprudential 
vocabulary underscoring the international trade law of the EU-Africa RTAs? Thus, the 
purpose is to understand the existing range of possibilities offered by the Law and 
Development Cooperation Doctrines, and to compare it to the choices made and 
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justifications presented in the course of the construction and interpretation of the Yaoundé 
and Lomé Conventions. 
In the remainder of this section, I analyse the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions with 
the aim of explaining how they relate to the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine. It 
is not a simple task to inquire into the role of international law and lawyers in the politically 
sensitive, economically complex, and legally revolutionary processes of transformation that 
the relationship between Europe and Africa underwent from the outburst of World War II 
onwards. The core of these changes related to the need of both regions to reinvent 
themselves. While European imperial powers had to reconstruct themselves as liberal-
welfarist states under the leadership of the United States’ Marshall Plan and the GATT, 
African colonies had to reborn as newly independent countries in a world dominated by the 
East-West and the South-North divides. Thus, the challenge is to unveil how these historical 
transformations were perceived by and often required reactions from the field of 
international law. My strategy is to start off by providing a brief account of the evolvement 
of the EU-Africa trade regionalism between 1947 and 1985. This involves historicising the 
formation, replacement, and development of regional trade arrangements underlying the 
legal governance of EU-Africa trade affairs.  
 
1. A Brief History of Legal Governance of the EU-Africa Trade Regime: From 
Colonialism to Union to Preference to Association and Back Again 
 
The origins of EU-Africa ‘trade’ relations have been a controversial topic. Some scholars 
claim that their roots go back to the late 1950s until the early 1970s, while others trace them 
even further back to the colonial legacy of the 19th century, or perhaps the 15th century.586 
The purpose of this section is to examine the role of legal doctrines in the formation and 
development of EU-Africa regional trade regimes under the GATT between 1947 and 1985. 
For this reason, the starting point of my analysis lies in the landmark events leading up to 
World War II. 
 
  
                                                   
586 Montana, 2003: 71-72. 
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(a) The French Empire, Union, and Community (1884-1960) 
 
In the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, Africa was partitioned into British, French, 
German, Belgium, and Portuguese colonies.587 During this era, the pattern of trade between 
European empires and their African, and also Caribbean and Pacific, colonies became 
characterised by the imperial ruling. This integrated Euro-African-Caribbean-Pacific system 
was constituted by international law rules and institutions, which provided that goods from 
the imperial metropole were admitted in the colonies, while colonial goods were exported to 
the former duty-free. After the Second World War, the imperial systems came progressively 
to an end due to the weakening position of European empires and the increasing pressures 
of the Cold War superpowers, the anti-colonial United States and the anti-imperial Soviet 
Union. 
Against this background, France was unwilling to denounce its former colonies, 
except for Indochina, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. In 1946, the French Empire was 
recast as the French Union588, a legal regime authorised under GATT Article 1:2 exemption. 
It was devised to allow colonies to move towards self-government while retaining 
connections with France.589 In 1958, the French Union became the French Community590, 
under which colonies were authorised to establish internal self-government, but still subject 
to some control in matters related to trade policy and defence. From the creation of the 
French Union to the end of French Community, the economic importance of colonies for 
France was in decline. Nonetheless, it was politically inconceivable for France to ‘abandon’ 
its colonies since they both were regarded as forming a single cultural unity. 
 
(b) The Treaty of Rome (1957-1963) 
 
The French imperial system began to change rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s due to the 
foundation of the European Economic Community and the decolonisation process led by 
the United Nations. Throughout the negotiations leading up to the establishment of the 
EEC, France tried to convince its new European partners that, by broadening the scope of 
association to include some of their colonies, the future EU would benefit from trading with 
                                                   
587 Ibid.; Lister, 1988: 18. 
588 Milward, 2005: 80-84; Lister, 1997: 61-62. 
589 Lynch, 1997: 166; Montana, 2003: 71-72. 
590 Lister, 1988: 6-9; 1997: 61-62; Milward, 2005: 80-84; Garavini, 2012: 48. 
  
253 
colonial markets.591 Less appealing, France also tried to sell them the idea of a single 
cultural unity. 
These arguments were met with a certain degree of scepticism.592 While market 
access to colonies was less advantageous than proposed, since some colonies were in any 
case required under international treaties to trade on a non-discriminatory basis, it also 
appeared that French interests would continue to be protected by existing marketing 
arrangements. In addition, the costs seemed to be significant. Not only the EU members 
would have to abandon their traditional and cheaper sources of tropical products, but they 
would also be required to provide financial aid to support the colonies. Not surprisingly, 
only Belgium supported the French proposal, whereas West Germany and the Netherlands 
were vigorously opposed, and Luxemburg and Italy were no more than indifferent. 
Despite these oppositions, France managed to secure the acceptance of its proposed 
association based less on the persuasiveness of its arguments and more on its negotiating 
strategy.593 Indeed, the French proposal, supported by Belgium, was suddenly and 
unexpectedly introduced at the very last minute of negotiations on the EEC. More 
importantly, France presented it as a condition for its participation in the EEC. Given this 
deal-breaking position, the other European partners had little choice but to agree. A few 
months later, the Treaty of Rome of 1957 was signed providing the establishment of the 
EEC and a special trade regime with its members’ colonies.  
The core goal of the Treaty of Rome was to set forth the foundations of the 
European common market between France, West Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux 
countries, which was protected by an external customs union. Article 3(k) assigned the EU 
one of its core activities: “the association of the overseas countries and territories, in order 
to increase trade and to promote joint economic and social development.” Part IV 
constituted a permanent regime for governing trade between the EU members and their 
colonies (the “Association”).594 It was structured around general rules595, while the more 
sensitive obligations were established in an Implementing Convention on the Association of 
the Overseas Countries and Territories with the Community (IC) limited to five years’ 
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duration. Under Article 131, the “associated status” could be accorded to overseas countries 
and territories (“OCT”) that had “special relations with” EU members.  
The purpose of the Association was to “promote the economic and social 
development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations 
between them and the Community as a whole.”596 The Association regime consisted of a 
kind of a system of market access between the EU and the individual OCTs.597 This 
preferential trade arrangement was complemented by the European Development Fund 
(EDF), a mechanism for providing financial aid to OCTs. Not surprisingly, the ideational 
project for trade affairs and the institutional model for regional governance incorporated 
into Part IV were modelled directly on France’s colonial strategy of maintaining the 
colonies dependent on the metropole.598 Nonetheless, the Association was vested as a free 
trade area similar to the EEC itself and in compliance with GATT Article XXIV.  
The origins of the EU’s ‘trade and development policy’ rest, therefore, on the 
French proposal and Part IV of the Treaty of Rome. It provided an ‘open door’ approach to 
selected colonies, and later newly independent countries, in Africa, Caribe, and the 
Pacific.599 This served as an open frame to accommodate colonial practices into the 
European integration project, while Part IV was the legal regime governing trade flows with 
the 18 ‘associated’ African OCTs. All in all, the establishment of the EU triggered the 
formation of a new pattern of trade relations with its members’ colonies and later 
developing countries. 
 
(c) The Yaoundé Conventions (1964-1975) 
 
The Association operated until being replaced by the Yaoundé Convention of 1964 
(“Yaoundé I”).600 The events leading to the conclusion of the Yaoundé Convention 
promoted a structural transformation in the EU-Africa relationship. The period from 1960 
                                                   
596 Article 131 of the Treaty of Rome. 
597 Annex IV to the Treaty of Rome provided the list of OCTs: French West Africa (eight territories: 
Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), French Guinea (now Guinea), Ivory Coast, Dahomey (now Benin), 
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to 1973 became known as the era of decolonisation. Starting off with French Guinea’s 
independence from France in 1958, most colonies followed the pathway in the early 1960s. 
The decolonisation challenged the basis of the EU’s trade and development policy, to the 
extent that the newly independent African countries would reject the European system of 
(neo-)colonial preferences. 
Decolonisation sparked demands for a redefinition of the legal regime of economic 
governance between the EU and the former African colonies.601 As a consequence, the 
Convention of Association of 1963 between the European Economic Community and the 
Associated African and Malagasy States (“AAMS”) 602 was a new, comprehensive treaty 
between sovereign states of Europe and Africa devised to regulate trade and development 
cooperation for a period of five years. The recognition of the newly independent African 
countries as sovereign states by the EU and of their mutual colonial heritage formed the 
cornerstone of Yaoundé I.603 Put differently, the Association was devised to govern regional 
trade between the EU and non-sovereign OCTs, whereas the Yaoundé Convention was 
negotiated between formally equal and sovereign partners.604 
The Yaoundé regime was centred on a series of FTAs between the EU and each 
AAMS. Since the European and African partners were equal, their relationship had to be 
based on reciprocity with regard to the exchange of preferential trade access as well as the 
institutional arrangement.605 This meant that AAMS were no longer limited to make 
demands through their metropole, but they could rather engage in deliberations directly 
with the EU. To ensure political equality, Yaoundé I established an institutional regime 
comprised of an association council, an association committee, a parliamentary conference, 
and a court of arbitration. 
As far as trade was concerned, Yaoundé I replicated the main subject-matters of 
Part IV. The AAMS continued to be accorded preferential access. Except for the products 
protected by the newly established Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the AAMS partners 
were granted immediate duty-free access on their products.606 Since Yaoundé I was based 
on reciprocity, the AAMS continued to reduce their tariffs and open quotas for EU products 
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while abolishing all quantitative restrictions within four years.607 This discipline on trade 
cooperation continued to be combined with the EDF’s financial aid. 
Before the expiry of Yaoundé I, the EU and the AAMS agreed to renew the 
Yaoundé Convention in 1969 for an additional 5-year term (“Yaoundé II”). Some not 
significant modifications were introduced to Yaoundé II. Yet, its conclusion was considered 
in the North-South relations as a force of stability for the AAMS in what was regarded as an 
unsettled period. Indeed, the five-year term of Yaoundé I was marked by broad political and 
economic changes. Part of this was due to the rise of the Third World and the attempt to 
challenge its dependence on the First or Second World.608 The other part was the AAMS’s 
rejection of East-West confrontation in favour of a South-North agenda for economic 
cooperation. They sought to echo the NIEO’s claim for more formal and material equality. 
This led them to demand a declaration that the Yaoundé regime was not a system of (neo-
)colonial domination but a free trade area among sovereign states. Finally, the EU began to 
conclude special arrangements with other developing countries lowering or abolishing 
duties on a range of tropical products.609 This proliferation of RTAs not only increased the 
complexity of EU-Africa regionalism but also reduced the priority given to the AAMS in 
the EU’s trade and development policy.610 It was under these circumstances that the 
extension of the Yaoundé Convention was concluded in 1969.611 
 
(d) The Lomé Conventions I and II (1975-1985) 
 
The Convention of Association between the European Economic Community and the 
African, Caribbean and the Pacific countries, signed in Lomé on 28 February 1975 (“Lomé 
I”), is an emblematic legal document for representing an effort to establish a new Euro-
African entente. 
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By the early 1970s, the Yaoundé regime came under harsh criticism.612 Some 
accused it of promoting neo-colonialism and divisiveness among the newly independent 
countries in Africa. Others claimed that the Yaoundé model failed in promoting economic 
integration or development since the trade declined steadily between the EU and Africa in 
the period between 1958 and 1974. Moreover, a number of global transformations were 
undergoing. The most important of all being the Arab-Israeli war, which led to the use of oil 
as an economic weapon and the formation of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) as a major commodity cartel. The success of the OPEC fuelled the 
imagination of the end of the First World economic superiority, and created the fears that a 
similar strategy could be undertaken by other commodities producers. Hence, it was 
because of these disappointments, and a general disillusionment of developing countries 
with the international trade system, that the idea of Yaoundé III was rejected. Instead, a new 
model of governing South-North regionalism had to be conceived. 
There was another reason for rethinking the Yaoundé regime. The accession of the 
United Kingdom to the EU in 1973 had the effect of bringing the developing countries 
associated with the British Commonwealth under the EU’s trade and development policy.613 
Pursuant to Protocol 22 (annexed to the UK’s Treaty of Accession), 20 Commonwealth 
states were offered the opportunity to negotiate a long-term agreement with the EU. Three 
options presented themselves: the enlargement of Yaoundé; the conclusion of bilateral trade 
agreements; or the collective agreement on a new plurilateral agreement. The first two 
options were contemplated, but ultimately rejected. Despite their diversity and division, the 
former colonies forged a consensus on a new group of developing countries located in 
Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) 614 willing to negotiate a new model for EU-Africa 
regional trade governance. 
Against this background, the Lomé I was concluded and came into force in 1976 for 
a period of 5 years, linking the 9 EU-member states with 46 ACP countries.615 The most 
distinctive feature of the Lomé regime was a commitment to an equal partnership between 
Europe and the ACP. The preamble committed the partners “to establish, on the basis of 
complete equality between partners, close and continuing cooperation in a spirit of 
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international solidarity,” and to “seek a more just and more balanced economic order.” This 
declaration was a response to the criticism that the Yaoundé Conventions had perpetuated 
dependency rather than promoted development. It was also a reflection of the mutual 
willingness to create a new model for South-North regional trade governance, which 
aspired to contribute to a more balanced and just international economic order. 
The Lomé regime aimed at reflecting the idea of partnership in the trade 
relationship, its legal rights and obligations, and institutional arrangement.616 At the 
institutional level, Lomé I sought to merge the Yaoundé architecture with the commitment 
to partnership: the ACP-EC council of ministers, the committee of ambassadors, and the 
joint consultative assembly. Since the Yaoundé’s court of arbitration had never been 
convened and given the preference for diplomatic rather than legal modes of dispute 
resolution, Lomé I did not provide a judicial arbitration procedure. At the policy level, the 
major objective of Lomé I was to promote EU-ACP trade, agricultural and industrial 
development, provide financial aid and support for regional cooperation. To avoid the 
shortcomings of the Yaoundé Conventions, Lomé I was based on non-reciprocal trade, 
which meant that the ACP were now required to treat the imports from the EU on a most-
favoured-nation basis. It also established the Stabilisation of Export Earnings Scheme 
(Stabex), a system for the stabilisation of export earnings from agricultural commodities. 
The first five-year term of the Lomé regime was generally regarded as successful 
for its commitment to equal partnership, while seeking to eschew any form of neo-
colonialism. This model was based on two pillars: the ACP was not required to offer trade 
preference to the EU (non-reciprocity principle) nor was prohibited from trading with other 
countries (non-discrimination principle).617 Also, Lomé I was acknowledged for its mandate 
to promote economic integration of developing countries in the global market, its range of 
development assistance programmes, and its lack of political conditionality on the ACP. 
However, there was a gap between Lomé I’s expectations and its actual reality. The most 
notable criticism of the Lomé regime was on its marginal impact on the trade balance. Not 
only the ACP did not increase its trade with the EU market but also appeared to have 
increased its dependency on raw materials as an export base in exchange for importing the 
EU’s industrial goods. Even the pro-development Stabex was criticised for rewarding 
failure rather than success. 
Signed in 1979 for an additional period of five years, Lomé II introduced only two 
relevant developments: policies and rules in favour of the least developed countries (LDC), 
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and the Stabilisation Scheme for Mineral Products (Sysmin). In contrast to Lomé I, Lomé II 
was regarded as not fully satisfactory to either the EU or the ACP.618 While Lomé I was 
perceived as part of a new pathway towards a new international economic order, Lomé II 
was experienced as the end of that path. The Lomé Conventions became the target for the 
frustration of both blocs with their poor economic outcomes, even if the major cause was a 
global recession triggered by a combination of the successive oil crises, a decline in the 
relevance and importance over commodities, and the economic slowdown in Europe from 
1975 onwards. Specifically, the ACP exports to EU failed to increase despite the 
preferential treatment, while exports from non-Lomé developing countries persistently grew 
in relative terms. By contrast, some in the EU blamed the impact of manufactured imports 
from developing countries as an important factor for causing the 1979 recession. 
Nonetheless, the shared hope of a South-North partnership of equals was gradually eroded 
as international financial institutions took over the leading role in managing and funding 
development affairs in Africa. 
Despite its shortcomings, the Lomé regime has been regarded as a landmark for 
South-North regional trade agreements. It reflected a significant improvement of the terms 
of the relationship of the newly independent African countries with the European Union.619 
From the Association to Yaoundé and then to Lomé II, the African states demanded and 
received more and more favourable conditions from the European Union, while the EU 
received less and less from the ACP. This suggests that the ACP obtained the greater 
advantages – aid, preferences, supports, and guarantees – precisely because of its 
weaknesses and needs. 
Notwithstanding, this sophisticated regional regime for governing South-North 
trade and development cooperation should not be confused with closer political ties or 
economic betterment for either bloc. Indeed, putting aside the legal aspects, the economic 
and political consequences of Lomé I and II were unexpected at best and disappointed at 
worse. The enlargement of the two groups (EU and ACP) and their reorganisation as 
continental blocs was perceived as a decline of the “special relationship” between 
individual partners.620 The plurilateralisation and segregation fostered by the Lomé regime 
diluted postcolonial ties and contributed to strengthening the regional-continental identities. 
Indeed, the ACP bloc, created as a legal fiction during Lomé negotiations, was turned into a 
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relatively stable political group. The implication was the increase of ACP’s leverage to 
bargain with the EU. 
Moreover, the economic outcome of the Lomé regime was regarded as 
disappointing.621 The ACP did enjoy a trade surplus with the EU, but this was also the 
position under the Association and Yaoundé Conventions. The ACP exports to the EU 
increased in absolute values but declined significantly in market share relative to other 
developing countries and developed countries. The Lomé Conventions also failed in 
fostering the industrial development of ACP countries. More surprisingly, the pattern of 
EU-Africa trade seemed to have remained mostly unchanged throughout the operation of 
the Association, Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. From 1945 to 1985, the ACP-EU trade 
was characterised by “an acute imbalance, both among products exported and among the 
ACP exporting countries […] this structure has changed very little and largely retains the 
features of the colonial period […] The rule of free trade is meaningless for countries 
which, at the present stage, because of their production structures, have practically nothing 
to export to the [EU] rather than primary commodities].”622 This means that, after forty 
years, ACP countries remained mainly dependent on exporting agricultural products and 
raw materials in exchange for European industrial goods. For these reasons, the Lomé 
Conventions were accused of having yielded perverse effects over their economies. 
All in all, the Lomé Conventions were understood as a clearly superior model of 
EU-Africa regional trade governance to its predecessor, the Yaounde.623 They symbolised a 
watershed in South-North postcolonial relations. Not only reciprocity was removed, but 
also the (neo-)colonial project for European-African trade was rejected. The purpose was to 
replace dependency by equality and stability as the pillars of the EU-ACP trade governance. 
Obviously, not every demand of either side could be met. Yet, Lomé I and II were 
historically important for consolidating a novel and unique archetype of South-North 
regional trade agreement. As examined in the next section, the EU-Africa regime for 
regional trade resulted partly from the operation of the Law and Development Cooperation 
Doctrine, which was built on a distinguishing combination of an ideational blueprint for 
development cooperation, an institutional project for inter-regional governance, and a 
jurisprudential programme for regulating trade and development affairs. 
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2. The Legal Governance of the EU-Africa Regional Trade Regimes: The Law 
and Development Cooperation Doctrine 
 
The previous section provides a historical introduction to the legal governance of the EU-
Africa regionalism. The purpose now is to describe and analyse the legal doctrine that 
exerted a dominant influence over (legal) decision-making in and over the Yaoundé 
Conventions and the Lomé Conventions I and II. I argue that the Law and Development 
Cooperation Doctrine was applied to govern how institutions were designed, regimes 
managed, rules interpreted, arguments made, with the aim of shaping, or solving disputes 
arising from, the EU-Africa regimes for regional trade. It provided a doctrinal framework of 
possibilities to make sense of and employ international law to manage these South-North 
RTAs. The period between 1947 and 1985 witnessed the long rise and sharp decline of the 
Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine, reaching the pinnacle of its authority and 
legitimacy in 1975 when Lomé I was signed. The next sections open, disentangle, and 
examine its ideational, institutional, and jurisprudential dimensions. This case study intends 
to serve ultimately as evidence to support my general hypothesis. 
 
(a) Ideational Dimension: Development Cooperation as the Political Economy 
Programme for EU-Africa Trade Regionalism 
 
The construction of legal doctrines of international trade law rests partially on the 
commitment to an ideational programme of international political economy for ordering 
trade relations towards a determined purpose. Section 5.A argues that three rival ideational 
projects for governing world trade were very influential from 1947 to 1985. Recall that 
liberal-welfarism, developmentalism, and socialism provided the political economy 
blueprints for constituting and managing the GATT, UNCTAD, and Comecon, respectively. 
The latter two shaped the mindsets and practices of officials, diplomats, policymakers, 
lawyers, and other policy-oriented experts involved in the conceptualisation, negotiations, 
constructions and operation of South-North regional trade agreements. 
On the one hand, liberal-welfarism aimed to shape the postwar understanding of 
regional trade agreements between developed and developing countries.624 Its core goals 
rested on a compromise between the liberal aspiration for universal trading on the basis of 
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non-discriminatory and reciprocal relations and the welfarist purpose of securing domestic 
economic and social development through state intervention. The idea of South-North 
regional trade regimes has always fitted uneasily under liberal-welfarism since it was 
associated with the interwar trade discrimination and European imperialism. Part of liberal-
welfarist supporters understood that universal free trade was the fairer and the most 
efficient mechanism for economic development. Since they were against any form of 
discriminatory, colonial or protectionist measures, RTAs should be proscribed. Others 
argued that RTAs were not intrinsically against liberal-welfarism. Rather, they could serve 
as a complementary form to universal free trade, to the extent that there should be legal 
rules determining that the RTAs must promote economic integration and trade 
liberalisation.  
On the other hand, developmentalism emerged as a contestation to liberal-
welfarism.625 Its core aspiration was to accommodate two goals: promotion of preferential 
cooperation at the international level, and state interventionism for fostering emancipatory 
development at the domestic level. The notion of South-North regional trade regimes was a 
central part of the developmentalist programme, since its purpose was to subvert the 
continuous use of RTAs as imperial systems of preferences in the past and as neo-colonial 
systems vested as free trade areas in the present. To do so, South-North RTAs were 
reconceived as pro-development systems premised on special and differential treatment, 
which was expressed in the form of trade preferences, non-reciprocity between developed 
and developing countries, and non-discrimination among developing countries.  
The ideational programme embedded into the Law and Development Cooperation 
Doctrines resulted from an unbalanced compromise between liberal-welfarism and 
developmentalism. The efforts to combine their blueprints entailed a wide range of projects 
and histories, concepts and norms, theories and methods. Some features of those 
programmes were found to have similarities while others were fundamentally contradictory. 
Lawyers’ work consisted of mapping, organising, selecting, and justifying the choice of 
particular ideational features to constitute the legal doctrine. Although these two 
programmes were very influential at the time, each of them developed one specific project 
devised for fostering economic development specifically. These blueprints rationalised 
abstract ideas in concrete policies, including proposals for promoting development through 
trade regionalism. The underlying political economy of the EU-Africa RTAs resulted from 
a unique (and unbalanced) combination of these projects inspired by liberal-welfarism and 
developmentalism. 
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The emergence of the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine coincided with 
the birth of two political economy projects offered to address ‘the problem of 
development’.626 Both began to be produced from the closing years of World War II when 
global economic governance of the developing world was being reimagined as the United 
States intensified its attacks against European colonial systems. After a period of 
intellectual maturation and policy delineation, these ideational blueprints for economic 
development had acquired sufficient contours, validity, and legitimacy to be named 
modernisation and structuralism.  
From the outset, modernisation was at the core of the EU’s policy debates about 
trade and development for African colonies and then sovereign countries.627 From the 1950s 
to the 1980s, these ideas and techniques were criticised and modified by new findings and 
theories from inside and outside odernisation, which in turn were reflected back into the EU 
policies. By contrast, structuralism was initially rejected by the European Union. However, 
after decolonisation, the newly independent African countries embraced structuralist 
theories and proposals and used them to continually criticise and demand changes.628 The 
tension between modernisation and structuralism deeply shaped the Yaoundé and Lomé 
Conventions. Therefore, the ideational project for development cooperation embedded into 
the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine drawn, with varying degrees of authority, 
from the unbalanced amalgamation of both modernisation and structuralism. 
The origins of modernisation were deeply rooted in liberal-welfarism.629 It was 
conceived under the political movement favouring decolonisation, and rejecting socialism, 
that was reflected in the US President Harry Truman’s “Point Four Aid” in 1949.630 Indeed, 
the Point Four has been regarded as the opening act for reimagining the liberal-welfarist 
world from a development viewpoint.631 In the decades following World War II, 
modernisation quickly became the orthodoxy in Western developed countries. 
Institutionally, modernisation drew inspiration from successful domestic and 
international policies and arrangements. Intellectually, the new sub-disciplines of 
neoclassical development economics and politics were placed at its heart. A new generation 
of Western thinkers was engaged in adapting Keynesian-inspired economics and liberal 
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political institutions to resolve the dualist-sector challenge of developing countries through 
capitalist-growth, industrialisation.632 The breakthrough of this group as to rationalise the 
non-Western-and-non-socialist poor regions of the world as suffering from the problem of 
‘underdevelopment’.633 This ‘problem’ could be solved by an objective and neutral 
application of policy-oriented social sciences. For instance, policies and techniques were 
devised to assist those regions to overcome the challenges of rural underemployment and 
late industrialisation through public investment, planning and intervention.  
The solution to help developing countries to become a Western industrial economy 
was to employ domestic and international instruments to mimic the historical path taken by 
developed countries.634 Modernisation policies focused directly on the state, which was 
placed at the centre stage at both domestic and international arenas, and indirectly on the 
managerial role of political and official elites. The state was assumed to have the perfect 
position to use policy-oriented expertise to guide the transition of its economy from 
traditional to modern.635 Domestically, state intervention was the primary mechanism to 
maintain order and stability as the pre-conditions for fostering endogenous economic 
growth. Internationally, the state was the main intermediary between the national 
socioeconomic needs and the liberal-welfarist package of trade and economic opportunities 
and financial aid offered by the benign Western developed countries.  
The structuralist project began in the early 1950s as a critique of modernisation.636 
A group of Latin American economists employed structuralist analysis to challenge 
neoclassical development economics and politics. They sought to explain the reasons for 
the declining returns of commodities trade, and for the specialisation in these products 
failed in entailing economic growth, diversification and industrialisation, and, more 
importantly, development, as otherwise assumed by modernisation. Grounded in the new 
sub-discipline of structuralist economics, and later on institutionalist and dependency 
theories, the main hypothesis of structuralism was that underdevelopment was not a stage of 
the development path on which countries were stuck or held back by deficiencies imposed 
by colonisation or caused by civilizational backwardness. Instead, underdevelopment was 
                                                   
632 The post-1945 generation of liberal-welfarist experts was composed by the economists Albert 
Hirschman, Kurt Mandelbaum, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, W. Arthur Lewis, Ragnar Nurske, and Walt 
Whitman Rostow as well as the political scientists Robert Packenham and Irene Gendzier. For a 
discussion of liberal-welfarist theories of economic development, see generally Cypher and Dietz (2009: 
chapter 5). For a discussion of the history of liberal-welfarist development ideas and practices, see 
generally Hodge (2015; 2016). 
633 Rist, 2008: 73. 
634 Ibid. 
635 Gilman, 2007: 4, 16-17; Doidge and Holland, 2014: 60-65; Hodge, 2015: 433-434. 
636 For a discussion of heterodox theories of economic development, see Cypher and Dietz (2009: Chapter 
6). 
  
265 
the political-economic outcome of a global capitalist system constructed to exploit 
peripheral commodities economies through their subjugation to core industrial economies. 
The difference in the terms of trade was evidence of the structural bias of the world trading 
system, which served exclusively to benefit the ‘core’ by sustaining its continuous 
economic progress while perpetuating the underdevelopment at the ‘periphery’. The 
modernisation goal to replicate the Western-style path of development in the Global South 
was hence impossible.  
The solution offered by structuralism was to transform the state into the central 
promoter of development.637 Domestically, the state should implement import-substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) and export-led growth policies. Internationally, it should protect its 
economic development by either decoupling from the global mechanisms of capitalist 
exploitation or at least resisting to them through legal reforms aiming to ensure a more just 
and fair international economic order. 
In the context of the legal governance of EU-Africa trade regionalism, a political 
economy programme for development cooperation was constructed through the clashes and 
compromises between modernisation and structuralism. Put differently, the ideational 
dimension of the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine was stabilised and organised 
around five constitutive features drawn from a modernisation-structuralist framework. 
First, the world of colonies and empires was gradually (and forcefully) replaced by 
a world-view of interdependent sovereign countries. The old and new developing countries 
were reconceived as ‘underdeveloped economies’638, constrained by internal ‘primitive-
backwards’ practices or external ‘colonialist’ or ‘capitalist’ exploitation, whereas developed 
countries were repositioned from imperial powers to stewards for a prosperous world 
economy.639 Third, each country was regarded as aspiring to achieve self-sustaining 
economic growth by either ‘naturally travelling’ or ‘intentionally striving’ for the 
development path, with, direct or indirect, assistance or intervention of the state in the 
economy. Fourth, the state was conceived of as the central actor to promote development by 
adopting national, regional, or international measures and policies. Finally, development 
was understood mainly as an economic problem that could be scientifically analysed and 
technically solved through policies, rules and institutions.  
Although it might seem counterintuitive given the prevailing position of the GATT 
and UNCTAD, the United Nations was regarded as the starting point for the 
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institutionalisation of the political economy project for regional development cooperation. 
In the aftermath of World War II, the UN had been established to preside over all areas of 
international affairs, including peace and security, economic, decolonisation, and 
development matters.640 The UN General Assembly functioned as a permanent forum for 
mediating the different, or perhaps rival, initiatives at the multilateral and regional levels. It 
was under the UN that the core ideational features of the programme for development 
cooperation were openly debated in light of the disputes between the (overlapping) 
multilateral trading systems, the GATT and the UNCTAD.  
The GATT primarily shaped the EU’s trade interactions with Africa by severely 
constraining the imperial systems of trade preference and then imposing limits upon 
regional trade agreements.641 After decolonisation, many African countries were 
encouraged to join the GATT. However, most of their exporting products (agriculture and 
textiles) fell outside its mandate. More importantly, Article XXIV not only disciplined the 
formation of RTAs, but its rules also presupposed the legitimacy and validity of regional 
trade governance institutions modelled on the GATT. From an ideational perspective, the 
often-neglected work of the GATT regime was to infuse liberal-welfarism into RTAs 
through its legal requirements. This does not mean that the European Union was less 
influential. As discussed previously, the core features of the EU-Africa trade regime were 
initially drawn directly from the Treaty of Rome and indirectly from the French colonial 
regimes. More concretely, the Yaoundé Convention was modelled on the liberal-welfarist 
GATT and on the French neo-imperialist Part IV of the Treaty of Rome.  
Despite that initial conflict, the political economy project for development 
cooperation was gradually refined and expanded until it became dominant. Part of its 
success was due to the prevailing position of modernisation in the First World. The other 
part was related to its resilience in accommodating the hasty ascension of structuralism. The 
influence of the UNCTAD over Africa spread out quickly in the post-independence. It 
shaped the EU-Africa trade regionalism by advocating for the establishment of the 
Generalized System of Preferences and, later, the NIEO. GSP was imagined as a non-
discriminatory regime of non-reciprocal trade concessions. Indeed, the GSP schemes 
symbolised the structuralist-inspired alternative model for the modernisation-inspired 
Article-XXIV RTAs.  
Between 1947 and 1985, the influence of liberal-welfarism and developmentalism 
over the EU-Africa regional trade regime varied. In the 1950s, the modernisation rationale 
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had penetrated in the GATT and EU. It affected the establishment and early years of the 
EU’s trade and development policy. However, the influence of the French imperial project 
was dominant. More specifically, the Association was built on France’s imperial 
programme with a modernisation façade. It was conceived as a regional regime to assist the 
overseas countries and territories to catch up with (European) civilisation by supporting 
their efforts to ‘modernise’ and ‘industrialise’.642 Assuming that supplying capital would be 
sufficient, or perhaps the main goal, to finance industrialisation and promote continuing 
growth, Part IV of the Treaty of Rome deployed the two core modernisation mechanisms at 
the regional level: free trade and financial aid.643 On the liberal front, a GATT-style free 
trade area was established to enable overseas countries and territories to generate foreign 
exchange by exporting commodities for which they were found to enjoy a competitive 
advantage. On the welfarist front, the EDF, a Bretton-Wood-inspired fund, was designed to 
channel funds to OCTs’ public investments.  
Only a few years following the implementation of the Association, the EU’s trade 
and development policy was challenged by decolonisation demands, structuralist critiques 
and new developments in modernisation.644 These attacks to the Association also penetrated 
into liberal-welfarism. The EU was required to defend and review its policies and practices 
towards OCTs. Indeed, the Yaoundé negotiations provided an opportunity to reconsider the 
ideational project underlying the EU-Africa trade regionalism. Although the institutional 
outcome had been disappointing for merely reincorporating the Association as an 
international law treaty, the Yaoundé Conventions signalised a shift in the ideational 
balance towards modernisation by introducing minor changes that sought to respond to the 
intellectual debate on development and the political reality of decolonisation.  
Throughout the 1960s, the political and intellectual circumstances led to the wide 
acceptance of structuralism and its coexistence and amalgamation with modernisation. The 
ideational project for development cooperation came progressively to incorporate the core 
tenets from both programmes, allowing international lawyers to craft regional trade regimes 
by making use of a wider doctrinal framework of theories, methods, and policies. The EU’s 
Memorandum on a Community Policy for Development Co-operation of 1971 (“1971 
Memorandum”) that preceded the Lomé negotiations reflected this broader ideational 
consensus. Nonetheless, modernisation and structuralism did not have the same weight. The 
1971 Memorandum shows that modernist theories became dominant in the EU’s trade and 
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development policy, while some structuralist ideas were incorporated and French imperial 
policies, marginalised.645  
The Lomé Convention of 1975 was the embodiment of the political economy 
project of regional trade and development cooperation. It was constructed to accommodate 
rules and standards, policies and mechanisms, grounded directly in modernisation and 
structuralism, and indirectly in liberal-welfarism and developmentalism. At the regional 
level, Lomé I accepted the benefits of free trade (modernisation), but moderated by non-
reciprocal and preferential access and supported by the Stabex and Sysmin (structuralism). 
This implies that it embraced neither modernisation nor structuralism in full. Instead, it 
reached a compromise by departing from market-access reciprocity (modernisation), and 
from general non-discriminatory treatment for all developing countries (structuralism). At 
the domestic level, the Lomé regime envisaged an active state responsible for implementing 
not only welfarist measures (modernisation) but also import-substitution-industrialisation 
(structuralism) and export-led-growth policies (modernisation/structuralism). Such state 
interventionism was conceived to be supported by EDF’s funds and technical assistance 
(modernisation) with no ‘political’ conditions attached (structuralism). 
 
(b) Institutional Dimension: the Governance Model of EU-Africa Trade 
Regionalism 
 
In section 5.C, I argue that from the encounter between liberal-welfarism and 
developmentalism four visions of institutional models for South-North trade governance 
emerged in the postwar period. These visions were grounded in institutional stories about 
the four more influential international regimes with mandates over trade affairs: the United 
Nations, the GATT, the UNCTAD, and the European Union. The relative importance of 
each institutional model for the formation, reconstruction, and management of the EU-
Africa regional trade agreements depended on how, and also by whom, these history 
lessons were articulated as legal arguments.  
Two visions resulted from the efforts of Western developed countries in reading 
history in light of liberal-welfarism with the aim of crafting a postwar institutional model of 
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trade governance. The main preoccupation for liberal-welfarist supporters was to prevent 
the discriminatory and protectionist measures that caused the collapse of the liberal trading 
system. The use of international law to establish an international organisation to govern 
trade affairs was a shared objective. Despite their overall consensus on a universal legal 
regime for world trade, there were disagreements on what role, if any, regional trade 
agreements should play in the postwar international economy. The consequence was the 
formation of two visions of regionalism, which, in turn, entailed distinct institutional 
models of trade governance.  
The GATT-centric vision conceived regional trade regimes between Europe and 
Africa as (imperialist) systems of trade preference that posed a threat to the multilateral 
trading system under the GATT. However, since EU-Africa RTAs were to be tolerated for 
political reasons, they should be formally constituted as either free trade areas or customs 
unions in strict accordance with Article XXIV, and modelled on the GATT itself. Thus, to 
be formally and teleological consistent with Article XXIV, the Yaoundé and Lomé 
Conventions should replicate the institutional model of GATT governance. 
Alternatively, the European-centric vision understood regional trade regimes 
between European countries and (colonial or postcolonial) Africa as multi-dimensional 
phenomena that reflected not only trade preferences and economic interests but also 
development commitments and historical and cultural ties. For this reason, EU-Africa 
RTAs were never regarded as mere FTAs under Article XXIV. Instead, they were 
conceived as economic integration mechanisms for development, which were an intrinsic 
part of the EU integration project. This means that (what later would become known as) the 
EU’s ‘trade and development policy’ was envisaged as instrumental and complementary to 
the formation of the European internal market. Specifically, the Yaoundé Conventions were 
regarded as designed on the Treaty of Rome and French Community, while the Lomé 
Conventions I and II on the EU and British Commonwealth. Hence, the institutional model 
for the EU-Africa regional trade regime should ultimately be the European Union itself but 
adapted to account for the unequal stage of development between the two blocs. 
These two liberal-welfarist visions shared a similar understanding of the history of 
international trade law and governance of South-North regionalism. They diverged, 
however, as to the legitimate use of South-North RTAs under the GATT regime. Whereas 
the GATT vision favoured multilateralism and a narrow GATT-FTA model of governance, 
the European vision defended regionalism and an EU-integration model. By contrast, 
developmentalism inspired two distinct models for institutional governance of South-North 
regional trade regimes. Although they agreed with liberal-welfarism on the significance of 
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the interwar events, their interpretation of them was profoundly different. The liberal 
trading system was not perceived as a benign model of governance to be replicated. Rather, 
it held responsible for making imperialism possible. Consequently, it could not serve as a 
model for either international or regional governance of trade affairs. The primary lessons 
to be taken into consideration to assist in the reinvention of trade regimes between newly 
independent African states and the European Union were related to decolonisation, political 
independence of colonies, and economic interdependence. By rethinking the past from a 
developmentalist viewpoint, two visions of history and governance of EU-Africa trade 
relations emerged. 
The UN-centric vision conceptualised regional trade regimes between Europe and 
Africa as international trading systems between (sovereign) developed countries and 
(sovereign) developing countries which often shared historical and cultural ties. These 
regimes were only possible because of decolonisation of the African peoples. Their main 
functions were as much economic as symbolic. Their aims were to foster economic growth, 
to reclaim African states’ participation in world trade, and to dispel the colonial images of 
their backwardness and primitiveness. Hence, neither the GATT nor the European Union, 
but rather the United Nations was regarded as the institutional model of governance that 
should assist post-colonial African states in reasserting their equality to the Western 
developed countries. 
Decolonisation was also the landmark moment for the UNCTAD vision rethink 
regional trade regimes between the European Union and post-independence countries in 
Africa. However, it was understood as a moment of betrayal rather than victory, since it 
only changed a visible for an invisible international system of imperial exploitation under 
the GATT governance. The creation of UNCTAD purported to promote and implement an 
institutional model of South-North governance based on a non-discriminatory and non-
reciprocal system of international trade under the Generalised System of Preferences. Thus, 
the GATT FTAs and CUs (generally) and the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions (in 
particular) were regarded as contradictory to the GSP schemes, since they violated the 
General Principle Eight of UNCTAD law for being based on principles of discrimination 
and reciprocity. 
Those four models of institutional governance and their respective institutional 
stories were, with different degrees of persuasiveness, regarded as legitimate and valid part 
of the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine. This doctrinal framework was broader 
and more resilient to accommodate the diversity and contestability entailed by the four 
visions. Lawyers could use this legal doctrine to make a credible argument about the virtues 
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and vices of governance bodies of a particular EU-Africa RTA by drawing from either one 
of those institutional models.  
The acceptance of a wider variety of governance models as legitimate and 
authoritative did not entail that they were all created equal or enjoyed the same influence. In 
fact, aspects of one or other vision prevailed over time ruling out the rival model or history 
lesson. Put differently, I suggest that the dispute between institutional models for South-
North RTAs would entail a more disruptive effect over contemporary legal doctrine than in 
the past since there was no strong consensus around a specific vision. Consequently, it is 
not unexpected to affirm that the relative influence of each model or story was contingent 
depending on the context in which it was invoked. Enmeshed in European, African, 
Caribbean and Pacific settings, lawyers were called to apply their Law and Development 
Cooperation Doctrine in decision-making underlying the negotiations, constructions and 
operations of the EU-Africa RTAs. What seems to be more surprising nowadays is the 
realisation that, despite its European origins, the history lessons and institutional models of 
regional trade governance were subject to highly disputed controversies. In the remainder of 
this section, I will examine the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions against the four visions, 
with the purpose of showing their relative influence. 
 
(i) The Yaoundé Governance of EU-AAMS Trade Regionalism  
 
The two Yaoundé Conventions were comprehensive international law treaties. The 
negotiations leading up to Yaoundé I were the opening act for the use of the Law and 
Development Cooperation Doctrine. This legal doctrine provided the range of possible 
models to craft the governance institutions of the first regional trade regime between 
formally and politically equal and economically and developmentally unequal African and 
Western European countries. 
The core aspects of the Yaoundé regime were not a novelty at the time since the 
Conventions served to ‘reincorporate’ Part IV of the Treaty of Rome as an international law 
treaty between sovereign states o Europe and Africa. Part IV established the Association for 
fulfilling the EU core goal of increasing trade and promoting economic and social 
development for the overseas countries and territories with “special relations” with EU 
members. It has been perceived as the legal instrument through which European 
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colonialism was ‘dressed up’ in liberal-welfarist apparel in order to be accepted and 
incorporated into the EU integration project.646  
The Association governance of the EU-OCT trade cooperation reproduced the 
GATT-style system of market access centred on reciprocity and non-discrimination, which 
was also adopted by the EU members to gradually achieve, over a period of 12 years, 
internal free trade within the European Union.647 The Association was complemented by the 
EU’s common external tariff, which increased the protection for the OCT exports by 
imposing high tariffs on the similar products imported from other suppliers.648 As far as 
investment was concerned, the IC set forth liberal rules on free and mutual establishment 
rights.649 Finally, the Association was completed by the European Development Fund, an 
exclusive Bretton-Woods-style funding mechanism designed to provide development aid to 
OCTs.  
The Association operated only for few years as envisaged since the majority of 
OCTs gained their political independence. Not surprisingly, it was criticised by the three 
institutional visions that contributed to its construction and implementation. GATT- and 
UN-inspired voices accused Part IV of perpetuating the existing colonial-metropole 
relationship under an FTA façade, while the supporters of the European visions argued that 
its purpose was to establish an institutional mechanism to preserve historical-political ties 
between the partners rather than promote an EU-style of economic integration.650 The first 
test of the Association came with the negotiations for a successor arrangement. Despite the 
critiques, Yaoundé I was the internationalisation of Part IV, to the extent that largely 
transposed the Association regime to govern the trade and development cooperation 
between the EU members and the newly independent African countries. 
The preamble of Yaoundé I indicated that the two liberal-welfarist visions exerted a 
dominant influence, while the UN view only residual. It provided that the contracting-
                                                   
646 See Ravenhill (1985: 47-48), Holland (2002: 25-27), Bartels (2007: 717-722), and Broberg (2013: 
676). 
647 Under Part IV, EU members committed to extend the benefits of the internal process of trade 
liberalization within the EU to the OCTs, which included gradual reduction, and eventual elimination, of 
customs duties and quantitative restrictions, with the exception of sensitive products. On the other side, 
OCTs agreed to reduce duties and open up quotas for EU products, following a transitional schedule; 
nevertheless, OCTs were still allowed to impose both quantitative restrictions on non-quota imports and 
customs duties to foster industrialisation and produce revenue for their budget (See IC Articles 9 and 14; 
Treaty of Rome Articles 13, 14, 32, 33, and 133). 
648 Bartels, 2007: 721. 
649 IC Article 8. 
650 Ravenhill, 1985: 52-53; Holland, 2002: 27. 
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parties must observe “the principles of the United Nations Charter”651 (UN vision) and the 
“Treaty of Rome”652 (EU vision) in their pursuit of trade and development cooperation to 
achieve “the economic, social and cultural progress of their countries.”653  
Five distinct and original features were introduced to the Yaoundé regime. First, 
Yaoundé I can be described as a legal instrument for ‘regime transposition’. The 
Association was built on Part IV of the Treaty of Rome and ICs between the European 
Union and EU members’ colonies. These ‘legal agreements’ challenged the classical notion 
of the centrality of state sovereignty as the (sole) subject of international law. Hence, 
Yaoundé I can be reasonably understood as ‘reconstructing’ Part IV and ICs as 
‘international law treaty’ to reflect the change in the legal status of the post-colonial African 
states.  
Moreover, GATT- and European-centric narratives portrayed the shift from 
“associated OCTs” to “associated states” as a ‘natural’, ‘logic’, or perhaps ‘strategic’, 
consequence of either a global event enmeshed into the dynamics of the Cold War, GATT 
negotiations and the US-EU foreign policies, or a European event that resulted from a 
diplomatic compromised between French-Belgium neo-imperialist ambitions and the 
European integration project. For these liberal-welfarist visions, decolonisation was 
generally regarded as a mere exchange of formal titles (from OCTs to AAMS), since 
African countries remained economically dependent on exports to the EU market.654 
Nonetheless, from a UN viewpoint, the independence of African colonies was the single 
most important event of the 20th century. Indeed, the rejection of the project for the French 
Community by the former OCTs in favour of political sovereignty, self-determination, and 
nationalism, was celebrated as a watershed event, regardless of its economic 
implications.655 Thus, the transformation of the Association into Yaoundé I was perceived 
not merely as a game of appearances for the new African countries, but the 
acknowledgement by the former coloniser of their new status as ‘subjects’ of international 
law. This, in turn, empowered them to conclude ‘international treaties’.  
Second, the Yaoundé Conventions constituted a uniquely complex regime of 
regional trade. Its legal governance was built on the French imperial practice reshaped by 
                                                   
651 “WISHING to demonstrate their common desire for co-operation on the basis of complete equality 
and friendly relations, observing the principles of the United Nations Charter” (Yaoundé I, Preamble). 
652 “HAVING REGARD TO the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
REAFFIRMING accordingly their desire to maintain their Association, […] 
RESOLVED to develop economic relations between the Associated States and the Community” 
(Yaoundé I, Preamble).  
653 Article 3(k) of the Treaty of Rome.  
654 See Milward (2005: 80-82, 85-86) and Lister (1997: 61-62). 
655 Milward, 2005: 80-84; Lister, 1997: 61-62. See also supra note 590. 
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the GATT and European models, and slightly chastened by the UN-centric view. The 
consequence was that the managerial premise of the EU-AAMS trade regionalism shifted 
from ‘assimilation’ to ‘interdependence’ and ‘development’.656 The notion of empire as a 
process of gradual integration of colonised peoples into the European civilisation was 
intrinsically embedded into the French Community, which served as the model for the 
Association. The ideational appeal of this French concept was weakened during the 
negotiations to the Yaoundé Conventions, through which it was marginalised in favour of 
the notion of an interdependent economy in which Europe was the midwife or steward of 
the ‘less developed’ countries or societies. To become an advanced European country, post-
colonial AAMS should follow the EU’s trade and development policies, which mainly 
consisted of preferential trade and investment liberalisation combined with financial aid. 
Third, the form and substance of the Yaoundé Conventions also changed. Formally, 
Yaoundé I was divided into four core titles657, each of them combining provisions crafted in 
the form of rule or standard658. Substantially, it integrated under the same regime distinct 
economic disciplines ranging from trade, services, and investment to development aid and 
technical assistance. Despite some degree of variation, its formal structure followed closely 
a specific normative pattern: liberal-free-trade norms tended to be constructed as rules, 
while welfarist-development-aid norms were often crafted as standards. Specifically, the 
titles on ‘trade cooperation’, ‘right of establishment and services’ and ‘institutions’ were 
mainly constituted of rule-based provisions. For instance, the provisions on trade 
cooperation were (directly) based on Part IV of the Treaty of Rome and (indirectly) 
modelled on the ‘rules’ of the GATT. The other example is of the development provisions 
that were designed on the ‘standards’ of the Bretton Woods Agreement, since they set forth 
vague rights and obligations that required on-going decision-making.  
The fourth novel feature was that the Yaoundé Conventions constituted a regional 
system of preferential market access rules containing exceptions devised to soften their 
                                                   
656 Milward, 2005: 83-84. 
657 Yaoundé I was comprised of four core and one miscellaneous titles: I – Trade (Articles 1-14); II – 
Financial and Technical Co-operation (Articles 15-28); III – Right of Establishment, Services, Payments 
and Capital (Articles 29-38); IV – Institutions of the Association (Articles 39-53); and V – General and 
Final Provisions (Articles 54-64). 
658 Duncan Kennedy argues that norms can be formally designed as either rules or standards. While rules 
deemed to be rigid and objective, and aim to increase certainty, standards are regarded as flexible and 
subjective, and aspire to realise substantive objectives. Rules tend to be associated with legal norms 
directing free trade, whereas standards are often used as legal norms for welfarist policies. Rules are 
generally criticised for supporting a mechanical decision-making process that leads to over- or under-
inclusiveness, whereas standards are attacked for defending a biased decision-making that is subject to 
arbitrariness (1976: 1687-1688, 1695-1696; 1997: 151).  
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application. Modelled on the Treaty of Rome and the GATT, the Title I on Trade659 sought 
to implement a preferential trade arrangement between formally equal state partners with 
the purpose of promoting a reciprocal, non-discriminatory, and gradual reduction of 
customs duties and quantitative restrictions.660 The provisions on trade were structured as 
rule-based norms, aiming at imposing clear obligations and rights. Standard-based 
provisions were also added to give some flexibility to the application of these liberal-free-
trade rules. For example, Article 6 provided that the right to impose either quantitative 
restrictions on non-quota imports or customs duties to protect infant industry. Another 
departure from the Association was that the AAMS were not required to liberalise trade 
among themselves. To be consistent with GATT law, the Yaoundé Conventions were 
structured not as a single FTA but rather as a bundle of interconnected FTAs.661 The 
normative architecture of the Yaoundé regime suggests that the EU and AAMS accepted 
the key tenets of liberal-welfarism (generally) and modernisation (in particular). At the 
regional level, they were not only expected to treat one another on a non-discriminatory 
basis but also they were regarded as formally equal and thus willing and able to reciprocally 
exchange trade concessions.662 At the domestic level, partners were authorised to legislate 
on social and economic matters, limited only to not impose discriminatory treatment 
between them.663 
By contrast, the provisions on development cooperation did not set forth clear and 
self-executing rights and obligations to the parties. Instead, the disciplines on financial aid 
and technical assistance and training were designed as open policy, which required 
affirmative interactions and continuous decision-making to be realised. The European 
Development Fund and the European Investment Bank (EIB) symbolised the differences 
between the formal design of provisions on trade cooperation and provisions on 
development aid, to the extent that the access to their financial resources was subject to the 
EU’s sole discretion. The implications were two-fold. On the one hand, only one-third of 
the EDF’s fund was successfully claimed by the AAMS and disbursed by the EU. On the 
other hand, the bulk of the EDF’s resources was channelled to infrastructure projects, 
excluding or undersupplying all other areas, notably the industrial sector.664 
                                                   
659 Articles 1-14 of Yaoundé I. 
660 Pursuant to Articles 2 and 11, all products from African countries received a measure of preferential 
treatment, except for the products covered by the newly established EU Common Agriculture Policy. 
There were also preferential measures providing progressive liberalization of products originating in EU 
countries (Article 2). 
661 Article 8 and 9 Yaoundé I. See also Bartels (2007: 723-724). 
662 Holland, 2002: 29. 
663 Bartels, 2007: 724-725. 
664 Holland, 2002: 29; Zartman, 1970: 28. 
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Fifth, a complex institutional and bureaucratic machinery composed of four main 
bodies was established to manage the Yaoundé regime. The “association council”, assisted 
by the “association committee”, contained one representative of each partner, and met 
annually to make binding decisions based on a joint agreement. The “parliamentary 
conference” had an advisory function, while the “court of arbitration” was the adjudicatory 
mechanism for resolving disputes over the Yaoundé Conventions. Despite their 
sophistication, these governance bodies were perceived as not very relevant for decision-
making. Whereas the trade and investment provisions were mostly self-executing ‘rules’, 
the development and financial assistance provisions were ‘standards’ and so demanded 
case-by-case deliberation. Nonetheless, such decisions were not under the mandate of those 
governance institutions rather they were subject to the EU’s discretion only. Finally, these 
bodies were perceived as designed not to make relevant political decisions. Instead, their 
function seems to have been only symbolic serving to “bolster the self-respect and 
confidence of the African members.” 665 
 
(ii) The Lomé Governance of EU-ACP Trade Regionalism  
 
After a decade of the legal governance of EU-AAMS trade regionalism, the Yaoundé 
regime was to be phased out. In 1973, the European Union and the ACP launched the 
negotiations on a new institutional model. The criticism of the Yaoundé Conventions was, 
with varying degrees of influence, taken into consideration by both sides. Also, the 
negotiations were affected by the rising of the Third World and its rejection of the East-
West confrontation and attempt to reverse its economic dependency on developed 
countries.666 This movement was magnified by its call for a new international economic 
order, and dramatised by the OPEC’s policies in the late 1970s, which affected the growing 
First-World dependence on commodities while triggering a run for securing raw materials 
supplies. In this turbulent context, the EU enjoyed a less dominant position and so it was 
‘more willing’ to meet the ACP’s demands. Consequently, the first Lomé Convention was 
signed in 1975. This political and economic conditions changed radically in the 1979 
negotiations on the extension of the Lomé Convention.667 The result was unsatisfactory on 
both sides, causing Lomé II to be perceived as resting on the same principles, yet as being 
less inventive and far-reaching than of its predecessor. 
                                                   
665 Feld, 1965: 243. 
666 Montana, 2003: 76. 
667 See supra note 618, and accompanying text.  
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The Lomé Convention I reflects the zenith of the influence exerted by the Law and 
Development Cooperation Doctrine as a distinct legal mode for governing the economic 
affairs between North and South. Despite the attempts of the European Union to label the 
agreement a “new model,” I argue that Lomé I should be more accurately understood as a 
continuation or development of, rather than a rupture with, the institutional model 
embedded into the Yaoundé governance. 
It is certainly not an exaggeration to assert that Lomé I was the most complex 
international law treaty on matters related to trade and development cooperation concluded 
between a bloc of developed countries (the EU) and a bloc of developing countries (the 
ACP). In contrast to 1964, the four institutional visions born out of liberal-welfarism and 
developmentalism had their main assumptions, arguments and models been tested, refined, 
and perfected through theoretical debates and practical experience by 1975. Despite their 
differences, they all converged in acknowledging that from the Association and Yaoundé 
Conventions to Lomé I, a new model of South-North regional trade governance emerged.  
From a European viewpoint, the first Lomé Convention was essentially the 
embodiment of the renewed European Union’s trade and development policy. 668 This fresh 
strategy mainly expressed the possible compromise between the French ‘organic’ approach 
and the British ‘interdependent’ approach to regulate their economic relations with former 
colonies. From a GATT perspective, the Lomé Convention was conceived as a trade 
agreement that set forth a ‘free trade area’ that fell uneasily under two exceptions to the 
most-favoured-nation treatment: Article XXIV and Part IV. Although resisted by a minority 
of GATT contracting-parties, Lomé I was regarded as the first “special and differential” 
RTA under Part IV of the GATT devised to grant non-reciprocal trade preferences to 
developing countries. Hence, international lawyers associated with both liberal-welfarist 
visions interpreted the Lomé Convention as expressing a new institutional model. 
Distinctively, the supporters of developmentalism also perceived Lomé I as an 
attempt to create a “new model.” The aspiration was that this novel form of trade 
governance would pave the way to transform the South-North relations in accordance with 
the objectives of the NIEO Declaration.669 This shared consensus did not mean that the UN 
                                                   
668 Holland, 2002: 32; Milward 2005: 88-90. 
669 “ANXIOUS to establish, on the basis of complete equality between partners, close and continuing co-
operation, in a spirit of international solidarity; 
RESOLVED to intensify their efforts together for the economic development and social progress of the 
ACP States […] 
DESIROUS of safeguarding the interests of the ACP States whose economies depend to a considerable 
extent on the exportation of commodities;  
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and UNCTAD approaches ceased to have differences, but rather they agreed on the 
existence of a new model underlying Lomé I. From a UN-centric standpoint, the first Lomé 
Convention represented an evolution in the strategy for interdependent development 
undertook by developing countries.670 The Lomé model symbolised a conceptual shift from 
a ‘reciprocal’ towards a ‘non-reciprocal’ system of trade preference favouring developing 
countries. This change is grounded on the understanding that a regional trade regime of 
‘politically equal’ and ‘economically unequal’ states should adopt institutional mechanisms 
to promote the economic development of the ACP and their gradual economic 
interdependence with other developed countries.  
The UNCTAD vision that was emerging when Yaoundé I was signed had not only 
been perfected over the previous decade but also had its influence increased along with the 
success of the UNCTAD Conferences I (1964), II (1968) and III (1972). In contrast to the 
UN view, the UNCTAD defenders argued that Lomé I might be a new model, but it still 
served to perpetuate (neo-)imperial patterns of EU-ACP trade relations.671 Despite the 
apparent move towards a non-reciprocal trade system and recognition of the ACPs as 
politically equal and economically unequal, the EU’s trade and development policy sought 
to subject former colonies to its own interests by weakening their bargaining powers 
through the segmentation of the ACP from the Third World. 
The effort to reimagine the legal governance of EU-ACP trade and development 
cooperation according to a new paradigm was materialised in the Lomé Convention. The 
preamble of Lomé I stated clearly that its purpose was “to establish a new model for 
relations between developed and developing States, compatible with the aspirations of the 
international community towards a more just and more balanced economic order.” This 
“new model” combined innovative with conventional features. In contrast to the Yaoundé 
Conventions, Lomé I reflected a more balanced compromise between liberal-welfarist and 
developmentalist visions. Their relative weight could be found in the details of Lomé I’s 
institutional design. However, despite the attempts to build a new model, the Lomé 
Convention – I argue – was a sophisticated South-North regional trade agreement but still 
thought, crafted, and operated through the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine. 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
ANXIOUS to promote the industrial development of the ACP States by wider co-operation between these 
States and the Member States of the Community;” (Lomé I, Preamble). 
670 Ravenhill, 1985: 28; Montana, 2003: 68-70; Zartman, 1976: 326-327. 
671 Nkrumah, 1964; Lister, 1988: 18; Montana, 2003: 68-70; Zartman, 1976: 326. 
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Seven innovative features of the Lomé Convention deserve special attention. First, 
the Lomé regime embraced, as Yaoundé did, the political economy project for development 
cooperation, but struck a more equitable compromise between its modernisation and 
structuralist policies and ideas. It was primarily modelled on the same liberal-welfarist 
models of legal governance but relaxed by developmentalist reforms. This suggests that, 
despite the rise of the Third World, the European Union held enough bargaining power to 
impose its ‘trade and development policy’. The main transformation inflicted by the 
UNCTAD vision was the abandonment of the reciprocity principle and the revision of trade 
rules. This represented the final departure from the French imperial strategy of claiming that 
reciprocity was a condition sine qua non for cooperative relations among equally sovereign 
countries.672 Thus, GATT-inspired rules on trade cooperation were reformed in light of the 
UNCTAD-inspired principle of non-reciprocity.673  
Second, the most original invention was the new institutional design conceived to 
bring into existence a non-reciprocal regime for regional trade favouring the ACP countries. 
This involved merging the GATT’s legal institution of ‘free trade area’ with the 
UNCTAD’s legal institution of ‘generalised system of preferences’. The result was the 
formation of a bundled-up preferential arrangement of 46 ‘non-reciprocal free trade zones’ 
between individual ACP countries and the European Union under the Lomé governance. 
The consequence was two-fold. ACP products were granted full duty-free and quota-free 
access to the EU market, except for the products under the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy, which represented less than 1% of ACP exports to EU.674 Moreover, ACP countries 
were not required or obliged to offer reciprocal market access to EU products, unless to 
comply with most-favoured-nation treatment. These obligations were subject to safeguard 
provisions, which authorised EU members to take measures in case of ACP products cause 
serious disturbances in any sector of their economy.675 
Third, the form and substance of Lomé had several original traits. The scope of the 
EU-ACP economic relations expanded to include new policy areas. The broader mandate 
covered not only cooperation on trade, services, and investments as well as financial and 
technical assistance (as under the Yaoundé Conventions), but also cooperation on export 
                                                   
672 Holland, 2002: 34; Bartels, 2007: 724; Milward, 2005: 97. 
673 See Articles 2-3, 7 of Lomé I. 
674 Zartman, 1976: 332. 
675 Article 10 of Lomé I. 
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earnings from commodities and industrial promotion. Lomé I was formally organised in six 
core titles676, each one combining rule- and standard-based provisions.  
Similar to the Yaoundé Conventions, the formal structure of Lomé I and II followed 
closely a specific normative pattern: liberal-free-trade norms tended to be crafted as ‘rules’, 
while welfarist-development-aid norms were often designed as ‘standards’. More 
specifically, the provisions on ‘trade cooperation’, ‘services’, ‘investment’, and 
‘institutions’ were mainly rule-based and modelled on the GATT and the EU. Conversely, 
the provisions on financial, development, and industrial assistance were mostly standard-
based and shaped on the Bretton Woods institutions. In addition, some of the novelties in 
trade and development cooperation introduced by the Lomé Convention were shaped on the 
UNCTAD vision. Interestingly, the UNCTAD-inspired provisions followed the same 
pattern of form and substance: the articles on the Stabex and industrial and technical 
cooperation were predominantly standard-based, while provisions on trade were primarily 
rule-based.677 
Fourth, an original notion of membership was introduced by the Lomé Convention 
devised to widen the eligibility criteria beyond former European colonies in Africa. Two 
factors drove to a sharp increase in the number of developing partners yielding important 
consequences. On the one hand, the first enlargement of the European Union in 1973 
impacted meaningfully the EU’s trade and development policy, notably the extension of the 
‘association status’ to the former British colonies in Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific.678 On 
the other hand, the Dutch and German request for ending the ‘organic’, ‘associative’ 
character of Yaoundé regime, and the UNCTAD demand for a non-discriminatory 
preference regime for all developing countries, were partially met.679 Under the Lomé 
regime, developing countries, which were not former European colonies but yet met the 
criteria established in Part IV of the Treaty of Rome, could apply for membership.680  
The practical effects were evident. Geographically, the membership expanded from 
Europe and Africa to the Caribbean and Pacific. The accession of the UK, Ireland and 
Denmark to the EU increased from 6 to 9 the number of European partners. Yet, the number 
                                                   
676 Lomé I was comprised of six core and one miscellaneous titles: I – Trade (Articles 1-15); II – Export 
Earnings from Commodities (Articles 16-25); III – Industrial Cooperation (Articles 26-39); IV – 
Financial and Technical Cooperation (Articles 40-61); V – Provisions relating to Establishment, Services, 
Payments and Capital Movement (Articles 62-68); VI – Institutions (Articles 69-83); and VII – General 
and Final Provisions (Articles 84-94). 
677 Compare Articles 2-3, 7 (on Trade) with Articles 26-39 (on industrial cooperation) of Lomé I. 
678 The Protocol No 22 of the UK’s Treaty of Accession accorded to 20 Commonwealth states the 
opportunity to negotiate a long-term agreement with the European Union. 
679 Zartman, 1970: 28-30; Montana, 2003: 79-80. 
680 Articles 88-90 of Lomé I. 
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of developing countries skyrocketed: from the original 18 Yaoundé states and Mauritius to 
46 partners, which added the 21 British Commonwealth countries (12 African, 6 Caribbean, 
and 3 Pacific) and 6 other African countries. During the five-year term of Lomé I, the 
number of ACP members quickly rose to 53. Moreover, the number of states classified as 
Least Development Countries raised steadily from 24 in Lomé I to 35 in Lomé II. This 
increasing importance of LDCs led to renewed emphasis on financial and development 
policies designed to provide them assistance. 681 Hence, the Lomé regime became a trans-
continental regime for governing economic interactions between developed and developing 
countries organised in two bargaining blocs according to their development stage.  
The fifth novelty was that the concessions of special treatments to certain ACP 
products as provided in specific commodities protocols under the Lomé Conventions. 
Specifically, Lomé I set forth preferential schemes for sugar, bananas, and rum to access the 
EU market. The Protocol 6 on Bananas granted preferential treatment to ACP imports, 
which consisted of duty-free entry to the EU up to specific quota. Under Protocol 3 on 
Sugar, the EU accepted to purchase a fixed quantity of ACP’s sugar at attractive prices 
aligned to the EU’s internal market prices. Finally, Protocol 7 on Rum provided for reduced 
duties. 
The establishment of the Stabex – a regional scheme for compensatory financing – 
was the sixth innovation. Title II of Lomé I regulated the mechanism for stabilisation of the 
ACP countries’ export earnings from commodities. Constructed with standard-based norms, 
the Stabex was an intricate institutional scheme managed by the EU on a continuous 
process of decision-making. This means that the European Union had discretion over the 
resources expenditure. The Stabex was designed to remedy the harmful effects of 
production shortfalls or price fluctuations of certain commodities on which the ACP 
countries were heavily dependent. Its aim was thereby to enable the ACP to achieve the 
stability, profitability, and sustained growth of their economies. In practice, the Stabex did 
not operate as envisaged. The global recession and the long-term decline in commodity 
prices prevented the ACP from repaying the loans taken to cover short-term falls in 
earnings.682 The result was that the request for Stabex compensation exceeded the allocated 
budget. Further, the resources were not equally distributed among the ACP. For instance, 
the Stabex directed more than one-third of available funds to groundnut production, while 
just three partners (Senegal, Sudan and Mauritania) received 38.1% of the available 
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682 Bartels, 2007: 738. 
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support.683 Despite the criticism, the Stabex not only was renewed by Lomé II of 1979 but 
also served the model for the Sysmin, a ‘special financing facility’ devised to protect ACP 
countries heavily dependent on mining exports to the EU market from loss of production or 
price collapses. 
Seventh, the governance structure of the Lomé regime replicated the Yaoundé 
design except for the court of arbitration, which had never been used.684 This implies, 
nevertheless, a shift in the emphasis from an adjudicatory mode of dispute resolution 
centred on arbitration (triadic) to an argumentative mode centred on mediation and 
conciliation (dyadic).685 Drawing from the Treaty of Rome, three principal bodies were 
established to support the Lomé governance: the ACP–EU ‘council of ministers’, the 
‘committee of ambassadors’, and the ‘joint consultative assembly’. The Assembly was 
composed of an equal number of ACP and EU representatives, and its decisions were 
consultative and non-binding. Nevertheless, the Assembly soon became the most energetic 
and active governance body having been responsible for proposing recommendations and 
resolutions to the Council.686 The Assembly was used by the ACP countries to vocalise their 
criticisms of Lomé I’s standard-based provisions, which were dependent on the EU’s 
discretion. Specifically, the burdensome procedures and delays related to the disbursement 
of funds were vigorously debated contributing to promote reforms. 
Against this backdrop, the EU-African trade governance changed substantially from 
the establishment of the Association until the termination of Lomé II. The transformations 
involving its model of governance were conceived, debated, and carried out within a 
particular doctrinal framework of institutional and policy alternatives. For instance, the Law 
and Development Cooperation Doctrine empowered lawyers to conceptualise and argue 
about the Lomé Conventions from four distinct institutional angles. Thus, the Lomé 
experiment could be described as a regional regime for trade governance that reflected 
either the consolidation of a neo-colonial system (UNCTAD vision), the institutionalisation 
of economic (inter-)dependency (UN vision), the formation of an interdependent regime for 
trade and development (EU vision), or the constitution of a special and differential free 
trade area (GATT vision).  
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684 Compare “Title VI” of Lomé I with “Title IV” of Yaoundé I. 
685 Drawing from Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, there are two modes of legal governance: dyadic and 
triadic. The former employs legal doctrines to make valid and legitimate argumentations within a not 
formally hierarchical or centralised setting. Under the dyadic mode, the parties involved in the 
negotiations or disputes reach their own agreements or solutions through argumentation and persuasion. 
Conversely, triadic system sets forth an institutionalised hierarchy, in which a third party finds a solution 
to a controversy (2004: 245-247). 
686 Holland, 2002: 35. 
  
283 
 
(c) Jurisprudential Dimension: International Law of EU-Africa Trade 
Regionalism 
 
From 1947 to 1985, the field of international law was passing through a period of intense 
normative, theoretical and doctrinal reform, renovation and experimentation. These 
processes were partially endogenous, led by an innovative attitude of lawyers towards 
international trade law, and partially exogenous, caused by ideational, political and 
economic transformations exemplified by the establishment of the GATT, Comecon, and 
UNCTAD at the multilateral level. In the context of EU-Africa regionalism, four 
jurisprudential projects for international trade law and governance gained relevance. 
Considering the constraints imposed by the Cold War, voluntarism and sociologism were 
approaches to international (trade) law developed by French lawyers aiming to reconcile 
specific trends in legal neo-positivism with the liberal-welfarist GATT law. Taking 
decolonisation seriously, contributionist and critical approaches were produced by post-
colonial African lawyers with the purpose of criticising the Western-centric international 
law of the world trading system while advocating for the developmentalist UNCTAD law. 
Out of this moment of creative destruction, I argue in Chapter 6 that three visions emerged, 
each of them offering a distinct understanding of the relationship between GATT law and 
EU-Africa regional trade agreements.  
Inspired by French voluntarism, the reformist vision conceived South-North 
regional trade agreements as international law treaties, through which ‘temporary’ regimes 
were created by a ‘special’ body of ‘non-universal’ (and so inferior) IEL rules and 
institutions to help developing countries overcome their underdevelopment. For this reason, 
the EU-Africa RTAs were regarded as not subject to GATT Article XXIV since its rigid 
and formalist rules of international trade law were designed to regulate RTAs devised for 
economic integration among (equal) developed countries (e.g. the EU and EFTA). 
Conversely, the introduction of Part IV was understood as an important step, to the extent 
that its flexible and purposeful standards of international development law were crafted to 
respond to the needs, interests, and values of the Third World.  
Grounded in French sociologism, the apologetic vision conceptualised South-North 
regional trade agreements as international treaties devised to establish and regulate trade 
preferences between states. This means that the EU-Africa RTAs were understood as 
preferential trading systems that expressed state economic preference, rather than 
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mechanisms for economic integration or instruments for developmentalist policies. The 
consequence was that they were regarded as constituted and governed by the disciplines of 
GATT Article XXIV rather than any other rule or institution of international development 
law. Moreover, RTAs (generally) and the EU-Africa RTAs (in particular) were contrary to 
the core principle of non-discrimination, and so they should be rigorously controlled by 
Article XXIV and ideally phased out.  
The utopian vision was based on the African critical project. It accused the GATT 
(generally) and South-North RTAs (particularly) of using international law to perpetuate the 
exploitation of developing countries by the First World. With the emergence of the Third 
World and the creation of the UNCTAD, South-North RTAs were reimagined as ‘special 
regimes’ of trade preference (in contrast to the GSP) capable of fostering cooperative 
(inter)dependency and emancipatory development. Thus, EU-Africa RTAs should be 
continuously reworked in order to shift their core function from liberal-welfarist 
instruments for economic exploitation to developmentalist mechanisms for economic 
development. 
Those three jurisprudential visions were tactically used to negotiate, craft, and 
interpret EU-Africa regional trade agreements. They were also used to assign meaning to 
the GATT text in the process of arguing about the validity and legitimacy of Part IV of the 
Treaty of Rome, ICs, the Yaoundé Conventions and the Lomé Conventions I and II. The 
persuasiveness of legal arguments grounded in these jurisprudential views was not equal. 
Rather, their authority varied over time and place depending on contextual factors. The 
purpose of this section is to show their relative significance in the constitution and 
application of the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine to the GATT law and 
governance of EU-Africa regional trade regimes. 
 
(i) The GATT Law of the Yaoundé Regime  
 
While the politics of decolonisation and the Cold War were important drivers for structural 
change, growing pressures from two fronts shaped the EU-Africa regional trade regimes 
and their outcomes. At the multilateral level, the GATT and UNCTAD were the main fora 
where controversies over the EU-Africa RTAs were articulated and solutions proposed 
through legal argumentation grounded, with varying degrees of relevance, in the 
jurisprudential visions.  
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Between 1964 and 1975, the GATT provided an institutional space where debates 
about the Yaoundé Conventions were reasoned through law. Not surprisingly, they were a 
central topic during and after the 1963–1967 Kennedy Round.687 Contracting-parties not 
allowed or not interested in acceding to the Yaoundé regime were entitled to protect their 
interests by challenging its consistency with GATT law. The United States accused it of 
perpetuating preferential treatment that distorted international trade flows, while GATT-
developing parties claimed that their products were unfairly discriminated and prevented 
from accessing the EU market. Indeed, the Yaoundé Conventions were perceived as the 
symbol of the European Union’s greater commitment to trade preferences and 
discrimination rather than to liberal-welfarism.  
During this period, the main ‘legal’ strategy was to contest the validity or 
legitimacy of an RTA through the GATT’s multilateral review mechanism under Article 
XXIV:7.688 This involved a process in which working parties examined whether FTAs and 
CUs met the requirements under Article XXIV.689 The analysis lay in two core obligations: 
RTAs must not raise barriers to trade with third countries (Article XXIV:5) and must 
eliminate all restrictive regulations of commerce on substantially all the trade between them 
(Article XXIV:8). When the Yaoundé Conventions were notified to the GATT, the 
European Union argued that both RTAs met the Article XXIV criteria.690  
Developing parties to GATT, but not to the Yaoundé Conventions, sought to resist 
to the EU-Africa preferential trade regimes by using GATT law.691 They contested the EU 
claim by making six legal objections to the compliance of the Yaoundé Conventions with 
Article XXIV, each of them can be roughly associated with one or more jurisprudential 
visions. The first criticism was on their illegitimate function of extending the historical 
system of preferences under GATT Article I:2 (shared by all jurisprudential visions).692  
The second complaint focused on the unclear and unstable legal arrangement 
underlying the Yaoundé regime (apologetic vision).693 It cast doubt on the “legal identity” 
of Yaoundé Conventions as an FTA under Article XXIV. The claim was that they were a 
bundle of FTAs under a common institutional architecture named ‘Yaoundé Convention’. 
This amalgamation of FTAs not only lacked express authorisation under Article XXIV but 
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also encouraged the rapid proliferation of RTAs, resulting in the practical disappearance of 
the non-discrimination principle. This would ultimately violate the general requirement of 
Article XXIV:4 providing that FTAs were conceived to create new trade and not to divert it. 
Additionally, the absence of a plan for eliminating trade barriers between the partners raised 
doubts on whether the Yaoundé Conventions were an FTA on its formation or an interim 
agreement. All in all, the normative and institutional design of the Yaoundé Conventions 
would turn almost impossible to undertake an analysis of their compatibility with Article 
XXIV. 
The third objection concerns the limited duration of each RTA to a fixed-term of 
five years.694 Two opposite claims were made by contracting-parties to challenge the 
temporality of the Yaoundé Conventions. One position defended that “an extensive or 
indefinite period” was an “implicit requirement” in Article XXIV, since the aim of RTAs is 
to promote economic integration (apologetic vision). Conversely, another contracting-party 
asserted that the Yaoundé Conventions could not be permanent since the “historical or 
other” reasons for their conclusion were transitory in nature (reformist vision).  
Fourth, there was a controversial objection against the authorisation for AAMS to 
increase duties for development needs.695 Some contracting-parties claimed that the use of 
such safeguard measures would be inconsistent with Article XXIV:8(b), which requires the 
elimination of duties on “substantially all the trade” (apologetic vision). Additionally, they 
stressed that the expression “substantially all the trade” should not be interpreted in purely 
statistical terms, and so the authorisation under an FTA for the application of duties or other 
restrictions for ‘any protective purpose’ could not be justified under Article XXIV:8(b). 
Others argued that the resort to those measures by developing countries was not only likely 
but also economically justified on the basis of their need for revenues and efforts to 
promote development and industrialisation (reformist vision). This implied that such 
safeguards would not violate Article XXIV:8(b). 
The fifth challenge was a direct attack on the principle of reciprocity (reformist 
vision). Some members of the working party claimed that South-North FTAs should not 
require reciprocal concessions from developing countries, which would be unable to accord 
free entry to substantially all products of a developed country.696 As a result, the 
requirement of Article XXIV should be interpreted in light of the new Part IV in order to 
prevent developing countries from according advantages under FTAs. 
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The last and most disruptive objection sought to put in question the suitability of 
Article XXIV, specifically, and GATT law, generally, to regulate FTAs and CUs between 
developed and developing countries (utopian vision). In the Yaoundé I Report, some 
contracting-parties only challenged the application of Article XXIV on the grounds that its 
disciplines were not devised for governing South-North RTAs.697 Further, it was one 
member of the working party examining Yaoundé II that first argued that GATT law was 
inappropriate to deal with EU-AAMS trade relations. Instead, they should be governed by 
the (newly agreed) GSP under the UNCTAD.698  
The second front was the developmentalist assault to EU-AAMS regional trade 
regime undertaken under the UNCTAD. In this setting, developed countries, generally, and 
the European Union, in particular, were accused based on a utopian vision of benefiting 
from the structural exploitation of the Third World. The UNCTAD I Conference of 1964 
found that developed economies had an unfair advantage over developing economies 
because the demand and price of commodities tended to decline relative to the demand and 
price of manufactured goods over the long term.699 The implication was two-fold. The 
deterioration of the terms of trade was understood to go against commodities exporters. 
This structural unbalance, also, shifted the bargaining power towards developed countries, 
leaving developing countries with little to offer in trade negotiations. This controversy was 
firstly translated into (non-binding) legal terms through the agreement on the General 
Principle Eight of the UNCTAD. This Principle stated that developed countries should 
grant general non-reciprocal trade concessions to developing countries. In 1968, the 
UNCTAD Conference II turned such Principle into the mutual agreement on the 
establishment of the GSP.700  
Furthermore, the General Principle Eight and other recommendations put forward 
by UNCTAD led to the “Part IV: Trade and Development” amendment to the GATT in 
1966, and to the adoption of the Enabling Clause in 1971 (temporary waiver) and 1979 
(permanent waiver). During the years that elapsed between the first (1964) and the second 
(1968) sessions of the UNCTAD, the Yaoundé I (1964) was concluded and the negotiations 
for Yaoundé II (1969) were on the way. The Yaoundé regime was attacked by developing 
countries for being the nemesis to the GSP for three central reasons (utopian view).701 They 
were constituted and regulated by GATT law. They legitimised a GATT-inspired 
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mechanism of reciprocal exchange of trade concessions. Finally, their rules of membership 
imposed discrimination between AAMS and other developing countries.  
The European Union and AAMS articulated a legal response to the GATT-
UNCTAD criticisms in two ways. On the one hand, the EU-AAMS countered the GATT 
attack by arguing that the Yaoundé provisions did not violate Article XXIV.702 They 
asserted that the Yaoundé Conventions constituted FTAs for the purpose of Article XXIV 
(apologetic vision). Its disciplines required neither the implementation of an institutional 
model of governance nor the evidence of FTAs were creating, rather than diverting, 
trade.703 Regarding the issue of temporality, there was not a requirement to conclude only 
permanent FTAs. In fact, almost all RTAs notified to the GATT shared a provisory 
character.  
Three more substantive counter-arguments were put forward by the EU-AAMS. 
The controversy over the consistency of safeguard measures to promote development with 
GATT law was addressed by the EU on two grounds (apologetic vision).704 Since all RTAs 
set forth safeguard clauses, their compatibility could only be assessed according to their use 
post facto and not ex ante. Also, the EU rejected the objection against the existence of 
safeguard measures by arguing that such view was grounded on “an out-of-date philosophy 
of economic development.” Moreover, the claim to the inconsistency of FTAs providing 
reciprocal exchanges between developed and developing countries was rejected based on 
the inexistence of such limitation in Article XXIV and the fact that the Yaoundé 
Conventions resulted from their partners’ trade interests and formal consent.705 Finally, the 
EU-AAMS refuted the objection to the application of Article XXIV to South-North RTAs 
by arguing that “[t]here was no reason to believe that the authors of Article XXIV had 
overlooked the possibility of free-trade areas between countries at different stages of 
development.”706 They claimed further that Article XXIV:5 provided that the GATT rules 
should not prevent the formation of RTAs, including the new Part IV. 
On the other hand, the EU sought to contain the UNCTAD assault by trying to 
revert the debate back to a liberal-welfarist framework. More specifically, the EU offered 
the so-called Brasseur Plan, which proposed to create a system of managed markets devised 
to protect developed countries from adverse effects while supporting developing countries’ 
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uncompetitive exports through selective preferences negotiated with each beneficiary 
according to its development stage (reformist vision).707  
The responses to the GATT and UNCTAD objections were somehow not accepted. 
As typical under the GATT, the legal issue of whether the Yaoundé Conventions were 
FTAs consistent with Article XXIV did not reach an agreement within working parties nor 
was resolved by the dispute settlement mechanism.708 Rather, the ‘legal’ decision was 
‘suspended’ by diplomatic compromises that diverged the conflict from working parties to 
the Kennedy Round.709 Moreover, the Brasseur Plan was rejected within the UNCTAD on 
the grounds of that it would not only increase the discretion of developed countries over 
developing countries but would also fragment their bargaining positions. 
 
(ii) The GATT Law of the Lomé Regime  
 
The 1970s witnessed profound transformations in the EU-Africa regionalism. The 
continuous economic disappointment of AAMS with the Yaoundé regime and of 
developing countries with the GATT (generally) and the Kennedy Round (in particular) led 
them to increase the pressure over the First World to reform the world trading system. 
Under the UNCTAD, they managed to secure the approval of the GSP in 1968. This was 
followed by the ‘acknowledgement’ of the GSP by GATT law through the 1971 Decision 
and later ‘incorporated’ through the 1979 Enabling Clause.710 In 1973, the EU’s first 
enlargement impacted its trade and development policy meaningfully. Finally, developing 
countries’ long campaign to reform international economic law and governance succeeded 
in approving the NIEO Declaration and Charter under the United Nations in 1974. 
Against this background, the negotiations on a successor to the Yaoundé regime 
began in 1973. By 1975, the European Union and the ACP agreed to establish a “new 
model” of South-North regional governance under Lomé I. In contrast to the Yaoundé 
Conventions, Lomé I and II were received with great enthusiasm by GATT contracting-
parties.711 Most of them welcome the new provisions related to trade and development 
cooperation. The EU and ACP explained that the Lomé regime aspired to be a new model 
devised to promote economic cooperation and contribute towards a new or more equitable 
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international economic order. Notwithstanding, some members of the working party raised 
significant legal objections against the Lomé regime. 
The most celebrated innovation of the Lomé Conventions was the abandonment of 
reverse preference and the adoption of the principle of non-reciprocity.712 In contrast to the 
Yaoundé Reports, the EU and ACP argued that Part IV should be applied in conjunction 
with Article XXIV to exempt developing countries from the obligation of extending 
concessions reciprocally (reformist vision).713 Consequently, only the EU was required 
under Article XXIV:8(b) to eliminate duties and other restrictions concerning substantially 
all trade with ACP. The majority of the working party’s members agreed with the EU-ACP 
interpretation of Article XXIV vis-à-vis Part IV.714 
The second clear novelty expressed in the Reports was the change in attitudes of 
most contracting-parties towards the UNCTAD and NIEO. It was noticeable that UNCTAD 
law had penetrated into the GATT governance and began to be employed to make legal 
arguments. Two consequences followed from this. The influence of UNCTAD law 
incentivised contracting-parties to expand the GATT mandate, in order to engage with trade 
and non-trade provisions of Lomé I and II. The EU-ACP invited the members of the 
working party to undertake a comprehensive and teleological analysis of the totality of rules 
and objectives under the Lomé Conventions.715 For instance, the EU argued that their goal 
was to “contribute towards the creation of a more just and balanced world economic order” 
(reformist vision).716 Distinctively, the ACP stated that their objective was to “build a 
stronger and more self-assured economies and step in the evolution towards a new 
international economic order” (utopian vision).717 The majority of the working party 
supported the aspiration for a novel or renewed international economic order embedded into 
the Lomé Conventions (utopian and reformist visions).718 
Moreover, the working party’s members increased their reference to UNCTAD 
norms and institutions. For instance, the EU asserted that the Lomé Conventions were not 
its only form to cooperate with developing countries.719 It, additionally, implemented a 
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‘GSP scheme’, and participated in ‘international commodity agreements’ and other pro-
development initiatives (utopian vision). The ACP asserted that the Lomé regime covered 
various aspects of development cooperation, such as agricultural, industrial and technical 
cooperation.720 Other members of the working party also referred to UNCTAD-inspired 
policies and measures, including the Stabex, Sysmin and industrial cooperation.721  
Nonetheless, legal objections were presented by the members of the working party. 
The most important opposition to the Lomé Conventions was concerned with its 
discriminatory effects over non-ACP developing countries. Contracting-parties argued that, 
to move towards a more just and balanced economic order, the Lomé Conventions should 
be implemented in a manner not to harm other developing countries (reformist vision).722 
Particularly, the Stabex could entail adverse effect on trade to the detriment of non-ACP 
developing countries. Others claimed that the best alternative for the EU’s trade and 
development policy would be to dismantle its web of RTAs while according preferential 
treatment to all developing countries on a non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory basis 
through the progressive implementation of the GSP (utopian vision). In the Lomé II Report, 
the ACP provided evidence that the Lomé regime was not harming the interests of third 
developing countries.723 
One contracting-party criticised the Lomé regime for fearing the increase of 
preferential treatment, which would, in turn, erode the GATT rules and prevent the progress 
of multilateral and non-discriminatory liberalisation (apologetic visions).724 Other members 
challenged the majoritarian understanding of the consistency of the Lomé Conventions with 
GATT law based on the combination of Part IV and Article XXIV.725 
All in all, Lomé I symbolised the heyday of the Law and Development Cooperation 
Doctrine. The legal arguments that were put forward by the EU, ACP, and other members 
of working parties were articulated within a shared doctrinal framework. This suggests that 
the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine was perceived as an authoritative and 
legitimate mode of deal with trade interests and controversies over EU-Africa regionalism 
through international law. Obviously, the Yaoundé and Lomé Reports provide no more than 
partial evidence of the fluid influence of the three jurisprudential visions over the ways 
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lawyers argue about South-North RTAs and interpret GATT law. Nonetheless, some 
general conclusions can be inferred from the above analysis. 
From 1947 to 1985, the notion of “South-North regional trade agreement” played a 
central role in defining the normative possibilities and borders of GATT law. It worked as a 
‘description’ and a ‘norm’. On the one hand, it characterised the essential properties that an 
entity must possess to be qualified as an FTA or CU. On the other hand, it involved a set of 
rules and institutions, rights and obligations, which were understood to constitute the 
normative basis of South-North regionalism. However, lawyers were challenged by how the 
relations between the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of South-North RTAs could (or 
should) be understood in light of a world trade fragmented into multilateral and regional 
trading systems. 
Most lawyers started out by retelling history to extract from its lessons a description 
of South-North regional trade regimes with the aim of distinguishing them from the 
preferential and imperial arrangements of the past, which were regarded as illegitimate and 
illegal in the postwar international economic order. However, difficulties emerged when 
they sought to explain which facts and norms counted to ascertain the boundaries of legality 
and legitimacy. By relying on their jurisprudential projects, lawyers produced three distinct 
visions of South-North RTAs. As suggested above, the echoes of each one of them can be 
found, with varying degrees of influence, in the arguments put forward by the members of 
working parties assessing the compatibility of the EU-Africa RTAs with GATT law. 
More concretely, apologetic-inspired arguments generally asserted that Article 
XXIV was the ultimate test for determining the validity and legitimacy of EU-Africa RTAs. 
They contended that the disciplines of Article XXIV were devised to prevent the 
proliferation of preferential and imperial trade agreements, which were poisonous to the 
natural evolvement of world trade. The apologetic arguments about the Yaoundé and Lomé 
Conventions tended to advocate for the strict application of Article XXIV, while calling 
attention for the threat posed by the proliferations of RTAs to the GATT regime and 
multilateral trade negotiations. 
Distinctively, reformist-inspired arguments did often acknowledge the virtues of 
Article XXIV, but also stressed its normative limits vis-à-vis developing countries’ needs. It 
reasoned that Article XXIV reflected the developed countries’ postwar understanding of the 
benefits of European projects for economic integration, which were not necessarily suitable 
for promoting economic development of newly independent African countries. The 
reformist arguments emphasised that the rules of Article XXIV were somehow inadequate 
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to govern about the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. Consequently, they should be applied 
in conjunction with Part IV, which was introduced to allow GATT law to be reinterpreted in 
light of developing countries’ interests. 
By contrast, utopian-inspired arguments frequently attacked the rules of Article 
XXIV claiming they were simply not applicable to South-North RTAs. Implicitly, they 
assumed that the existing GATT rules were devised to realise developed countries’ policies 
and interests, including the reproduction of systems of exploitation of the Third World. As a 
result, they advocated for replacing GATT law with UNCTAD law as the normative basis 
to examine the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. Some of them even questioned the legality 
and legitimacy of the EU-Africa RTAs on the grounds that the GSP was a proper 
mechanism to govern South-North trade relations. 
The point is that the distinct patterns of legal argumentation about EU-Africa 
regional trade regimes seemed to be explained by the unequal degree of influence of the 
three jurisprudential visions. Each line of reasoning claimed to be valid and legitimate since 
they resulted from an apolitical and objective analysis of the facts and norms related to 
South-North trade regionalism. Therefore, I contend that the combination of (normative and 
factual) indeterminacy and the general authority often entrusted to international law 
empowered contracting-parties to use GATT law to defend their positions, reach 
agreements, or solve controversies over the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. Put 
differently, the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine not only allowed officials, 
diplomats, and lawyers to debate trade matters by translating them into ‘apolitical’ and 
‘objective’ legal issues, but also offered doctrinal solutions to deal with them through 
GATT law. For instance, the political and economic struggle about reverse preferences was 
rationalised as a legal problem involving the principle of reciprocity (generally) and 
GATT’s Article XXIV:8 and Part IV and the UNCTAD’s GSP (in particular). 
 
Conclusion 
 
I would like to conclude by reflecting on how the above-analysis contributes, directly, to 
supporting (even if partially) my central hypothesis stated in this chapter and, indirectly, to 
the overall argument of this thesis. My account suggests that the Law and Development 
Cooperation Doctrine was, in significant part, a mode of legal governance that structured 
and guided decision-making in and over EU-Africa regional trade regimes. I also describe it 
  
294 
as a doctrinal framework that served to empower and constrain the legal imagination, which 
was both reflected in, and sustained by, the making and interpretation of the international 
trade law of the EU-Africa regionalism.  
Moreover, I infer from my analysis of the 28 South-North RTAs that the Law and 
Development Cooperation Doctrine was neither the only nor the dominant legal doctrine in 
the period. Rather, I postulate that the other 24 RTAs, which could be functionally 
classified as for either ‘economic integration’ or ‘trade cooperation’, were governed by two 
other legal doctrines. If this were true, then it would be reasonable to hypothesise that not 
only more than one legal doctrine could exist at the same time, but also their emergence 
was associated with the lawyers’ efforts to provide valid and legitimate responses to the 
profound transformations that world trade was undergoing.  
This reflection opens avenues to further inquiries that are relevant to our current 
debates about the future of the world trading system. It, first, allows us to question the 
substantive and formal limits imposed on the making and interpretation of South-North 
regional trade agreements by the text of, and the official decisions on, Article XXIV and 
GATT/WTO law. This calls our attention to the empowering and constraining effects 
entailed by legal doctrines on the ways of thinking and practising the GATT/WTO law of 
South-North regional trade regimes. Accordingly, the attention shifts again to the central 
question about the disciplinary grip imposed by the present-day, dominant legal doctrine on 
legal imagination, which prevents lawyers to rethink the international trade law and 
governance of South-North regionalism in the face of contemporary challenges.  
To assist us in breaking up the imaginative constraints, this chapter examines the 
Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine, with the aim of showing that the 
contemporary legal doctrine is neither the only alternative nor the necessary outcome of a 
jurisprudential and institutional evolution towards doctrinal perfection of the GATT/WTO 
law of South-North RTAs. As explained in Chapter 4, a legal doctrine results from a 
dynamic interplay of particular constitutive features that are entangled in legal practices and 
arguments but can be intellectual separated in three domains: ideational, institutional, and 
jurisprudential. With particular regard to the EU-Africa trade regimes, each of these 
domains must address the following questions: what are the ideational, institutional, and 
jurisprudential programmes for EU-Africa trade governance? How were these projects 
combined into a doctrinal framework? How was this legal doctrine validated and 
legitimised inside and outside the field of international law? What changes did it entail on 
lawyers’ mindsets and practices? What were its impacts on the rules and institutions of both 
the GATT and EU-Africa trade regimes? Therefore, a full account of the Law and 
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Development Cooperation Doctrine necessarily includes an analysis of its constitutive 
features, political and intellectual origins, and impacts on norms and regimes of 
international trade law and governance. 
My analysis of legal doctrines focuses on their ideational, institutional, 
jurisprudential dimensions. The ideational dimension of the Law and Development 
Cooperation Doctrine refers to the political economy programme for EU-Africa regionalism 
that emerged from the unbalanced compromise between modernisation and structuralism. 
The political economy programme was characterised by the attempt to accommodate a wide 
range of modernisation and structuralist theories, methods, and policies into an ideational 
framework that aspired to enlist regional agreements in the task of fostering economic 
development. This resulted in a relatively coherent vernacular that was employed to 
conceive, negotiate, and manage the general goals, specific policies, and concrete 
instruments of the EU-Africa trade regimes. Hence, the ultimate purpose of EU-Africa 
regionalism was to promote ‘economic development’. 
As regards the institutional dimension, four visions were found entrenched in the 
Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine. The EU-Africa RTAs could be validly 
understood as regional regimes for trade governance that reflected either the formation of a 
special and differential free trade area (GATT vision), the implementation of a trade and 
development mechanism (EU vision), the consolidation of a neo-imperialist system 
(UNCTAD vision), or the institutionalisation of economic (inter-)dependency (UN vision). 
These models were employed, with varying degrees of influence, to make credible 
arguments about the virtues and vices of governance bodies, the advantages and 
disadvantages of the institutional design of policy mechanisms, or the benefits and 
shortcomings of the form and content of rules and standards. Thus, the lack of a strong 
consensus around one vision led the EU-Africa trade regimes to be characterised by an 
experimental institutionalism.  
The jurisprudential dimension relates, finally, to ideas about and practices of the 
nature and functions of the international trade law of EU-Africa regionalism. Three 
particular visions, which emerged from French and African schools of international law, 
were embedded into the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine. Grounded in French 
voluntarism, the reformist vision conceptualised the EU-Africa RTAs as ‘temporary’ 
special regimes, pursuant to Article XXIV and Part IV of GATT, devised for assisting 
African countries to overcome their underdevelopment. Drawn from French sociologism, 
the apologetic vision conceived the EU-Africa RTAs as preferential trade agreements, 
which would be a violation of the non-discrimination principle under GATT law if it were 
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not for the political exception provided in Article XXIV. Inspired by the African critical 
jurisprudence, the utopian vision understood the EU-Africa RTAs as legal mechanisms of 
exploitation of developing countries, which, nonetheless, could be reconstructed as ‘special 
regimes’ of trade preference though UNCTAD law in order to promote cooperative 
(inter)dependency and emancipatory development.  
The above jurisprudential visions were employed by international lawyers to make 
and interpret the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions and to assign meaning to the text of the 
GATT in the process of arguing about their validity and legitimacy. For instance, apologetic 
claims often asserted that Article XXIV was the ultimate test for assessing any RTA 
regardless of the difference in development levels among its partners. Reformist arguments 
frequently reasoned that Article XXIV provided a valid and legitimate form of assessment 
of RTAs among developed countries; however its application to the EU-Africa RTAs had to 
be balanced by the principle of special and differential treatment introduced by Part IV. 
Conversely, utopian arguments habitually rejected the application of Article XXIV to the 
EU-Africa RTAs claiming that its application to any South-North RTA was illegitimate and 
invalid for aiming to reproduce systems of exploitation of the Third World. As a result, the 
Conventions of Yaoundé and Lomé should either be governed by UNCTAD law or 
replaced immediately by GSP schemes. 
The history lessons of international (trade) law tell us that a number of South-North 
regional trade agreements entered in force over almost four decades following the signing 
of the GATT. In this context, international law and lawyers undertook a central role in their 
formation and development of South-North (generally) and EU-Africa (in particular) 
regional trade regimes. By reflecting on the hypothesis and findings put forward by this 
chapter, I contend that the making and interpretation of each trade agreement underpinning 
the EU-Africa regimes were, in substantial part, governed by the Law and Development 
Cooperation Doctrine. Between 1964 and 1985, the Law and Development Cooperation 
Doctrine was historically important for providing a framework (distinct from the other legal 
doctrines) that contributed significantly to bring into being a new archetype of South-North 
RTAs, which produced long-term effects over the economic relations between Europe and 
Africa.  
The protracted rise of the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine reached its 
zenith in 1975 with the conclusion of the Lomé Convention. Lomé I symbolised the 
contingent accommodation of its constitutive features at a relatively equal level of authority 
and legitimacy. The following decade was characterised as one of falling hopes in the Lomé 
regime, which was accompanied by profound transformations: the exhaustion of the Cold 
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War, the liberalisation and reforms of the Tokyo Round, the new protectionism fostered by 
the United States, the second expansion of the European Union, the economic slowdown 
and debts crisis in the Third World, as well as the rise of neoliberalism in the GATT, of 
Anglo-American functionalism in legal expertise, and of neoclassical thinking in economics 
and political science. The combined effects of these external and internal factors caused the 
legal doctrine to experience a sharp decline of its influence. When Lomé III entered into 
force in 1986, the Law and Development Cooperation Doctrine had already been displaced 
as the mode of legal governance in the EU-Africa trade regime.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Trade agreements are dead. Long live trade agreements. As of this writing, regional trade 
agreements are under siege. They have never been the darlings of the general public but not 
the public enemy number 1 either. This situation has changed dramatically, as they have 
been made scapegoats, along with immigration, for the demise of the middle and working 
classes in the developed world. Far from being innocent instruments for trade cooperation 
among states, contemporary RTAs are, indeed, deeply implicated in the edification of 
contemporary global economic governance that has failed in delivering on the neoliberal 
promises of prosperity and welfare. They have contributed to spreading the ideational 
programme of global market-led growth, constituting regional marketplaces for trade 
policies bargain, and implementing variations of the institutional and normative blueprint 
for limiting domestic regulation and constraining policy space. However, they are not 
causes but the outcomes of a series of past and present choices made by politicians, 
officials, policymakers, experts, and ultimately voters. My point is the crisis of trade 
regionalism is part of the crisis of the American-European faith in ‘market societies’. 
Those contemporary attacks on RTAs undergone by leading American and 
European politicians reflect the decline of a consensus on the benefits of (global and 
regional) markets. They are not irrational but supported by real grievances of many working 
families that have suffered, on the one hand, from economic policies, such as fiscal 
austerity and the dismantle of welfare state, adopted in response to the Great Recession and, 
on the other hand, from the impact of low-cost imports from and job losses to third 
countries. These families came to realise that globalisation lifted many but not all boats: 
financiers and bankers are richer, while middle and working classes, poorer. As a reaction, 
not only the ‘typical’ South-North RTAs, such as the NAFTA and TPP, but also the 
venerable European Union have come to be associated with their demise. Indeed, today’s 
public rhetoric blames existing RTAs for harming domestic economies since their 
provisions limit economic sovereignty instead of constraining unfair trade and immigration.  
It is surprising, however, that the solutions proposed recently by the British and 
American governments are not quite to get rid of RTAs. The US trade policy seems to 
embrace a more ‘divide and conquest’ tactic than a non-RTA dogma. It has challenged 
RTAs where the US economic power is (arguably) diluted, such as in the TPP and NAFTA 
while proposing to conclude or modernise bilateral agreements with other countries. In the 
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UK, the Global Britain plan follows a similar strategy: Brexit combined with bilateral 
agreements with trade partners, including one with the EU itself. In other words, the same 
politicians seem to be playing a game of (hegemonic or imperialist?) utopias while still tied 
up to the shared understanding of the ‘need for’ RTAs. This would make one wonder 
whether the central question lies in RTAs or elsewhere. 
The argument I want to make is that the current public and, to a great extent, legal 
discourses about RTAs seem to be once again missing the opportunity to engage with the 
two core debates that inspired this thesis. The broader debate is about the role of markets in 
society: do we want a global market economy or a global market society? The specific 
debate is about the role of RTAs in meaningfully contributing to a global market by 
sustaining and governing trade between developed and developing countries. Framing this 
differently, should South-North RTAs be solely conceived as institutional marketplaces 
where states bargain for trade concessions that would ultimately contribute to the realisation 
of a global free and fair market? Alternatively, can they be re-imagined as institutional 
domains where developed and developed countries may jointly discover paths to foster 
economic development?  
The central contribution my thesis seeks to make is to bring those debates to the 
fore and engage with them through the lens of international law. I aimed to demonstrate the 
participation, and also responsibility, of law and lawyers in the constitution and governance 
of a global market society by producing and managing South-North regionalism. More 
specifically, I sought to highlight how histories and doctrines are continuously devised by 
lawyers to use international law in the making and interpretation of South-North regional 
trade agreements. I want to conclude by outlining my specific arguments developed in the 
previous chapters, and reflecting on the avenues for further inquiries and debates they open. 
 
Challenging Plato’s Rulers: Breaking-up with the Traditional History of the International 
Trade Law of South-North Regionalism  
 
“Those who tell the stories rule society,” asserted Plato.726 Part of his The Republic was 
dedicated to teaching the Greek leaders through history-telling. The great philosopher 
acknowledged that stories were key to shape identity, ideas, and actions: “Our first business 
                                                   
726 1955: 115. 
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is to supervise the production of stories, and chose only those we think suitable, and reject 
the rest.”727  
My first argument is ‘Platonic’ in a sense it is about the importance of history 
lessons and history-telling for the international trade law and governance of South-North 
regionalism. My analysis showed that conventional accounts chronicle the evolution of the 
world trading system and RTAs from the early-20th century onwards. The creation of the 
GATT in 1947 and its re-constitution as the WTO in 1995 are told to symbolise the shared 
preference for multilateralism, while the waves of regionalism are portrayed as the 
inescapable reality that has relentlessly challenged, and so denied the realisation of, that 
ideal. This grand narrative explains that their interaction has swung over time between 
hostility and complementarity, depending on the contingent interpretation of the effects of 
regionalism on the world trading system.  
As far as the traditional history goes, I argue that the important lessons ‘identified’ 
by mainstream literature can be broadly summarised as follows. The ideational mission of 
the GATT/WTO is to foster multilateral trade liberalisation while preventing protectionism 
and directing RTAs to serve as complementary instruments for a global market. The 
institutional defects inherent to the GATT have been partially responsible for the surges in 
regionalism and for failing to ensure that all RTAs contribute to international economic 
integration. The formalist jurisprudence played a significant part in crafting inadequate 
solutions to normative ambiguities and policy contradictions underlying GATT law, which 
in turn weakened the GATT’s authority over regionalism.  
Those lessons are articulated by the traditional style of history-telling to be received 
as valid or ‘taken-for-granted’ descriptions of the GATT governance of regionalism. Their 
purpose is to ‘guide’ legal thinking and practice. The narrative by which they identify 
problems frames legal imagination around a set of choices defined as valid and legitimate. 
Institutionally, the solution would then be to introduce reforms to the WTO not to prevent 
but to reinforce the direction of regionalism towards international economic integration. 
Jurisprudentially, functionalism would be the answer for as a more ‘suitable’ approach to 
interpreting WTO law as a process for decision-making over RTAs, through which 
economic, political, and legal rationales are balanced and managed to find adequate 
solutions. Ideationally, the response would be to redefine and enlist RTAs as a second-best 
co-producer of a global market.  
  
                                                   
727 Ibid. 
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The analysis I carried out demonstrated that the powerful effects of these lessons 
and solutions are to validate and legitimise the dominance of the existing legal doctrine on 
the WTO law of South-North RTAs. These institutional and jurisprudential stories have 
been retold to frame necessities, concerns, and issues associated with regionalism in a 
particular way that has significantly constrained the range of potential norms, ideas, and 
techniques to be considered in thinking and applying international trade law to our 
contemporary problems. My claim is, therefore, that the traditional style of history-telling 
bears a great deal of responsibility for preventing lawyers who share the above 
understanding from responding imaginatively to present-day challenges. 
My response to the conventional narratives is two-fold. Methodologically, I sought 
to rethink ‘what’ and ‘how’ lawyers historicise international trade law by identifying the 
shortcomings of the ‘traditional approach to legal history’ and proposing an alternative to 
assist lawyers to re-engage with their past and present expertise and choices. Substantially, I 
resituated the international trade law of South-North regionalism within a wider temporal 
trajectory and spatial context, in order to rescue the ‘rest’ of international trade law that has 
been ‘forgotten’ due to political and intellectual struggles.  
I applied my ‘alternative approach’ to partially retell the history of the interaction 
between multilateralism and regionalism. Although providing the trajectory of South-North 
regionalism since the late-19th century would have been ideal, such a comprehensive study 
would not have fit within the limits of this thesis. Nonetheless, I offered two very brief, and 
not exhaustive, overlapping stories of international law and lawyers in the making and 
management of South-North RTAs under the GATT. From their narratives, I argue that a 
different set of lessons can be learned about the ideational, institutional, and jurisprudential 
ideas and practices involved in the international trade law of South-North RTAs. As 
importantly, I showed that the traditional history is neither an objective and apolitical 
description, nor a suspect teleology, or a frozen set of teachings, which could only support a 
universally applicable legal doctrine. Therefore, my findings aim to challenge the lessons 
that underlie present-day legal expertise of South-North regionalism.  
 
Unchaining from Keynes’s Zombie Slave-Masters: Thinking against the Dominant Doctrine 
on the International Trade Law of South-North Regionalism  
 
In The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, John M. Keynes concluded his 
masterpiece by warning us that some ideas and practices are long-lived, often surviving 
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their creators and taking new and different forms. Some of them endure while others are 
forgotten. But even when they have been proved wrong or dangerous, ideas and practices 
may be very hard to kill. Indeed, they are like zombies that keep on trying to slave our 
imagination. Keynes wrote, wisely, that: 
the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed 
the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be 
quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some 
defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are 
distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am 
sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the 
gradual encroachment of ideas. Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain 
interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not 
many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty 
years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even 
agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or 
late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.728 
 
My second argument is, in this sense, ‘Keynesian’ with respect to the dominance of 
the contemporary legal doctrine on the international trade law of South-North regionalism. 
Grounded in my detailed examination of academic, policy and official texts, I demonstrated 
that present-day doctrine is constituted of three domains of legal thinking and practices. 
Ideationally, it embraces a neoliberal programme of market-led growth and integration. 
Institutionally, the WTO serves as a governance model. Jurisprudentially, WTO law is 
regarded as central while functionalist ideas and techniques enjoy preponderant authority. 
The combination of these features underlies the single doctrinal framework for conceiving 
and managing South-North RTAs. 
From the late-1980s onwards, the dominant legal doctrine has not only marginalised 
its competitors in legal expertise but also gathered authority in and over the WTO and 
South-North RTAs. It has been gradually perfected to ensure its internal validity and 
external legitimacy. However, its higher level of specialisation narrowed the range of 
available lessons and norms, ideas and methods. One of the most critical consequences was 
to associate all RTAs with a relatively uniform model, which conceives RTA as legal 
arrangements devised primarily to promote trade liberalisation, irrespective of partners’ 
economic or development differences and imbalances on policy preferences and bargaining 
power. I argue, therefore, that the legal doctrine plays a pivotal role in constraining lawyers’ 
ability to think imaginatively about options and solutions to present-day problems 
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concerning the relationship between international law and governance, trade regionalism, 
and economic development. 
My response to this disciplinary consensus is to provide an enhanced understanding 
of how legal doctrines affect the participation of law and lawyers in the making and 
interpretation of South-North RTAs (and vice versa). I propose a ‘socio-legal approach’ to 
account for what is the critical function of legal doctrines in international trade law and 
governance. Applied to South-North regionalism, my focus is to foreground the connection 
between the constitutive features of legal doctrines, and their effects over the way RTAs are 
thought, constructed and governed. Specifically, I used that proposed socio-legal analytic to 
investigate past legal doctrines on the international trade law of South-North RTAs so as to 
be possible to compare to the present one.  
Grounded in my findings, my hypothesis is that three distinct legal doctrines were 
produced to structure decision-making in and over South-North RTAs between 1947 and 
1985. Each of them is characterised by a distinguished combination of constitutive features 
that can be apprehended and understood through their ideational, institutional, and 
jurisprudential dimensions. I have named them as (a) Law and Economic Integration 
Doctrine, (b) Law and Trade Cooperation Doctrine, and (c) Law and Development 
Cooperation Doctrine. These terms were coined to reflect the ‘legal nature’ and ‘archetype’ 
(or model) of South-North RTAs. Finally, I suggest that their influence achieved its zenith 
in the 1970s, but was followed by a sharp decline shortly afterwards. By the late-1980s, 
they were marginalised by the rise of today’s dominant legal doctrine.  
To partially prove my hypothesis, I examined the rise and fall of the Law and 
Development Cooperation Doctrine. My account showed how lawyers engaged 
international law in the creation and operation of RTAs between the European Union and 
the newly independent African states from 1947 to 1985. I claim, therefore, that the 
Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions were negotiated, designed, and interpreted based partially 
on a distinct doctrinal framework. Finally, I conclude that further research would be 
necessary to demonstrate or falsify my hypothetical explanation that two other distinct legal 
doctrines governed the rest of South-North RTAs in the period. 
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Appropriating Bourdieu’s Martial Art: the Practice of Re-Imagining the International 
Trade Law of South-North Regionalism 
 
My attempts to re-engage legal history and doctrine bring me back to the question with 
which this thesis began. Are we – lawyers – somehow responsible for the outcomes leading 
up to Brexit and Trumpism? Following the line of thinking of this thesis, lawyers were 
decisively implicated in sustaining and managing the multilateral and regional regimes 
underlying the world trading system. As a result, lawyers must take their sizeable share of 
blame for the production of economic imbalances and political grievances that paved the 
way for the 2016 attacks to the (neoliberal) international economic order. As I have 
demonstrated, part of the responsibility is associated with their uncritical acceptance of the 
ideational dedifferentiation – embedded in today’s doctrine – between South-North and 
North-North RTAs. The consequence was that lawyers stopped debating South-North 
regionalism, allowing one view of RTA to dominate legal expertise.  
The overall goal of this thesis is to transform that the existing state of mind and 
practice by restoring the debate about the international trade law and governance of South-
North regionalism to the premier position within the IEL field. Pierre Bourdieu said once 
that “sociology is a combat sport, a means of self-defence. Basically, you use it to defend 
yourself, without having the right to use it for unfair attacks.” If sociology is ‘a’ martial art, 
law is ‘the’ martial art par excellence. It is through legal expertise that social norms become 
law, and it is through legal history and doctrine that law becomes an (martial) art of 
imaginative and argumentative practices. Thus, international trade law could (or should) be 
reconsidered as a means of debating whether we prefer a ‘global market society’ or a 
‘global society with a market economy’. More specifically, whether the international trade 
law of South-North regionalism should, as a self-defence technique against the 
contemporary rise of isolationism and nativism, be rethought as a way for assisting both 
developing and developed countries to cooperatively discover avenues to economic 
development. 
For international lawyers engaged in re-imagining South-North regionalism, or 
more broadly for those committed to the project of re-rethinking the world trading system 
as a response to its crisis of legitimacy, my central argument is that we should practice the 
art of writing histories of the forgotten choices and crafting doctrines that foreground the 
relevant questions of economic development, social justice, and redistribution. This is a 
way to re-open space in public and legal debates for contesting and re-imagining South-
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North regional trade regimes. By destabilising the consensus on today’s legal doctrine and 
offering a discussion of the Law and Economic Development Doctrine, my purpose is to re-
open space for debating and rethinking the ideational, institutional, and jurisprudential 
dimensions of South-North RTAs.  
My hope is, therefore, that this thesis contributes to broadening our horizons to the 
possibility (or perhaps the necessity) to develop a great awareness of the diversity of past 
and present programmes and facts, ideas and practices, norms and regimes produced around 
the world, through which the relationship between international law, global governance, and 
South-North regionalism can be reimagined to foster economic development. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Year Short Name Full Name 
1963 EC-Turkey 
Association 
Agreement (Ankara 
Agreement) 
Agreement establishing an Association between the 
European Economic Community and Turkey, signed in 
Ankara on 12 September 1963 
1963 Yaoundé I Convention of Association between the European 
Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States 
associated with that Community, signed in Yaoundé on 20 
July 1963 
1969 EC-Morocco 
Association 
Agreement 
Agreement establishing an Association between the 
European Economic Community and the Kingdom of 
Morocco, signed in Rabat on 31 March 1969 
1969 EC-Tunisia 
Association 
Agreement 
Agreement establishing an Association between the 
European Economic Community and the Republic of 
Tunisia, signed in Tunis on 28 March 1969 
1969 Yaoundé II Convention of Association between the European 
Economic Community and the African and Malagasy States 
associated with that Community, signed in Yaoundé on 29 
July 1969 
1970 EC-Israel Agreement Agreement between the European Economic Community 
and the State of Israel, signed on 29 June 1970 in 
Luxembourg 
1970 EC-Malta Agreement Agreement between the European Economic Community 
and Malta, signed on 29 June 1970 in Luxembourg 
1970 EC-Turkey Additional 
Protocol 
Additional Protocol to Association between the European 
Economic Community and Turkey signed in Brussels on 23 
November 1970,  
1972 EC-Cyprus 
Association 
Agreement 
Agreement establishing an Association between the 
European Economic Community and the Republic of 
Cyprus, signed on 19 December 1972 
1972 EC-Egypt Agreement Agreement between the European Economic Community 
and the Arab Republic of Egypt, signed in Brussels on 18 
December 1972  
1972 EC-Lebanon 
Agreement  
Agreement between the European Economic Community 
and the Lebanese Republic, signed on 22 January 1972 
1973 EC-Turkey 
Supplementary 
Protocol 
Supplementary Protocol to Association between the 
European Economic Community and Turkey, signed in 
Ankara on 30 June 1973 
1974 Finland-Bulgaria 
Agreement  
Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the 
People’s Republic of Bulgaria on the reciprocal removal of 
obstacles to trade, signed in 1974 
1974 Finland-
Czechoslovakia 
Agreement  
Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the 
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the reciprocal removal 
of obstacles to trade, signed in1974 
1974 Finland-Hungary 
Agreement 
Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the 
Hungarian People’s Republic on the reciprocal removal of 
obstacles to trade, signed in 1974 
1975 EC-Israel Agreement Agreement between the European Economic Community 
and the State of Israel, signed on 29 June 1970 
1975 Lomé I  Convention of Association between the European 
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Economic Community and the African, Caribbean and the 
Pacific countries, signed in Lomé on 28 February 1975 
1976 EC-Algeria 
Cooperation 
Agreement  
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the People's Democratic Republic of 
Algeria, signed in Rabat on 27 April 1976 
1976 Australia-Papua New 
Guinea Agreement 
Agreement on trade and commercial relations between the 
government of Australia and the government of Papua New 
Guinea, signed in 1976 
1976 EC-Morocco 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Republic of Tunisia, signed in Tunis on 
25 April 1976 
1976 EC-Tunisia 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the People's Democratic Republic of 
Algeria, signed in Rabat on 27 April 1976 
1976 Finland-Poland 
Agreement 
Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the Polish 
People’s Republic on the reciprocal removal of obstacles to 
trade, signed on 29 September 1976 
1977 EC-Egypt Cooperation 
Agreement 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Arab Republic of Egypt, signed in 
Brussels on 18 January 1977 
1977 EC-Jordan 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, signed 
in Brussels on 18 January 1977 
1977 EC-Lebanon 
Cooperation 
Agreement 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Lebanese Republic, signed in Brussels 
on 3 May 1977 
1977 EC-Syria Cooperation 
Agreement 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Syrian Arab Republic, signed in 
Brussels on 18 January 1977 
1979 Lomé II Convention of Association between the European 
Economic Community and the African, Caribbean and the 
Pacific countries, signed in Lomé on 31 October 1979 
1980 EC-Yugoslavia Interim 
Agreement 
Interim Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia on trade and trade cooperation, signed in 
Belgrade on 2 April 1980 
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